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Judgment
Bachawat, J.—This is a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution. On January 15, 1953 certain immovable properties belonging to the certificate debtor was sold by the Certificate Officer, Khas Mahal in execution of a certificate. On April 25, 1953 the certificate debtor applied u/s 23 of the Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act for setting aside the sale on the ground mentioned in their petition and inter alia on the ground of material irregularities in the certificate proceedings and in publishing and conducting the sale. The order sheet shows that the learned Judge fixed May 15, 1953 for hearing of the case. On May 5, 1953 the lawyer for the certificate debtor put in the notice fee with a written requisition asking for issue of notice to the auction purchaser and also mentioning in the requisition that the date of hearing had been fixed on May 15, 1953. On May 10, 1953 the Certificate Officer issued notice on the auction purchaser to show cause. On May 15, 1953 the auction purchaser filed his show cause petition. The order sheet shows that the Certificate Officer heard the lawyers for the parties. He directed that the matter will appear on May 18, 1953 for orders. On May 18, 1953 the Certificate Officer passed an order rejecting the petition for the setting aside of the sale. He considered the Application on its merits and held that the grounds for setting aside of the sale had not been made out on behalf of the certificate debtor. Complaint is made on behalf of the certificate debtor Petitioner before us that the proceedings before the Certificate Officer are in contravention of natural justice. The point arises in this way. In the body of the judgment delivered by the Certificate Officer on May 18, 1953, he stated. The last hearing date, i.e., May 15, "1953 was fixed for preliminary hearing to ascertain whether "this sale set aside application should be entertained as well as "for filing of any objection by the auction purchaser". Having regard to this observation Mr. Baksi contended that May 15, 1953 was really fixed for a preliminary hearing and no date was fixed for the final hearing of the matter and the Petitioner had no effective opportunity of adducing evidence in support of his case. Undoubtedly, his contention receives some support from the observations made by the Certificate Officer in his judgment. But on a careful consideration of the whole matter we have, with some reluctance, come to the conclusion that there has been no contravention of natural justice in this case. The order sheet discloses that the parties well knew that May 15, 1953 had been fixed for hearing of the case. The written requisition filed on behalf of the certificate debtor on May 5, 1953 also shows that the certificate debtor knew that the case had been fixed for hearing on May 15, 1953. It is plain enough that on May 15, 1953 the lawyers for both parties were heard at length on the merits of the case. On that date neither party asked for an adjournment of the hearing nor did they ask for any opportunity to adduce evidence in the ease. The order sheet does not show that the case had been fixed on May 15, 1953 for a preliminary hearing. The Certificate Officer, of course, thought that the case had been fixed for a preliminary hearing but the parties were under no mistake of fact nor is there any material to show that either party was misled as to the nature of the hearing which took place on May 15, 1953. We are satisfied that the case was finally heard to the knowledge of both parties on May 15, 1953.
There was an appeal from the order of the Certificate Officer, dated May 18, 1953. This order was set aside on appeal by the Additional Collector, 24 Parganas, who remanded the case to the Certificate Officer for hearing after giving the parties an opportunity to adduce evidence. From this order a revision petition was filed before the Commissioner, Presidency Division, who by his order, dated January 20, 1954, set aside the order of the Additional Collector, 24-Parganas, and restored the order of the Certificate Officer. The further revision petition filed before the Member, Board of Revenue, was dismissed. The learned Commissioner, Presidency Division, points out that the case was heard on the merits on May 15, 1953, and that neither party on that date asked for an adjournment of the case or for a further opportunity to adduce evidence. The order of the Commissioner, Presidency Division, as also the order of the Member, Board of Revenue, cannot possibly be challenged in a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution. They acted within their jurisdiction. There is no error of law on the face of the record nor is there any failure of natural justice so far as they are concerned.
