High CourtsDivision Bench(2011) 03 SHI CK 0032

Balak Ram Dhirta vs State of Himachal Pradesh and others

High Court Of Himachal Pradesh · Decided on 23 March 2011 · Citation: (2011) 2 ShimLC 200

HON’BLE JUDGES
Surinder Singh, J · R.B. Misra, J
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
L.P.A. No 30 of 2011

AI Structured Summary

Not yet generated for this judgment

Judgment

16 paragraphs · 1,292 words

R.B. Misra, J.—The present Letters Patent Appeal is arising from the impugned interim order dated 7.1.2011 passed in CMP No. 7684 of 2010 of learned Single Judge.

2.

Appellant herein/writ petitioner while working as Branch Manager in H.P. State Cooperative Agriculture and Rural Development Bank Ltd. (in short called ''Bank'') Chopal was transferred in the same capacity to the ''Bank'' in Chowari, District Chamba, vide order dated 21.10.2010 of the Managing Director of the Bank. Being aggrieved, the appellant preferred CWP No. 7684 of 2010 with prayers to quash the above said order, inter alia, for issuance of appropriate directions to the respondent-Bank authorities to adjust the appellant herein (writ petitioner) to any other nearby Branch Office of the said Bank. This Court (D.B.) on 8.12.2010 was pleased to pass the order which reads as below:

Petitioner submits that he is on medical leave and on joining duty, he may be allowed to perform his duty as Bank Manager in one of the vacancies available. Since it is submitted that the petitioner has not been relieved as on today, it is for the Bank to retain and accommodate the petitioner appropriately.

3.

After exchange of Affidavit(s), the said writ petition has been admitted. After hearing the said writ petition, learned Single Judge was pleased to pass an order dated 7.1.2011 which reads as below:

The petitioner wants to implead Chairman of the Bank by name as a party by making allegations of malafide also as against him. Necessary application be filed by the next date. The interim order staying the transfer of the petitioner stands vacated since the petitioner may take time for filing the application. He had already completed tenure of 3 years service at the present place of posting. Therefore, no case is made out for extending the interim order passed in favour of the petitioner. The same stands vacated accordingly. Put up on 7.3.2011 Copy dasti.

4.

The appellant herein has already completed much more than 3 years of service as a Branch Manager of the said Bank at Chopal. The appellant/writ petitioner has also arrayed Managing Director of the ''Bank'' alleging malafide against him at later stage and the writ petition is yet to be adjudicated upon in reference to the pleadings of the parties, materials on record and response of Managing Director therefore, we do not find any illegality in the impugned interim order dated 7.1.2011, passed by the learned Single Judge in CWP No. 7684 of 2010 recalling the interim stay order of transfer. Without expressing anything on the merits of the case of the appellant herein, in our considered view the Letters Patent Appeal against the vacation of interim order cannot be allowed.

5.

The protection was granted to the appellant herein/writ petitioner, by way of interim order regarding his transfer which however, was vacated by an interim impugned order dated 7.1.2011, therefore, subsequently granting relief by way of staying the impugned interim order, shall tantamount to granting final relief, as prayed for in the writ petition. Such relief, if granted, would restore the appellant in his original position of Branch-Manager in Bank at Chopal, which in our considered view is not justifiable more so, when the allegation of malafide incorporated at subsequent stage of filing the writ petition is yet to be adjudicated upon.

6.

Hon''ble Supreme Court has consistently held that the Court should not pass an interim order which amounts to a final relief. Whether the petitioner is entitled for any relief has to be adjudicated upon at the time of final disposal of the writ petition. The Court should not pass an interim order without considering the issues of public interest balance of convenience, as to whether prirna facie case is made out; as to whether the party concerned could be compensated in terms of money etc., and other relevant consideration. (Vide Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Chandan Nagar, West Bengal Vs. Dunlop India Ltd. and Others, , State of Rajasthan and Others Vs. Swaika Properties and Another, ; A.P. Christians Medical Educational Society Vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh and Another, , State of Jammu & Kashmir Vs. Mohd. Yaqoob Khan and Others, ; U.P. Junior Doctors'' Action Committee and Others Vs. Dr. B. Sheetal Nandwani and Others, ; Guru Nanak Dev University Vs. Parminder Kr. Bansal and another, ; St. John''s Teacher Training Institute (for Women), Madurai, Vs. State of Tamil Nadu and others, etc. etc., ; Bharatbhushan Sonaji Kshirsagar (Dr.) v. Abdul Khalik Mohd. Musa; Bank of Maharashtra Vs. Race Shiping and Transport Co. Pvt. Ltd. and another, ; Commissioner/Secretary to Government Health and Medical Edu. Deptt. Civil Sectt., Jammu Vs. Dr Ashok Kumar Kohli, ; Shiv Shankar and Others Vs. Board of Directors, U.P.S.R.T.C. and Another, ; Union of India (UOI) and Another Vs. Shree Ganesh Steel Rolling Mills Ltd. and Another, ; AIR 1997 993 (SC); C.B.S.E. and Another Vs. P. Sunil Kumar and Others, ; and State of Uttar Pradesh and Others Vs. Ram Sukhi Devi, .

7.

The logic behind this remains that ill-conceived sympathy masquerades as interlocutory justice exposing the judicial discretion to the criticism of private benevolence and the Court should not be guided by misplaced sympathy, but should rather pass interim orders making accurate assessment of even the prima facie legal position. The Court should not embarrass the authorities under the Statute by taking over the functions to be performed by them.

8.

In Union of India v. Era Education Trust, AIR 2000 SC 1573, Hon''ble Supreme Court after considering its large number of judgments held that while passing interim order in exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, principles laid down for granting interim relief under Order XXXIX of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 should be kept in mind. It can neither be issued as a matter of right nor it should be in the form which can be granted only as final relief.

9.

In Morgan Stanley Mutual Fund Vs. Kartick Das, Hon''ble Supreme Court held that ex-parte injunction could be granted only under exceptional circumstances. The factors which should weigh for grant of injunction are- (a) whether irreparable or serious mischief will ensue to the plaintiff; (b) whether the refusal of ex-parte injunction would involve greater injustice than grant of it would involve; (c) even if ex-parte injunction should be granted, it should only be for limited period of time; and (d) general principles like prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss would also be considered by the Court.

10.

In Burn Standard Co. Ltd. and Others Vs. Dinabandhu Majumdar and Another, Hon''ble Supreme Court deprecated the practice of grant of interim relief which amounts to final relief, observing that High Court should exercise its discretion, while granting interim relief, reasonably and judiciously and, if loss can be repairable or the loss can be satisfied by giving back wages etc., no interim order should be granted. The relevant observations of Burn Standard Company Ltd. (supra) are extracted as below:

It should be granted only in exceptional circumstances where the damage cannot be repaired, for the reason that if no relief for continuance in service is granted and ultimately his claim....is found to be acceptable, the damage can be repaired by granting him ail those monetary benefits which he would have received and he continued in service. We are, therefore, of the opinion that in such cases it would be imprudent to grant interim relief.

Emphasis added

11.

Similar view has been reiterated in Council for Indian School Certificate Examination Vs. Isha Mittal and Another, .

12.

In view of the aforesaid analysis we do not find any scope of interference in the L.P.A., therefore, it is dismissed, so also the pending application(s), if any.