Bachi Singh vs Chief Development Officer and Another

Prafulla C. Pant, J.—By means of this Writ petition, moved under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has challenged the order dated 25.6.1997 (copy Annexure-3 to the writ petition) whereby his services were terminated from the Group ''D'' post.

Brief facts of the case, as narrated in the writ petition, are that the petitioner was appointed as Class IV employee as ''Patrawahak'' in the Kshetriya Gramya Vikas Sansthan of Rural Development Department. He joined his duties on 23.11.1995 in pursuance of the appointment letter dated 22.11.1995 (copy Annexure-1 to the writ petition). Before the appointment, an interview was held on 20.11.1995 on the basis of the list, containing names including that of the petitioner, forwarded by the Employment Exchange. However, suddenly the services of the petitioner were terminated w.e.f. 25.6.1997 (copy Annexure-3 to the writ petition). The petitioner has challenged the said order on the ground that he had completed more than one and a half years unblemished services to the satisfaction of all his superiors. It is further alleged in the writ petition that the petitioner''s services were wrongly terminated in violation of the rules.

A counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondents in which it has been stated that the petitioner was appointed against temporary post and his services were liable to be terminated at any time by giving one month''s notice or one month''s salary in lieu thereof. It: is further stated in the counter-affidavit that the impugned termination order was passed in accordance with the rules. It is also stated in the counter- affidavit that since the Government abolished ''housing cell'' of the Rural Development Department as such there was no need of services of the petitioner, and he being the juniormost employee was served with the order of the termination. Lastly, it is stated in the counter-affidavit that the appointing authority i.e. District Development Officer has not been impleaded by the petitioner in the writ petition as such the petition is bad in law.

I heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the affidavit, counter-affidavit and rejoinder- affidavit along with the annexures annexed thereto.

Before further discussions, this Court feels it necessary to examine the letter of appointment dated 22.11.1995 which reads as under:

^^dk;kZy; iq[; fodkl vf/kdkjh] uSuhrky A

i=kad @1&LFkk@28@p-J-@ fnukad 22 uoEcj] 1995

dk;kZy; vkns''k

fu;qfDr

v/khuLFk dk;kZy; lewg ^^?k** deZpkjh lsok fu;ekoyh] 1985 ds v/khu xfBr p;u izkf/kdkjh lfefr }kjk ftyk lsok;ktu dk;kZy;] uSuhrky ls Hksts x;s vH;fFkZ;ksa ds fnukad 20-11-1995 dks fy; x;s lk{kkRdkj ds QyLo:i Jh cPph flag] iq= Jh ''ksj flag] 9&cqdfgy] vf/kdkjh fuokl] eYyhrky uSuhrky dh fu;qfDr prqFkZ Js.kh �i=okgd� ds in ij {ks=h; xzkE; fodkl laLFkku] ihiqYl dkWyst] gY}kuh �uSuhrky� esa dk;ZHkkj xzg.k djus dh frfFk ls osrueku :- 750&12&870&n-jks-&14&940 ij vuqeU; Hk�kksa lfgr dh tkrh gS A ;g fu;qfDr iw.kZr;k vLFkkbZ gS rFkk fdlh Hkh le; mHk; i{k dh vksj ls ,d ekl dk uksfVl vFkok uksfVl ds ,ot esa ,d ekg ds vfxze osru Hkqxrku fd;s tkus ij lekIr dh tk ldsxh A

;ksxnku nsus ls iwoZ Jh flag dks fuEu izek.k&i=ksa dh izfrfyfi ftyk fodkl vf/kdkjh ds dk;kZy; esa izLrqr djsaxs vkSj f''k{kk ;ksX;rk ,oa vk;q ds ewy izek.k&i= dk Hkh voyksdu djk;ssaxs A**