In this connection Mr. Baksi contended that the Commissioner, Presidency Division, had only limited power to revise the order of the Additional Collector, 24-Parganas. He contended that the Commissioner, was exercising revisional jurisdiction and that he could set aside the order of the Additional Collector, 24-Parganas, only if the Additional Collector had exercised the jurisdiction which he did not possess or failed to exercise the jurisdiction which he possessed or if he had exercised jurisdiction with material illegality or irregularity. I am unable to accept this contention. It is true the Act distinguishes between appellate and revisional jurisdiction. Section 51 of the Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act, 1913, provides for appeals including an appeal to the Collector from an order made by the Certificate Officer. Section 52 of the Act bars second appeals. Section 53 provides for revisional jurisdiction. u/s 53 the Commissioner may revise an order passed by a Collector and the Board of Revenue may revise an order passed by the Commissioner under the Act. In case where appeal lie the aggrieved party may appeal as a matter of right. The parties cannot claim revision as a matter of right. The revisional power is a discretionary power vested in the authorities specified u/s 53 of the Act. But the Revisional power is not limited in the manner suggested by Mr. Baksi. The provisions of Section 115 of the CPC cannot be projected into Section 53 of the Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act. In the exercise of his revisional powers the Commissioner may examine the legality and propriety of the order which he has been called upon to revise. In the instant case the Commissioner having examined the legality and propriety of the order of the Additional Collector, 24-Parganas, came to the conclusion that that order should be set aside. I have come to the conclusion that the Commissioner, Presidency Division, had full power to pass the order which he made in this case.
Mr. Baksi also contended before us that the certificate in this case is a nullity on the grounds (a) that the certificate is not in form No. 1 prescribed by Rule 84 of Schedule 11 to the Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act, 1913, and (b) that the fourth column of the certificate was left blank and was not filled up by mentioning therein the Municipal number of the immovable properties in spite of the fact that rent was due to the State Government. With regard to these objections the position stands thus. The first objection was not taken before any of the subordinate Tribunals. It is not even taken in the petition before the High Court. The second ground was taken for the first time in the petition before the Member, Board of Revenue, and is repeated in the petition in this Court. These objections should have been taken at the earliest possible opportunity and before the Certificate Officer.
In the absence of such objection, the materials on the record are not sufficient to dispose of these objections. There is even no material on the record to show that the immovable properties bear a municipal number. Besides, the certificate holder is not a party to this case. I find from the order sheet of the case in the High Court that the Collector, 24-Parganas, made an application for being added as a party but this application was dismissed by this Court inter alia on objection of the Petitioner certificate debtor. In these circumstances, we think that we should not pronounce upon the validity or otherwise of the certificate.
No other objection was raised before us.
The learned Advocate-General appearing on behalf of the auction-purchaser contended inter alia that the petition for setting aside the sale u/s 23 of the Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act, 1913, was not maintainable inasmuch as the requisite deposit was not put in by the certificate debtor simultaneously with the filing of the application. It is not necessary to decide this contention urged by the Advocate-General because he succeeds on other points.
I therefore, make the following order. The Rule be and is hereby discharged.
Each party will pay and bear his own costs.
this Court does not think it fit to pronounce on the validity or otherwise of the certificate in these proceedings. This order will not prejudice the right, if any, of the Petitioner certificate debtor to challenge the validity of the certificate in appropriate proceedings. We hereby expressly reserved the right, if any, of the Petitioner to challenge the validity of the certificate in further proceedings.
Chattebjee, J.
I agree with the order by my Lord but add a few paragraphs.
Mr. Bakshi''s grievance against the order of the Certificate Officer is that the principle of natural justice has been violated inasmuch as lie was not allowed any opportunity to adduce evidence. The Certificate Officer no doubt says on May 18, 1953 that May 15, 1953 was fixed for a preliminary hearing to ascertain whether the application should be entertained; but no hearing on any preliminary point took place on May 15, 1953. On May 18, 1953 the parties addressed the Certificate Officer on their respective cases and the Certificate Officer heard the learned lawyers for both the parties "in details". There is no statement in the order sheet dated May 18, 1953, nor there is any petition to show that the certificate debtor offered before the Certificate Officer to adduce evidence. The records of the case contain some of the materials necessary for disposing of a petition for setting aside the certificate sale. The certificate was there. The sale proclamation is there. The reports of the-various process servers were there. A good part of the documentary evidence necessary in such a case was already on record. Therefore, it could not be said that the application could not be heard without further evidence. Further, the-Certificate Officer in one place regrets that the certificate debtor took no steps for adducing evidence. He says as follows:
While understanding full implications of this contention. I am at a loss to-understand why no paper in support of the above contention has been filed by the certificate debtors.
