High CourtsSingle Bench

Balwant Rai vs Mohan Lal

Jammu And Kashmir High Court · Decided on 3 November 2008 · Citation: AIR 2009 J&K 71 : (2010) 1 JKJ 137 : (2009) 5 RCR(Civil) 593

HON’BLE JUDGES
J.P. Singh, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) — Order 2 Rule 2
RESULT
Dismissed
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Judgment

100 paragraphs · 2,133 words

J.P. Singh, J.—Petitioner has filed these revision petitions calling in question 2nd Additional District Judge, Jammu's order of September 24,

2007 deciding three preliminary issues framed in respondent's suit Nos. 38/Civil and 39/Civil against him. The three common issues, which were

decided by the 2nd Additional District Judge, Jammu, are as under:

1.

Whether the suit is not maintainable, as it does not satisfy the requirement of Order 37 CPC ? OPD

2.

Whether the suit is hit by Order 2, Rule 2 of CPC. If so, what is its effect ? OPD

3.

Whether the suit is hit by principle of constructive res judicata ? OPD

2.

Appearing in support of the Revision petitions, Mr. Jatinder Choudhary assails the findings of the trial Court on issue No. 2 saying that

respondent's suit were not maintainable in view of the bar enacted under Order 2, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, hereinafter referred to as

the ""Code"", in that, the plaintiff-respondent had omitted to seek the relief of recovery of the suit amount when he had filed his earlier suit seeking a

Decree for permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the petitioner-defendant from selling 14 shops and a house consisting of three rooms,

kitchen, bathroom, latrine, verandah and compound constructed on Plot No. 38 situated at Old Janipur, Jammu, to any person other than the

plaintiff-respondent and to refrain from taking any advance for, or/and to execute Sale Deed of the house. He has placed reliance on judgment

dated 16-10-2007 delivered by this Court in CSA Nos. 5/2006 and 6/2006 (reported in AIR 2008 J. and K. 37) to support his submission.

3.

Learned Counsel had made a feeble attempt to question the findings of the trial Court on issue Nos. 1 and 3 saying that the plaints having not

been drawn, in requisite form, the respondent's suits, which were otherwise barred by the principle of constructive res judicata, were unsustainable.

4.

Supporting the findings of the trial Court on all the issues, Mr. M. L. Bhardwaj, learned Advocate for the respondent, says that based on a

different cause of action than the one pleaded in the earlier suit, the provisions of Order 2, Rule 2 of the Code or the principle of constructive res

judicata were not applicable to respondent's subsequent suits. He submitted that the respondent had drawn the plaint in accordance with the

provisions of Order 37 of the Code and the order passed by the trial Court holding the plaint to have been validly drawn did not suffer from any

error of law or jurisdiction.

5.

I have considered the submissions of learned Counsel for the parties and gone through the records of the case.

6.

Before dealing with the submissions raised at the Bar, few facts need to be noticed.

7.

Before the filing of two suits by the respondent seeking recovery of an amount of Rs. 1 lac in each suit from the petitioner, on the basis of

Promissory Notes executed on 14-1-1994 and 15-8-1995, the respondent-plaintiff had filed a suit against the petitioner-defendant seeking a

Decree for permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the petitioner-defendant from selling 14 shops and a house consisting of three rooms,

kitchen, bathroom, latrine, verandah and compound constructed on Plot No. 38 situated at Old Janipur, Jammu to any person other than the

plaintiff and to refrain from taking any advance for, or/and to execute Sale Deed of the house. It has been pleaded by the respondent-plaintiff in the

suit that he had advanced an amount of Rs. 4,50,000/- on loan to the petitioner who had mortgaged all the documents of his house and the shops

with him. The petitioner had thereafter executed an Agreement to Sell on 2-6-1998 saying therein that in case he would fail to pay Rs. 4,50,000/-

with interest to the respondent, he would execute Sale Deed of the shops and house in favour of the respondent. Petitioner is stated to have later

refused to execute Sale Deed of the shops and house in favour of the respondent and had declared that he would sell the property to someone

else, compelled whereby, the respondent had filed the suit of permanent prohibitory injunction as mentioned hereinabove.

8.

With the aforementioned facts in view, I will proceed to examine the submissions made at the Bar.

9.

Before dealing with the findings of the trial Court on issue No. 1, regard needs to be had to the provisions of Order 37, Rule 2 of the Code,

which for facility of reference are reproduced hereunder:

2.

Institution of summary suits

(1) A suit in which this Order applies, may if the plaintiff desires to proceed hereunder, be instituted by presenting a plaint which shall contain,:

(a) a specific averment to the effect that the suit is filed under this Order;

(b) that no relief, which does not fall within the ambit of this rule, has been claimed in the plaint; and

(c) the following inscription, immediately below the number of the suit in the title of the suit, namely:

(Under Order XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure, Svt. 1977).

10.

Although the provisions of Order 37, Rule 2 of the Code require a plaintiff, desirous of proceeding under Order 37 of the Code, to aver the

three requisites indicated in Rule 2, yet there is no corresponding provision in Order 37 which may indicate the consequences flowing from the

omission to incorporate the three requisites in the plaint, which, in other words, would demonstrate that incorporation of the three requisites in the

plaint may not be mandatory to maintain a suit under Order 37.

11.

