Balwant Rai Nayyar vs Central Bank of India and Others

G.R. Majithia, J.—The petitioner has challenged order of dismissal from the services of the Central Bank of India passed by respondent No. 2 (Disciplinary Authority) contained in Ref. No. PRSV/80/557, dated March 20, 1980, and the appellate order dated December 16, 1980, passed by respondent No. 3 (Appellate Authority) in this petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India.

The petitioner was an employee of the Central Bank of India (for brevity, the Bank). During the year 1972-73, he was posted as Sub-Accountant at its Nizam Road Branch at Ludhiana. A case under Sections 408/420, 468/467, Penal Code, was registered at Police Station Division No. 1, Ludhiana against him on the complaint of one Nahar Singh, who had a Savings Bank account with the Nizam Road Branch Ludhiana of the Bank. He was tried by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ludhiana and was convicted for the offence u/s 420, Penal Code vide judgment dated January 19, 1980. He was not sentenced to imprisonment but was released on probation of good conduct u/s 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act on his entering upon a bond in the amount of Rs. 7,000/- with one surety of the like amount so as to appear and receive sentence when called upon during the period of one year from the date of the order of the Court and in the meantime to keep peace and be of good behaviour. He was dismissed from service by the disciplinary authority vide order dated March 20, 1980. He filed appeal against the order of dismissal and the same was dismissed by the Appellate Authority (Respondent No. 3) vide order dated December 16, 1980. observing thus:-

"The aforesaid appeal is being disposed of by the undersigned as a duly competent Appellate Authority under the Central bank of India Employees (Discipline & Appeal) Regulations, 1976. In the said appeal, Shri Nayyar had requested that a personal hearing should be given. The undersigned acceded to this request and accordingly a hearing was given to him on November 27, 1980 at Chandigarh when he was permitted to appear along with any other Officer employee as his representative. Shri Nayyar, however, chose to appear personally and also chose to make only written submissions. I have gone through the papers on record and very carefully considered all the submissions made by Shri Nayyar, those contained in his appeal as well as in the written submissions made by him on November 27, 1980. After duly examining the same, I have to observe that:-

The judgment indicates that merely because the member is given the benefit under the probation of Offenders Act, he is not necessarily required to be reinstated. It should be noted that in arriving at a decision in this case, I have taken into account the entire conduct of the delinquent employee, the gravity of the misconduct committed by him namely, the charge of cheating has been duly established against him and the impact which his misconduct is likely to have on the administration.

I, therefore, come to the conclusion that considering all the relevant aspects, the punishment of dismissal is appropriate within the competence of the Disciplinary Authority and I, therefore, confirm that Shri B.R. Nayyar should be dismissed."

The petitioner has challenged the order of dismissal from service and the appellate order only on the ground that he was not given an opportunity to show cause against the proposed penalty of dismissal from service.

In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 19 of the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970 (5 of 1970), the Board of Directors of the Bank in consultation with the Reserve Bank of India and with the previous sanction of the Central Government, made regulations called the "Central Bank of India Officer Employees (Conduct) Regulations, 1976" (for short, the Regulations). Regulation 5 states the authorities competent to institute disciplinary proceedings and impose penalties. Regulation 6 lays down the procedure for imposing major penalties. Regulation 7 provides for action to be taken by the Disciplinary Authority on the inquiry report. Regulation 8 provides for procedure to be adopted for imposing minor penalties. Regulation 4 provides for minor and major penalties which may be imposed on an officer employee for acts of misconduct or for any other good and sufficient reasons. Major and minor penalties are as under:-

"Minor penalties:

(a) Censure;

(b) Withholding of increments of pay with or without cumulative effect;

(c) Withholding of promotion;

(d) recovery from pay or such other amount as may be due to him of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to the bank by negligence or breach of orders.

Major Penalties:

(e) reduction to a lower grade or post to a lower stage in a time scale;

(f) compulsory retirement;

(g) removal from service which shall not be a disqualification for future employment.;

(h) dismissal which shall ordinarily be a disqualification for future employment"

Regulation 11 provides for special procedure to be followed in certain cases, viz. where an officer employee has been convicted on a criminal charge by a criminal court. It reads thus:-

"11. Special procedure in certain cases:

Notwithstanding anything contained in Regulation 6 or Regulation 7 or Regulation 8 the Disciplinary Authority may impose any of the penalties specified in Regulation 4 if the officer employee has been convicted on a criminal charge, or on the strength of facts or conclusions arrived at by a judicial trials.

Provided that the officer employee may be given an opportunity - of making representation on the penalty proposed to be imposed before any order is made."

A bare perusal of this provision indicates that if an officer employee like the petitioner has been convicted on a criminal charge at a judicial trial, the Disciplinary Authority can impose any of the penalties specified in Regulation 4 and it is not obligatory for it to follow the procedure prescribed for imposing major penalties. The conviction of an officer employee at a judicial trial per se is sufficient for infliction of any of the penalties specified in Regulation 4. The provisions contained in Regulation 11 confer un-guided powers on the Disciplinary Authority to impose any of the penalties provided for in Regulation 4. I do not want to express any opinion on the vires of Regulation 4 as the same has not been challenged. A proviso has been added to Regulation 11 saying that the Disciplinary Authority will give an opportunity to the delinquent officer employee to make representation against the proposed penalty under Regulation 4. The proviso contains a solitary provision consistent with the principles of natural justice. Since the Disciplinary Authority has wide option of imposing any of the penalties mentioned in Regulation 4, it is obligatory for it to give an opportunity of hearing against the proposed punishment to the delinquent officer employee. Admittedly, in the instant case, no opportunity was afforded by the Disciplinary Authority to the petitioner before inflicting the penalty of dismissal from service. He was given an opportunity of hearing when he filed an appeal against the order of dismissal from service. This opportunity of hearing by the Appellate Authority is not a substitute for an opportunity of hearing by the Disciplinary Authority before imposing the penalty of dismissal from service. The order of dismissal from service cannot be sustained as it was passed in violation of the principles of natural justice and in violation of the first proviso to Regulation 11 of the Regulations.

For the reasons stated above, the writ petition succeeds, the orders of dismissal from service dated March 20, 1980 and the appellate order dated December 16, 1980 passed by the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority respectively are quashed. However, the Disciplinary Authority will be at liberty to take such action against the petitioner as is warranted under the Regulations and in the light of the observations made above. The Disciplinary Authority will take into consideration while imposing the punishment that the petitioner had suffered agony for all these years commencing from January 7, 1976. In the circumstances of the case, I make no order as to costs.