The position, therefore, is that there is absolutely no material on the record to show that the certificate debtor offered to produce-evidence and the same was refused. petition for adjournment to take evidence was filed. Before May 18, 1953 no such grievance was made before the Certificate Officer. All grievances that are stated to have been made are subsequent to the decision of the Certificate Officer.
Coming now to the statute, there is no provision in the Public Demands Recovery Act directing the Certificate Officer to take evidence before the hearing of the petition. There are no provisions'' in the rules or regulations made thereunder would make it obligatory upon the Certificate Officer to accept evidence before he disposes of the case. It is indeed true that a party is at liberty to produce evidence before a Certificate Officer; but neither the party nor the Certificate Officer is bound by any rule under the Act to offer or to take evidence before the application is disposed of. I am, therefore, of opinion, if the Certificate Officer has proceeded to decide the case on the evidence on record and without calling upon the parties to produce further evidence, he has done nothing inconsistent with the provisions of law or of the statute. I may refer to a decision R. v. Brighton and Free Rent Tribunal (1950) I.A.E.R. 946. In that case in a petition for fixing rent the landlord produced certain witnesses who were not cross-examined. Before the Tribunal the tenant did neither produce evidence nor cross-examine the witnesses. The question was whether the tribunal could proceed on that evidence. It was held by Goddard, C.J., that the hearing before a tribunal may not necessarily be a hearing like that of a court. If the tribunal had observed all the formalities of the Act and had offended against none of the provisions or against the regulations made under it, there was no ground for holding that the tribunal''s determination was not in accordance with law and therefore the motions for certiorari and mandamus should be refused. Under the Public Demands Recovery Act there is no provision directing reception of evidence. I would, therefore, hold that the tribunal could adopt such a procedure as they considered fit and proper provided it was not inconsistent with the principles of natural justice. The principle of natural justice would have been violated had evidence been tendered but not allowed to be taken. There is no case like that. I would, therefore, overrule the argument of Mr. Bakshi that principle of natural justice was violated.
Against the order of the Certificate Officer u/s 23 there was an appeal and the Collector in appeal held that the parties should have been given an opportunity to adduce evidence. If that is what the Collector thought I do not think he again went beyond his jurisdiction or violated any principle of natural justice or made an error of law apparent on the face of records.
Against the order of the Collector there was a petition for revision to the Commissioner u/s 53 of the Public Demands Recovery Act. The question is, what are the powers of the Commissioner in revision. The Commissioner set aside the order of the Collector and restored that of the Certificate Officer.
Section 51 grants a right of appeal. Section 52 of the Act bars a second appeal. Section 53 provides for revision to various authorities. Revision in this case was made to the Commissioner and a Commissioner is the Chief Revenue Officer of a Division. The statute does not specifically say what are the powers of the Commissioner in revision. All that has been stated is that a Commisioner may revise but the extent of his powers has not been defined in the statute.
Section 115 of the CPC gives the High Court a power to revise. The circumstances under which that power can be exercised are described in Clauses (a), (b) and (c). That power is provided after elaborate provisions have been made for appeals to the High Court from original orders and original decree as also from appellate orders and appellate decrees. Necessarily in that context the power of revision is a limited one. Section 153 of the Bengal Tenancy Act also provides for a power of revision of the District Judge but that power is also in the same terms as Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The power of the District Judge in revision is thus specifically provided for. Section 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Court Act gives a power of revision to the High Court on questions of law. Whenever a power of revision is granted to a superior judicial authority against the decision of another judicial authority, that power is usually limited to questions of law or to questions of jurisdiction. I am not quite sure whether one of the reasons behind it is that at one stage of the history of judicial procedure questions of fact were largely referred to juries and questions of law were to be decided by the Judges and the revision is with respect to the order made by the Judges.
