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Judgment
Sanjiv Khanna, C.J.—This appeal is directed against the judgment dated 09th May, 2008 passed by the learned single Judge in W.P.(C) No. 16242/2006, vide which the judgment dated 6th October, 2006 of the Intellectual Property Appellate Board (''Appellate Board'' for short) was set aside.
The facts are that the Appellant is a company incorporated under the Laws of United State of America. The Appellant is an ultimate subsidiary of Pernod Ricard S.A., which is engaged in the business of manufacturing and marketing a variety of alcoholic beverages worldwide. The Appellant is also carrying on business under various brands such as ROYAL SALUTE, CHIVAS REGAL, etc. The Appellant claims that it has coined and adopted the trade mark ''BLENDERS PRIDE'' through its predecessors in title i.e. M/s Seagram Company Limited in the year 1973. According to the Appellant on account of extensive sale and marketing, the trade mark ''BLENDERS PRIDE'' has come about to acquire the highest level of distinctiveness, goodwill and reputation in various countries. In order to secure its proprietary right in the said trade mark, the Appellant had applied for and was granted registration of its trade mark ''BLENDERS PRIDE'' in more than 50 countries. The Appellant has been selling ''BLENDERS PRIDE'' whisky in India through its licensees, namely, Seagram India (P) Ltd. since 1995. The Appellant has also applied for registration of its trade mark ''BLENDERS PRIDE'' under application Nos. 623364 and 623365 in Class 33 which are pending registration.
On 25th August, 2003 the 4th Respondent''s application No. 618414 for registration of an identical trade mark ''BLENDERS PRIDE'' was advertised in the Trade Marks Journal Mega-1. The Trade Marks Journal was published on 7th October, 2003. The Appellant had filed Form TM-44 seeking extension of one month''s time for filing the notice of opposition against the 4th Respondent''s application on 6th January, 2004. The statutory period for filing opposition is three months, which can be further extended upto one month. There is no dispute that the application for extension of time was filed within the statutory period of three months. On 19th January, 2004 the Appellant had filed its notice of opposition before the Trade Marks Registry, New Delhi and the same was numbered as DEL-160325. On 16th February, 2004 Trade Marks Registry had issued a notice to the 4th Respondent inviting its counter statement and had also stated that if the counter statement was not filed, the trade mark application would be deemed to be abandoned. The Appellant came to know on 20th January, 2005 that the trade mark registration certificate bearing No. 618414 was issued on 13th January, 2004 itself to the 4th Respondent. The Appellant immediately, through its attorneys, had informed the Trade Marks Registry about the pending opposition proceedings, (DEL-46O325), which were yet to be disposed of.
Since no communication was received from the Registry, the Appellant had filed a writ petition before this Court in WP(C) Nos. 2712 and 2713/2005. Meanwhile, on 16th February, 2005, the Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks had issued a show cause notice u/s 57(4) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 (herein after referred to as ''the Act'') calling upon the 4th Respondent to show cause as to why such impugned registration certificate, which was issued inadvertently and erroneously, should not be cancelled. On 2nd March, 2005, this Court disposed of WP(C) 2712 and 2713 of 2005 with the observation that the Registrar should proceed to decide the issues arising out of the show cause notice as expeditiously as possible in accordance with law.
The 4th Respondent had thereafter filed its reply on 14th March, 2005 to the show cause notice u/s 57(4) of the Act. The Assistant Registrar, Trade Marks Registry after taking on record the submissions made by the 4th Respondent and after considering the same, and on being satisfied that no prima facie case was made out, by order dated 26th May, 2005 directed the 4th Respondent not to use the certificate in any manner and also to return the said certificate on the ground that the opposition proceedings were pending and fixed the date of hearing 28th June, 2005. Against this order the 4th Respondent had filed a writ petition bearing WP(C) Nos. 10080-81 of 2005 before this Court which came to be disposed of on 13th September, 2005 whereby the Assistant Registrar was directed to dispose of the proceedings on or before 16th November, 2005.
The Assistant Registrar after having heard the parties vide his order dated 14th November, 2005 discharged the show cause proceedings as withdrawn on the ground that it was issued without jurisdiction.
