Babu vs State of Kerala

R. Basant, J.

(i) Did the Court below err in accepting and acting upon the oral evidence of PWs 1 and 2, siblings?

(ii) Is the accused entitled to the benefit of any reasonable doubt?

These are the question raised before us by the learned counsel Sri. Sanu Mathew for the appellant in this case. The appellant has been found guilty, convicted and sentenced u/s 302, 449 and 458 IPC. He has been sentenced to undergo imprisonment for various terms including a sentence of life for the offence punishable u/s 302 IPC. The Court below had directed that the sentences be directed to run consecutively.

The prosecution alleged that the appellant, a young man aged about 28 years had committed lurking house tress pass by night into the house of deceased Ayyappan after having made preparations to commit the offence of murder. After having so entered the house he allegedly caused the death of deceased Ayyappan by inflicting cut injuries on him with MO 1 chopper. He had allegedly gained access into the house by removing the tiles of the roof in the kitchen of the house. PW 2, the wife of the deceased had developed illicit intimacy with the appellant. She had eloped with the appellant. But after she was traced, consequent to a complaint filed before the police, she opted to go with the deceased and her children. She did not heed to the demand of the appellant to go with him. That allegedly operated as the motive for the appellant against the deceased.

Investigation commenced with the registration of Ext. P1(a)FIR on the basis of Ext. P1 FI statement lodged by PW 1, the brother-in-law of the deceased, an eye witness. Investigation was completed and final report was filed by PW 18. The learned Magistrate after observing all legal requirements committed the case to the Court of Sessions. The learned Sessions Judge took cognizance of the offences alleged against the appellant. The appellant denied the charges levelled against him. Thereupon, the prosecution examined PWs 1 to 18. Exts. P1 to P16 were proved. MOs 1 to 22 were also marked.

In the course of cross examination of prosecution witnesses and later when examined u/s 313 Cr.PC (and specifically in the statement filed by the appellant at the close of examination u/s 313 Cr.PC), the appellant admitted his presence at the scene of occurrence, at the time of occurrence. But he had a totally different version to advance. According to him, he was invited by PW 1 and the deceased to go over to the house of the deceased for some discussions in connection with his alleged affair with PW 2. He was asked to go over in the night only. When he reached the house of the deceased, PW 1 and the deceased were present. There was yet another unknown person also. It is the case of the appellant that the deceased and PW 1 along with the said unknown person had questionable and objectionable motives. It is the case of the appellant that he was attacked on that night in the courtyard of the house of the deceased. He ran into the house of the deceased and there in the absence of any light, there was an incident in which according to the appellant the deceased must have suffered injury at the hands of the unknown person. The appellant was to attack the appellant. Accordingly the deceased had suffered the injury. This is the defence set up by the appellant.

The appellant examined DW1 and proved Exts. D1 and D2 case diary contradictions when PWs 2 and 3 were examined.

The learned Sessions Judge on an anxious consideration of all the relevant inputs came to the conclusion that the prosecution has succeeded in establishing the offences u/s 302, 449 and 458 alleged against the appellant. Accordingly, the learned Sessions Judge proceeded to pass the impugned judgment.

Before us, the learned counsel for the appellant and the learned prosecutor have advanced their arguments. The learned counsel for the appellant argues that the Court below has erred in accepting and acting upon the oral evidence of PWs 1 and 2. In the light of the stand taken up by the appellant, the Court below should have carefully evaluated the evidence of PWs 1 and 2. The non examination of other witnesses must be reckoned as crucial and vital. At any rate, the appellant must be conceded the benefit of doubt, contends the learned counsel.

The learned prosecutor on the contrary contends that the oral evidence of PWs 1 and 2 eye witnesses is absolutely convincing and the prosecution cannot be found fault with for not further duplicating the evidence. At any rate, the prosecution has eminently succeeded in establishing the offences alleged against the appellant and in these circumstances, the appellant is not entitled to the benefit of any doubt. The appeal deserves to be dismissed, contends the learned prosecutor.

