Babasaheb Kedar Ginning Pressing Va Prakriya Sanstha Ltd., Saoner vs Additional Collector, Nagpur and another

(NAGPUR BENCH)

S. K. Shah, J.—The learned Single Judge dealing with this writ petition by his order dated 25th September 1997, has made this Reference on a issue whether the Appellate Authority under the C. P. and Berar Letting of Premises and Rent Control Order, 1949 is a "Court" to which the provisions of section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act apply.

This Reference has occasioned because of the divergent views of different Benches of this Court on the point.

In the present petition, the Rent Controller had passed an order in favour of the present petitioner granting him permission to issue notice to the respondent/tenant for eviction from the rent premises under the provisions of the C. P. and Berar Letting of Premises and Rent Control Order, 1949 (for short, the "C. P. and Berar Rent Control Order, 1949"). The respondent had preferred appeal before the Appellate Authority u/s 21 of the C. P. and Berar Rent Control Order, 1949 being the Additional Collector, Nagpur and since there was delay in filing of the appeal, the respondent had filed an application for condonation of delay u/s 5 of the Limitation Act. By the impugned order dated 23rd October 1996, the Additional Collector, Nagpur condoned the delay in filing the appeal. The present writ petition has been filed against the said order. The same landlord, as the petitioner, has also filed similar writ petition, being Writ Petition No. 534 of 1997 against the similar order passed by the Additional Collector, Nagpur condoning the delay in filing appeal before him by another tenant against whom the petitioner/landlord has obtained order of permission to issue notice of eviction from the Rent Controller.

As the matter came up for hearing, it was noticed that number of such writ petitions have been filed against the order passed by the Additional Collector, Nagpur either granting the application for condonation of delay or refusing the same on the ground that he had no jurisdiction u/s 5 of the Limitation Act. All those petitions were ordered to be joined with this petition as the common question of law has arisen. Those Writ Petitions are, Writ Petitions No. 1106 of 98, 244 of 97, 1927 of 98, 1967 of 98, 2083 of 98, 217 of 98, 2659 of 98, 2781 of 98, 2782 of 98 and 3903 of 99 all of which have been filed by the tenant as the Rent Control Appellate Authority, viz. the Additional Collector, Nagpur refused to pass any order on the tenant''s application for condonation of delay for want of jurisdiction. Lastly, Writ Petition No. 1981 of 98 has been filed by the landlord against the order passed by the Additional Collector on 18-12-1997 holding that he had no jurisdiction to pass an order for condonation of delay in filing the appeal against the order passed by the Rent Controller refusing the permission to issue quit notice to the tenant.

All these writ petitions have occasioned as a result of the ruling of this Court in the case of Dinesh Dande Vs. Somani Radio Corporation and Others, , in which the learned Single Judge of this Court took the view that the Authority, viz. the Additional Collector, Nagpur exercising appellate powers under the Rent Control Order was not the "Court" and, therefore, he had no jurisdiction u/s 5 of the Limitation Act to consider and decide the application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal.

However, in earlier two judgments of this Court in the case of Ranchoddas Atmaram Bairagi and another vs. Gupta Brass Stores and others, reported in 1983 Mh.L.J. 933 (decided by V. A. Mohta, J.- as he then was) and that in the case of Bhagwantibai wd/o Shrigovind Agrawal vs. Damodar Sheoprasad Agrawal; 1990 Mh.L.J. 1097 (decided by H. W. Dhabe, J. - as he then was), view has been taken that the Appellate Authority exercising powers u/s 21 of the C. P. and Berar Rent Control Order, 1949 had jurisdiction to entertain and decide application for condonation of delay preferred u/s 5 of the Limitation Act.

As a result of these divergent views, the present Reference has been made.

