Baldev Singh and another vs State of Punjab and another

The trial of the petitioners in complaint No. 165 dated

16.5.2011, (Annexure P-1) registered under Sections 498-A, 406, 120-B

IPC has culminated into their conviction under the aforesaid heads and they

have been substantively sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a

period of one year and six months. They have challenged the order of

conviction and sentence by way of an appeal before the learned Sessions

Court, Mansa. During the pendency thereof, it is claimed that the parties

have entered into compromise with the intervention of respectable persons.

Compromise-deed (Annexure P-5) reiterating the factum of compromise,

has been placed on record.

Report has been called from the Additional Sessions Judge,

Mansa, after statements of the parties was recorded regarding the

compromise. Additional Sessions Judge, Mansa has reported that the

compromise is voluntary, genuine and without any coercion or undue

influence. He has also sent copy of the statements of parties and copy of the

compromise.

Learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 2 states that

the complainant has no objection if the proceedings are quashed and the

judgment and order of conviction and sentence are set aside.

Hon''ble the Apex Court in Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab &

Ors. 2012(10) SCC 303 has held as under:-

"48. The question is with regard to the inherent power of the High Court in quashing the criminal proceedings against an offender who has settled his dispute with the victim of the crime but the crime in which he is allegedly involved is not compoundable Under Section 320 of the Code. 49. Section 482 of the Code, as its very language suggests, saves the inherent power of the High Court which it has by virtue of it being a superior court to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It begins with the words, ''nothing in this Code'' which means that the provision is an overriding provision. These words leave no manner of doubt that none of the provisions of the Code limits or restricts the inherent power. The guideline for exercise of such power is provided in Section 482 itself i.e., to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. As has been repeatedly stated that Section 482 confers no new powers on High Court; it merely safeguards existing inherent powers possessed by High Court necessary to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or to secure the ends of justice. It is equally well settled that the power is not to be resorted to if there is specific provision in the Code for the redress of the grievance of an aggrieved party. It should be exercised very sparingly and it should not

be exercised as against the express bar of law engrafted in any other provision of the Code. 50. In different situations, the inherent power may be exercised in different ways to achieve its ultimate objective. Formation of opinion by the High Court before it exercises inherent power Under Section 482 on either of the twin objectives, (i) to prevent abuse of the process of any court or (ii) to secure the ends of justice, is a sine qua non. 51. In the very nature of its constitution, it is the judicial obligation of the High Court to undo a wrong in course of administration of justice or to prevent continuation of unnecessary judicial process. This is founded on the legal maxim quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, conceditur et id sine qua res ipsa esse non potest. The full import of which is whenever anything is authorised, and especially if, as a matter of duty, required to be done by law, it is found impossible to do that thing unless something else not authorised in express terms be also done, may also be done, then that something else will be supplied by necessary intendment. Ex debito justitiae is inbuilt in such exercise; the whole idea is to do real, complete and substantial justice for which it exists. The power possessed by the High Court Under Section 482 of the Code is of wide amplitude but requires exercise with great caution and circumspection."

In State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswami, AIR 1977 SC 1489,

the Hon''ble Supreme Court has observed that the ends of justice are higher

than ends of mere law, though justice has got to be administered according

to the laws made by the legislature yet the Court proceeding ought not to be

permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution.

The Larger Bench of this Court in the case of Kulvinder Singh

& Ors. Vs. State of Punjab & Anr. 2007(3) RCR (Criminal) 1052, while

discussing the scope of quashing of prosecution on the basis of compromise,

by this Court in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., even in non-

compoundable offence(s) has held that there is no statutory bar under the

Cr.P.C . which can affect the inherent power of this Court under Section 482 .

Further, the same cannot be limited to matrimonial cases alone and the

Court has the wide power to quash the proceedings even in non-

compoundable offences notwithstanding the bar under Section 320 of the

Cr.P.C., in order to prevent the abuse of law and to secure the ends of

justice.

In the case of Sube Singh & Anr. State of Haryana & Anr.

Crl. Misc. No. M-38140 of 2011, decided on 09.04.2014, a Division Bench

of this Court while dealing with the question, as to whether the criminal

proceedings can be quashed in exercise of powers under Section 482

Cr.P.C. even after the accused was found guilty and convicted by the trial

court and the matter is sub-judice before the appellate Court, answered the

reference in the affirmative. Relying upon the decisions rendered in

Kulwinder Singh and Gian Singh (supra), the Court observed as under:-

"16. The magnitude of inherent jurisdiction exercisable by the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. with a view of prevent the abuse of law or to secure the ends of justice, however, is wide enough to include its power to quash the proceedings in relation to not only the non-compoundable offences notwithstanding the bar under Section 320 Cr.P.C. but such a power, in our considered view, is exercisable at any stage save that there is no express bar and invoking of such power is fully justified on facts and circumstances of the case." It has further been held that:

"20 ... Since there is no statutory embargo against invoking of power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. after conviction of an accused by the trial Court and during pendency of appeal against such conviction, it appears to be a fit case to invoke the inherent jurisdiction and strike down the proceedings subject to certain safeguards."

Adverting to the facts of present case, the parties have mutually

settled their dispute and have buried the hatchet. There is nothing on record

which is suggestive of the fact that the petitioners are pervious convicts.

Keeping in view the pronunciation of law and also the facts, in

my opinion, it would be a fit case to exercise the powers under Section 482

Cr.P.C.

Therefore, the instant petition is allowed. Consequently,

impugned complaint as well as summoning order and all other consequent

proceedings thereto, qua the petitioners are quashed. The judgment and

order of conviction and sentence are also set aside.