Balwant Singh vs Mehar Singh Rathee, Advocate

S. D. Bajaj, J.

Petitioner Balwant Singh was Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat, Rajpur in Police Station Ganaur of Sonepat district for the period 1971 to 1983 without obtaining the due authority from Panchayat by means of its resolution, the petitioner stealthily received from S.D.O. Drainage through the learned DistrictJudge, Rohtak, cheque No. 285909/0O2860 dated 6th September, 1974 for Rs. 7739.25 as compensation of the Panchayat lands. Its income was not reflected in the Gram Panchayat cash book. Nearly seven months thereafter the petitioner quietly but fraudulently deposed this amount in the Panchayat account on 3rd April, 1975 but did not reflect it in the cash bock on income side. Panchayat auditor V.P. Bhardwaj while conducting audit of Panchayat account for the period May, 1974 to January, 1977 detected the aforesaid embezzlement and brought the matter to the notice of the Deputy Commissioner and D.D. P.O. for suitable action against the petitioner.

In this regard First Information Report No. 137 dated 23rd September, 1987 was registered against Puran Singh the then Secretary of the Panchayat in Police Station Ganaur Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sonipat, acquitted the accused on 15th December, 1981 alleging that it was, in fact the petitioner and not the Gram Panchayat Secretary who had embezzled the amount. Successor Sarpanch in Shri Mehar Singh Rathee, Advocate, filed private complaint against the petitioner on 21 st September, 1994. Vide application Annexure P. 2 dated 20th August. 1986 permission of the court was asked for to appear himself as witness in the complaint and again on 12th November, 1988 application Annexure P. 3 was moved for being allowed to, lead additional evidence by production of relevant Panchayat records.

Alleging that dilatory tactics aforesaid as also the filing of the complaint were all an abuse of the process of the Court, petitioner arrayed as respondent in the complaint Annexure P. 1 has filed Cr. Misc. No 8471M of 1983 for quashing the complaint. It has been asserted in the quashing petition that for the stale matter of 1974 the petitioner is being unnecessarily harassed and dragged in court by his political rival in successor Sarpanch even though he bad admittedly deposited the amount in the Panchayat funds on 3rd April 1975. Hence the quashing petition

In reply it was asserted that the petitioner could assail the summoning order in revision but could not invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code after recording of precharge evidence against him; when the case is already fixed for arguments on the framing of charge. On merits it was asserted that the amount of compensation was withdrawn by the petitioner and that while acquitting Panchayat Secretary the Court had recorded certain remarks against the petitioner and, therefore, the respondent bad filed private complaint against the petitioner thereafter on 21st September, 1984. It was also asserted that the respondent complainant did not obtain any unnecessary adjournment, produced primafacie precharge evidence expeditiously and that additional evidence now sought to be produced has a direct bearing on the decision of the case against the petitioner. The complaint Annexure P. 1. it was asserted, contains allegations quite distinct from the ones obtaining in the complaint quashed by this Court and the basic distinction between the two is that in the earlier one evidence had not been recorded while it has been duly recorded in this case. Hence the quashing petition merits dismissal.

I have heard Shri R. P. Dahiya, Advocate, for the petitioner, Shri U. S. Sahni Advocate, for the respondent and have carefully perused the relevant record.

Referring to the observations made in Criminal Misc. No. 688283 of 1986 it was asserted on behalf of the petitioner that inordinate delay of over 16years from 1974 to 1990 in the prosecution of the complaint is obviously a negation of the guarantee of speedy trial envisaged inArticle 21 of the Constitution and, therefore complaint deserves to be quashed.

Hon''ble the Supreme Court of India had an occasion to express itself in this regard in Mangilal Vyas v. State of Rajasthan, 1990(1) Recent Criminal Reports 473 : Judgments Today 1990(1) Supreme Court 74. The relevant observations read :

"The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the appellant had been prosecuted in 1., criminal cases for offences under Section 408 or 409 IPC, that the proceedings are pending for over 25 years the prolongation of the trial without any fault on the part of the appellant amounts to prosecution of the appellant and, therefore, the proceedings should have been quashed by the High Court. It is maintained that in spite of passage of several years, no evidence worth the name has been recorded by the prosecutor. We have been taken through the various steps taken in each case and the nature of the evidence purported to have been collected.

We do not consider it necessary to narrate the detailed facts lading to the present appeals except to state that the trial in the pending cases has been unduly protracted due to various causes. It is no doubt a regrettable feature, but having regard to the nature of the allegations made and the availability of evidence in support of the prosecution, it is not expedient to terminate the proceedings at this stage, on account of lapse of time alone, by invoking the inherent power of the court. We think that the circumstances of the case only, call for appropriate directions for the expeditious disposal of the pending proceedings and the law has to be allowed to take its own course to prevent miscarriage of justice.

The High Court has directed the Trial Court to proceed with the cases against the appellant day to day and decide them expeditiously. We would, however, direct the Trial Court to dispose of the cases within a period not exceeding one year from the date of the receipt of the records. A copy of this judgment shall be. forwarded to the Trial Court forthwith."

The case before the Supreme Court had been pending for 25 years and still the Court allowed another one year to the subordinate Criminal Court to complete the proceedings. In the present case the matter, has been pending for only 61/2 years by now, counted from 21st September, 1984 the date of filing the complaint. In line with the guidelines aforesaid learned trial court is allowed six months time to complete the proceedings before itself. Both the parties through their counsel have been directed to appear before the learned trial court on 18th February, 1991. Six months period aforesaid would be reckoned from that date.