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Judgment
Petitioner was an employee of Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation (''Corporation'' for short). By an order dated 3-6-1988, the Appellate Authority confirmed the orders made by the disciplinary authority dated 6-3-1987, as a result of which, petitioner has approached this Court in a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution inter alia contending that the order imposing punishment by the disciplinary authority and confirmed by the Appellate Authority is vitiated and the orders are illegal and invalid, inasmuch as the circular instructions issued by the Corporation is only prospective and such circular could not have been issued by respondent-Corporation which would interfere with the discretion and functioning of quasi-judicial authority like disciplinary authority.
Most of the facts are not in dispute. Petitioner while working as Divisional Controller, Mangalore Division, Mangalore was served with a charge memo dated 16-9-1985 containing charges of misconduct as Divisional Manager. Along with the charge memo, petitioner was also furnished with statement of imputations, list of witnesses and documents. The delinquent officer was asked to offer his explanation to the charge memo within 10 days of the receipt of the memo as the enquiry was proposed to be held against him. By reply dated 9-10-1985, petitioner filed his written-statement of defence in detail, denying that he had committed the acts of misconduct as alleged in the charge memo on the various dates which constituted acts of misconduct and insubordination. Since the explanation offered by the delinquent was not satisfactory, the disciplinary authority appointed an Enquiry Officer who after holding the enquiry submitted his report together with the records of the enquiry proceedings and other documents to the disciplinary authority. In the Enquiry Officer''s view, the delinquent is not guilty of anyone of the charges alleged in the memo. The disciplinary authority after disagreeing with the findings of the Enquiry Officer and after reappreciating the evidence on record, being of the view that the petitioner is guilty of the offences alleged in the memo, passed an order dated 6-3-1987, imposing the following punishment. The same reads as under:
"In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-regulation (2) of Regulation 19 read with the Schedule appended thereto of the Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation Servants (Conduct and Discipline), Regulation, 1971. I, N. Vishwanathan, Vice-Chairman and Managing Director, KSRTC, being the disciplinary authority order that:
(1) The pay of Sri B. Sreenivasaiah, be and is reduced by two stages in the time scale which will have permanent effect and consequently operative for the remaining period of his service.
(2) He will not be considered for promotion to the next higher grade/post for a period of five years.
(3) The suspension of Sri Sreenivasaiah pending enquiry is revoked.
(4) The intervening period from the date of suspension pending enquiry to the date he resumes duty by the order above be and is treated as period spent not on duty.
(5) He is posted to work as Mechanical Engineer - Head Quarters (M) C.O., in the leave vacancy of Sri K.S. Mensinkai who has proceeded on leave, with direction to report for duty within 24 hours from the receipt of this order".
Disturbed by this order, petitioner had filed an appeal before the Appellate Authority as provided under the Conduct Rules of the Corporation, who in turn by his order dated 3-6-1988, rejected the appeal on merits and confirmed the orders made by the disciplinary authority.
Though numerous grounds are raised in support of the prayer for quashing the orders of appellate and disciplinary authorities, what has been really pressed into service is, the contention that the circular instruction issued by respondent-Corporation is prospective and governs the cases arising after 15-1-1985 and it has no application to those cases which had arisen and decided before that date. The second contention is that the Corporation could not have issued instruction through their circular, which would interfere with the discretion and functioning of quasi-judicial authority like the Divisional Controller and at any rate, the contravention of those instructions cannot be termed as acts of misconduct and the disciplinary authority could not have held the disciplinary enquiry in respect of conduct of an officer in discharge of his quasi-judicial duties. The third contention is that the failure to give notice by the disciplinary authority to the petitioner when he disagreed with the findings of the Enquiry Officer would vitiate the proceedings. A feeble argument was advanced that the charges are vague and lack material particulars and the delinquent was prevented from effectively filing his explanation by way of defence and therefore, proceedings are opposed to rules of natural justice. Lastly, it was submitted that the allegations made in the charge memo do not constitute misconduct.
Sri B.B. Mandappa, learned Counsel for the respondents ably supported the impugned orders and resisted the reliefs sought for by petitioner.
The charge memo dated 16-9-1985 contains charges of misconduct. In that, it is alleged that delinquent while working as Divisional Controller of Mangalore Division of the Corporation had wilfully disobeyed the orders of Chief Executive of the Corporation conveyed through circular bearing No. KST:CO:ADM:Rules 2627 of 84-85, dated 15-1-1985 regarding the conductors in the waiting list who are involved in "Red Mark" cases. Secondly, they accuse him of repeatedly and successively imposing ineffective punishments on 18 conductors despite they being caught in "red mark" cases, thereby allowing the chronic defaulters to thrive with impunity and failing to safeguard the interest of the Corporation.
Delinquent had denied the charges alleged against him in his reply to the charge memo. In so far as the first charge, the delinquent in his explanation states that the circular dated 15-1-1985 is prospective in operation and governs cases arising after 15-1-1985 and it has no application to the cases that had arisen before that date. This assertion of the delinquent is contrary to the facts alleged in the imputation of misconduct served on the petitioner along with the charge memo. In the statement of imputations, respondents refer to nearly 18 cases where the delinquent is said to have imposed ineffective punishments in disobedience of the circular instructions dated 15-1-1985, wherein the Chief Executive of the Corporation instructs that the conductors in the waiting list who are caught in "red mark" cases should be compulsorily removed from the "badli list'' following the procedure prescribed. The cases referred to by the respondents in their statement of imputation not only refers to cases decided by the delinquent prior to issuance of the circular but also cases after issuing and circulating the circular dated 15-1-1985. The circular is issued by the Head of the organisation. It has the binding effect on its subordinate authorities. Petitioner could not have ignored the instructions contained in the circular and could not have imposed lesser and ineffective punishment that what was indicated in the circular. Petitioner justifies his action only by saying that all the 18 cases referred to in the charge-sheet is of the conductors caught in "red mark" cases prior to issue of circular dated 15-1-1985 which is wholly contrary to the facts stated in the statement of imputation. The disciplinary authority taking into consideration the circular instructions and its binding effect on the subordinate officers of the department holds that the delinquent is guilty of the charge of disobeying the lawful orders of Chief Executive of the Corporation conveyed through circular dated 15-1-1985. I do not think that the disciplinary authority has committed any error in coming to that conclusion since the allegations that are made against the petitioner pertains not only to those cases which were considered and decided by him prior to the issuance of circular but also those cases arising after issuance and communication of the circular to the unit heads. Therefore, first contention of the learned Counsel deserves to be rejected and it is rejected.
