Awadhram Bhosle vs Godavari Kaushal

This civil revision filed under Section 23E of the Chhattisgarh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (for short “the Act of 1961”) read with Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short “CPC”) is directed against the impugned order dated 27.07.2019 passed by the Rent Controlling Authority, whereby the application filed by the non-applicant herein (landlord/plaintiff) under Section 23A of the Act of 1961 has been allowed and a decree of eviction has been passed in his favour vis-a-vis the applicant herein (tenant/defendant) has been directed to vacate the suit premises within two months from the date of the order.

The aforesaid impugned order dated 27.07.2019 has been challenged on the following factual backdrop that the original landlord/plaintiff, namely, Suderlal Kaushal, being retired government servant, has filed an application under Section 23A of the Act of 1961 claiming eviction on the ground of bonafide need to evict the defendant/tenant (applicant herein) and put the plaintiff/landlord in possession of the accommodation being Khasra No.763/78, Patwari Halka No.18, R.I.C.- Durg, Tehsil and District Durg (Chhattisgarh) in which the defendant/tenant (applicant herein) is running a shop in the name and style of “Anand Kirana and General Stores” since 15.10.1993. The said application was filed by the plaintiff/landlord on the ground that the plaintiff requires the said shop for business/non-residential purpose and he has no other suitable alternative accommodation of his own in the township of Durg. It has been further averred by the plaintiff/landlord that the said shop was in the name of plaintiff’s wife and after her death the same has been transferred in his name and in the name of his daughter, namely, Godavari Kaushal. The plaintiff has retired from his service and wants to start a business alongwith his daughter’s husband and he does not have any other shop in the city of Durg. During the pendency of the said application, on 04.02.2016, the original plaintiff died and the name of his daughter- Godavari Kaushal was substituted being his legal heir. Further, during the pendency of this revision, Godavari Kaushal also died and her legal heirs have been brought on record in this civil revision.

The tenant/defendant (applicant herein) filed its written statement before the Rent Controlling Authority opposing the said application filed by the plaintiff on the grounds that the plaintiff has two more shops which have also been given on rent and the plaintiff has a shop in the same complex which he got vacated and is lying closed and the same can be used by him for his bonafide need to start a business. Therefore, the plaintiff is not entitled for order of eviction.

The learned Rent Controlling Authority by impugned order dated 27.07.2019 has allowed the application filed by the plaintiff/landlord finding the plaintiff/landlord being able to prove his ground for eviction as provided under Section 23A(b) of the Act of 1961 and thereby directed the tenant/defendant (applicant herein) to vacate the suit premises, against which this revision has been preferred.

Ms. Aditi Singhvi, leaned counsel appearing for the applicant (tenant) submits that since the original plaintiff- Suderlal Kaushal died on 04.02.2016 the application for eviction is not maintainable in light of the decision of Madhya Pradesh High Court in the matter of Santosh Kumar Jaiswal vs. Joseph and another 1994 SCC Online Mp 484 : ILR 1998 MP 785 and further the plaintiff/landlord has failed to prove that he has no other reasonably suitable alternative non-residential accommodation of his own in his occupation/possession in the city of Durg. A such, the impugned order dated 27.07.2019 deserves to be set aside and the present revision deserves to be allowed.

Mr. A.K. Prasad, learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff/landlord (non-applicant) herein supported the impugned order dated 27.07.2019 by submitting that the plaintiff has clearly proved his bonafide need alongwith other grounds for eviction of the tenant/defendant (applicant herein) and, therefore, the learned Rent Controlling Authority has rightly allowed the application filed by the plaintiff/landlord for eviction of the tenant/defendant by recording a finding which is neither perverse nor contrary to the record. Thus, the present revision deserves to be dismissed.

I have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made hereinabove and went through the record with utmost circumspection.

The first ground of challenge is that since the original landlord/plaintiff-Suderlal Kaushal has died on 04.02.2016, the cause of action has come to an end and, therefore, the impugned order of eviction of tenant (applicant herein) is liable to be set aside being bad in law.

True it is that the application for eviction was filed on 17.10.2005 and during the pendency of the application, on 04.02.2016, the original plaintiff/landlord died and, thereafter, the order of eviction was passed on 27.07.2019 and, further, during the pendency of this revision, Smt. Godavri Kaushal (daughter/legal heir of the original plaintiff- Suderlal Kaushal) also died and her legal heirs have been brought on record.

The Supreme Court in the matter of Hukum Chandra (dead) through legal representatives v. Nemi Chand Jain and others (2019) 13 SCC 363 relying upon its earlier decision in the matter of Om Prakash Gupta v. Ranbir B. Goyal (2002) 2 SCC 256 held that rights of the parties stand crystallised on the date of institution of the suit. However, in appropriate cases, court can take note of all the subsequent events. It was further held that the normal rule is that in any litigation the rights and obligations of the parties are adjudicated upon as they obtained at the commencement of the litigation. It was also held that whenever, there is subsequent events of fact or law, which have a material bearing on the rights of the parties to relief or on the aspects of moulding appropriate relief to the parties, the court is not precluded from taking cognizance of the subsequent changes of fact and law to mould the relief. Hukum Chandra’s case (supra) was relating to Section 12(1)(f) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (like the case in hand) and their Lordships of the Supreme Court finding that landlord’s son for whom eviction of the suit premises had been sought, though became gainfully employed after filing of suit, declined to take subsequent event on record and dismissed the appeal filed by tenant affirming decree for eviction.

