Baldev Raj vs Dharmo Rani

V.K. Bali, J.—As before the learned Single Judge, so also before us, the question that has been debated in all these appeals is as to whether the Insurance Company can be held liable for payment of compensation awarded to the claimants. Inasmuch as in all these appeals bearing Nos. 2253 to 2257 of 1989 the only question is as referred to above, we propose to decide the same by common order.

Brief facts, for determination of the controversy involved in these appeals, would reveal that on May 19, 1986, Bhira deceased along with other members of his family, was standing on the bus stand Sekhup on Karnal-Assandh road. They were to attend a marriage party. Inasmuch as the bus service was disturbed on that day as a result of strike, a truck bearing registration No. RJ1-1506 coming from Assandh side was signalled to stop for lift and the driver of the truck agreed to give them lift on payment of Rs.200/-. Unfortunately, however, when the truck reached near village Charo, it went out of control and over-turned in a kacha pond. Bhira and others sustained multiple injuries and thereafter died in the hospital. The legal heirs of deceased filed applications for compensation u/s 110-A read with Section 92-A of the Motor Vehicles Act. The driver of the truck, National Insurance Company and owner were made party to the petitions.

in the resultant trial, the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal returned findings that the truck was owned by Man Raj who had transferred its ownership by an affidavit dated May 14, 1986 to Baldev Raj appellant and that the accident had taken place on May 19, 1986 and the transferee did not notify the transfer of ownership of the vehicle to the Insurance Company. On the findings aforesaid, while dealing with inter se dispute between the owner and Insurance Company with regard to liability to pay compensation, the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal found that the insurance policy, Ex.R1 contained a specific provision that passengers could not be carried in a goods vehicle and, therefore, the compensation that had since been allowed to the claimants, was payable by the driver and owner of the vehicle jointly and severally.

Insofar as findings with regard to there being a specific provision in the insurance policy, Ex.R1 that passengers could not be carried in a goods carrier, learned Single Judge upheld the same as it was a case which could fall in exclusion clause u/s 96(2)(b)(ii) of the Motor Vehicles Act. However, in support of the finding that driver and owner were liable to pay the compensation, another dimension was added by the learned Single Judge when it was observed that if the matter was to be viewed from another angle, i.e. the original owner transferring the truck before the date of accident to Baldev Raj, applicant, intimation whereof was not given to the concerned company, then also the Insurance Company could not be saddled with the liability to pay compensation to the claimants.

In these appeals filed under Clause X of the Letters Patent, Mr. S.D. Bansal, learned counsel representing the appellant, takes an exception to this, finding of the learned Single Judge on the basis of Full Bench judgment of Andhra Pradesh High Court in Madineni Kondaiah and Others Vs. Yaseen Fatima and Others, . Learned counsel contends that the liability of the transferor so far as third party risk is concerned continues till he discharges statutory obligation under Sections 29-A and 31 read with Section 94 of the Act and that the policy does not lapse on transfer so far as third party risk is concerned. Mr. Giani, learned counsel representing the respondents, however, joins issues with the learned counsel for the appellant.

There is no need at all to go into the only contention raised by learned counsel inasmuch as not a word could be urged with regard to findings recorded by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal that came to be confirmed by the learned Single Judge that in the insurance policy, Ex.R1, there was a specific provision that the passengers could not be carried in a goods vehicle and the case would fall in the exclusion clause u/s 96(2)(b)(ii) of the Act. If the findings to the effect, as have been mentioned above, with regard to exclusion clause, cannot be touched, the discussion on the only point raised by Mr. Bansal would be only academic. The result of the case would not change. That being so, it is unnecessary or us to go into the question of law raised by learned counsel for the appellant.

Finding no merit in these appeals, we dismiss the same, leaving, however, the parties to bear their own costs.