Aggrieved by the said order dated 14th November, 2005 passed by the Assistant Registrar, the Appellant had filed an appeal u/s 91 of the Act before the Appellate Board on the ground that the Assistant Registrar had abdicated his jurisdiction conferred on him vide Section 57(4) of the Act and had refused to exercise his jurisdiction despite himself having issued the show cause notice dated 16th February, 2005 and after acknowledging unlawful issuance of the certificate of registration in contravention of Section 23 of the Act by his office. The Appellant had also sought order of quashing and removal of the impugned trade mark in Class-33 granted in favour of 4th Respondent on the ground that it was illegal, null and void ab initio as granted in contravention of the provisions of Section 23 of the Act as period for filing of the opposition had not expired and opposition filed by the Appellant had not been decided.
The Appellate Board vide order dated 6th October, 2006 allowed the appeal and cancelled the Trade Mark Certificate No. 618414 that was granted to the 4th Respondent. The Appellate Board directed the Registrar to hear and dispose of the opposition proceedings filed by the Appellant in respect of Trade Mark Application No. 618414 of the 4th Respondent. The Appellate Board held that the opposition filed by the Appellant was within limitation as provided by Section 21 of the Act and the extension application (filed within three months) had been allowed by the Registrar by necessary implication because the Registrar took the opposition filed by the Appellant on record and directed the 4th Respondent to file reply, failing which, his application for registration of the trade mark BLENDERS PRIDE will be treated as abandoned. Therefore, the registration certificate issued by the Registrar to the 4th Respondent was in violation of the mandate of Section 23(1) of the Act, since it was issued before the limitation for filing opposition had expired. The Appellate Board further held that the Registrar had the jurisdiction u/s 57(4) of the Act to issue suo motu notice as the issue of invalidity of the mark was not raised as on 16th February, 2005 i.e. the date of issuance of the show cause notice. The written statement in the Jalandhar suit was filed by the Defendant therein two months later i.e. in April 2005 after issuance of the show cause notice dated 16th February, 2005 and since the Appellant, who had filed opposition against the registration of the trade mark BLENDERS PRIDE, was not a party to the Jalandhar suit, Section 125 had no application to the present case as it relates to forum where the application for rectification can be filed when the issue of validity is also raised as an issue in infringement suit. It has no application to suo motu powers of the Registrar to correct procedural defect acting as the "tribunal" u/s 57(4) of the Act.
Being aggrieved by the order dated 6th October, 2006, passed by the Appellate Board, the 4th Respondent had filed W.P.(C) No. 16242/2006 before this Court, which came to be allowed on 9th May, 2008 by the learned single Judge on the ground that in view of the written statement filed by the Seagram India (P) Ltd., the Defendant in Suit No. 2/2005 before the District Court, Jalandhar, Section 125 of the Act, which is a non-obstante clause became operational and applicable "in rem" and hence provisions of Section 57(4) which empowered the Registrar to exercise suo motu jurisdiction as tribunal ceased to operate. The learned single Judge summarized his conclusions as follows:
(a) The filing of written statement in the Jalandhar suit, questioning the validity of the trademark-where the Petitioner is the Plaintiff-had the effect of clothing the Appellate Board with exclusive jurisdiction to decide upon the issue of legality and validity of the trademark u/s 125(1). Consequently the Registrar, Mumbai and the Assistant Registrar, Delhi were denuded of their power and jurisdiction to deal with and proceed further on the notices dated 16th February, 2005 and 26th May, 2005; the Board alone could have decided the question, upon a reference u/s 125(1).
(b) The impugned order to the extent it discusses the merits of the case, is unsustainable, as it dealt with the issues improperly, in erroneous exercise of appellate power which the Board did not possess.
Consequently, the learned single Judge had allowed the writ petition and quashed the order of the Appellate Board. However, rights and contentions of the parties concerning the legality and validity of the registration of the trademark were preserved and it was directed that in the event of a reference sought from the Appellate Board, u/s 125(1), the same shall be decided in accordance with law.
