Ayub vs Shahista Parveen

K.N. Phaneendra, J.

Petitioners 1 to 6 and their respective counsel and respondent No. 1 and her counsel are present before the Court.

Sri Syed Khaleel Pasha, learned advocate has filed vakalat on behalf of respondent No. 1. It is submitted before the Court that parties have compounded the offences by compromising and resolving the conflict between themselves.

The first respondent and the first petitioner have filed a joint memo. It is specifically stated in the said joint memo that the first respondent is the wife of the first petitioner and the first respondent had lodged a complaint against the petitioners herein for the offences punishable under Sections 406, 498A, 504, 324 r/w. Section 34 of IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act and the same is culminated in CC.No.51782/2013, pending on the file of the XI Additional CMM, Mayohall, Bangalore. It is further stated that due to intervention of the elders, well wishers and the family members, the first petitioner and the first respondent by way of Khula have dissolved their marriage between themselves on 29.9.2014 and the first respondent has agreed to receive a sum of Rs.2,00,000/- by way of Demand Draft towards full and final settlement for herself and her son from the first petitioner.

In view of the submission that petitioner No. 1 and respondent No. 1 have decided to live apart with each other and they do not want to proceed criminal case both of them have sought for quashing of the entire proceedings in CC.No.51782/2013.

Though some of the offences in the said criminal case are non-compoundable in nature, in view of the decisions of the Apex Court in the case of Jitendra Raghuvanshi and Others Vs. Babita Raghuvanshi and Another, and in the case of Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab and Another, , this Court gets absolute jurisdiction to exercise the power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C in appropriate cases to quash the proceedings in respect of non-compoundable offences. The observations made by the Apex Court in GIAN SINGH''S Case (cited supra) are as under:-

"Held, power of High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from power of a criminal court of compounding offences under S. 320 -Cases where power to quash criminal proceedings may be exercised where the parties have settled their dispute, held, depends on facts and circumstances of each case - Before exercise of inherent quashment power under S. 482, High Court must have due regard to nature and gravity of the crime and its societal impact.

Thus, held, heinous and serious offences of mental depravity, murder, rape, dacoity, etc. or under special statues like Prevention of Corruption Act or offences committed by public servants while working in their capacity as public servants, cannot be quashed even though victim or victim''s family and offender have settled the dispute -Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society."

Further, the observations made by the Apex Court in Jitendra Raghuvanshi''s Case (cited supra) are as under:-

"The inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. are wide and unfettered. It is trite to state that the power under Section 482 should be exercises sparingly and with circumspection only when the Court is convinced, on the basis of material on record, that allowing the proceedings to continue would be an abuse of process of court or that the ends of justice require that the proceedings ought to be quashed. Exercise of such power would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and it has to be exercised in appropriate cases in order to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone the courts exist. Thus, the High Court in exercise of its inherent powers can quash the criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint in appropriate cases in order to meet the ends of justice and Section 320 Cr.P.C. does not limit or affect the powers of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

Consequently, even if the offences are non-compoundable, if they relate to matrimonial disputes and the Court is satisfied that the parties have settled the same amicably and without any pressure, it is held that for the purpose of securing ends of justice, Section 320 Cr.P.C. would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing of FIR, complaint or the subsequent criminal proceedings. The institution of marriage occupies an important place and it has an important role to play in the society. Therefore, every effort should be made in the interest of the individuals in order to enable them to settle down in life and live peacefully. If the parties ponder over their defaults and terminate their disputes amicably by mutual agreement instead of fighting it out in a court of law in order to do complete justice in the matrimonial matters, the courts should be less hesitant in exercising their extraordinary jurisdiction. It is the duty of the courts to encourage genuine settlements of matrimonial disputes and Section 482 Cr.P.C. enables the High Court and Article 142 of the Constitution enables the Supreme Court to pass such orders.

In the present case, the appellants (the husband and his relatives, accused under Sections 498A, 406 r/w. Section 34 IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961) had not sought compounding of the offences. They had approached the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing of the criminal proceedings. The High Court ought to have quashed the criminal proceedings in question by accepting the settlement arrived at by the parties concerned."

Looking to the above said facts and circumstances of the case and the observations made by the Apex Court, the disputes between the husband and the wife and as they are purely private and personal in nature, there is no legal impediment to quash the proceedings. Joint memo accepted only with regard to compromise for quashing the proceedings.

Hence, the following order is passed: -

Petition is allowed. Consequently, the entire proceedings in CC.No.51782/2013 pending on the file of XI Additional CMM, Mayohall, Bangalore are hereby quashed.