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Judgment
22 paragraphs · 539 wordsGwyer, C.J.—This is an application for leave to appeal Under Section 208(b), Constitution Act. The case was one in which the appellant
had sued the respondent for a sum due under a promissory note and had obtained a decree. After the decree had been obtained, the Madras
Agriculturists'' Relief Act became law. That Act gave agriculturist debtors the right to have their debts drastically scaled down, and Section 19
empowered the Courts to apply its provisions to a decree for the payment of a debt obtained against an agriculturist before the commencement of
the Act. This Court, when the case came before it, heard arguments on a variety of questions, including the question whether the Act conflicted
with the Negotiable Instruments Act, which is an Act within the exclusive competence of the Central Legislature; but a majority of the Court were
of opinion that questions relating to the Negotiable Instruments Act were irrelevant for the purposes of the case, and held that the original debt had
merged in the decree and that the scaling down was of a liability evidenced by a decree and not by a negotiable instrument at all.
Counsel for the appellant has cited to us a number of decisions in which the Judicial Committee itself has indicated the principles on which it will
act when advising His Majesty to grant or withhold special leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council. This Court will not attempt to formulate in
advance any code of rules which it will take for its guidance in granting or withholding leave to appeal to the Judicial Committee, and will deal with
each case on its merits as it comes before it. But it will not be disposed to grant leave to appeal, save in cases of real importance, cases which are
likely to affect a large number of interests hereafter or cases in which difficult questions of law are involved.
In the present case, the decision of the Court dealt only with the scaling down of decrees obtained before the Madras Act came into force. The
number of such decrees must necessarily be limited, and there can be no addition to their number. In a case which was before us in May 1939 and
in which we had refused leave, the applicant afterwards petitioned the Judicial Committee for special leave to appeal. The Judicial Committee, in
refusing special leave, emphasized the fact that the decision of this Court was concerned with the construction of a section which would have no
application in the future: Hori Ram Singh v. King-Emperor (''40) 27 AIR 1940 PC 54. It appears to the Court that this is a sufficient reason for
refusing leave in the present case. It should be added that the amount in dispute in the case appears on the figures which were given to us not to
have exceeded Rs. 3000 or Rs. 4000 at the outside. The majority of the Court declined to enter into any of the other questions which were raised
at the Bar and reserved their opinion upon all of them. There is, therefore, nothing to prevent these matters being raised and determined at any
future time in an appropriate case. The applicaion is dismssed.
