B. Ranga Reddy vs Collector

These are two appeals Nos. 42 and 43 of 1953 respectively filed by B. Ranga Reddy and the Collector of Hyderabad District and they are directed against the judgment and decree dated 27-4-1953 of the District Judge, Secunderabad. In his appeal B. Ranga Reddy challenges the adequacy of the compensation and costs as awarded by the lower appellate Court and also the area of the lands compulsorily acquired.

The question to be determined in the Collector''s appeal is whether the learned District Judge has erred in raising the amount of compensation from O.S. Rs. 1,94,727/- awarded by the Collector to O.S. Rs. 4,37,353/- and in allowing interest inter alia from 1-9-1946.

B. Ranga Reddy, with industry open to a lay man, ably argued his appeal and opposed that of the Collector at considerable length. Shri Raja Ram Iyer, ably assisted by his learned junior, met the challenge of Shri B. Ranga Reddy with his usual ability and stressed the questions arising in the appeal by the Collector.

The lengthy argument concluded on 21-10-1955, and the judgment was reserved. While perusing the papers for preparing our judgment we wore struck by the absence of the State from the array of parties to the appeal. We had to take note of that fact because of the undermentioned authorities.

In ''Municipal Corporation of Pabna v. Jogendra Narain 13 C WN 116 (A) following the observations made in - ''Ezra v. Secretary of State'' at page 89 of ILR Cal 36 (B), it was held that in a proceeding for the ascertainment of compensation on a reference u/s 18 of the Indian Acquisition Act the claimant is to be regarded as the Plaintiff and the Government as Defendant.

In ''Fakir Chand v. Municipal Committee of Hazra 18 Ind Cas 37 (C), a Bench of the Punjab Chief Court emphatically laid down that in an appeal in the case of land acquisition award, the only person, who can be impleaded as a Respondent is the Secretary of State, and if he is not made a Respondent when the appeal is filed, there is in fact and in law no appeal at all so far as the Respondent is concerned. An appeal cannot be said to be presented when the memorandum of appeal omits the name of the person who alone can be the Respondent to such appeal.

And again in another context die Lahore High Court in - ''Collector and Chairman, District Board, Gujranwala v. Hiranand AIR 1929 Lah 10 (2)(D), decided that a District Board for which property is acquired by a local Government under the Land Acquisition Act is not competent to prefer an appeal from an award of the District Judge in connection with the acquisition, the proper person to appeal in such a case being the Secretary of State for India. The same question came up for decision in the case of - ''Nihalchand v. District Board, Mianwali AIR 1936 Lah 564 (E). It was held therein that.

It appears clear from a reading of the Act and of the authorities, namely ''Fakirchand v. Municipal Committee, Hazra (C)'', and ''Municipal Corporation, Pabna (A)'', (referred to above) that the only party to an appeal of this kind and to the proceeding before the learned District Judge, where the question is as to the amount of compensation or of the area involved in the acquisition is the Secretary of State through the Collector... It now becames clear, therefore, that not only was the appeal not properly constituted here but the award itself of the learned District Judge in which the Secretary of State was not shown as a party at all was a bad award.

In Secretary of State Vs. Shyamapada Banerjee, the facts were that on a reference by Collector as to the amount of compensation, the tribunal made a declaration that the claimant Kalipada Banerjee was entitled to enhanced amount of compensation on the basis of settlements between the claimants to the property. The terms of these settlements were embodied in two petitions of compromise filed before tribunal.

By these settlements, the compensation awarded by the Collector was divided between Kalipada and the other claimants and Kalipada was given the right to get the excess amount of compensation, if any to be awarded by the tribunal. There were certain admissions about Kalipada''s or his representative''s title to the land acquired by the other claimants in these petitions of compromise. One of the questions that arose for determination was in whose presence the claim to the enhanced amount was to be adjudicated by the tribunal. Nasim Ali J. with whom Narsing Rao J. concurred observed as follows:

The only person who will be affected by this determination is the Appellant (the Secretary of State) because he will have to pay the enhanced amount. In the determination of this question in view of the facts of the present case, the persons interested are the Respondents who claim the money and the Appellant against whom money is claimed. The Appellant is the only person interested in opposing the Respondent''s claim. In the events that have happened in this case, the Appellant is not only a proper party but is also a necessary party. There is nothing in Section 20, Land Acquisition Act which militates against this view.

In view of these authorities, we again called upon the parties to appear before us to show cause why the proceeding in the lower Court and the appeals in question be not dealt with in accordance with the ratio decidendi of the case cited in the foregoing lines. B. Ranga Reddy hereinafter to be referred to as the claimant and Shri Raja Ram Iyer addressed us on the preliminary question.

We have to meet the contention of the claimant only since the learned advocate for the Collector did not challenge the correctness of the rule laid down in the above cases except that the Collector can appeal when the question to be determined is limited to the amount of compensation. The claimant however relied on a number of authorities. We need not discuss those authorities in detail because they have no direct bearing on the point in issue.

