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Judgment
7 paragraphs · 451 wordsN. Ananda, J.—There is inordinate delay of 1723 days in filing revision petition. The trial court had convicted petitioner for an offence punishable u/s 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (for short, ''the Act''). The petitioner was before I-appellate court in Criminal Appeal No. 544/2004. The appeal was dismissed on merits in terms of judgment dated 07.06.2005. The petitioner has filed instant petition on 26.05.2010. There is inordinate delay of 1723 days in filing revision petition. In support of the application (IA No. 1/2010) filed u/s 5 of the Limitation Act, petitioner has stated that he was not aware of the judgment passed by I-appellate court. It is only on 20.04.2010, agents of respondent came to the house of petitioner for money saying that his appeal got dismissed long back and demanded to comply the order passed by trial court. Therefore, petitioner preferred the appeal.
The petitioner was a party to the proceedings. He cannot be permitted to plead ignorance of the proceedings or the result of the proceedings.
In a decision reported in Lanka Venkateswarlu (D) by L.Rs. Vs. State of A.P. and Others, the Supreme Court has held:
We are at a loss to fathom any logic or rationale, which could have impelled the High Court to condone the delay after holding the same to be unjustifiable. The concepts such as liberal approach", justice oriented approach", "substantial justice" can not be employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation. Especially, in cases where the Court concludes that there is no justification for the delay. In our opinion, the approach adopted by the High Court tends to show the absence of judicial balance and restraint, which a Judge is required to maintain whilst adjudicating any lis between the parties. We are rather pained to notice that in this case, not being satisfied with the use of mere intemperate language, the High Court resorted to blatant sarcasms.
The use of unduly strong intemperate or extravagant language in a judgment has been repeatedly disapproved by this Court in a number of cases. Whilst considering applications for condonation of delay u/s 5 of the Limitation Act, the Courts do not enjoy unlimited and unbridled discretionary powers. All discretionary powers, especially judicial powers, have to be exercised within reasonable bounds, known to the law. The discretion has to be exercised in a systematic manner informed by reason. Whims or fancies; prejudices or predilections can not and should not form the basis of exercising discretionary powers.
In the case on hand, petitioner has failed to establish sufficient cause to condone inordinate delay of 1723 days in filing the revision petition.
Therefore, IA No. 1/2010, as also revision petition are dismissed.
