Babulal and another vs State

K.M. Natarajan, J.—This revision is directed against the conviction of the Petitioners u/s 75 of the Madras City Police Act and the sentence of fine of Rs. 75/- each in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three weeks passed by the IX Metropolitan Magistrate, Madras in A.P.C. No. 1740 of 1983.

The brief facts which are necessary for the disposal of the criminal revision are as follows: The Petitioners were charge-sheeted before the IX Metropolitan Magistrate, Saidapet, u/s 75 of the Madras City Police Act, alleging that at about 12:30 P.M. on 17.3.1983, in the premises of the Saidapet Court, the accused abused P.W.1 Saleem and attempted to beat him with hands and behaved disorderly and thereby caused breach of public peace.

In support of the charge, 3 witnesses have been examined. According to P.W.1, on the day of the occurrence, in connection with a private complaint, he went to the Court and while he was coming out, the two accused abused P.W.1 and attempted to beat him and questioned as to how he gave a complaint to the Police and thereafter this case was instituted against them. P.W.2 also is one of the persons who accompanied P.W.1, P.W.3 is the sub Inspector of Police who investigated the case and filed charge-sheet.

The plea of the accused is that it is true that there was a case pending at that time, between them and P.W.1 at Saidapet Court, but it is false to allege that there was any occurrence and that the case was foisted against them due to previous enmity.

However, the learned Magistrate for reasons assigned by him, found the Petitioners guilty and convicted and sentenced the Petitioners as stated supra.

Mr. M. Ravindran, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioners mainly argued that the ingredients which are necessary for constituting an offence u/s 75 of the Madras City Police Act have not been made out. According to the learned Counsel, it is not enough if it is stated that the accused abused the Petitioner, and the actual words used by the accused should be clearly stated that it is for the Court to find out whether those words would be sufficient to constitute the offence as to involve breach of peace and whether it will amount to indecent behaviour so as to attract S. 75 of Madras City Police Act. The learned Counsel would also submit that even in respect of the alleged overt act that the accused came to beat P.W.1 with hands, there are conflicting versions between P.W.1 and P.W.2 and that it will not amount to an offence u/s 75 of the M.C.P. Act. He would also submit that finding that the case given by P.W.1 against the accused would not stand and that case subsequently ended in acquittal, this case has been foisted and in support of which he filed the judgment in that case.

The only question which arises for consideration is whether the conviction sustainable on the evidence of P.W.1 and P.W.2. As rightly pointed out by the learned Counsel for the Petitioners, P.W.1 and P.W.2 have tendered evidence that the accused abused P.W.1 and attempted to beat him with hands. They have not stated as to what were the words actually uttered and how they were abusive and how it caused public breach of peace so as to attract Section 75 of the Madras City Police Act. In this connection, the learned Counsel drew the attention of this Court to the decision of this Court reported in Kannammal, In re 1966 L.W. (Crl.) 40.

City Police Act, Section 75 - Ingredients - How proved.

In a Prosecution u/s 75 of the Act, the police officer merely stated that the accused was "behaving in a disorderly and indecent and riotous manner, causing annoyance to the public, in public road."

Held, the ingredients of the offence are acts which can be interpreted as amounting to riotous, disorderly and indecent behaviour in a public street. Behaviour might either by physical movements of the body, or words uttered by a person or compounded of both. It will be a question of fact in each case, whether the physical acts of a person, or words uttered by that person at that time, or both taken together, could be possibly considered as amounting to riotous disorderly or indecent behaviour. The police officer giving evidence cannot be permitted to virtually pronounce a judgment by merely using the words of the section without furnishing any detail. It is for the officer to give such particulars, of acts or speech or both; it is for the Court to decide whether those particulars are true and whether they come within the mischief of the charge u/s 75 of the Act.

He also drew the attention to the subsequent decision in Pitchaiah Pillai, In re 1970 M.LJ. (Crl.) 283 where the question what constitutes indecent or disorderly behaviour and whether the utterance of filthy and outrageous languages in a public place, if punishable u/s 75 of the Madras City Police Act was dealt with. In that case, in view of the language used by the accused, it was held that they constituted indecent behaviour within the ambit of Section 75 of the Madras City Police Act. The learned Counsel drew the attention to the ratio laid down in the above decision where it was observed "Behaviour can be seen and spelt out only from the words uttered." In the same judgment it was held that the utterance of the language quoted in that case, in the opinion of the Court constituted disorderly or indecent behaviour. The ruling reported in Kannammal, In re1 was also referred to and it was observed that the actual words were not quoted in Kannammal''s case but it has been clearly quoted in the case of Pitchaiah Pillai. In the instant case, in view of the fact that P.Ws.1 and 2 have not tendered evidence as to what were the languages or the actual Words uttered by the Petitioners, there is absolutely no material to find out whether they would amount to disorderly or indecent behaviour within the meaning of Section 75 of the Madras City Police Act. On this short ground alone, the conviction is not sustainable. As the prosecution has not established the necessary ingredients to constitute an offence u/s 75 of the Madras City Police Act, this revision has to be allowed.

In the result, the revision is allowed. Conviction and sentence imposed by the learned Magistrate are set aside and the Fine amount, if any paid, is directed to be refunded to the Petitioner.