We have considered all the relevant circumstances. We do not think it necessary to specifically renarrate the oral and documentary evidence placed before the learned Sessions Judge. Suffice it to say that we have been taken in detail through the oral evidence of PWs 1 to 18 and DW1. The contents of Exts. P1 to P16 and Exts. D1 and D2 have been read over to us by the learned counsel. We have also been taken through the charges framed by the learned Sessions Judge against the appellant and the answers given by the appellant in the course of his examination u/s 313 Cr.PC including the statement filed at the end of the examination u/s 313 Cr.P.C. We shall specifically advert to relevant materials wherever necessary in the course of the discussions.

Primarily the prosecution relied on the oral evidence of PWs 1 and 2. Prosecution attempted to draw inspiration for the oral evidence of PWs 1 and 2 from the contents of Ext. P1 FI statement lodged promptly by PW 1. The prosecution further relied on the recovery of MOs 18 and 19 under Ext. P7 by the Investigating officer as pointed out by the accused. The prosecution further relied on the injuries found on the person of the accused which again is in tandem with the case of the prosecution.

We find it absolutely safe and beyond controversy to concur with the finding of the learned Sessions Judge that the deceased had succumbed to the injuries described in Ext. P8, on the night of 21.2.2000 inside the house of the deceased. There is virtually no controversy on this aspect. The only question that is raised before us is as to whether it was the appellant who had inflicted those injuries.

PW 2 is the wife of the deceased. It has come out in evidence that the deceased and PW 2 were residing in the house of the sister of the appellant and that there was occasion for PW 2 and appellant to be intimate and close. The evidence further shows that PW 2 had eloped with the appellant in November 1999. A complaint was lodged by the deceased. PW 2 was traced. She was produced before the learned Magistrate. She grew wiser and opted to return with the deceased and her children. Thereafter the spouses along with their children were residing together. Though the appellant does not admit the sequence of events, the evidence of DW1 relied on by the appellant does itself show the truth of the statement of PWs 1 and 2 on this aspect. There is no semblance of doubt raised in our mind about the acceptability of this version of the prosecution that PW 2 had eloped with the appellant and had returned. She had subsequently taken the decision to live with her husband, the deceased and her children.

PW 2 has a case that the appellant subsequently also wanted her to leave her husband and children and go with him. She was not willing. She had conveyed this information to others and it was thus that PW 1, her brother chose to come and reside along with PW 2 and the deceased. Accordingly, PW 1 was residing for some period of time along with his sister and brother-in-law. That evidence of PWs 1 and 2, which is duly supported by the evidence of PW 3, another brother of PW 2 is found to be absolutely acceptable. Notwithstanding the valiant attempt on the part of the appellant to deny these circumstances, we are convinced that the Court below has committed no error in choosing to accept and act upon the oral evidence of PWs 1 to 3 on this aspect. This aspect is specifically corroborated by the contents of Ext. P1 as also the oral evidence of DW1.

We come to the precise question as to what happened on the night of that eventful day. According to PWs 1 and 2, PW 2 and the deceased along with the mother of the deceased and two children born in the wedlock were sleeping in the only bedroom in the house. PW 1 who had chosen to reside with the sister and brother-in-law in an obvious attempt to support them was sleeping in the closed veranda outside. On the night PW 2 heard the cries of the deceased. She cried aloud. PW 1''s attention was attracted. He rushed into the bedroom from where the cries came out. He switched on the light. He found the appellant wearing MO 16 underwear alone inside the room holding MO 1 weapon in his possession. The deceased with injuries was lying on the floor of the room. PW 2 confirmed that the deceased had sustained the injury at the hands of the appellant. The appellant had an altercation with PW 1. He ran away from the house of the deceased. PW 1 tried to pursue him. But he could not be apprehended. PW 1 and others saw that some clothes/articles (MOs 11 to 15) were available outside the house. Lunki MO 10 was available inside the kitchen of the house. The tiles of the kitchen were removed to facilitate entry into the house through such open roof.

