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Judgment
Veeraswami, J.—The only question in these second appeals relates to whether a grant of a minor inam comprised of both warams or of only
assessment. They arise out of the suits instituted by the Zamindar of Vettavalam, who is the common Appellant, to recover possession from the
several Respondents of the lands in question with damages for use and occupation and future mesne profits. The lands were originally ryotwari
lands situated in Sanipoondi village. The Zamindar was rendering kaval service and was receiving a certain sum as average ready money Damasha
allowance. By an order, dated April 10, 1862, the Government discontinued the kaval service and directed resumption of half the allowances for
services discontinued and assignment of the net assessment on the lands in question, as inam to the ex-service holder. Nothing would appear to
have been done immediately or until 1883, when the Inam Commissioner, pursuant to the direction of the Government, actually granted the Inam,
in lieu of the allowance, under the Title Deed No. 1251. in favour of the Appellant''s grandfather. The Appellant maintained that the grant was of
the land itself and not merely the assessment thereon, and that his predecessors had been cultivating the land either directly or through tenants
under terminable leases. He denied that the Respondents had any permanent rights of occupancy in the hand. He claimed, therefore, that he was
entitled to evict the Respondents as tenants and recover from them possession of the land. The suits were resisted by the Respondents on the
ground that their predecessors-in-title had been in possession and enjoyment of the land from time immemorial and that the grant in favour of the
Appellant''s grandfather was only of the Government''s share of the revenue from the land. They also urged that the enfranchisement of the inam
and grant of the title deed to the Appellant''s predecessor-in-title did not and could not confer on the original grantee any proprietory rights to the
lands. Both the Courts below concurred in accepting the defence and in dismissing the suits and the appeals arising therefrom.
The original title deed itself is not forthcoming. The only material from which the nature and quantum of grant can possibly be determined is a
certified extract from the Fair Inam Register relating to the village of Sanipoondi and Kalathur in the taluk of Tiruvannamalai in South Arcot District.
This area is of course now within the limits of North Arcot District. Both the Courts below were of the opinion that as the suits were brought by a
minor Inamdar to eject his alleged tenants, it was for him to establish that the grant was of both warams or that the Respondents or their
predecessors-in-title were let into possession by the Inamdar and that if he failed to establish these facts by cogent evidence, he was bound to fail.
The Courts below were clearly right in the approach following Lakshmanna v. Venkateswarlu ILR (1950) Mad. 567 (P.C.). As the, only material
evidence the Appellant produced was the certified extract from the Fair Inam Register, they construed the relevant entries therein and agreed in
holding that the inam granted was only the teervai or assessment. It is the correctness of this concurrent finding that Sri Vedanthachari for the
Appellant canvasses. His contention is that although the land was a ryotwari land at the time, the minor inam, was granted and it was at the time
held by ryotwari pattadars, having regard to certain entries in the Inam extract and the limited rights of pattadars under ryotwari tenure as
understood at that time, the grant included rights in the soil as well, and that, in any case, the grant of assessment wag capable of construction as a
grant of land with the revenue attached to it. Learned Counsel in support of his contention has called in aid a number of decided cases to show
how the relationship of a ryotwari pattadar with the Government and its implications were understood at the time of the grant and insisted that the
entries in the Inam extract should be interpreted in the light of such contemporaneous understanding of the tenure.
Before noticing some of the citations for the Appellant, I may first refer to the Inam extract and the relevant entries therein. The first five columns
in the Inam extract relate to the class, extent and value of the inam. The land was shown to be situate in seven villages and the class of inam was
described as Kaval. The total extent of the land both dry and wet under the inam was 26 acres 41 cents. Under column (7), the total assessment
on the land is given as Rs. 182-2-3. There is a further entry:
91-1-21/2 resumed for services discontinued.
91-1-1 net to be assigned as inam vide G.O. quoted in column (8).
In column (8) reference is made to Government Order Revenue department No. 806, dated April 10, 1862 and the inam is described as
Maniam ready money by deduction from beriz-service since discontinued. Column (20) is if unconnected to the original holders, possession how
obtained and in what year.
and under, this column are found 21 names of pattadars. This is further clarified in column (21) under the caption Remarks. This is what is
mentioned in this column:
The amount shown in column (7) is the average annual ready money Damasha allowance enjoyed by Zamindars mentioned in columns (15) and
(16) for kaval service rendered (since discontinued). The lands now recommended to be assigned as inam in lieu of the above allowances are held
on ryotwari patta. The pattadars whose names are given in the margin are not willing to have the lands assigned as inam. No other land is available
for assignment. Under Board''s proceedings, dated 22nd May 1875, No. 1403 the pattadars consent for such assignment is immaterial. To be
confirmed as personal subject to the payment of quit rent of Rs. 91-1-0 which is equal to half of the assessment of the above lands to the party in
column (6).