Mr. Sudhir Chandra, learned senior counsel appearing for the Appellant a contended that the learned single Judge has failed to see that irrespective of whether Section 125 is or is not held to be applicable in the present case, it could not have possibly affected the jurisdiction of the Registrar to issue the show cause notice dated 16th February, 2005 as registration itself procedurally was contrary to the law. The written statement before Jalandhar Court in Suit No. 2/2005 was filed by Seagram India (P) Ltd., the Defendant therein towards the end of April 2005. whereas the show cause notice had been issued by the Registrar on 16th February, 2005. Hence, undisputedly, no plea of invalidity had been raised or had arisen before Jalandhar Court on the date of issuance of show cause notice by the Registrar i.e. 16th February, 2005. Hence, Section 125 could neither be invoked nor applicable to the show cause notice in question. Learned senior counsel, therefore, contended that no fault could be found with the jurisdiction of the Registrar in issuance of the show cause notice dated 16th February, 2005. It is also submitted by him that learned single Judge was not right in holding that invocation of Section 125 by any Defendant in a suit, would, ipso facto, deprive the Registrar acting as the "tribunal" to exercise his suo motu statutory power conferred on the "tribunal" u/s 57(4) of the Act.
He submitted that the interpretation given by the learned single Judge would mean that the Registrar is handicapped and deprived of his suo motu power to correct his own error and is dependent on any Defendant to succeed or fail in getting corrected such an error by the Appellate Board. This view, according to him, is contrary to the interpretation given by the Supreme Court to the word "tribunal" u/s 57(4) of the Act in the case of Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar, Trade Marks, AIR 1999 SC 222 : 1998 PTC (18) 717 (SC) . He submitted that as per the Supreme Court, the Registrar of Trade Marks is as much a "tribunal" as the Appellate Board for purposes of exercising the suo motu power u/s 57(4) of the Act. If the proceedings concerned are pending before the Registrar of Trade Marks, he is the "tribunal" and has a right to exercise the suo motu power of correction of errors committed by his office. He submitted that learned single Judge had further misinterpreted Section 125 of the Act to mean that once an issue of invalidity is raised by any Defendant in an infringement suit, it is an issue of invalidity "in rem". According to him the learned single Judge failed to see that Section 125 has to be read harmoniously to Section 124 of the Act. Following the interpretation of the learned single Judge, the Registrar is deprived of his suo motu power to correct the error in issuance of the registration, when Section 125 is invoked. In such a case, the said error remains on the register, if the Defendant, after raising the plea of invalidity in a suit for infringement, chooses not to proceed with filing of a rectification petition before the Appellate Board. In this connection, learned senior counsel has referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Hardie Trading Ltd. and Another Vs. Addisons Paint and Chemicals Ltd., to the effect that it is the duty of the Registrar to maintain purity of the register. It is submitted by learned senior Counsel that the Registrar had repeatedly stated in the show cause notice dated 16th February 2005 and in interim order dated 26th May, 2005, that issuance of registration certificate to the 4th Respondent, while the opposition filed by the Appellant was still pending was an error committed by his office and the said registration should be cancelled. Thus, the said registration certificate was a complete nullity. The issue regarding validity of registration certificate was specifically raised in the appeal by the Appellant. The Appellate Board, quashed the registration certificate after recording categorically that it was issued in contravention of Section 23 i.e. before the expiry of the period prescribed by Section 21 of the Act and despite a pending opposition filed on record. According to him, the learned single Judge erroneously interfered with the order of the Appellate Board on the misconceived and palpably wrong ground that the Board had no jurisdiction to do so. He submitted that the only question was whether the registration certificate granted by the Assistant Registrar of Trademarks to the 4th Respondent was due to inadvertence and in contravention of the provisions of Section 23 of the Act. The said certificate having been granted in violation of Section 23 of the Act could not be allowed to remain on the register.
In reply it is contended by Mr. V.P. Singh, learned senior counsel for the 4th Respondent that in view of Section 125(1) of the Act and the non-obstante clause, the rectification application could only be maintained before the Appellate Board and the Registrar had no jurisdiction to rectify the register. He submitted that the power of the Registrar to rectify u/s 57, including the suo motu power u/s 57(4) is ousted and excluded by non obstante clause occurring in Section 125 of the Act. He submitted that in Whirlpool''s case the Supreme Court was directly concerned with suo motu power of the Registrar u/s 56(4) of the Act and had concluded that the suo motu power of the Registrar was totally excluded and, therefore, had quashed the suo motu notice. He submitted that the Appellate Board erred in holding that Section 125 had no application because the Appellant was not a party to the suit filed by the 4th Respondent at Jalandhar. He submitted that the provisions of Section 125 has application in rem and, therefore, the fact that the present Appellant was not a party to the suit at Jalandhar is of no consequence. In any event, the licensee of the Appellant namely, Seagram India (P) Ltd., had raised almost similar contentions in the said suit.