The aforementioned appointment letter itself shows that the petitioner was appointed on Group-''D'' post purely on temporary basis and the letter itself contained the condition that his services are liable to be terminated at any time by giving him one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. There is no dispute as to the fact in the present case that the termination of the petitioner from service is not based either on stigma or in any other charge. The order of termination dated 25.6.1997 is simpliciter which reads as under :

dk;kZy; vkns''k

xzkE; fodkl vuqHkkx&5 ds ''kklukns''k la[;k 1349@38-5-97&20@vk-iz-@97 fnukad 9-4-1997 }kjk vkokl fodkl izdks"B lekIr dj fn;s tkus ds QyLo:i vc foHkkx dks Jh cPph flag] i=okgd dh lsokvksa dh vko'';drk ugha gSa vr% Jh cPph flag dks ,d ekg dk vfxze osru Hkqxrku djrs gq;s fnukad 25-6-1997 ls mudh lsok;sa lekIr dh tkrh gSa A

�ts- d- frokjh�

ftyk fodkl vf/kdkjh

uSuhrky A**

The above letter, terminating the services of the petitioner is impugned before this Court. Said order itself shows that in view of abolishing of ''housing cell'' in the department, services of petitioner as ''Patrawahak'' are no more required. It is also mentioned in the letter that he will be entitled to one month salary in lieu of one month notice. As such there appears no illegality in the impugned order.

Learned counsel for the petitioner drew my attention to Rule 25 of Group ''D'' Employees Service (U. P.) Rules, 1985 and argued that since the petitioner stood confirmed on completion of period of probation after a year as such his services could not have been terminated. Rule 25 of aforesaid rule reads as under :

"25. Confirmation. - A probationer shall be confirmed in his appointment at the end of the period of probation or extended period of probation, as the case may be, if his work and conduct have been found to be satisfactory, the appointing authority considers him fit for confirmation and his integrity is certified."

I have examined the matter from the angle, the petitioner has argued. For the benefit of Rule 25, one requires to have been placed on probation, under Rule 24 which provides that a person on appointment to a post in the establishment in a permanent vacancy shall be placed on probation for a period of one year provided that the contirious service rendered in a officiating or temporary capacity in a post borne on the Establishment may be taken into account in computing the period of probation for that post. In other words, Rule 24 provides that only the person appointed on a permanent vacancy is on probation, and period spent on officiating or temporary capacity, shall be treated as the period of probation. It is no where stated by the present petitioner, if his appointment was against a permanent vacancy nor is it his case that such vacancy was available to him on later date. As such the benefit of said rule cannot be said to be available to the petitioner unless he is appointed against a permanent vacancy nor is it his case that such vacancy was available to him on later date. In the service jurisprudence, it is settled principle of law that a person appointed on a temporary basis gets confirmed on availability of a permanent vacancy. Here in the present case, it is not a case of the petitioner that he was appointed against permanent post rather his appointment letter shows that he was appointed on a temporary basis. As such benefit of rule of confirmation is not available to the petitioner.

Shri K. N. Joshi, learned counsel for the petitioner, drew my attention to Annexure-2 to the writ petition which is a copy of the letter dated 9.11.1995 whereby the petitioner was called for interview by the District Development Officer. Said letter reads as under :

^^vkidk lsok;kstu dk;kZy;] uSuhrky ls prqFkZ Js.kh in ds fy; uke vk;k gS A bl tuin ds vf/k"Bku esa fjDr prqFkZ {ks=h; xzkE; fodkl laLFkku] ihiqYl dkWyst] gY}kuh gkosa tks bl gsrq vkidks dksbZ ekxZ O;; ns; u gksxk A

�tqxy fd''kksj frokjh�

ftyk fodkl vf/kdkjh

uSuhrky A**

Learned counsel referring the aforesaid letter emphasized that the word "RIKT referred to the permanent vacancy but this Court is unable to accept the submission for the reason that mere ''RIKT means ''VACANCY'' which includes temporary as well as the permanent vacancy.

On examination of the entire matter in controversy since this Court is satisfied that the impugned order of termination is simpliciter in nature and is in terms of the appointment letter, issued to the petitioner and as such suffers from no illegality.

In the circumstances, the writ petition is dismissed with the observation that if the petitioner meanwhile is reappointed or absorbed in service by the respondents, the observations made in the judgment shall not come in the way in continuance of his service. No order as to costs.