Babu Rameshwar Prasad Singh and Another vs Mangar Kahar and Others

Rowland, J.—These are applications presented by the plaintiffs who instituted on September 14, 1933, suits for produce rent in respect of holdings of their tenants. Rents were claimed for the years 1339, 1340, 1341 and 1342. The Courts below have held that the suit was within time in respect of the rents of 1311 and 1342, the cause of action for which arose in September 1934 and September 1935, respectively, but as regards the claim'' for the rents of 1339 and 1340 the limitation ran from Bhado 30, that is to say, September 14,1932, and September 4, 1933, respectively; and this part of the claim was barred by Section 184, Bihar Tenancy Act, read with Schedule III, Article 2 (b) (ii), which prescribes a period of limitation of one year from the last day of the agricultural year in which the arrear fell due.

Under the Bengal Tenancy Act as it stood until the passing of the amendments of 1934, the period of limitation for such a suit was three years from the last date of the agricultural year, and no doubt had the Amending Act not been passed, the suits would have been within time. It is argued that the new provision creating a shorter period of limitation does not apply to this suit, the cause of action for which arose before the passing of the Act. In support of this contention reliance is placed on Manjuri Bibi v. Akkel Mahmud 17 C.W.N. 889 : 19 Ind. Cas. 793 : 17 C.L.J. 316. In that case the Calcutta High Court examined an amending statute which created a shorter period of limitation governing certain classes of suits for dispossession. There was a difference of opinion among the Judges, but it was eventually decided that the new shorter and special period of limitation did not apply to suits instituted after the commencement of the amending Act in respect of causes of action which arose before the amending Act came into force. This decision has since been generally regarded as a leading case, and Mr. B.C. Sinha for the petitioners has asked me to apply and follow it in these applications. It is necessary, therefore, to examine the reasoning on which the above decision was based. Mookerjee, J. pointed out that the Eastern Bengal and Assam Tenancy Amendment Act of 1908 became law on June 10, 1903, and came into operation on that very date. Hence it was argued that the Legislature could never have intended the new provision of limitation to apply to causes of action which hid accrued before the new statute became law, because the effect would be to extinguish forthwith all causes of action in existence and enforceable in a Court of Justice at the time when the statute came into operation. The learned Judge said:

To hold that this amended provision applies to suits in respect of dispossession, which, has taken place more than two years before the enactment of the new law, is to maintain the position that the Legislature intended the litigant to accomplish what is impossible in the nature of thing for him to do; in other words, to prescrible that his rights are forthwith extinguished without previous notice and without opportunity afforded to him to escape the operation of the new law.

The learned Judge continued :

In my opinion, the cardinal and fundamental point in the case before me is that the Eastern Bengal and Assam Tenancy A mending Act of 1908 came into operation the very moment it became law, consequently, if it were taken to effect pre-existing causes of action, the effect would be absolutely to bar at once all actions where the cause of action had accrued more than the limited time before the statute was passed.

A little later the learned Judge explained:

On the other hand where a new statute of limitation reduces the time previously allowed for commencement of the suit, but does not come into operation forthwith and allows a reasonable time for the enforcement of existing causes of action, the Court will not hesitate to hold that the Statute may affect causes of action already accrued in the same manner as those accruing after its passage.

It is, therefore, manifest that the decision on which Mr. B C. Sinha has so strongly relied is based on the distinction between the cases in which a new period of limitation is introduced by an Act coming into force on the very day of its passing and cases in which a similar new period is introduced by an Act the passing of which is succeeded by its coming into force after an interval which would have first given the litigant full notice of the amendment to the law and a fair and reasonable opportunity of availing himself of the right of suit which was soon to be extinguished by the amended enactment. In point of fact, Mookerjee, J. never suggested that the previous decisions in Saraswati Dasi v. Horitaram Chakerburti 16 C. 741 and in Ramdhan Bhadra v. Ram Kumar Dey 17 C. 926 had been wrongly decided. The ground on which he distinguished those cases was that in them the Court was considering the application of a period of limitation introduced by an Act which as is well-known came into operation many months after it had become law. In the latter of these decisions the contention was raised that the cause of action having arisen before the Bengal Tenancy Act came into operation the plaintiff would be entitled to bring his suit within twelve years, that being the time within which he might have sued if the Bengal Tenancy Act had not been passed. But the contention was negative, and it was pointed out that Section 181, Bengal Tenancy Act, declares that suits specified in Schedule III of the Act, shall be instituted within the time prescribed in that schedule, and there is no saving clause for suits in which the cause of action had arisen before that Act was passed. It is certainly not the rule that when a statute introduces a shorter period of limitation suits instituted after the amendment of the law in respect of causes of action accruing before such amendment are governed by the rule of limitation which was in force on the date when the cause of action accrued. On the contrary, the rule ordinarily applicable is the law which is in force at the Time of the institution of the suit. This principle was emphasized in Soni Lal v. Kanhaiya Lal 35 A. 227 : 19 Ind. Cas 291 : 40 I.A. 74 : 13 M.L.T. 437 : 1.7 O.W.N. 605 : 11 A.L.J. 389 : (1913) M.W.N. 470 : 17 C.L.J. 488 : 15 Bom. L.R. 489 : 25 M.L.J. 131 (P.C.) by their Lordship of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. Their Lordships observed that the High Court had rightly held that:

