Deepa Ram vs State And Ors

Arun Monga, J

Grievance of the petitioner arises from an order dated 12.02.2015 (Annex. 3), whereby, based on the police verification report, his services as Safai Karamchari were terminated due to his conviction in 2003. The petitioner further seeks directions to the respondents to reinstate him in service with all consequential benefits.

Succinct, relevant facts as pleaded in the petition are as follows:

2.1 The respondents conducted a recruitment process for selecting candidates for the position of Safai Karamchari (Sweeper) through a lottery system in year 2014. The petitioner was selected under the Scheduled Tribe category and was appointed on 15.10.2014 as a probationary trainee for two years on a fixed salary.

2.2 Subsequently, the petitioner’s case was forwarded for police verification. The police report dated 15.11.2014 revealed that the petitioner was involved in Criminal Case No. 383/2001 and charged under Sections 341, 323, and 147 of the IPC.

2.3 Criminal trial resulted in the acquittal of the petitioner for offences under Sections 323 and 341 of the IPC due to a compromise. However, the petitioner was convicted under Section 147 of the IPC, but was granted the benefit of Section 3 of the Probation of Offenders Act, as the offence under Section 147 is non-compoundable.

2.4 Following this, the petitioner was issued a termination order on 12.02.2015, stating that his services were terminated due to the police verification report, which revealed his conviction in 2003. Aggrieved, petitioner has preferred the present petition.

In the aforesaid backdrop, I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and gone through the case file.

Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned order dated 12.02.2015 (Annex.3) suffers from non-application of mind. Section 147 IPC is non-compoundable, the petitioner was convicted for it alone. It is submitted that Section 147 IPC applies only in cases involving more than one person, as it relates to being a member of an unlawful assembly. Considering that the related offences under Sections 323 and 341 IPC are minor and punishable by fine only, these could not reasonably serve as grounds to terminate the petitioner’s employment. Moreover, these offences are neither related to moral turpitude nor connected to the discharge of duties as a Class IV employee.

4.1. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that the impugned order disregards the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. If the benefit of Section 3 of this Act is extended to a person, it implies that the convicted person is released after admonition. Admonition does not constitute a sentence, and it depends on the Court’s assessment after considering the circumstances of the case, the nature of the offence, and the character of the offender. Additionally, Section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act provides that, notwithstanding any other law, a person found guilty of an offence and dealt with under Section 3 or 4 shall not suffer any disqualification attached to a conviction under such law. Therefore, the impugned order is liable to be set aside.

None appears for the respondents, but the stand taken in reply is that in his application form, the petitioner swore that any false or concealed information would entitle the respondents to cancel his appointment.

5.1 On 05.11.2014, after the petitioner was appointed on probation, the Superintendent of Police submitted a report stating that the petitioner was involved in Criminal Case No. 383/2001, in which he was convicted under Section 147 of the IPC.

5.2. The petitioner failed to disclose material facts. The petitioner was still a probationer employee and not a confirmed one. It is well-established that suppression of material facts, particularly regarding criminal charges, is a significant lapse. Employer has the right to cancel the appointment or terminate the services of an individual who deliberately conceals such information in order to obtain public employment. Therefore, the petitioner, having suppressed crucial information, cannot claim an unfettered right to continue in service. Hence, the petition deserves to be dismissed.

While issuing notice, following order dated 26.03.2015 was passed by a Coordinate Bench of this Court, then seized of the matter, which is reproduced hereinbelow:-

“It is contended that the services of the petitioner have been terminated on the ground that as per police verification, he was convicted for the offence under Sections 323, 341 and 147 IPC whereas the petitioner stood acquitted under Section 323, 341 IPC on account of compromise and was granted the benefit of Section 3 of the Probation of Offenders Act on account of the fact that offence punishable under Section 147 IPC was not compoundable and accordingly, the said case cannot come in the way of the petitioner. Moreover, the said case was of 10 years prior to the date of his appointment.

Issue notice. Meanwhile, the impugned order dated 12.02.2015 shall remain stayed.”

Apropos, the petitioner continued to be in service. On the other hand, none appears for any of the respondents. In fact, it transpires that the respondents had preferred an application under Article 226(3) of the Constitution of India seeking vacation of the interim order passed by this Court, which was disposed of by a subsequent order dated 17.02.2017 in the following terms, order reproduced as follows:-

“The matter has come upon an application for vacation of the interim order dated 26.03.2015 passed by this Court. Heard learned counsel for the parties.

The order impugned in the present writ petition is order dated 12.02.2015 whereby services of petitioner Safai Karmchari has been terminated. A perusal of the impugned order dated 12.02.2015, reveals that his services have been terminated on the basis of his alleged conviction on 11.07.2002.

Petitioner’s appointment has been made vide order dated 15.10.2014 and at the time of appointment and filling of forms for recruitment, there was no requirement or condition of disclosure of particulars of any criminal case pending or decided against him, which is evident from perusal of the Application Form submitted by the respondents as Exhibit R/1.

Having considered the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties and perusal of the record, this Court does not find any reason to vacate the interim order passed by this Court on 26.03.2015. The application moved under Article 226(3) of the Constitution is, therefore, rejected.

List this matter for admission in third week of March 2017.”

It so appears that, by the sheer passage of time, the respondents seem to have acquiesced to the continuation of the petitioner in service and accepted it as a fait accompli. That is perhaps why there is no representation on their behalf.

Be that as it may, in any case, I am in agreement with the observations made and the reasons recorded in the aforesaid order dismissing the application seeking vacation of the interim protection granted to the petitioner. The aforesaid observations are made absolute, and in terms thereof, the petition is allowed, and the impugned order dated 12.02.2015 (Annex.3) is set aside, with consequences to follow.

Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.