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Judgment
13 paragraphs · 1,433 wordsA.S. Nehra, J.
Petitioner was convicted under Section 16(1)(a)(i) read with Section 7 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, and was sentenced to undergo R.I. for a period of six months and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/ and in default of payment of fine, the petitioner was further directed to undergo R.I for a period of two months by Chief Judicial Magistrate, Faridabad, on 24th April, 1986. The appeal filed by the petitioner was dismissed by Additional Sessions Judge (III) Faridabad on 9th July, 1986. Hence this revision petition.
The prosecution story in brief is as under :
On 19th March 1983, at about 6.00 a.m. Shri Piare Lal, Food Inspector along with Dr. R.K. Sharma, inspected the premises of the accused Bali Ram and found him having in his possession about 600/650 coloured ice candy for public sale contained in ice box. The Food Inspector demanded a sample of the coloured ice candy from the accused by giving him notice in writing in form VI as prescribed under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955. He purchased 16 pieces of said coloured ice candy from the accused on payment of 80 paise against receipts. The purchased ice candy was melted and after that it was divided into three equal parts and was put in three clean and dry bottles. Two drops of formaline per 25 mls. of the sample were added in each bottle. The bottles were then stoppered, labelled and wrappeal in strong thick paper. A paper slip bearing LHA code number and signatures was affixed on each bottle from top to bottom. After securing the bottles with strong thread, the bottles were sealed with the sealed of the Doctor and the Food Inspector. Thumb impressions of the accused were obtained on each bottle so as to cover the paper slip and the wrapper. One seal bottle along with memo in form VII was sent to Public Analyst, Haryana, Chandigarh, for analysis through railway parcel in a sealed box. Another copy of form VIII along with seal impression of the seals used for sealing the box was sent separately by registered post to Public Analyst Haryana, Chandigarh. Two sealed bottles along with two copies of memo in form VII were deposited with LHA, Faridabad. Public Analyst declared in his report that the sample contains articifical sweetner free from sugar and containing unpermitted yellow basis coaltar dye. As the sample was found adulterated, the present complaint was filed.
On appearance of the accused, he was supplied with copy of complaint. In precharge evidence, Food Inspector Shri Piare Lal appeared as PW1. From the documents on record and the statement of the Food Inspector, finding a prima facie case for an offence under Section 16(1)(a)(i) read with Section 7 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, charge was framed against the accused to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed trial.
The Food Inspector again appeared for further crossexamination. Dr. R.K. Sharma was examine as PW2. Mool Chand who was joined while taking the sample from the accused was given up as having been won over by the accused and the prosecution evidence came to a close.
The statement of the accused as provided under Section 313, Criminal Procedure Code was recorded thereafter, in which the accused denied having any factory. He also denied the sample to have been taken from him. He admitted his signatures on the papers which according to him were taken in the capacity of a witness. He has claimed false implication. In defence, he has examined two witnesses and closed his defence. The main defence of the accused was that the sample was not taken from him. He has claimed that he was sitting in the ice factory and after taking of the sample he was asked to thumb mark the documents as a witness.
The prosecution case is that the sample was taken in the presence of Mool Chand, who was given up as having been won over by the accused. He has been examined as DW2 by the defence. He deposed that on 19.3.1983 at about 7.00 or 7.30 a.m. he was passing by the ice cream factory of Kallu Gupta and he went inside the factory. Bali Ram and Kallu Gupta along with one or two other persons were sitting inside. He further stated that he started taking tea when 23 persons came inside the factory and Kallu Gupta seeing them ran away, and those persons obtained the signatures and thumb impressions of Bali Ram as witness.
In my view this defence version is not acceptable. First reason is that the thumb impressions of a witness could not be obtained on the sample bottle. In his statement under Section 313, Criminal Procedure Code the accused admits his thumb impressions to have been obtained on the sample bottles. If Bali Ram and Mool Chand were asked to sign as witnesses, the distinction could not have been made between the two persons. One was asked to sign Ex. PA to Ex. PC and the accused thumb marked these papers along with sample bottles. Secondly, the accused has examined Bhim Singh as DW1, who stated that about 21/2 years back, he was delivered an envelope of the name of Kallu and he tendered that envelope to Kallu but Kallu refused to accept it saying that it was not belonging to him. DW1 thereafter stated that he kept the envelope with him and about a year after that he was sitting on a tea shop where Bali Ram was also sitting and the accused was talking of some registered envelope. He says that when he heard Bali Ram saying so, he delivered the envelope to him. The statement of DW1 shows that the accused was expecting a registered envelope. There is nothing on record to suggest that Bali Ram was expecting some other registered envelope than the one containing the result of the analysis of the sample from the Public Analyst. If the sample was not taken from the accused, there was no reason for him to expect such registered envelope. Last of all, the Food Inspector and Dr. R.K. Sharma appearing as PW1 and PW2 have stated that the sample was taken from the factory of the accused. There is no reason to disbelieve these two witnesses. Thus, there is no merit in the contention of the petitioner that he does not own any ice factory and was not having ice candy for public sale and the sample was not taken from him.
The speedy trial was the essence of justice and inordinate delay in disposal of the case itself has caused sufficient agony to the petitioner. The sample of ice candy in this case was taken on 19th March, 1983, the complaint was filed in the Court on 9th May, 1983 and the trial was concluded by the Chief Judicial Magistrate on 24th April 1986. The present revision petition is pending since 1986 against the petitioner and this prolonged litigation itself is a ground for treating the petitioner in a lenient manner. It has been held by the Supreme Court in Bhram Dass v. State of H.P., 1988 (2) Prevention of Food Adulteration Cases 13. as under :
"Coming to the question of sentence, we find that the appellant had been acquitted by the trial Court and the High Court while reversing the judgment of acquittal made by the appellate Judge has not made clear reference to clause (f). The occurrence took place about more than eight years back. Records show that the appellant has already suffered a part of the imprisonment. We do not find any useful purpose would be served in sending the appellant to jail at this point of time for undergoing the remaining period of sentence, though ordinarily in an antisocial offence punishable under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, the Court should take strict view of such matters."
I find that in the instance case, for last more than ten years, the petitioner has faced this protracted litigation and has undergone sufficient mental harassment. So keeping in view the circumstances of the case, I find it is fit case where no useful purpose would be served by sending the petitioner to jail at this stage for undergoing the remaining period of sentence.
As a result, I maintain the conviction of the petitioner but limit the sentence of imprisonment to the period already undergone by him. The sentence of fine is, however, maintained along with its default clause.