The law of limitation applicable to a suit or proceeding, is the law in force on the date of the institution of the suit or proceeding.

Therefore, in deciding the period of limitation applicable to this suit, it is material to consider whether as in the case of the Eastern Bengal and Assam Tenancy Amendment Act of 1908 which was construed in Manjuri Bibi v. Akkel Mahmud 17 C.W.N. 889 : 19 Ind. Cas. 793 : 17 C.L.J. 316 the enactment we are construing came into force on the very day in which it was passed into law or as in the case of the Bengal Tenancy Act, which was applied in Ramdhan Bhadra v. Ram Kumar Dey 17 C. 926 there was an interval between the passing of the Act and its coming into force so that a party effected by the new period of limitation had a reasonable time during which he could avail himself of his remedy before the new period of, limitation came into force.

Now a reference to the Bihar Tenancy Amendment Act, 1934 (B. and Order Act VIII of 1934) shows that the assent of the Governor-General to this Act was published in the Bihar and Orissa Gazette of November 14 1934. It was enacted in Section 1 (2) that the Act should come into force on a date to be appointed by the Local Government by notification; and in fact the Act was brought into force by a notification of the Local Government on June 10, 1935. Therefore, the case "before me is not on all fours with Manjuri Bibi v. Ahkel Mahmud 17 C.W.N. 889 : 19 Ind. Cas. 793 : 17 C.L.J. 316 but is governed by the principle in Ramdhan Bhadra v. Ram Kumar Dey 17 C. 926 and of the Privy Council decision in Soni Lal v. Kanhaiya Lal 35 A. 227 : 19 Ind. Cas 291 : 40 I.A. 74 : 13 M.L.T. 437 : 1.7 O.W.N. 605 : 11 A.L.J. 389 : (1913) M.W.N. 470 : 17 C.L.J. 488 : 15 Bom. L.R. 489 : 25 M.L.J. 131 . It is not necessary to refer to more recent decisions except to say that there seems to have been a consensus of authority at least on this side of India accepting the law to be as stated in Manjari Bibi v. Akkel Mahmud 17 C.W.N. 889 : 19 Ind. Cas. 793 : 17 C.L.J. 316. A doubt was raised as to whether the Privy Council decision in Soni Lal v. Kanhaiya Lal 35 A. 227 : 19 Ind. Cas 291 : 40 I.A. 74 : 13 M.L.T. 437 : 17 C.W.N. 605 : 11 A.L.J. 389 : (1913) M.W.N. 470 : 17 C.L.J. 488 : 15 Bom. L.R. 489 : 25 M.L.J. 131 (P.C.), had shaken the authority of this decision. The matter carue before a Special Bench in Gopeswar Pal v. Jiban Chandra 41 C. 1125 : 24 Ind. Cas 37 : AIR 1911 Cal 806 : 19 C.L.J.549 : 180 W.N. 804 and it was decided that the decision in Manjuri Bibi v. Akkel Mahmud 17 C.W.N. 889 : 19 Ind. Cas. 793 : 17 C.L.J. 316 was still good authority for the class of cases to which it applies. It was said:

The law as amended may regulate the procedure in suits in which the plaintiff could comply with its provisions, but cannot (in our opinion) govern suits where such compliance was from the first impossible. The effect is to regulate, not to confiscate. There are thus two positions: where in accordance with its provisions a suit could be brought after the passing of the amendment, it may be that the amendment would apply, but where it could not, then the amendment would have no application. The facts in Soni Lal v. Kanhaiya Lal did not involve the second of these positions.

Nor does the case before me. The Courts below have correctly held the shorter period of limitation to be applicable to these suits and the applications must be dismissed. The opposite parties not having appeared, no order for cost will be passed.