The earlier two judgments of the Single Benches of this Court were not brought to the notice of the Single Bench of this Court in Dinesh''s case wherein the view was taken that the Appellate Authority acting u/s 21 of the C. P. and Berar Rent Control Order, 1949 had no jurisdiction u/s 5 of the Limitation Act. The learned Single Judge in Dinesh''s case had taken into consideration the provisions of Clause 21(2-a) of the C. P. and Berar Rent Control Order, 1949 as also the provisions of section 29(2) of the Limitation Act and by relying on the rulings of the Apex Court in the case of Nityanand M. Joshi and others vs. Life Insurance Corporation of India and others, reported in 1970 Mh.L.J. 439 (SC) and in the case of Smt. Sushila Devi Vs. Ramanandan Prasad and Others, , took the following view :-

Though the limitation provided in sub-clause (2-a) of the Rent Control Order may be treated as special law, but since the Reviewing Authority is not a Court as contemplated, sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act shall not be attracted. Sub-clause (2-a) of clause 21 of the Rent Control Order for the purpose of limitation is self-contained in the matter of review of the order passed by the Appellate Authority. It is true that for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed by any special law, section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, to the extent it is not expressly excluded by any special law, may be attracted, but since the Reviewing Authority is not a Court, the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act shall not apply." 9. For proper appreciation of the view of the learned Single Judge, it would be advantageous to reproduce the relevant provisions. Clause 21 (2-a) of the C. P. and Berar Rent Control Order, 1949 reads as under :-

"21 (2-a). The Collector may, either on his own motion at any time on the application of any party interested made within ninety days of the passing of an order, review any order passed by himself or any of his predecessors-in-office and pass such order in reference thereof as he thinks fit so however that no order shall be varied or reversed unless notice has been given to the parties interested to appear and be heard in support of such order."

Since in the instant petition before us, the provisions of providing for appeal are concerned, those provisions of section 21(1) read as under:-

"21(1). Any person aggrieved by an order of the Controller may, within fifteen days from the date on which the order is communicated to him, present an appeal in writing to the Collector of the district: Provided that in computing the period prescribed above, the time properly taken in obtaining a copy of the order complained of shall be excluded."

Thus, it would be seen that the Collector has powers to review his own orders either sua motu or on an application of party made within 90 days of the passing of an order. The appellate provision of section 21(1) indicates that any person aggrieved by an order of the controller has to file an appeal in writing to the Collector of the District within fifteen days from the date on which an order is communicated to him i.e. aggrieved person. The proviso indicates that in computing the period prescribed above, the time properly taken for obtaining copy of the order complained of, has to be excluded. In all the aforesaid petitions, the appeals were not filed before the Collector or the Additional Collector who is invested with the powers under the C. P. and Berar Rent Control Order, 1949, within fifteen days from the date of order or communication of the order. They sought to take help of section 5 of the Limitation Act to condone the delay in filing the appeal. As such, the aforesaid appellate provisions of the C. P. and Berar Rent Control Order and the provisions of the Limitation Act, particularly section 5 and section 29(2) of the Limitation Act are relevant for our purpose and it will be advantageous to set out those provisions for ready reference.

Section 5 of the Limitation Act prescribes as under :-

"5. Extension of prescribed period in certain cases. - Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) may be admitted after the prescribed period, if the appellant or the applicant satisfied the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period."

Sub-section (2) of section 29 of the Limitation Act reads as under :-

"(2). Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only insofar as and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law."

Sub-section (2) of section 29 of the Limitation Act indicates that where any special or local law prescribes a period of limitation for any suit, appeal or application, then the provisions of section 3 of the Limitation Act would apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and it further provides that for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (of the Limitation Act) shall apply only insofar as and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. In other words, the provisions of sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act will apply for determining the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal of application except where the special or local law expressly excludes the application of sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act. Section 21(1) of the C. P. and Berar Rent Control Order prescribes fifteen days limitation for filing an appeal against the order of the Controller. It also prescribes that in computing the period of fifteen days, the time taken in obtaining the copy of the order shall have to be excluded. Thus, it will be seen that there is no express provision either in section 21 or any other provisions of the C. P. and Berar Rent Control Order, 1949 excluding the application of the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act.