Be that as it may, what I find from the reading of respondent's plaints is that he has specifically mentioned in the title of the two plaints that

these were ""summary suits under Order 37, Rule 2 of the CPC for recovery of Rs. 1 lac with interest from the defendant, on the basis of hundi and

receipt.

12.

In paragraph (11) and the prayer clause of the two plaints, the respondent-plaintiff records as follows:

11.

That parties to the suit are residents of Old Janipur Jammu and hundi was also executed at Old Janipur Jammu within the territorial jurisdiction

of this Hon'ble Court. Hence this Hon'ble Court has got the jurisdiction to entertain the summary suit under Order 37, Rule 2 of C.P.C. and grant

the relief.

It is, therefore, respectfully prayed that a decree for recovery of Rs. One Lac with 24% P.A. interest from the defendant on the basis of hundi and

receipt dated 15-8-1995 respectively under the provision of Summary suit under Order 37 Rule 2 C.P.C. may kindly be passed and the amount

be recovered with interest mentioned in the hundi till the whole amount is finally paid to the plaintiff with costs of the suit.

13.

Perusal of respondent's plaints indicates that he has not claimed any such relief in the suits which may not fall within the ambit of Order 37 of

the Code.

14.

In this view of the matter, I am of the view that the trial Court was perfectly right in deciding issue No. 1 against the petitioner, in that, the

respondent had substantially complied with the requirements of Order 37 Rule 2 of the Code in drawing his plaints.

15.

I, therefore, do not find any error in trial Court's deciding issue No. 1 against the petitioner.

16.

I will now proceed to examine petitioner's counsel's second submission that the respondent's suit was hit by the principle of constructive res

judicata and the provisions of Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code, and the trial Court had erred in deciding issue Nos. 2 and 3 against the petitioner.

17.

Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code does not require that when a transaction or right gives rise to several causes of action, they should all be combined

in one suit. All that is prohibited by Order 2 Rule 2 (3) of the Code is that a cause of action cannot be permitted to be split up to sue for one part

in one and the other in another suit. When a cause of action gives rise to only one relief, the entire claim is required to be included in the suit, and, if

it is not so done, the subsequent suit for the omitted or relinquished portion would be barred forever. There may be cases in which same cause of

action may give rise to several reliefs. In such cases alone, all these reliefs are required to be claimed in the same suit, for omission to do so, would

attract the Bar of Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code.

18.

Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code, would have, however, no application to cases where the plaintiff bases his suit on separate and distinct cause(s)

of action and chooses to relinquish one or the other. In such cases, it shall remain open to the plaintiff to file a fresh suit on the basis of a distinct

cause of action which he may have so relinquished.

19.

In order-to deal with the issue in question, the expression ""cause of action"" appearing in Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code needs to be properly

understood.

20.

Cause of action has acquired a judicially settled meaning i.e. simply a factual situation, the existence of which entities one person to obtain from

the Court a remedy against another person. It includes every fact which is material to be proved to entitle the suitor to succeed, and every fact

which a defendant would have a right to traverse. ""Cause of action"" has also been taken to mean that particular act on the part of the defendant

which gives the plaintiff his cause of action/complaint, or the subject-matter of grievance founding the action and not merely the technical cause of

action.

21.

It was observed by the Privy Council in Payana v. Pana Lana (1914) 41 IA 142 that ""the rule is directed to securing the exhaustion of the relief

in respect of a cause of action and not to the inclusion in one and the same action, different causes of action, even though they arise from the same

transaction. One great criterion is, when the question arises as to whether the cause of action in the subsequent suit is identical with that in the first

suit, whether the same evidence will maintain both actions.

22.

In view of the above legal position as to the meaning of the expression ""cause of action"" appearing in Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code it is clear that

respondent's earlier suit, based on Agreement to Sell dated 2-6-1998 had been filed against the petitioner on he basis of a cause of action which

had accrued to him because of the threat of the petitioner to sell the shops and house to someone else, was thus entirely different from the one

which has been pleaded by the respondent in the present suits to have accrued to him after the filing of his earlier suit, when despite presentation of

the hundies to the petitioner by Mr. V.K. Khajuria, Notary, the defendant had not honoured the demand thereby giving a cause of action to the

respondent to file suits against the petitioner when he had refused to pay the demanded amount on 19-8-1998.

23.

In view of the above discussion, I find that learned 2nd Additional District Judge, Jammu was justified in deciding issue No. 2 against the

petitioner by holding that the present suits were on the basis of hundies and the earlier suit had been filed on the basis of an Agreement to Sell.

24.

I, therefore, do not find any substance in petitioner's contention that the respondent's suits were hit by the bar enacted by the provisions of

Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code.

25.

Judgment delivered by this Court in CSA Nos. 5/2006 and 6/2006 (reported in Ramesh Chander Vs. Rakesh Kumar and Another, is not

applicable to the facts of the present case as it does not deal with the issue which has arisen in the present revision petitions.

26.

The next contention of petitioner's counsel is also devoid of any merit, in that, nothing had been decided by the Court oh merits in the earlier

suit on the issues which arise in the subsequent two suits and in that view of the matter principle of constructive res judicata would have absolutely

no application to the maintainability of the present suits.

27.

All the preliminary objections reflected in the three similar issues raised in the two suits are thus untenable which have been rightly repelled by

the trial Court by deciding the issues against the petitioner.

28.

There is thus no force in these revision petitions which are. accordingly, dismissed.