We have a fairly prompt FI statement lodged by PW 1 before the police. The incident took place at 0045 hours on 21.2.2000. The FI statement, Ext. P1 was lodged by PW 1 at 0300 hours. Ext. P1 statement was recorded by PW 17 and Ext. P1 FIR was registered by him. The seal of the learned Magistrate on the FIR shows that the FIR had reached the Court only at 11.00 a.m on 22.2.2000. We have gone through the cross examination of PW 17 and PW 18. To PW 17 no specific question was asked to explain the delay in the FIR reaching the Court. Nay, what is significant is that the evidence of PW 7 that the FI statement was recorded at 03.00 hours on 21.2.2000 is not seen specifically challenged also. It is true that there is delay in the FIR reaching the Court. It is true that PW 18 who was asked about it did not offer any satisfactory explanation. The learned Prosecutor also did not choose to seek or elicit any explanation from PW 17 for this delay in the FIR reaching the court. All these notwithstanding, we are not at all persuaded to agree that there was any delay in PW 1 lodging the FI statement. We are not in any way persuaded to doubt or suspect the genuineness of the prompt FI statement Ext. P1, for the mere reason that there was some delay in the FIR reaching the Court. We are satisfied that Ext. P1 can certainly be made use of by the Court to draw inspiration for the version of PWs 1 and 2.

We have been taken in detail through the evidence of PWs 1 and 2. There is not a semblance of doubt raised in our mind about the acceptability of the oral evidence of PWs 1 and 2. The theory advanced by the accused sounds like a fairy tale to us. His contention that he was invited to go to the house of the deceased in the midnight rebels against reason, logic and commonsense. The same does not rhyme well with normal human probabilities.

Argument is advanced that the prosecution could have examined the mother of the deceased or the children of the deceased to offer further assurance for the oral evidence of PWs 1 and 2. The learned counsel for the appellant strains to contend that some local neighbours who had come to the scene of the occurrence on the same night and to whom PW 1 had narrated his version could also have been examined. We have no hesitation to agree that those witnesses could also have been examined. But, the question is whether their evidence is essential for unfolding the case of the prosecution and whether the non examination of such witnesses can deliver any advantage to the appellant. We are certainly, of the opinion that the non examination of those witnesses cannot at all arouse the slightest doubt in the mind of the court about the acceptability of the oral evidence of PWs 1 and 2.

No separate scene mahazar has been prepared. That is quite understandable as Ext. P3 inquest report has been prepared which contains the detailed description of the scene of the crime. That the Investigating Officer had not prepared a separate scene mahazar cannot at all enable the appellant to assail the factual observations noted by the Investigating Officer in Ext. P3 inquest report. Ext. P3 inquest report clearly explains how the miscreant gained access into the house by removal of roof tiles of the kitchen. PW 1 speaks about it. PW 2 also speaks about it. In Ext. P3 inquest report prepared by PW 18, this facility through which the miscreant gained access into the house is described in detail. We are not persuaded to agree that the omission/failure of the Investigating Officer to prepare a separate scene mahazar is in any way relevant, significant or crucial. Ext. P3 contains a detailed description, the data in which broadly support the oral evidence of PWs1 and 2.

The learned counsel for the appellant advances the argument that going by the evidence of PW 1, PW 1 had pushed open the door of the bedroom. He relied on the evidence of PW 2 that the door was bolted from inside. He relies on the circumstance that no damage of the bolt of that door is seen in the description of the scene in Ext. P3 inquest report. We find absolutely no crucial significance on this aspect. PW 1 had only stated that he pushed the door open. He had not stated that he had broken the door open. The evidence of PW 2 that the door was bolted from inside cannot be reckoned to be sacrosanct or crucial, when we note that the room had another open access with no doors to the kitchen. It is also worth mentioning that the spouses along with the mother of the husband and their two children were sleeping in the room and there is no question of any privacy being affected by the door being not bolted. In these circumstances we are of the opinion that this contention laboriously advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant cannot deliver any advantage to the appellant.

The learned counsel for the appellant strenuously contends that Pws1 and 2 are interested, they being siblings and they being the brother in law and wife of the deceased. They have an animosity against the appellant because of the earlier objectionable relationship between PW 2 and the appellant. The appellant does not specifically admit such relationship but even going by the case of PWs 1 and 2 they are shown be interested persons having an animus against the appellant, contends the learned counsel. The learned counsel builds up a further argument that in these circumstances implicit reliance of the oral evidence of PWs 1 and 2 is not justified at all.