As could be seen from the observations of the learned Single Judge in Dinesh''s case (supra), this aspect was taken into consideration by the learned Judge. However, he further added that the Reviewing Authority as it was concerned before him and even the Appellate Authority under the Rent Control Order, as it is relevant in the instant case before us, was not the "Court". The learned Single Judge, however, took the view that section 5 of the Limitation Act and all other provisions of the relevant Act apply to the suits, applications and appeals which are required to be filed under the provisions of the CPC before "Courts" and, therefore, all the provisions of Limitation Act including section 5 apply only to the "Courts". He further took the view that the Reviewing or the Appellate Authority for that matter under the C. P. and Berar Rent Control Order was not the Court and, therefore, such Authority had no jurisdiction u/s 5 of the Limitation Act to condone the delay in filing the appeal within the period prescribed under the relevant provisions.

The main question, therefore, that arises for consideration is, whether the Authority either Reviewing or appellate under the C. P. and Berar Rent Control Order, 1949 is or is not the Court. If it is held that it is a Court, then obviously it will have jurisdiction to invoke provisions of the Limitation Act including section 5 thereof and condone the delay. However, if it is held that it is not a Court, then obviously such Authority will have no authority to condone the delay.

It has to be noted that there is no controversy as to the fact that the C. P. and Berar Rent Control Order, 1949 is a local law prescribing limitation for review/appeal against the order of the Controller. Therefore, that prescribed period will apply and not any other, even prescribed under the Limitation Act. As observed above, there is also clear provision in sub-section (2) of section 29 of the Limitation Act which says that even in such cases where the special or local law prescribes limitation for filing suit, application or appeal, the provisions of sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act would automatically be attracted if the special or local law does not expressly exclude their application.

Thus, the point that needs to be considered is, whether the Authorities exercising powers under the C. P. and Berar Rent Control Order, 1949 can be said to be the Court. On this aspect, the learned counsel for petitioner submitted that there are number of authorities of this Court as also of other High Courts holding that the Authorities working under the Rent Control Order, 1949 were not the Courts, but they were quasi-judicial authorities. In other words, it is submitted that the Authorities under the Rent Control Order, 1949 are exercising functions not as Court, but only as quasi-judicial authority. As such, these Authorities cannot be said to be the Court, as contemplated by the provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act.

The authorities cited in support of this submission are, 1976 Mh.L.J. Note 54, 1964 Mh.L.J. Note 65 and 1963 Mh. L.J. Note 28. Even so there can be no dispute as to the fact that the Authorities exercising powers under the Rent Control Order have to decide the dispute between the landlord and the tenant and such decision has to be judicious. At any rate, it is clear that the function of the Authorities under the C. P. and Berar Rent Control Order is not an administrative function. This aspect has been very elaborately dealt with by the Single Bench of this Court (Mohta. J) in the case of Ranchhodas vs. Gupta Brass Stores and others (cited supra). The learned Single Judge had scanned and examined all the provisions of the C. P. and Berar Rent Control Order, 1949 and concluded that although the Authorities exercising powers under the Rent Control Order, not in strict sense of the Court, but all the same they were exercising the function of judicial nature and in exercising their powers under the Rent Control Order, possessed several attributes of Courts which make them Courts. Having made such observation, the learned Judge held that the Authority under the C. P. and Berar Rent Control Order, 1949 had jurisdiction under the Limitation Act. The relevant observations are as under :-

"7. It is thus clear that any adjudication under the HRC Order has to be preceded by judicial enquiry which necessarily means, summoning and/or compelling the presence of parties and their witnesses and their examination on oath. The authorities perform certain duties which otherwise would have fallen on the ordinary Courts. Legal practitioners are allowed and several complicated questions of law and fact are seriously argued and decided. It is a matter of common knowledge that fight before the authorities under the HRC Order is bitter than in Civil Courts to the exclusion of which here certain judicial functions are performed. There is a power to execute the order and/or to secure compliance of provisions and to prevent its breaches. Regular appeal, its hearing, review all are provided for. The judgments are definite and authoritative. Above all the powers are derived from the State under a Statute and some of them are judicial powers of the State. It is thus apparent that the authorities do possess several attributes which make them Courts.''''

