Atma Parkash vs Harbans Lal

Shamsher Bahadur, J.—This judgment will dispose of four appeals by different tenants of the same landlord raising the question of construction of the proviso to Section 12 of the Delhi Rent Control Act (Act No. 59 of 1958)(hereinafter called the Act).

The facts on which there is no dispute are these. Building bearing municipal Nos. 1309--12, which is the subject-matter of the four different appeals, is situated in Mohalla Faizganj, Bahadurgarh Road, Delhi, belonging to a Muslim evacuee. This entire property was purchased at a public auction by the Respondent Harbans Lal on 19th of September, 1960, for a sum of Rs. 26,050. The auction was confirmed on 26th of October, 1960, but the sale certificate came to be granted much later on 16th August, 1961. The new landlord moved applications for fixation of standard rent against four tenants of the four different units comprised in the property purchased by him in open auction. These applications were made on 23rd July, 1963. The short question for determination in all these four appeals is whether the applications made by the landlord for fixation of rent were barred by time under the provisions of Section 12 of the Act to which I would advert in a moment. The Rent Controller holding that the applications were barred by time dismissed them by four different orders passed on 31st of January, 1964. On the appeals preferred by the landlord, the Rent Control Tribunal took a different view on the question of limitation and found them to be covered by the proviso to Section 12 of the Act. As in the view of the Tribunal the applications for fixation of standard rent were in time, all the four cases were remanded for decision on merits. The four different tenants feeling aggrieved have approached this Court for interference in appeal.

The cases of the tenants have been argued with great fairness by Mr. Rawal, their learned Counsel. It is common ground that before the Delhi Rent Control (Amendment) Act, 1963 (Act No. 4 of 1963), Section 3 was as follows:

Nothing in this Act shall apply--

(a) to any premise''s belonging to the Government; or

(b) to any tenancy or other like relationship created by a grant from the Government in respect of the premises taken on lease, or requisitioned, by the Government.

It is not disputed that u/s 3 of the Act, the landlord could not move an application for fixation of standard rent as the premises belonged to the Government. This fetter on the rights of the landlord was removed by Act No. 4 of 1963 in the amendment introduced to Section 3, by the following proviso:

Provided that where any premises belonging to the Government have been or are lawfully let by any person by virtue of an agreement with the Government or otherwise, then, notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any court or other authority, the provisions of this Act shall apply to such tenancy.

This Act which was published in the Government Gazette on 12th March, 1963, came into force from that date and it cannot be doubted that the landlord thereafter could make application for fixation of standard rent.

Reference may now be made to Section 12 on which reliance has been placed by the learned Counsel for the Appellants both here and before the authorities under the Act:

Any landlord or tenant may file an application to the Controller for fixing the standard rent of the premises or for determining the lawful increase of such rent,--

(a) in the case of any premises which were let, or in which the cause of action for lawful increase of rent arose, before the commencement of this Act, within two years from such commencement;

(b) in case of any premises let after the commencement of this Act;

(c) in the case of premises in which the cause of action for lawful increase of rent arises after the commencement of this Act within two years from the date on which be cause of action arises:

Provided that the Controller may entertain the application after the expiry of the said period of two years, if he is satisfied that the Applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the application in time.

It is common ground between the parties that the case is governed by Clause (a) of Section 12 as the premises had been on lease before the commencement of the Act and the application was not made for any lawful increase of rent within the meaning of Clause (c). The premises were under the tenancy of the Appellants before the enforcement of the Act on 9th of February, 1959.

It is contended by the learned Counsel for the Appellants that an application for increase in standard rent has to be made within two years of the commencement of the Act. The landlord was thus bound to make these applications up to 9th of February, 1961. The proviso would operate, in the submission of the learned Counsel, only if the delay was sufficiently accounted for to the satisfaction of the controller. In his ensuing contention the learned Counsel submits that the affidavit does I not disclose the reason which prevented the landlord from making the applications within two years. The reference about illness for about two months is vague and is not a sufficient compliance of the requirements of the proviso which are the same as in Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

It is incontrovertible that till the 12th of March, 1963, the landlord''s right to bring an application for standard rent had not been clarified. Though the sale certificate was granted to the landlord on 16th of August, 1961, his right to bring an application still was a matter of doubt till the passing of the Act No. 4 of 1963. In the view of the Rent Control Tribunal, the date from which time began to run was 16th of August, 1961, when the sale certificate was given for before that date the landlord in any event could not, in his capacity as owner, bring an application for enhancement of rent. The applications for enhancement which were made on 23rd of July, 1963, were thus within a period of two years. I am inclined to agree with the learned Counsel for the Appellants that Clause (a) of Section 12 does not extend the terminus quo beyond the date of commencement of the Act and it matters not when the right to bring an action for lawful increase of rent arose. No doubt, Clause (a) lays emphasis on premises and these having been with the tenants before the commencement of the Act, this provision comes into operation. It is still to be examined whether the Controller could, in the circumstances of the case, have entertained the applications after the expiry of two years. In my opinion, there is sufficient cause in the present case for the Controller to have exercised the indulgence which he has under the proviso. The Amending Act came into force on 12th of March, 1963, and it always takes some time before persons affected by the change of legislation come to know of it. Though no specific plea has been taken to this effect, I am not minded to interfere with the discretion which has been exercised by the Rent Control Tribunal keeping in view the circumstances that the sale certificate was granted as late as 16th of August, 1961 and the amending legislation came into force on 12th of March, 1963.

These appeals, therefore, fail and are dismissed. In the circumstances, I would make no order as to costs.