We do take note of the fact that the oral evidence of PWs 1 and 2 is supported eminently by other circumstances. The evidence of PW 11 doctor clearly shows that the injuries could have been caused with a weapon like MO 1. That MO 1 weapon did not belong to the household and the miscreant had brought it into the house is also evident from the totality of the circumstances. The prosecution has a case that MO 1 was brought by the accused. The prosecution has a further case that MOs 11 to 15 were articles which the appellant kept outside the house before he entered the house through the opening created by the removal of the roof tiles. The prosecution has a further case that MO 10 Lunki which was found available in the kitchen was that of the appellant. Consequent to the hostility of the brothers of the appellant the prosecution could not adduce specific evidence to connect appellant with MO 1 and MO 10 to 15. That inability of the prosecution according to us is not vital or crucial in the facts and circumstances of the case.

The prosecution has a case that the appellant had run away from the house without taking his other clothes, wearing MO 16 underwear only. The appellant also admits and accepts that he hurriedly went away from the house on his bicycle MO 22. It is the case of the prosecution that the appellant while fleeing from the house of the deceased after the incident had stolen MOs 18 and 19 which were left outside the house of PW 10 for drying on a clothesline. The appellant had allegedly worn those clothes while he retreated from the scene. Precise evidence about the distance between the house of the appellant and the house of PW 10 or between the house of the deceased and the house of PW 10 is not available. At any rate, we take note of the circumstance, that PW 10 had identified MOs 18 and 19 clothes to be his. They according to him were clothes that were thieved from the clothesline where they were placed for drying on that night. This evidence of PW 10 significantly is not challenged at all. We have the evidence of PW 18 Investigating Officer supported by the evidence of PW 9 that MOs 18 and 19 were pointed out by the appellant and they were seized under Ext. P7 after his arrest. It is doubtful whether this piece of evidence can be admitted through the pigeon hole available u/s 27 of the Evidence Act. But, certainly that evidence can be admitted as a piece of conduct of the appellant u/s 8 of the Evidence Act. The evidence shows that MOs 18 and 19 were pointed out by the appellant and they were seized by PW 18 under Ext. P7 seizure mahazar in the presence of PW 9. The contents of the contemporaneous seizure mahazar Ext. P7 support and corroborate the evidence of PW 18. PW 9 is of course a police official. No independent attester to Ext. P7 has been examined but that does not militate against the acceptability of evidence of recovery of MO 18 and 19. This piece of evidence which has the fragrance of truth clearly reveals that the appellant must have taken MOs 18 and 19 away from the clothesline outside the house of PW 10 to avoid the embarrassment of traveling on his bicycle on that night wearing his underwear only. That piece of evidence supports the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 that the appellant fled from the house of the deceased wearing only his underwear leaving behind certain other clothes at the scene. The evidence of PWs 1 and 2 do thus get convincing assurance from this piece of evidenceof recovery of stolen MO 18 and 19 and the unchallenged oral evidence of PW 10.

The above discussions lead us to the conclusion that the course adopted by the learned Sessions Judge in having chosen to place reliance on the oral evidence of PWs 1 and 2 which is convincingly supported and corroborated by Ext. P1 FI statement, the facts observed and reported in Ext. P3 inquest report and the evidence of recovery of Mos18 and 19 read along with the evidence of PW 10, the owner of those clothes does not at all warrant appellate interference. The court below had seen the witnesses perform in the witness stand before it and the process of reasoning adopted by the Court below to place reliance on the oral evidence of PWs 1 and 2 is found to be absolutely fair, reasonable and just. The same does not warrant appellate interference at all.

There cannot be any doubt that the evidence of PW 1 and 2 when believed establish the offences punishable u/s 302, 449 and 458 IPC. The sentences imposed do also appear to be absolutely modest and reasonable. The same do not also warrant any interference.

The learned counsel for the appellant however submits that the impugned direction issued by the learned Sessions Judge that specified terms of imprisonment must run consecutively with the sentence of imprisonment for life runs counter to the rationale of section 427 Cr.P.C. We agree with the learned counsel. We are satisfied that the sentences shall run concurrently in accordance with the mandate of section 427 Cr.P.C. The challenge in this appeal can succeed only to the above extent.

In the result:

a. this appeal is dismissed.

b. The impugned judgment is upheld in all other respects but it is directed that the substantive sentences of imprisonment shall run concurrently and not consecutively.