In another ruling of this Court by the learned Single Judge (H. W. Dhabe, J) in the case of Bhagwantibai vs. Damodar Agrawal (supra), similar question was considered as to the applicability of the provisions of sections 5 and 29(2) of the Limitation Act. The learned Judge held that in view of the provisions of section 29(2) and as in the Rent Control Order, which is a local law, there is no express provision excluding the application of the provisions of sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act, the Authority exercising powers under the C. P. and Berar Rent Control Order, 1949 had jurisdiction u/s 5 of the Limitation Act to condone the delay. In the aforesaid ruling the learned Single Judge had taken into consideration several rulings of different High Courts as also the Apex Court and mainly relied upon the ruling of the Apex Court reported in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Another Vs. Mst. Katiji and Others, . Besides this, there are number of rulings of different High Courts who had occasion to consider the applicability of section 5 of the Limitation Act in respect of exercise of powers by the Authorities under the Rent Control Order and the view taken in all such cases was that such Authorities has jurisdiction u/s 5 of the Limitation Act to condone the delay. We do not find it necessary to deal with those authorities in detail, as we, hereinafter, would take into consideration and rely on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Mukri Gopalan Vs. Cheppilat Puthanpurayil Aboobacker, which deals with all the aspects of the matter. Suffice it to mention the citations of the few authorities of the different High Courts and the Apex Court. They are, Bandobanji Mutalik vs. Bhaskar Kulkarni, AIR 1972 Mysore 311; Shantilal vs. Shantibai, 1985 SCC 578 Tamil Nadu Buildings Rent Control Act; Gopal Dass and Others Vs. Nathulal Baraya, ; Gedda Durga Malleswara Rao Vs. Ranga Panaiah and Bros., .

The entire controversy regarding the Authorities exercising jurisdiction under the Rent Control Order and as to whether have powers u/s 5 of the Limitation Act to condone the delay, has been set at rest by the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Mukri Gopalan vs. Cheppilal (supra). In the said case the Apex Court was considering the provisions of section 18 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act and the powers of the Appellate Authority under the said Act. It was also the question for consideration before the Apex Court, whether such Appellate Authority constituted u/s 18 of the said Act was Court and whether the provisions of the Limitation Act could be attracted while considering the application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal. By examining those provisions as also the provisions of section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, the Apex Court held that the Appellate Authority functioning under the said provisions was functioning as a Court and that in view of the provisions of section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, such Appellate Authority had jurisdiction u/s 5 of the Limitation Act to condone the delay, as in the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, (for brevity), the "Kerala Rent Act") there was no express provision excluding the application of sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act. Relying on the earlier Apex Court''s decisions in the case of Shri Virindar Kumar Satyawadi Vs. The State of Punjab, and Brajnandan Sinha Vs. Jyoti Narain, , the Supreme Court took the view that the Appellate Authority constituted u/s 18 of the Kerala Rent Act had all the essential trappings to constitute such authority as a Court, by making the following observations :- "8. Once it is held that the Appellate Authority functioning u/s 18 of the Rent Act is not a persona designata, it becomes obvious that it functions as a Court. In the present case all the District Judges having jurisdiction over the areas within which the provisions of the Rent Act have been extended are constituted as appellate authorities u/s 18 by the Government notification noted earlier. These District Judges have been conferred the powers of the appellate authorities. It becomes, therefore, obvious that while adjudicating upon the dispute between the landlord and tenant and which deciding the question whether the Rent Control Court''s order is justified or not such appellate authorities would be functioning as Courts. The test for determining whether the authority is functioning as a Court or not has been laid down by a series of decisions of this Court. We may refer to one of them in the case of Thakur Jugal Kishore Sinha Vs. Sitamarhi Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. and Another, . In that case this Court was concerned with the question whether the Assistant Registrar of Co-operative Societies functioning u/s 48 of the Bihar and Orissa Co-operative Societies Act, 1935 was a Court subordinate to the High Court for the purpose of Contempt of Courts Act, 1952. While answering the question in the affirmative, a division bench of this Court speaking through Mitter, J. placed reliance amongst others on the observations found in the case of Brajnandan Sinha Vs. Jyoti Narain, wherein it was observed as under (para 18 of the AIR):-

It is clear, therefore, that in order to constitute a Court in the strict sense of the term, an essential condition is that the Court should have apart from having some of the trappings of a judicial tribunal power to give a decision or a definite judgment which has finality and authoritativeness which are the essential tests of a judicial pronouncement.