The only authority cited by him which calls for serious consideration is the case decided by Tendolkar J., In re: Jerbai Framji Metha, . That case related to a reference u/s 18 of the Indian Acquisition Act. Upon its being called upon for hearing, an advocate appeared on behalf of the Government. The counsel for the claimant raised a question as to whether the Government was entitled to appear in a reference u/s 18. Tendolkar J. after examining the scheme of the Indian Act with particular reference to Sections 20, 27(2) and 28 thereof ruled that after the Government has made a declaration u/s 6 of the said Act, it drops out of the reference.

If this decision is taken as a correct guide to the rule according to which these appeals are to be disposed of, the authorities which have led to the present discussion would seem to be wrongly decided and there would apparently be no objection to the validity of the proceeding before the District Judge because of the State or Government not being served with notice, nor to the maintainability of the appeals. To better appreciate the basis on which the decision of the Bombay case rested, we may point out that according to Section 20 of the Indian Act on a reference being received, the Court was bound to cause notices to be issued to:

(a) the applicant,

(b) all persons interested in the objection, except such (if any) of them as have consented without protest to receive payment of the compensation awarded, and

(c) if the objection is in regard to the area of the land or to the amount of the compensation, the Collector.

Section 27(2) provides that:

(1) Every award shall also state the amount of costs incurred in the proceedings under this part, and by what persons and in what proportion they are to be paid,

(2) When the award of the Collector is not upheld, the costs shall ordinarily be paid by the Collector, unless the Court shall be of opinion that the claim of the claimant was so extravagant or that he was so negligent in putting his case before the Collector that some deduction from his costs should be made or that he should pay part of the Collector''s costs.

The wording of Section 20, suggests very strongly that notice on the Collector is necessary only in a case where the objection is in regard to the area of the land or to the amount of compensation. But Section 16 of our Act which otherwise is in pari materia with Section 20 of the Indian Act makes a slight departure therefrom. It lays down that notice is to be issued by the Court to the Collector as a Defendant in cases where the objection is in regard to the amount of compensation. It does not provide for a case where the objection relates to the area of the land as well.

''I''hen on the reasoning adopted in ''Jerbai Framji Metha''s case'', (G) the Collector in view of the provisions of Section 16 of our Act would have no right to defend, as Defendant, the award with respect to the area of the land to be compulsorily acquired. Who, then, is to be served with notice to admit or controvert the issue about the disputed area. That entity, in our opnion, can be no other than the State or Government for the simple reason that the Government or State makes the acquisition compulsorily for itself. That position, inter alia, is in a great measure supported by Clause (2) of Section 22 of our Act. It, in contradistinction to Clause (2) of Section 27 of the Indian Act, says that when the award of the Collector is not upheld the whole of the costs shall be borne by the Sarkar i.e., the Government.

As against this legal position, the learned claimant attempted to find an escape by contending that having regard to the object of the Act and functions entrusted thereby to the Collector, the Collector and Government must be interpreted to be inter-changeable terms. But unfortunately these terms convey a different meaning. ''Talukdar'' (Collector) has been defined in Section 2 of the Act to mean ''''the officer in charge of the Revenue administration of a district and also includes an officer whom Sarkar-e-Ali (the Government) appoints for purposes of this Act."

The very definition of ''Talukdar'' (Collector) brings out the distinction between the Collector and the Government and they by no stretch of imagination can ever be said to convey the same meaning or are interchangeable terms as contended by the claimant. The other argument of the claimant was that the expression in Section 16 of the Act that ''''when objection is to the compensation of the land" must, be read as "when objection is to the compensation and area of the land".

In contending thus, it is forgotten that Courts are not competent to introduce words which the Legislature has not used. The Hyderabad Legislature has before it the Indian Land Acquisition Act as a model but they preferred to make a slight departure from the provisions of Section 20 of the Indian Act. The will of the Legislature will have to be given effect and not some interpretation which may suit the convenience of the claimant.

Now in the claimant''s appeal consistent with the objections in his application to the Collector u/s 14 of the Act the contest relates not "only to the amount of the compensation but also to the area of the land and the costs not awarded by the District Judge despite the fact that the award of the Collector had not been upheld by him.

In this state of law, it can safely be laid down that the District Judge had no jurisdiction to decide the issue of area and the question of costs without serving notice on the State or the Government, and for the matter of that we too possess, no competence to dispose of those issues without some one to represent the concerned party. In view of the fact that the State had not been a party to the proceeding before the District Judge, we cannot implead it under Rule 20 of Order 41, CPC in these appeals.

In so far as the enhanced amount of compensation is concerned, the Collector''s appeal would seem to be in order but the difficulty is that we are incapable of adjudicating upon that issue unless we are in a position to determine the exact area of the land.

In these circumstances, the proper course would appear to be to send back the case to the learned District Judge for serving notice on the State and for determining thereafter the area of the land after due inquiry and also the question of costs.

For the reasons stated above, we remand the case to the District Judge, Secunderabad to be dealt with in accordance with law. After this is done, the Appellants in both the appeals, which will be governed by this common judgment, if dissatisfied with the award of the Court below, can appeal again to this Court. The Appellants in each appeal would be entitled to a certificate for the refund of the court-fee paid on their respective memorandum of appeal. We make no order as to costs in both the appeals.