According to Mr. Singh even it is it assumed that Section 125 was inapplicable, the Appellate Board ought to have remanded the matter back to the Registrar for decision on merits of suo motu notice instead of deciding the same itself, particularly when no arguments were addressed in this regard by the parties during the course of hearing. Further, according to him in the absence of any specific order for grant of extension of time under the Act, the question of applicability of Section 23 shall not arise. He submitted that the registration certificate granted to the 4th Respondent was valid and the provisions of Section 23(1)(a) of the Act were fully complied with.
We have given our anxious thought to the rival submissions made at the Bar. In our considered opinion it is not possible to sustain the impugned order of the learned single Judge. The factual position is undisputed. The application of the 4th Respondent was advertised in Trade Marks Journal on 25th August, 2003 and the said application was made public on 7th October, 2003. Section 21(1) of the Act provides for three months statutory time for filing opposition, which can be extended up to one month in aggregate by the Registrar. The period for filing opposition is calculated from the date the Trade Mark Journal is made public as per Rule 47 of the Trade Marks Rules, 2000. The application for extension of time by application TM-44 was made by the Appellant on 6th January, 2004 i.e. within the statutory period of three months. Opposition was thereafter filed by the Appellant on 19th January, 2004 and on 16th February, 2004 a notice thereof was duly issued by the Registrar to the 4th Respondent. When it was brought to the notice of the Registrar that the registration certificate had been issued in contravention of Section 23 a show cause notice u/s 57(4) of the Act was issued suo motu by the Registrar on 16th February, 2005 and by a further order dated 26th May, 2005, the Registrar had directed the 4th Respondent not to use the trade mark and return the same as the said certificate of registration was issued inadvertently and erroneously.
We may at this stage refer to the provisions of Section 21(1) and Section 23(1) of the Act, which read as follows:
Section 21-Opposition to registration - (1) Any person, may within three months from the date of the advertisement or re-advertisement of an application for registration or within such further period, not exceeding one month in the aggregate, as the Registrar, on application made to him in the prescribed manner and on payment of the prescribed fee, allows, give notice in writing in the prescribed manner to the Registrar, of opposition to the registration.
Section 23-Opposition - (1) Subject to the provisions of Section 19, when application for registration of a trade mark has been accepted and either-
(a) the application has not been opposed and the time for notice opposition has expired; or
(b) the application has been opposed and the opposition has been decided in favour of the applicant, the Registrar shall, unless the Central Government otherwise directs, register the said trade mark and the trade mark when registered shall be registered as of the date of the making of the said application and that date shall, subject to the provisions of Section 154 be deemed to be the date of registration.
Section 21(1) confers the right to file opposition to registration not only to a person who is the proprietor of the mark or claims interest in the mark but to any person. The opposition has to be filed within the period of three months which can be extended for a further period of one month in aggregate. Section 23(1) prohibits grant of registration during the statutory period for filing the opposition as prescribed by Section 21. The object of maintaining a trade mark register is that the public should know whose goods they are buying and with whom particular goods are associated. It is, therefore, essential that the register should not contain trade marks which are identical or which so closely resemble each other that an unwary purchaser may be likely to be deceived by thinking that he is buying the goods of a particular person whereas he is in fact buying the goods of another. The objects is to maintain purity of registration.
In Hardie Trading Limited v. Addison Paints & Chemicals Limited (supra) the Supreme Court stressed the duty of the Registrar to maintain purity of the register in following words:
29....Section 56 on the other hand deals with situations where the initial registration should not have been or was incorrectly made. The situations covered by this Section include- (a) the contravention or failure to observe a condition for registration; (b) the absence of an entry; (c) an entry made without sufficient cause; (d) a wrong entry; and (e) an error or defect in the entry. Such type of actions are commenced for the "purity of the register", which it is in public interest to maintain...
31...although they were no doubt inserted to prevent officious interference by those who had no interest at all in the Register being correct, and to exclude a mere common informer,, it is undoubtedly of public interest that they should not be unduly limited, inasmuch as it is a public mischief that there should remain upon the Register a Mark which ought not to be there, and by which many persons may be affected, who, nevertheless, would not be willing to enter upon the risk and expense of litigation....