Reliance was also placed on another decision of this Court in the case of The Sree Meenakshi Mills, Ltd. Vs. Their Workmen, . Following observations found at page 1018 (of SCR) (at p. 157 of AIR) therein were pressed in service.

"It may be stated broadly that what distinguishes a Court from a quasi-judicial tribunal is that it is charged with a duty to decide disputes in a judicial manner and declares the rights of parties in a definitive judgment. To decide in a judicial manner involves that the parties are entitled as a matter of right to be heard in support of their claim and to adduce evidence in proof of it. And it also imports an obligation on the part of the authority to decide the matter on consideration of evidence adduced and in accordance with law. When a question therefore arises as to whether an authority created by an Act is a Court as distinguished from a quasi-judicial tribunal. What has to be decided is whether having regard to the provisions of the Act it possesses all the attributes of a Court.

In the aforesaid well-settled tests for deciding whether an authority is a Court or not, are applied to the powers and functions of the Appellate Authority constituted u/s 18 of the Rent Act it becomes obvious that all the aforesaid essential trappings to constitute such an authority as a Court are found to be present."

As regards the application of section 29 (2) of the Act, the Apex Court observed that there were two requirements to be satisfied by the Authority invoking these provisions and set out those requirements as under :-

"(i). There must be a provision for period of limitation under any special or local law in connection with any suit, appeal or application, (ii) The said prescription of period of limitation under such special or local law should be different from the period prescribed by the schedule to the Limitation Act." The Apex Court held that if these two requirements are satisfied, then consequences contemplated by section 29(2) would automatically follow. The Apex Court then laid down the consequences as under :-

"(i). In such a case section 3 of the Limitation Act would apply as if the period prescribed by the special or local law was the period prescribed by the schedule.

(ii) For determining any period of limitation prescribed by such special or local law for a suit, appeal or application all the provisions containing Ss. 4 to 24 (inclusive) would apply insofar as and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law."

Thus, it is clear that if the Authorities acting under the C. P. and Berar Rent Control Order, 1949 are held to be the Court, then the provisions of section 29(2) of the Limitation Act would automatically apply and the aforesaid consequences would follow, in that, the provisions of sections 4 to 24 (both inclusive) of the Limitation Act would apply insofar as and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by the special or local law (here, the C. P. and Berar Rent Control Order, 1949). Under these circumstances, it is clear that the Reviewing or the Appellate Authority exercising powers under the Rent Control Order will have jurisdiction u/s 5 of the Limitation Act to condone the delay in filing the said proceedings, viz. review/appeal.

The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner had tried to make out a distinction regarding the provisions of the Kerala Rent Act which were for consideration of the Apex Court in Mukri Gopalan''s case (supra) and the provisions of the C. P. and Berar Rent Control Order, 1949. In the Kerala Rent Act, the Authority exercising powers was termed as Rent Control Court. In the C. P. and Berar Rent Control Order, 1949, it is termed as Rent Controller. The Appellate Authority in the Kerala Rent Act is the District Judge whereas under the C. P. and Berar Rent Control Order, 1949, the Authority exercising appellate powers is the Collector or the Additional Collector for that matter. Therefore, it is submitted on behalf of the petitioner that the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in Mukri Gopalan''s case will not be attracted so far as the provisions of the C. P. and Berar Rent Control Order, 1949, are concerned. However, this submission does not appear to be correct. Merely because the Authority exercising powers under the Kerala Rent Act is termed as Rent Control Court, it does not automatically become Court as contemplated by the provisions of the Limitation Act. This is clear from the provisions of section 3 of the Kerala Rent Act which has been reproduced in the aforesaid decision of the Apex Court and it provides, "the Government may by Notification, appoint a person who is or is qualified to be appointed Munsiff to be the Rent Control Court for such local area". This makes it clear that it is not the Court as contemplated under the CPC or the Limitation Act although it is termed as Rent Control Court. The person exercising powers under the Kerala Rent Act was not Munsiff, but was a person who is or is qualified to be appointed as Munsiff and his appointment was to be made by Notification issued by the Government. Similar is the case in the provisions of the C. P. and Berar Rent Control Order, 1949. As per the provisions of section 2(1) of the said Order, ''''Controller" means an officer appointed to exercise the powers of a Controller under the said Order. Similarly, u/s 18 of the Kerala Rent Act, the Government was authorised by general or special order notified in the gazette to confer on such officers and authorities not below the rank of a subordinate Judge the powers of Appellate Authorities for the purpose of the said Act in that area or in such classes of cases as may be specified in the Order. Similar is the case with the C. P. and Berar Rent Control Order. It is the Collector or the Officer of that rank who is empowered to exercise the appellate powers.

