High CourtsSingle Bench

Bachubhai N. Patel vs State of Gujarat

Gujarat High Court · Decided on 30 January 2014 · Citation: (2014) LabIC 1750

HON’BLE JUDGES
Kaushal Jayendra Thaker, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Section 120(B), 466, 468, 471
RESULT
Allowed
CASE NUMBER
Special Civil Application No. 4178 of 2009
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Judgment

12 paragraphs · 959 words

Kaushal Jayendra Thaker, J.—By way of this petition, the petitioner has prayed to quash and set aside the order of his dismissal passed by respondent No. 3, dated: 30.09.2008, and has also prayed for a direction to the respondent authorities to re-consider his case and to reinstate him in service with continuity of service, back wages and all other consequential benefits. The brief facts leading to the filing of the present petition reads as under;

2.

The petitioner came to be appointed by the respondents as Talati-cum-Mantri with effect from 27.12.1972 and was initially posted at Village: Patpur, Tal.: Choryasi, Dist.: Surat. Later on, a complaint being C.R. No. 151 of 2004 came to be registered against the present petitioner and others for the offence punishable under Sections 466, 468, 471, 120(B) of the IPC and Section 12 of the Passport Act, 1963, with Palsana Police Station. In connection with the aforesaid offence, the charge-sheet was lying against the petitioner and others on 7(17).01.2005 and after a full fledged trial, the learned JMFC, Bardoli, convicted the petitioner and others. Being aggrieved with the same, the petitioner and others preferred an appeal before the Sessions Judge, Vyara, who suspended the order passed by the learned JMFC, Bardoli, and released the petitioner and others on bail. Pursuant thereto, the petitioner was issued a notice dated 04.03.2008 and was asked to make a representation. The petitioner replied the said notice and informed the competent authorities that he had already preferred an appeal against his conviction. Thereafter, the petitioner came to be terminated vide order dated 30.09.2008 and was relieved from service with effect from 06.10.2008. Subsequently, the appeal preferred by the petitioner came to be allowed and he was acquitted of the charges levelled against him. Hence, the petitioner made a representation before the authorities to reinstate him in the wake of his acquittal, but, the authorities took no action. Hence, the present petition.

3.

Heard. While admitting this matter on 29.04.2009, this Court passed the following order;

RULE. The parties concerned are directed to complete the pleadings within a period of six months from today. On completing the pleadings, it will be open for the petitioner to submit an application for fixing the early date of hearing, which shall be considered.

4.

Despite the aforesaid order neither the State nor DDO felt it necessary to file a counter, which shows the lethargic manner in which the life of a litigant, who is their own employee, is put to peril by the Babus''. It is an admitted position of fact that the inquiry was short-circuited and the petitioner was dismissed, because he was convicted by the learned JMFC, Bardoli. However, the aforesaid order did not culminate into confirmation and on the contrary even during the pendency of the appeal, the sentence imposed on the petitioner were ordered to be suspended by the learned 4th Addl. & District Sessions Judge, Vyara, by order dated 31.12.2007. Thereafter, the appeal preferred by the petitioner culminated into his acquittal and others, i.e. his co-accused.

5.

Ms. Pathak, learned AGP for respondent No. 1, vehemently supported the order passed by the respondent authority and placed reliance on the following judgments in support of her case;

(1) Depot Manager, Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation Vs. Mohd. Yousuf Miya, etc., ;

(2) Avinash Sadashiv Bhosale (D) Thr. L.Rs.. Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, ;

6.

Ms. Mandaviya, learned Advocate for respondent No. 3, also submitted that the petitioner was dismissed from the service after following the procedure laid down under the law, and hence, this petition be dismissed.

7.

I am unable to accept the submission of Ms. Mandavia for the reason that there is no material on record to show that a full fledged inquiry was ever conducted, pursuant to which the order dismissing the petitioner from service was passed. It is an admitted position that the departmental inquiry, in the instant case, was short-circuited. This Court, even for a moment, is not suggesting that the Disciplinary Authority cannot hold departmental inquiry. The issue in the case on hand is reinstatement of the petitioner. The Hon''ble Apex Court, recently, in the case of State Bank of India and Another Vs. Mohammed Abdul Rahim, , held as under at Para-11;

11.

The respondent was acquitted on 22.02.2002; the demand for reinstatement was made by him on 22.04.2002 and he was reinstated in service by the appellant bank on 07.11.2002. On the view that we have taken, at the highest, what can be said in favour of the respondent is that he is entitled to wages from the date he had lodged the demand for the same following his acquittal, namely, from 22.04.2002; until the date of his reinstatement, if the same has not already been granted by the appellant bank.

8.

In the case on hand, the petitioner was acquitted by the learned Sessions Judge, Vyara, on 12.02.2009, and hence, the respondent authorities were not justified in not reinstating the petitioner. Thus, in view of the above the decisions relied on by Ms. Pathak would not apply to the facts of the case on hand and the order dated 30.09.2008 cannot be sustained in the eye of law and this Court is inclined to quash and set aside the same. In the result, this petition is ALLOWED. The order dated 30.09.2008 passed by respondent No. 3 is quashed and set aside. The respondent authorities are directed to reinstate the petitioner, FORTHWITH. Insofar as the back wages and other consequential benefits are concerned, the respondent authorities shall consider and decide the same at the earliest and in accordance with law. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent. No order as to costs. Direct service is permitted.