The decision of the Inam Commissioner under column (22) was that the inam was confirmed as on October 2, 1883 as recommended in column
(21). Columns (3) to (7) are headed as The Particulars of lands which are recommended to be granted as maniyam in lieu of Damasha maniyam
are given below. There is no doubt from the entries I have referred to, that on the date of the grant, the land was actually in the holding of ryotwari
pattadars and that they were in possession. Learned Counsel for the Appellant does not dispute this. It is further clear from column (7) read with
column (21) in the Inam extract that from the total assessment of Rs. 182-2-3 on the land, was to be deducted Rs. 91-1-21/2 representing that
part of the inam resumed for service discontinued and that what was assigned to the grantee as inam was the net balance of Rs. 91-1-1. That is
how the assignment of assessment on the land was conferred as personal inam subject to the payment by the grantee of a quit rent of Rs. 91-1-0
equal to half of the assessment of the lands. There is also the further fact that the cash allowance itself which the service-holder was getting was
only a sum of Rs. 91-1-21/2 and when the service was discontinued and the cash inam was resumed, there is nothing to suppose that in lieu
thereof about 26 acres of wet and dry lands were granted as substituted inam which should be far more valuable and much larger than what the
Inamdar was receiving as cash allowance. In view of these facts and circumstances, the conclusion is irresistible that at the time when the grant was
made, there were ryotwari pattadars in possession of the land and the grant was only of the assessment on the land subject to the liability of the
Inamdar to pay quit rent of Rs. 91-1-0 leaving a balance out of the total assessment equivalent to the cash allowance resumed.
But learned Counsel for the Appellant lays great stress on the use of the word land or lands in
The particulars of lands which are recommended to be granted as maniyam in lieu of Damasha maniam, the land now recommended to be
assigned as inam in lieu of the above allowances and no other land is available for assignment
in the Inam extract and contends that this meant that what was granted was the land itself including the assessment. He explains that the fact
that there were ryotwari pattadars in possession of the land at the time of the grant, did not, in any way affect, such construction of the grant, since
the tenure of a ryotwari pattadar, as understood at or about the time of the grant was not that ryotwari pattadar had by virtue of such a patta a
permanent right of occupancy in the land but that the ryotwari patta created merely a relationship analogous to that of a tenancy and the right to
possession remained with the Government and the Government at its will could resume possession from such a pattadar. Learned Counsel adds
that, that was why the lands themselves were recommended to be assigned as inam in lieu of the allowances and the consent of the pattadars
therefore was considered to be unnecessary. I am not impressed by this argument.
In Fakir Mohammad v. Tirumala Ghariar ILR (1876) Mad. 205, 222, a Full Bench case, while keeping in mind the distinction between what
was called the old resident cultivator with heritable and often transferable right of occupancy and a new coiner entering into possession of fields
which the State or the landholder permits him to cultivate, Morgan, C.J., with whom Holloway, J., concurred said at page 221:
In land belonging to the State the ordinary pattadar acquires by the patta alone no higher interest than he derives from a private proprietor whose
land he undertakes to cultivate.
The learned Chief Justice observed that at the time the pattas were, given to the Appellants in that case who were mirasidars, the land was
immemorial waste in a mirasi village and the grant of a patta meant nothing more than in form, an annual settlement and on the face of the
transaction, there was nothing which could be regarded as amounting to the creation or recognition of a permanent right in the Appellants. He
considered in effect that a ryotwari patta granted for the first time for a waste land resulted in nothing more than a relationship implied in a
terminable annual tenancy and that it created or conferred on the pattadar no right of occupancy in the land. Holloway, J. who, as I said, concurred
with the learned Chief Justice expressed his view thus:
I think that these lands were held from year to year, and that as the tenants had An undoubted right to terminate the tenancy at the end of any fasli,
the landlords, the Government, had an equal right to do so.
Upon that view, the majority Judges held that the mirasidars, who had held ryotwari pattas of the waste land and who neither cultivated nor
paid revenue with the result that the land was sold for recovery of arrears of revenue but who at the revenue sale themselves became purchasers,
were not entitled to recover possession from persons to whom the Collector, ignoring the sale issued patta for the land. Inees, J., dissented from
that view and, in his opinion, the relationship that was brought about by grant of a ryotwari patta was not that of a landlord and tenant on
terminable annual tenancy. The learned Judge rejected the theory that the basis of the relationship of a ryotwari pattadar with the Government was
tenancy and held at page 213:
I would not be understood to asset that any title is conveyed by the patta. That is it best, as was decided by the Privy Council in Freeman v. Fairlie
(1828) 1 M.J.A. 305. evidence of the title. The title arises by occupancy, and to occupancy attaches a liability to the State demand upon occupied
land; and the record of the demand in the patta drawn out in the name of the occupant is evidence, though it may be not conclusive evidence of his
occupancy right.
The consent of the Collector to the occupation of assessed waste lands, which is now made a condition of a right to occupy is, properly viewed,
only a fiscal arrangement to enable the State to register the liabilities of the cultivators. The question of the right of the cultivating ryot is well
considered in the 5th Chapter of Wilk''s History of Mysore and I think the late enactment�Madras Act II of 1864, which is mainly a
consolidation of the Old Regulations positively negatives the limitation of the tenure assumed in the decisions in the cases of Chockalinga Pillai v.