Similarly, in the matter of D. Sasi Kumar v. Soundararajan (2019) 9 SCC 282, their Lordships of the Supreme Court relying upon its earlier decision in the matter of Gaya Prasad v. Pradeep Srivastava (2001) 2 SCC 604, held that the landlord should not be penalised for the slowness of the legal system and the crucial date for deciding the bona fide requirement of landlord is the date of application for eviction, and retainted the proposition laid down in Gaya Prasad (supra).

The effect of the death of landlord, qua the bona fide need under Section 12(1) (e) & (f) of the Act of 1961 was considered by the Supreme Court in the matter of Shantilal Thakordas and others v. Chimanlal Maganlal Telwala AIR 1976 SC 2358. It was held that if the law permits the eviction of the tenant from the requirement of the landlord “for occupation as a residence for himself and members of his family”, then the requirement was both of the landlord and the members of his family. On his death the right to sue survives to the members of the family of the deceased landlord. It was further held that after the death of the original landlord the senior member of his family takes his place and is well competent to continue the suit for eviction for his occupation and the occupation of the other members of the family.

Similarly, in the matter of Kamleshwar Prasad v. Pradumanju Agarwal (dead) by L.R’s. AIR 1997 SC 2399, their Lordships of the Supreme Court clearly held that even if the landlord died during the pendency of the writ petition in the High Court, the bona fide need cannot be said to have lapsed as the business in question can be carried on by his widow or any elder son. As such, the bona fide need continues and business can be carried on.

The decision of the Supreme Court in Kamleshwar Prasad (supra) has been followed by the M.P. High Court in the matter of Swarnjeet Singh v. Asharam Gamne 2001(1) M.P.H.T. 396 holding that if the bona fide need continues, business can be carried-on by widow of the original landlord or any other elder son.

Similarly, the Supreme Court in the matter of Shakuntala Bai and others v. Narayan Das and others AIR 2004 SC 3484 has held that bona fide need of landlord has to be examined on the date of institution of the proceedings and if decree for eviction is passed, the death of landlord during the proceeding of appeal preferred by tenant will make no difference and his heirs are entitled to defend the estate. It was observed as under: -

“14. Sub-section (1) of Section 12 of the Act says "no suit shall be filed in Civil Court against a tenant for his eviction …". The language employed does not say "no decree shall be passed …". So the bar created is against filing of the suit except on one of the grounds enumerated in clauses (a) to (p) of the sub-section. Therefore what is to be seen is whether the suit was validly filed i.e. whether on the date of filing of the suit one of the grounds was made out. A suit validly filed cannot be scuttled or held no longer maintainable in absence of any specific provision to that effect. Therefore, the principle that "the need of the landlord must exist till the decree for eviction is passed by the last Court and attains finality" can even otherwise have no application here in view of the express language used in the section.

As the preamble shows the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 has been enacted for expeditious trial of eviction cases on the ground of bona fide requirement of landlords and generally to regulate and control eviction of tenants. If the subsequent event like the death of the landlord is to be taken note of at every stage till the decree attains finality, there will be no end to litigation. By the time a second appeal gets decided by the High Court, generally a long period elapses and on such a principle if during this period the landlord who instituted the proceedings dies, the suit will have to be dismissed without going into merits. The same thing may happen in a fresh suit filed by the heirs and it may become an unending process. Taking into consideration the subsequent events may, at times, lead to rendering the whole proceedings taken infructuous and colossal waste of public time. There is no warrant for interpreting a Rent Control legislation in such a manner the basic object of which is to save harassment of tenants from unscrupulous landlords. The object is not to deprive the owners of their properties for all times to come.”

Reverting to the facts of the present case in light of the aforesaid legal position laid down by their Lordships of Supreme Court in the aforementioned judgments, it is quite vivid that in the instant case the learned Rent Controlling Authority has clearly recorded a finding that since the original plaintiff/landlord has succeeded in proving his requirement for bonafide need and he has no other alternative accommodation in the township of Durg and further the date of bonafide need has to be seen on the date of application and merely because due to long drawn pendency of the application for eviction, the original landlord has died, it cannot be held that the bonafide need has come to an end and in view of preposition of law laid down by their Lordships of Supreme Court in the afore-stated judgments, the objection raised in this behalf is hereby over-ruled.

The next ground of challenge in this revision is that the original landlord/ plaintiff has not proved that he has no other reasonably suitable alternative non-residential accommodation of his own in his occupation/possession in the city of Durg. The learned Rent Controlling Authority after carefully perusing the record and considering the written statement has clearly came to the conclusion that the plaintiff/landlord has no other reasonably suitable alternative non-residential accommodation of his own in his occupation/possession in the city of Durg and, therefore, granted a decree of eviction in his favour, which in my considered opinion is a finding of fact based on evidence and same is neither perverse nor contrary to the record.

In that view of the matter, I do not find any merit in this civil revision. It is accordingly dismissed by affirming the order passed by the learned Rent Controlling Authority dated 17.07.2019.

At this stage, Ms. Aditi Singhiv, learned counsel for the tenant (applicant) submits that some reasonable time may be granted to the applicant for vacating the suit premises. Accordingly, three months’ time is granted to the applicant herein (tenant/defendant) to vacate the suit premises and same shall be done on or before 30.08.2023, subject to depositing the entire arrears of rent and filing a proof thereof alongwith an affidavit of his own before the Rent Controlling Authority to the effect that meanwhile he will not alienate or create any third party right or part with the possession within 10 days’ from today. If any of the aforesaid condition is violated, this part of the order shall automatically stands dissolve without reference to the Bench.