In a recent decision of the Bombay High Court in Sardar Gurudas Singh Bedi Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, a Division Bench declared that Rule 47(6) of the Trade Marks Rules is ultra vires and held that the application for extension of time in Form No. TM44 could be made even after the expiry of the period of three months. The following observations of the Division Bench are pertinent:
It would therefore, have to be held, that the power in the Registrar to extend the period, can be before the period of three months has expired, as also even after the period of three months has expired. In such event, the expression one month in aggregate will have to be read to mean also on the expiry of the period of three months. The discretion in the registrar therefore, to extend the time would also be on the expiry of the period of three months. It is not as it the Registrar is bound to give a period of one month. It is open to the Registrar considering the facts of the matter, to give such additional period and if discretion is to be exercised to extend time, then to grant such time, so that it does not exceed in the aggregate one month. This is how the delegate, understood the law when Rule 51(3) was omitted in 1969, in the rules of 1959. The period of one month in aggregate therefore, in Section 21, will have to be read to mean aggregate of one month even on the expiry of the period of three months.
In the instant case the application for extension of time for filing notice of opposition against 4th Respondent''s registration application was filed on 6th January, 2004 i.e. within the stipulated period of three months. On filing of the application, the registration certificate could not have been issued to the 4th Respondent before accepting or rejecting the application for accepting the trade mark. Therefore, it is evident that the registration certificate granted to the 4th Respondent was in violation of Section 23(1) of the Act.
The show cause notice dated 16th February, 2005 issued by the Registrar to the 4th Respondent for inadvertently and erroneously issuing the registration certificate was ultimately discharged by the Registrar himself on the ground that he seized to have jurisdiction in view of the provisions of Section 125 of the Act. Sections 124 and 125 both are relevant for the purpose of deciding this appeal and are reproduced below:
Stay of proceedings where the validity of registration of the trade mark is questioned, etc. - (1) Where in any suit for infringement of a trade mark-
(a) the Defendant pleads that registration of the Plaintiffs trade mark is invalid, or
(b) the Defendant raises a defence under Clause (e) of sub-section (2) of Section 30 and the Plaintiff pleads the invalidity of registration of the Defendant''s trade mark.
The court trying the suit (hereinafter referred to as the court) shall, -
(i) if any proceedings for rectification of the register in relation to the Plaintiffs or Defendant''s trade mark are pending before the Registrar or the Appellate Board, stay the suit pending the final disposal of such proceedings.
(ii) If no such proceedings are pending and the court is relation to the Plaintiffs or Defendant''s trade mark is prima facie tenable, raise an issue regarding the same and adjourn the case for a period of three months from the date of the farming of the issue in order to enable the party concerned to apply to the Appellate Board for rectification of the register.
(2) If the party concerned proves to the court that he has made any such application as is referred to in Clause (b) (ii) of Sub-section (1) within the time specified therein or within such extended time as the court may for sufficient cause allow, the trial of the suit shall stand stayed until the final disposal of the rectification proceedings.
(3) If no such application as aforesaid has been made within the time specified or within such extended time as the court may allow", the issue as to the validity of the registration of the trade mark concerned shall be deemed to have been abandoned and the court shall proceed with the suit in regard to the other issues in the case.
(4) The final order made in any rectification proceedings referred to in Sub-section (1) or Sub-section (2) shall be binding upon the parties and the court shall dispose of the suit conformably to such order in so far as it relates to the issue as to the validity of the registration of the trade mark.
(5) The stay of a suit for the infringement of a trade mark under this section shall not preclude the court from making any interlocutory order (including any order granting an injunction directing account to be kept, appointing a receiver or attaching any property), during the period of the stay of the suit.
Application for rectification of register to be made to Appellate Board in certain cases - (1) Wherein a suit for infringement of a registered trade mark the validity of the registration of the Plaintiffs trade mark is questioned by the Defendant or where in any such suit the Defendant raises a defense under clause(e) of Sub-section (2) of Section 30 and the Plaintiff questions the validity of the registration of the Defendant''s trade mark, the issue as to the validity of the registration of the trade mark concerned shall be determined only on an application for the rectification of the register and, notwithstanding anything contained in Section 47 or Section 57, such application shall be made to the Appellate Board and not to the Registrar.
(2) Subject to the provisions of Sub-section (1), where an application for rectification of the register is made to the Registrar is made to the Registrar u/s 47 or Section 57, the Registrar, may, if he think fit, refer the application at any stage of the proceedings to the Appellate Boards.
