High CourtsDivision Bench(1998) 02 MAD CK 0093

Bakiam vs The State of Tamil Nadu and another

Madras High Court · Decided on 2 February 1998 · Citation: (1999) 1 CTC 57

HON’BLE JUDGES
V.S. Sirpurkar, J · R. Balasubramanian, J
CASE NUMBER
H.C.P. No. 383 of 1997

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Judgment

66 paragraphs · 1,468 words

Judgment Pronounce by V.S. Sirpurkar, J

1.

Heard. In this petition, the detention of one Mathi @ Mathiyazhagan son of Krishnan, u/s 3(2) of the Tamil Nadu Prevention of Dangerous

Activities of Bootleggers, Drug Offenders, Forest Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Slum Grabbers Act, 1982 (Tamil Nadu

Act 14 of 1982), passed by the Commissioner of Police, Chennai city is in challenge. The detaining authority has considered the said detenu as a

Goonda"" within the meaning of Section 2(f) of the Said Act.

2.

The detaining authority has relied on two adverse cases. They being Crime Number 127 of 1997 on the file of H.B. Thiruvotriyur Police Station

under Sections 341, 307 I.P.C. altered to 302 I.P.C. and Crime No. 130 of 1997 on the file of the same Police Station under Sections 147, 148,

341, 323, 336, 427 and 506(ii) I.P.C. The ground case relied upon by the detaining authority is vide Crime Number 179 of 1997 on the file of the

same Police Station for the offences under Sections 147, 148, 341, 332, 336, 427, 307 and 506(ii) IPC., The incident in the first adverse case is

said to have taken place on 15.1.1997 where the detenu is said to be a member of an unlawful assembly with some others, which was armed with

deadly weapons and the said assembly restrained one Umapathy due to previous enmity and chased him near a temple at West Mada Street,

Thiruvotriyur upto the playground opposite to veterinary hospital. The said Umapathy was caught hold of and then assaulted with sharp edged

weapons by the members of the assembly. As a result of which, the said Umapathy was injured seriously and ultimately died in the hospital.

3.

The Second adverse case is based on the incident dated 16.1.1997, that is the very next day, at about 09.15 hours at the West Mada Veethi

front of Door No. 15, where the detenu was a member of an unlawful assembly with some others, which was armed with deadly weapons and

assaulted one Sivakumar and caused simple injury to him, terrorised him and created panic in the locality. A complaint was lodged by the said

Sivakumar.

4.

The ground case is based on an incident dated 24.1.1997, when again, the detenu with some other persons was a member of an unlawful

assembly with deadly weapons and this assembly assaulted the police party. This incident took place in the morning when one Arjunan and his

Police party were proceeding to collect information and while they were so proceeding, they received reliable information about the

aforementioned unlawful assembly and the accused therein, who were all wanted in respect of a murder case. The said police party therefore

proceeded to the spot and noticed the detenu along with some others and when the said assembly saw the Police Party, it was incited to assault

the Police Party. The said Arjunan was assaulted by one of the members of the unlawful assembly with patta knife over his neck. Not only this, the

members of the assembly pelted stones on the police party and a huge crowd had gathered at the spot. The members of the unlawful assembly

escaped and while they were being chased, the members of the said unlawful assembly picked up soda water bottles from the bunk shop of one

Kannan and hurled the same against the Police and the Public. The bottles fell on the road and broke into pieces. The broken pieces scattered all

over road side. These daring acts caused alarm in the whole locality and the fact that the Police Party was assaulted in broad day light caused

terror to be spread. On the basis of this, the impugned order came to be passed. It is further suggested in the grounds that the detenu thereafter

surrendered on the same day on 24.1.1997 before the XV Metropolitan Magistrate, who sent them to custody. He was further remanded. It was

expressed that if the accused person is able to get bail, that would be prejudicial to the interests of the Society, in as much as, his liberty would

prejudice the public order of the Society.

5.

The Learned counsel firstly contended that the detention was ordered by the detaining authority without considering the relevant material. He

contended that the detenu has presented a surrender petition before the XV Metropolitan Magistrate but there is nothing in the grounds to suggest

that the contents of the surrender petition had been considered by the detaining authority. The learned counsel further submits that had those

contents been submitted, then it would have certainly affected the thinking process of the detaining authority as the detaining authority in those

circumstances would have come to know the circumstances under which the detenu had surrendered before the Court.

6.

It is difficult to accept this contention, for the simple reason, that the surrender petition would not by itself have the effect of affecting the thinking

process of the detaining authority. In the first place, there is no requirement in the Code of Criminal Procedure to give such surrender petition. If an

accused person who surrenders before a Magistrate gives such a surrender petition, that by itself would not be a document, which has any legal

sanction. It is merely a statement made to the Court that a particular accused wants to surrender as he feels that he is wanted by the Police

machinery. The surrender petition, thus having no status in law or in Criminal Procedure Code, would not be a document, which could be said to

be a material document, so as to affect the thinking process of the detaining authority. The learned counsel was unable to say as to how such a

petition would have been able to affect the thinking process of the detaining authority except suggesting that he would have known the

circumstances under which the accused persons, then including the detenu had surrendered. That in our opinion would not be sufficient.

7.

The detaining authority has considered the fact that the accused persons have committed the offences on 15.1.1997, 16.1.1997 and ultimately

on 24.1.1997. Those offences were ghastly and in addition to it, those offences were committed at the public place as to cause alarm in the

neighbouring areas. The detaining authority has also considered the fact of the surrender by the detenu alongwith others, and their being remanded

to further custody. The said facts, would in our opinion, be sufficient, though we would not go into the sufficiency of the reasons. In our opinion, it

would not have been necessary for the detaining authority to consider the circumstances under which the detenu and other accused offered

themselves for arrest. The first contention therefore lacks merits and it must be rejected.

8.

The Second contention raised on behalf of the petitioner is that there is no material on record to suggest that the detaining authority was aware

of the fact of the remanding of the accused. In his attempt, the learned counsel invited the attention of the court at page 153 of the paper book

supplied to the accused, which is the Special report. The learned counsel wants to suggest that this Special Report is silent as to whether the

accused persons who had surrendered before the XV Metropolitan Magistrate were further remanded to the Police custody at all and upto what

period that remand was extended. It is suggested further that in the absence of that material, it was impossible for the detaining authority to know

as to whether the accused persons were actually remanded to the Police custody. However, in answer to this, the learned Additional Public

Prosecutor took us through the paper, which is at page 67. That document clearly suggests that the accused persons who had surrendered were

remanded to the police custody upto 7.2.1997. In that view, it cannot be said, that the detaining authority did not have any material to know as to

whether the accused persons were under remand and further as to upto what date they were remanded. It is given in the grounds that the accused

persons were in remand and the detaining authority was aware of that fact. In that view of the matter, this contention of the learned counsel must be

rejected.

9.

Learned counsel further contended that the factum of the detention was not informed to the near relatives. There also, unfortunately for the

petitioner, the factual position is otherwise. We have seen the documents ourselves, which bear the endorsement of the near relative of the

petitioner and it suggests that the said relative has been informed almost immediately after the arrest. Therefore, this contention has also to be

rejected.

10.

In the result, it has to be held, that the petition has no merits and must be dismissed. It is accordingly dismissed.