Atma Ram and Another vs Kewal Sons Farm Private Limited

Mahesh Grover, J.—In a suit for pre-emption, the suit was decreed in favour of the present appellants in the following terms:

In view of my above discussion under forgoing issues present suit for possession by way of pre-emption is hereby decreed without cost. A decree for possession by way of pre-emption in respect of suit land comprising of Rect. No. 75, killa No. 7 (8-0), being tenants in possession on the payment of Rs. 1,50,000/- along with all rights appertent thereto is hereby passed in favour of plaintiffs and against defendants. Accordingly, decree sheet be drawn. File be consigned to the record room after due compliance.

In appeal filed by the respondent, the decree was modified partially and the following order was passed:

Therefore, the judgment and decree of the trial Court has to be modified to the limited extent and it is held that the plaintiffs were entitled to a decree of possession with respect to the land comprised in Rect. No. 75, killa No. 7 on payment of proportionate sale consideration of the sale deed along stamp and registration charges. The payment would be made within one month from today, failing which the suit would stand dismissed. The appeal is partly accepted. The parties are left to bear their own costs. Decree sheet be drawn and file be consigned.

The appellants did not deposit the requisite amount within the stipulated period. They moved an application before the learned Trial Court for extension of time to deposit the amount as directed by the appellate Court. The same was declined vide order dated 22.8.2007. Thereafter, they challenged this order ostensibly under the provisions of Section 148 of C.P.C. praying for extension of time. The same was also declined by the Court of the District Judge on 21.11.2007.

The instant regular second appeal, has been filed against judgment and decree dated 21.7.2007 passed by the District Judge, Faridabad, wherein time of one month was granted to the appellants, but not extended further to enable them to deposit the requisite amount.

It has been contended by the learned Counsel for the appellants that his only endeavour in filing the appeal is to seek partial modification of the order dated 21.7.2007 by seeking extension of time to deposit the requisite amount which the appellants had failed to deposit within the stipulated period because of fault of the counsel before the Courts below, who did not care to inform them.

Learned Counsel for the respondents has opposed the appeal on the ground that pursuant to the provisions of Order 20 Rule 14, the suit necessarily has to be dismissed if the requisite amount has not been deposited within the stipulated period. Reliance is placed on the judgment of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Sulleh Singh and Others Vs. Sohan Lal and Another, and the judgment of this Court in the case of Dinesh v. Lal Singh and Ors. 2007 (2) R.C.R. (Civil ) 864.

I have heard learned Counsel for the parties and have perused the impugned judgment and other material on record.

Provisions of Order 20 Rule 14 are extracted here:

Decree in pre-emption suit-

Where the Court decrees a claim to pre-emption in respect of a particular sale of property and the purchase-money has not been paid into Court, the decree shall-

(a) specify a day on or before which the purchasemoney shall be so paid and

(b) direct that on payment into Court of such purchase-money, together with the costs (if any) decreed against the plaintiff, on or before the day referred to in Clause (a), the defendant shall deliver possession of the property to the plaintiff, whose title thereto shall be deemed to have accrued from the date of such payment, but that, if the purchase-money and the costs (if any) are not so paid, the suit shall be dismissed with costs.

The Hon''ble Supreme Court in Sulleh Singh''s case (supra) has held as under:

In the present case, the lower appellate court did not grant any stay to the plaintiffs-respondents. In view of the fact that the plaintiffs respondents did not deposit the amount as directed by the Trial Court on or before 1 April, 1969, it became mandatory on the lower appellate court by reason of the ruling of this Court in Naguba Appa Vs. Namdev, to dismiss the suit. The observations of this Court in Naguba Appa''s case (supra) that the pre-emptor is bound to comply with the directions of the Trial Judge unless that decree is altered in any manner by a Court of Appeal do not mean that where the deposit is not made in accordance with the directions of the Trial Court, the appellate court can extend the time for payment. Thereafter, the lower appellate court was in error in extending the time for payment till 20th August, 1969.

The contention of the appellants that the lower appellate court was wrong in extending the time for payment is correct because the failure of the plaintiffsrespondents to deposit the amount in terms of the Trial Court''s decree would result in pre-emptors'' suit standing dismissed by reason of their default in not depositing the pre-emption price. The contention of the appellants that the High Court was wrong in not setting aside the order of extension of time passed by the lower appellate court is correct. It is only if the plaintiffsrespondents had paid the decretal amount within the time granted by the Trial Court or if the plaintiffsrespondents had obtained another order from the lower appellate Court granting any order of stay that the lower appellate court might have considered the passing of appropriate order in favour of pre-emptors. The High Court should have allowed the appellants'' appeal and not made any distinction in dismissing plaintiffrespondent Nathi''s suit and allowing plaintiff-respondent Sohan Lal any extension of time to make the payment. Further, it appears that the plaintiff respondent Sohan Lal did not pay the amount.

In the aforesaid case, the appellate Court had extended the time for payment, which was assailed and the Apex Court held that the provisions of Order 20 Rule 14 are mandatory and the Court has no power to extend the time or to vary the terms of the decree.

In view of the aforesaid settled position of law, the time could not have been extended and the appellants clearly lost their rights to derive any benefit from the decree. There is, thus, no infirmity in the order of the Courts below as they could not have extended the time granted by the Court in the first instance.

No ground to interfere.

Dismissed.

Consequently, all the pending applications are also dismissed.