A plain reading of Section 124 makes it clear that when an issue of invalidity is pending before the Registrar or the Appellate Board and issue with regard to invalidity is raised in the suit, the suit has to be stayed and the Registrar or the Appellate Board as the case may be, before whom the proceedings are pending, should dispose of the same and the said finding will be binding between the parties. Section 125 of the Act contemplates that whenever in a suit the validity of the registered trade mark of the either of the parties is questioned, the same shall be determined only on an application for rectification of the register and, that notwithstanding anything contained in either Section 47 or Section 57, the application can be preferred only before the Appellate Board and not the Registrar. Section 125 thus determines the forum available to a party to apply for rectification of the registration on grounds of invalidity when raised in suit for infringement. It restricts filing of such rectification application with the Appellate Board as against the option provided by Section 47 and Section 57 of the Act to file such application either before the Registrar of Trade Marks or before the Appellate Board, as he may opt for. However, the power of the Registrar to correct his own mistakes is wholly independent of the right of a party to make or not to make an application u/s 125 for rectification of the register. The Registrar is the custodian of the register and it is his bounded duty to correct his mistake whether or not an aggrieved person makes an application for rectification.
In the instant case, the Registrar having issued the show cause notice well before any written statement was filed with regard to the invalidity of trade mark in suit, the proceedings before the Registrar had to be disposed of by the Registrar and his finding would bind the parties. The interpretation given by the learned single Judge suggests that the Registrar is handicapped and deprived of his suo motu powers to correct his own error and once written statement is filed such error can be corrected only by the Appellate Board when Section 125 is invoked. The effect of this would be that such an error shall remain on the Register if the Defendant, after raising the plea of invalidity in a suit for infringement, choose not to proceed with filing of a rectification petition before the Appellate Board. Such an interpretation would be directly in contradiction to the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Hardie Trading Ltd. (Supra) that it is the duty of the Registrar to maintain purity of register.
In any event, to our mind, the question of applicability of Section 125 is clearly academic in the present case. In the appeal before the Appellate Board the Appellant had raised the issue of validity of the registration and specific prayer was made for quashing the registration granted in favour of the 4th Respondent. The 4th Respondent had replied to and challenged all the grounds and the prayer. The entries was before the Appellate Board and the issue was not confined to the jurisdiction of the Registrar u/s 58(4). The Appellate Board categorically held as follows:
We have carefully heard the contentions of both the counsel. Learned senior counsel for the Appellant brought to our notice that the Registrar of Trade Marks notice on 16th February, 2004 calling upon the third Respondent to file their counter statement within two month as per Section 21(1) of the Act. We are of the opinion that the notice of opposition had been taken on record and numbered as DEL-160325 which clearly shows that the Form TM-44 filed by the Appellant herein for extension of time had been accepted by the Registrar of Trade Marks. After that the notice had been issued to the third Respondent calling upon them to file their counter statement. We are of the opinion that after the application for extension had been accepted by the Registry, the opposition being numbered and notice also sent to the Respondent herein calling upon them to file their counter statement, the Registrar of Trade Marks has issued the certificate before the statutory period is a total abuse of process of law. Looking into the facts of the case we of the opinion that the Registrar of Trade Marks had failed to follow the provisions of Section 23 of the Act and we find that the Registrar had issued the certificate on 13.1.2004, that is even before the expiry of statutory period for filing notice of opposition.
Section 23(1) of the Act clearly mandates that only after the statutory period for filling opposition has expired a registration certificate could be granted. The Appellant had filed an application for extension of time in filing opposition to the registration of trade mark of the 4th Respondent and the notice of opposition was taken on record by the Registrar. The above fact is evident from the show cause dated 16th February, 2004 and the interim order of 26th May, 2005. In the absence of an order rejecting such application, it cannot be held that time for filing opposition had expired. The entire issue was considered by the Appellate Board which is a tribunal as per Section 2(ze) of the Act. The tribunal had ultimately come to the conclusion that the registration was in contravention of the provisions of the Act and directed the Registrar to decide the application of the 4th Respondent on merits.
After taking into consideration the above facts and contentions of the parties we hold that no injustice has been done by the Appellate Board in directing de novo hearing of the case. Consequently the appeal is allowed and the order of the learned single Judge is set aside. No order as to costs.