It was further submitted on behalf of the petitioner that in the case before the Apex Court, the person appointed to exercise appellate power was a District Judge. However, under the provisions of the C. P. and Berar Rent Control Order, 1949, it is the Collector who has to exercise the appellate power and that Authority was a persona designata. However, this submission is not acceptable as the same is answered by the Apex Court in the aforesaid judgment. Similar arguments were advanced before the Apex Court to the effect that the District Judge who was appointed to exercise the appellate power under the Kerala Rent Act was a persona designata and the Apex Court dispelled that argument by saying that it was not a persona designata and observed as under :-

"It is now well settled that an authority can be styled to be persona designata if powers are conferred on a named person or authority and such powers cannot be exercised by anyone else".

Similar is the case here. It is the Collector who is authorised to exercise the powers. At some places, it is the Additional Collector who is authorised to exercise the appellate power. But in any eventuality, it is by designation and not by name. Therefore, the Authority appointed to exercise the appellate power cannot be said to be persona designata. 20. One more distinction tried to be made out by the learned counsel for petitioner. The submission was that the Appellate Authority or the Reviewing Authority for that matter exercising that power under the C. P. and Berar Rent Control Order cannot be said to be a Court as contemplated to exercise powers under the provisions of the CPC and, therefore, they cannot be termed as the Court. Similar arguments were advanced by the learned counsel Mr. Nariman before the Apex Court in Mukri Gopalan ''s case and the Apex Court dispelled that submission, as already discussed above.

Under these circumstances it is clear that the Reviewing or the Appellate Authority exercising powers under the C. P. and Berar Rent Control Order, 1949 are exercising judicial functions and, therefore, they have all essential attributes of a Court and, therefore, they are Courts as held by the Apex Court in Mukri Gopalan''s case (supra). It is also clear that the C. P. and Berar Rent Control Order, 1949 though provides limitation for filing review or appeal against the order of the Rent Controller, it does not expressly exclude the application of the provisions of sections 4 to 24 (both inclusive) of the Limitation Act. As such, the provisions of sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act would automatically apply to the proceedings before the Reviewing or the Appellate Authority exercising powers under the C. P. and Berar Rent Control Order, 1949 and thus, they have jurisdiction u/s 5 of the Limitation Act to consider and decide the application for condonation of delay in filing review or appeal against the order of the Controller within the prescribed period. In this view of the matter, the decision in Dinesh''s case (supra) cannot be held to be a good law.

The Reference made by the learned Single Judge is, therefore, answered accordingly.

Consequently, writ petition No. 531 and 534 of 97 shall be placed before the Single Judge for deciding on merits the challenge to the orders passed by the Additional Collector, Nagpur on the application for condonation of delay. Writ Petition No. 3903 of 99 and W. P. No. 1981/98 be also placed before the Single Judge as the same are yet to be admitted. In all other writ petitions, the Additional Collector, Nagpur had taken view that he had no jurisdiction to decide the application for condonation of delay u/s 5 of the Limitation Act. As discussed above, that view is incorrect. The Additional Collector, Nagpur exercising appellate powers under the C. P. and Berar Rent Control Order, 1949 has jurisdiction u/s 5 of the Limitation Act to decide applications for condonation of delay. Therefore, the matters in all other writ petitions shall be sent back to the Additional Collector, Nagpur for decision on the delay condonation applications on merits.