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Judgment
7 paragraphs · 705 wordsR.N. Mittal, J. (Oral)
This revision petition has been filed by the defendantvendees against the order of the Subordinate Judge 2nd Class, Kaithal dated 11th October, 1985, allowing the application of the legal representatives of Ratna plaintiff (deceased) to be impleaded as parties.
Briefly the facts are that Ajmer Singh sold the property in dispute for a consideration of Rs. 14,000/ to defendants No. 1 to 5 vide sale deed dated 27th May, 1983. Ratna real brother of the vendor, filed a suit for possession by preemption. He died on 11th September, 1984. Shahab Singh, his son, made an application for impleading three sons of the deceased as the plaintiffs in the case. The application was allowed by the trial Court. The defendant vendees have come up in revision to this Court.
The learned counsel for the petitioners has argued that the right of pre emption was a personal right and, therefore, the suit did not survive after the death of the preemptor. In support of his contention he places reliance on a Full Bench judgment of this Court in Chandrup Singh v. Data Ram, 1982 P.L.R. 771 : 1984 R.R.R. 579. On the other hand, Mr. Ram Rang has argued that the right of preemption is a right which runs with the land and, therefore, the legal representatives of the deceased who had an independent right of preemption could continue the suit.
I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at a considerable length. However, I agree with the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners. It is not necessary to elaborate the point as the matter has been settled by a Full Bench of this Court in Chandrup Singh''s (supra). It was observed by the learned Chief Justice, speaking for the Court, that where by custom the right of preemption is rooted in the ownership of land then the right might pass with such land but where it is rooted in blood relationship there can be no passing of the specific blood relationship prescribed with precision by the statute. All this is a very strong pointer to the fact that the statutory right of preemption based on blood relationship is in essence a purely personal right and as such would normally not be heritable. It is further observed that on principle and on their weight of precedent the purely statutory right to preemption, resting wholly on bloodrelationship alone under section 15(1) of the Punjab Preemption Act, is not a heritable right and does not devolve on the heirs on the death of the plaintiff preemptor before the grant of the decree in the suit.
While deciding the case the learned Full Bench overruled two Division Bench judgments of this Court in Smt. Joginder Kaur v. Jasbir Singh, 1965 P.L.R. 1158, and Gurdev Kaur v. Shrimati Chanan Kaur, 1971 P.L.R. 800. In the former case a female had sold the property in dispute. The brother of her husband filed a suit for preemption claiming his right under section 15(2)(b) of the Punjab Preemption Act. During the pendency of the suit he died and his sons were brought on the record. The vendees came up in revision to this Court. Mehar Singh, J. (as he then was) held that the son of a deceased plaintiff in a preemption suit can continue the suit if at the date of the sale he had an independent right to preempt. In Gurdev Kaur''s case (supra) it was observed by D.K. Mahajan, J. (as he then was) that the right of preemption was a right which runs with the land. As the right runs with the land it passes on the death of the preemptor to his legal heirs and they can continue the suit filed by him. The reasoning given in both the cases was the same as given by Mr. Ram Rang. As both the Division Bench judgments have been expressly over ruled by the learned Full Bench, consequently the reasoning given by Mr. Ram Rang cannot be accepted.
For the aforesaid reasons I accept the revision petition, set aside the order of the trial Court and dismiss the suit of the plaintiff with no order as to costs.
