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Judgment
23 paragraphs · 2,008 wordsSwatanter Kumar, J.—Challenge in these 76 regular first appeals/cross objection commonly is to the judgment of the learned District Judge, Ropar, both dated 9.4.1990. Vide judgment in the case of Bachhattar Singh, the learned Judge had answered 35 land references made to him by the Land Acquisition Collector, u/s 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. hereinafter referred to as the Act. While vide the second judgment in RFA No. 1791 of 1990, titled Nachhattar Singh v. State of Punjab, 5 other references were answered by the common judgment. In this way 40 appeals have been preferred by the Sate, 8 appeals have been preferred by the claimants and 28 cross objections have been preferred by the claimants against these two judgments. As all these appeals and cross objections though arise from two judgments dated 9.4.1990, yet common acquisition notification; evidence and similar question of law and fact, therefore, it will be appropriate to dispose of all these appeals together by a common judgment.
The undisputed facts can be recapitulated for proper appreciation of the controversies in issue. Government of Punjab intended to acquire land measuring 94.72 acres in the revenue estate of village Dharak Khurd, H.B. No. 55, Tehsil Kharar, District Ropar for a public purpose, namely, construction of S.Y.L Canal. For this purpose notifications u/s 4 and 6 of the Act respectively, were issued and published in the gazette of the State Government on 18.9.1985 and 24.9.1985. Upon inviting objections the learned Land Acquisition Collector, after granting opportunity to the parties, in accordance with law, determined the following rate of compensation payable to the claimants:-
Chahi Rs. 62,000/-per acre 2. Barani/Bagh Barani Rs. 50,000/- per acre 3. Banjar Jadid, Banjar Rs. 35,000/- per acre Qadim, Gair Mumkin.
The claimants being dissatisfied from the extent of the amount awarded to the claimants for acquisition of their respective lands, they preferred references u/s 18 of the Act. The learned Judge after recording evidence produced by the parties vide two different judgments both dated 9.4.1990 decided all the references in relation to this notification and village, granted the following relief to the claimants:-
"As a result of my above finding on the above issues, the claimants are awarded compensation at the following rates:-
Chahi Land Rs. 90,000/- per acre. 2. Barani, Bagh Barani Rs. 70,000/-per acre. 3. Banjar Jadid Rs. 50,000/- per acre. Gair Mumkin.
In addition to this, the claimants will also be entitled to payment of solatium al the rate of 15% of the market value besides an additional amount at the rate of 12% per annum u/s 234(1-A) of the Land Acquisition Act. They will also be entitled to payment of interest as per Section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. Parties are left to bear their own costs. Counsel fee is assessed Rs. 200/-. Memo of costs be prepared. File be consigned to the record room. These two judgments resulted in filing of the above 76 appeals and cross objections as both the State and the claimants were not contended with the pronouncement of the award of the learned District Judge.
The learned District Judge while enhancing the compensation relied upon Ex. P. 13, which is the copy of the judgment of the same court dated 4.4.1989 while answering 35 references. However, in the case of answering 10 other references the learned Judge relied upon Ex.P.14, the sale deed and the copy of the judgment of the District Judge mark X dated 24.1.1990.
The contention raised on behalf of the State is that the learned Judge could not have relied upon Ex.P.14 as vendor and vendee had not been examined in Court. The learned Counsel for the State further contended that the compensation awarded is unreasonably excessive and prayed for restoration of the award of the Collector.
No counsel appeared to argue the matter on behalf of the claimants despite the fact that these cases have been on the regular board of the Court for a considerable time and were repeatedly called on 26.5.1999, 27.5.1999 and then on the adjourned date of 16.8.1999 when the matter was reserved for judgment, as the Court was left with no alternative but to conclude the hearing.
In order to examine the merits of the contentions raised on behalf of the State, it will be relevant to refer to the gist of the evidence produced by the parties before the learned trial Court. The claimants had examined four PWs which included the claimants and Patwari. Ex.P.1 to Ex.P.4 were the site plans produced on record in relation to tubewells. Ex. P. 10 and Ex.P.14 were the sale instances produced by the claimants. Judgments of the High Court as well as of the learned District Judge were tendered in evidence as Ex.P.12 and Ex.P.13. Marks X and Y were also the judgment placed on record. To meet this oral and documentary evidence of the petitioner-claimants, the respondents had examined only one witness Mr. Joginder Singh Kanungo. S.Y.L Canal Project, and tendered in evidence Annexures R.1 to R.3 the sale instances and Ex.R.4 site plan.
At the outset it must be noticed that as far as sale deeds/sale instances produced by either of the parties are not admissible in evidence. Ex.P.10, Ex.P.14 and Ex.R.1 to Ex.R.3 are the sale instances where no vendor, vendee or any other competent officer from the concerned authorities are examined to prove the authenticity and genuineness of the sale-deeds and the consideration mentioned therein. Resultantly, as per the law settled by the Supreme Court of India in the case of A.P. State Road Transport Corporation, Hyderabad Vs. P. Venkaiah and others, and Special Deputy Collector and another etc. Vs. Kurra Sambasiva Rao and others, etc., , the sale instances produced by either of the parties, are liable to be ignored, being inadmissible in evidence.