The Income Tax Act grants powers to the Commissioner for revision and he has been given that power to revise and to make enquiries which means that he may not merely decide questions of law and jurisdiction but also start new investigations and arrive at proper findings and this necessarily involves revision on facts. The Administration of Evacuees Properties Act of 1950 provides powers of revision to the Custodian General but that power refers both to "legality" as also to "propriety" of the order and that is the reason that the Supreme Court held in Indira Sohanlal Vs. Custodian of Evacuee Property, Delhi and Others, that the power of revision was not limited to questions of law or jurisdiction. In most cases where powers are given to administrative tribunals of a superior order to revise the decisions of administrative tribunals of an inferior order, wide powers are given. The reason is such wide powers are necessary for administrative purposes. A revising officer is ordinarily a superior officer, who is not merely to do justice between the State and the subjects but also has to carry on the administrative policy underlying the Act. I must say, Public Demands Recovery Act is the machinery by which public demands are recovered. Therefore this Act has a very important public purpose to serve, viz., realisation of public demands. If in such Act, the powers of revision be granted to the Chief Revenue Officer of the Division it would be difficult to construe that power to be limited one. That is not limited by the statute and to introduce such limitation would be to sacrifice the language of the statute for the purpose of keeping it in pari materia with other statute whereby revisional powers have been granted to one Judicial authority from another Judge. I am of opinion that no limitations being granted by the statute, no limitation can be imposed by the Court and add words to the statute which the statute itself does not contain. I am, therefore, of opinion that the Chief Revenue Officer of the Division has powers to interfere in a case where it is necessary. If there is any limitation, the limitation is provided by the principle of natural justice.
Section 52 of the Public Demands Recovery Act bars a second appeal. That does not mean that a second appeal within the meaning of Section 100 of the CPC does not lie. That means that a party aggrieved by the Appellate order of the Collector has no further right of Appeal. Having limited the party''s right to file only one appeal, the Legislature vested the superior Revenue Officers with powers of revision. Because such powers have been granted to the superior Revenue Officer, a party may move that tribunal and that tribunal has the power of revision, none the less the parties have no right to prefer an appeal or, in other words, they have no right to be heard, even though the revisional authority may have the power to revise and that is all what is meant by Sections 52 and 53.
I am not sure if I would get some support from the General Clauses Act, viz., Section 15 of the Bengal General Clauses Act. Section 15 of the Bengal General Clauses Act (after amendment) says, when any power is conferred by any Bengal Act, that power may be exercised from "time to time" as "occasion arises" or, in other words, it says, it is discretionary with the authorities vested with powers to exercise them on proper occasions. That power, before the amendment, referred to the power of the Government but by the Amendment the reference to Government has been deleted. One effect of that amendment may be that it now refers to all authorities vested with any power by any Act. Sandhiram v. Deputy Commissioner AIR (1953) Ass 168 may be referred to. If such is the effect of the amendment, they can interfere on questions of fact as well as questions of law but still they are not bound to interfere on every occasion but on such occasions as they think fit and proper.
I am therefore, of opinion that the revisional authority had powers to revise both on fact as well as on law. The Board of Revenue gave no reasons nor did they hear the parties. As I have already considered the matter, I must hold that the parties had no right to be heard but yet the Board had discretion to hear or not to hear and to revise or not to revise and, if they have exercised their power either way, I am afraid, it is impossible for me to say that they had gone beyond their jurisdiction conferred by the Act. There is no provision in the Act which directs the revising authority to hear the parties. If they do not hear, they do not violate any of the provisions in the Act and I am, therefore, of opinion that the Board had powers not to hear but still dismiss the petition.
The result is, I would therefore agree to the order prepared rather reluctantly as evidence might have been given but the Certificate Officer is not responsible for this.