The second contention of the learned Counsel is that the disciplinary authority could not have held any inquiry, much less disciplinary enquiry against the petitioner in respect of the conduct of an officer in discharge of his quasi-judicial duties. The subsidiary contention is that violation of circular instructions issued by the Chief Executive Officer of the Corporation by the Divisional Controller while discharging its quasi-judicial function cannot be construed as misconduct. In my view, this contention of the learned Counsel is no more a debatable issue in view of the observations made by the Supreme Court in Union of India v Upendra Singh. The Court was pleased to observe as under:
"13. Before parting with this case, we may refer to the decision of this Court in Union of India v K.K. Dhawan. Following A.N. Saxena, this Court held that a disciplinary inquiry can be held even with respect to the conduct of an officer in discharge of his judicial or quasi-judicial duties. Having said so, this Court set out the situations in which disciplinary action can be taken with respect to the judicial/quasi-judicial conduct. Paragraphs 28 and 29 of the judgment will bring out the ratio: (SCC p. 67, paras 28 and 29).
"28. Certainly, therefore, the officer who exercises judicial or quasi-judicial powers acts negligently, recklessly or in order to confer undue favour on a person is not acting as a Judge. Accordingly, the contention of the respondent has to be rejected. It is important to bear in mind that in the present case, we are not concerned with the correctness or legality of the decision of the respondent but the conduct of the respondent in discharge of his duties as an officer. The legality of the orders with reference to the nine assessments may be questioned in appeal or revision under the Act. But we have no doubt in our mind that the Government is not precluded from taking the disciplinary action for violation of the Conduct Rules. Thus, we conclude that the disciplinary action can be taken in the following cases.
(i) where the officer had acted in a manner as would reflect on his reputation for integrity or good faith or devotion to duty;
(ii) if there is prime facie material to show recklessness or misconduct in the discharge of his duty;
(iii) if he has acted in a manner which is unbecoming of a Government servant;
(iv) if he had acted negligently or that he omitted the prescribed conditions which are essential for the exercise of the statutory powers;
(v) if he had acted in order to unduly favour a party;
(vi) if he had been actuated by corrupt motive, however small the bribe may be because Lord Coke said long ago "though the bribe may be small, yet the fault is great".
The instances above catalogued are not exhaustive. However, we may add that for a mere technical violation or merely because the order is wrong and the action not falling under the above enumerated instances, disciplinary action is not warranted here we may utter a word of caution. Each case will depend upon the facts and no absolute rule can be postulated".
In view of the law declared by the Apex Court. I do not think any elaborate discussion is required on this issue. In that view of the matter, the second issue raised by learned Counsel for the petitioner has no merit and accordingly, it is rejected.
Now coming to the third issue, even this issue should not detain me for long, in view of the observations made by the Supreme Court in the case of State Bank of India, Bhopal v S.S. Koshal. In the said decision, the Court was pleased to observe as under:
"6. So far as the second ground is concerned, we are unable to see any substance in it. No such fresh opportunity is contemplated by the regulations nor can such a requirement be deduced from the principles of natural justice. It may be remembered that the Enquiry Officer''s report is not binding upon the disciplinary authority and that it is open to the disciplinary authority to come to its own conclusion on the charges. It is not in the nature of an appeal from the Enquiry Officer to the disciplinary authority. It is one and the same proceeding. It is open to a disciplinary authority to hold the enquiry himself. It is equally open to him to appoint an Enquiry Officer to conduct the enquiry and place the entire record before him with or without his findings. But in either case, the final decision is to be taken by him on the basis of the material adduced. This also appears to be the view taken by one of us B.P. Jeevan Reddy, J. as a judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in (1983)3 Serv. LR 319 at 324 and 325 : (1984) LabIC 1478 2. The second contention accordingly stands rejected".
Respectfully following the dicta of the Apex Court in the aforesaid decision, the third contention of the learned Counsel is rejected.
Insofar as the fourth and the last contention of the learned Counsel is concerned, the settled position of law is that, the charges should contain particulars and should be specific and not vague, otherwise it will vitiate the entire enquiry proceedings. Whether charges are vague or not, has to be examined in the light of the circumstances of each case. A reading of the charge memo dated 10-9-1985 would definitely indicate that the charge-sheet is not so vague or so general as to make it impossible for making effective representation. In my view, charges alleged in the charge memo is capable of being understood and sufficiently definite for the delinquent official to make effective representation and therefore, it cannot be said that the enquiry is vitiated on account of omission of particulars, and the delinquent was prejudiced in any manner, whatsoever. Accordingly, this issue also has no merit and accordingly, it is rejected.
These are the only four issues raised by learned Counsel Sri Narayana Bhat for petitioner. Since I have negatived all the contentions canvassed, the petition deserves to be dismissed.
For the reasons stated, there is no merit in the petition and accordingly, it is dismissed. Rule discharged. No order as to costs.