As far as the potential and location of the land is concerned Ex.R.4 is the site plan. The cumulative effect of the oral and documentary evidence produced by the parties is that the land in question is primarily a Barani or Gair Mumkin/Banjar Qadim Land. PW1 had stated that on the northern side of the village Dharak Khurd there is village Dassian on the eastern side village Dharak Kalan, on the western side village Pamaur and on the southern side is village Majat. The lands acquired are at quite a distance. It was certainly for the claimants to prove better location of the land if they wanted to claim higher rate of compensation.
The learned trial Court had accepted the statement of PW1 and had proceeded on that basis to award compensation in question. Villages Majat, Bibipur and Rora are the nearby villages awards for acquisition of lands of which had been given before the award in the present case was pronounced. Ex. P. 13 is an award passed by the learned District Judge in relation to acquisition of the land in village Bibipur vide notification dated 6.8.1985 where the Court had awarded compensation at the rate of Rs. 80,000/- per acre for Chahi, Rs. 68,000/- per acre for Barani and Rs. 53,000/- per acre for Gair Mumkin Lands. Mark ''Y'' is an award of District Judge granting compensation at the rate of Rs. 90,000/- per acre for the land acquired in village Majat vide notification dated 19.9.1985. These two exhibits were considered amongst others by the learned trial Court in coming to the conclusion in the impugned judgment. As is clear from the evidence on record that village Bibipur and village Majat are hereby acquired land.
There is no evidence led by the claimants to show that the land in question is better located than the land of villages Majat and Bibipur. In those cases certainly some identical or little more compensation had been awarded. But that was for the evidence produced in those cases. Some element of discretion has to be exercised by the Courts based on guess work guided by settled principles of law for determining the compensation payable to the claimants. Exercise of such discretion necessarily need not be interfered by the High court unless such discretion or relief granted was pulpably erroneous or was supported by no evidence. That is certainly not the case here.
During the course of hearing learned counsel for the State also brought to the notice of this Court that certain similar proceedings which had obtained finality in relation to other villages where land was acquired for S.Y.L. Canal Project, somewhat same compensation had been awarded.
It may be noticed at this stage that after the judgment was reserved the learned counsel Mr. C.B. Goel and Mr. K.S. Grewal, Advocates appeared and wanted to argue the matter. I heard them at some length. Mr. Goel relied upon a judgment of Division Bench of this Court in LPA No. 384 of 1996 decided on 21.2.1997 granting compensation at the rate of Rs. 4,84,000/- per acre to the appellants.
In the interest of justice I would even proceed to examine what was mentioned by the learned counsel for the parties. The judgment in LPA No. 384 of 1996 has no relevancy to the facts of the present case. It is a judicial pronouncement of Hon''ble Division Bench of this Court, but it relates to Ropar or the village which had become part of Ropar. It can hardly be disputed that Ropar is a fully developed town and was so at the time of acquisition. It is settled principle of law that the judicial pronouncement can safely be relied upon by the Courts in fixing compensation payable to the claimants, but such instances again should be comparable in all respects. A judicial precedent of a far away distance cannot be said to be a correct precept for such determination when they fall in two different villages having distinct, potential, location and development. Reference in this regard can be made to the judgment of the Hon''ble Supreme Court of India in the case of The Land Acquisition Officer, City Improvement Trust Board Vs. H. Narayanaiah and Others, .
PW1 in his statement has specifically conceded that the acquired land is nearly 6 kilometres away from Kharar which is at a quite distance from Ropar town. It has further come on record in his statement that the land is Banjar, Barani and Banjar Qadim. As such it cannot even, on facts, give the same advantage and the claimants would be bound by the statement of PW1 as he was their own witness.
The claims of tubewells have neither been raised in ground of appeal nor anything was argued before me in that regard by the learned counsel for the parties. As such no claim of the claimants arises for consideration as far as Chahi land.
Ex.P.13 is the best piece of evidence as it relates to village Bibipur, Tehsil Kharar and the land was acquired vide notification dated 6.8.1985 and compensation was awarded at the rate of Rs. 80,000/- per acre for Chahi, Rs. 68,000/- per acre for Barani, and Rs. 53,000/- per acre for Gair Mumkin. It is not disputed before me that village Bibipur is closest to the acquired land. Its location and kind of land is somewhat similar and can easily be stated to be a judicial instance which can be said to be a comparable example. Keeping in view that the notification in the present case was subsequent to that notification. I see no reason to interfere with the findings recorded by the learned Additional District Judge.
These R.F.As (86 in number), have been on the regular board earlier but shown for hearing on 26th May, 1999, 27th May, 1999 and ultimately for today i.e. 16.8.1999. The cases have been called out three times afternoon nobody appears on behalf of the claimants/appellants. Learned counsel for the State has already concluded his arguments. Even thereafter the Court has awaited for a considerable time for the counsel appearing for the claimants. Still nobody appears.
Arguments heard. Judgment reserved.