Vythealinga Pundara Sannadi (1871) 6 M.H.C.R. 164 and Mrs. Jessie Foulkes v. S. Liajaralhina Mudali (1871) 6 M.H.C.R. 175.
Today there is not the slightest doubt that the view of the majority as to the nature of the tenure of a ryotwari pattadar does not hold good,
though no decision has been brought to my notice which has since expressly over-ruled the decision of the majority in Fakir Mohammed v.
Tirumala Chettiar ILR (1876) Mad. 205. The present position of a ryotwari pattadar under the Government, as I think is that he is the proprietor
or owner of the land covered by the patta and the only obligation of his to the Government is to pay the revenue with which the land is charged in
terms of the patta, and that in default, the land is liable to be sold for recovery of arrears of revenue. The relationship of a ryotwari pattadar with
the Government is not that of a tenant and landlord and there is no question between them of any terminable tenancy at will or otherwise in relation
to the land held by him under the patta. Lakshmanna v. Venkateswaralu ILR (1950) Mad. 567 recognized the position and it was observed at
page 593:
In this connection, it may be stated that it is not correct to say, as was boldly argued, that a ryotwari pattadar has no proprietorship in the land he
holds under the Government.
The Privy Council then quoted with approval the following passage from Baden Powell''s Land Systems of British India:
Under the ryotwari system every registered holder of land is recognized as its proprietor. He is at liberty to sublet his property, or to transfer it by
gift, sale or mortgage. He cannot be objected by Government so long as he pays the fixed assessment, and has the option option of (annually)
increasing or diminishing his holding or of entirely abandoning it The ryot under this system is virtually a proprietor under a simple and perfect title,
and has all the benefits of a perfect lease without its responsibilities.
It may be assumed that the pattadar is the owner of the kudiwaram right as opposed to the melwaram right which is vested in the Government.
The Privy Council pointed out that the settlement by the Government under the ryotwari system was with the actual cultivator while under
Regulation XXV of 1802, it was with the zamindar, who had the right of receiving rent from persons who were in occupation of lands. But Sri
Vedantachari argues that while that may be the present position of a ryotwari pattadar under the Government, what should govern the
interpretation of the entries in the Inam extract is the view that prevailed at the time of the grant as to the implications of a ryotwari patta. I think
learned Counsel is right there. But I am unable to accept his contention that the majority view in Fakir Muhammed v. Tirumala Chariar I.L.R.
(1876) Mad 205 was necessarily the only prevailing view only current at the time of the grant. As I said, Innes, J., did not agree with that view.
There were also earlier decisions which were contrary to the majority view. In The Secretary of State for India v. Nunja ILR (1882) Mad 163 the
argument that a ryotwari patta enured only for a year was repelled. Turner, C.J., and Muttuswamy Ayyar, J., strongly doubted the correctness of
the majority view in Fakir Muhammed v. Tirumala Chariar ILR (1876) Mad. 205 and stated that if occasion arose they would propose the ruling
to be reconsidered. Further Fakir Mohammed v. Tirumala Chariar ILR (1876) Mad. 205 was confined to an immemorial waste land to which the
mirasidars were known to have been originally admitted into possession for the first time by the grant of a ryotwari patta. Even the majority view in
that case did not exclude the possibility of a ryotwari patta being granted in favour of a person already in possession of land hereditarily and of
such a person having a right of occupancy in the land. In this case the Respondents asserted that they and their predecessors-in-title had been in
possession of the land from time immemorial. There is no evidence to show that the pattadars were let into possession by the Government on
ryotwafi pattas. On the other hand, the Appellant asserted that the Respondents and their predecessors had been let into possession by his
predecessors-in-title on tenancy which he has failed to prove. In the circumstances, therefore, I cannot accept the contention that the entries in the
loam extract should be understood in the sense that though ryotwari pattadars were in possession of the land at the time of the grant the
proprietory interest in the land nevertheless remained with the Government and that it passed on for the inamdar under the grant. Nor am I
prepared to hold that the grant of assessment implied not only the right t collect the revenue but also the rights of the Government in the land. Not
only the law was not that the Government retained with it the proprietary interest in the land which it had granted a ryotwari patta, but on the terms
found in the Inam extract, there can be little doubt that assessment in the context meant nothing more than revenue and did not carry with t any
other right. Learned Counsel for the Appellant stresses that imposition of quit rent meant that the Government had rights to the la But this view
proceeds on the wrong assumption that the Government at the time of the grant had any interest in the land. It follows, therefore, that the argument
that after the grant, the ryotwari pattadars ceased to be such and thereafter held under the Inamdar has no substance.
Strong reliance was placed, as I said, by learned Counsel for the Appellant on the word land in the entries in the Inam extract and reference
was also made to Act VIII of 1869. But I am satisfied that the word land in association with the other words, and the context of the entries in the
Inam extract meant that the grant was only of the revenue and it did not include occupancy right which the ryotwari pattadars at the time of the
grant held.
The second appeals are dismissed with costs.
No leave.