High CourtsSingle Bench

Bansidhar Joshi vs Dev Dutt Joshi and Others

Uttarakhand High Court · Decided on 9 May 2007 · Citation: (2007) 05 UK CK 0040

HON’BLE JUDGES
Rajesh Tandon, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Limitation Act, 1963 — Section 20, 5
RESULT
Allowed

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Judgment

18 paragraphs · 1,047 words

Rajesh Tandon, J.—Heard Sri M.S. Pal, Sr. Advocate assisted by Sri D.N. Sharma counsel for the revisionists.

2.

Present revision has been filed against the order dated 6.8.2004 passed by the Civil Judge, Khatima, District Udham Singh Nagar in Misc. Case No. 31 of 2001, thereby dismissing the application under Order 9 Rule 13 C.P.C.

3.

Briefly stated the plaintiff revisionist has filed an application under Order 9 Rule 13 C.P. along with the application u/s 5 of the Limitation Act, for condonation of delay on the ground that the application was ill and has filed medical certificate for 8.6.2000 to 10.8.2001 He has also explained the same in the application.

4.

The Apex Court in the case Sarpanch, Lonand Grampanchayat Vs. Ramgiri Gosavi and Another, has held as under:

The Authority has a discretion to condone the delay in presenting the application provided sufficient cause for the entire delay is shown to its satisfaction. This discretion like other judicial discretion must be exercised with vigilance and circumspection according to justice, common sense, and sound judgment. The discretion is to know through law what is just, see keighley case-10 Coke''s Rep 139 : 77 ER 1136

The wording of the second proviso similar to the provisions of Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act. In Krishna. v. Chathappan ILR Mad 269 the Madras High Court indicated in the following passage how the discretion u/s 5 should be exercised:

We think that Section 5 gives the Courts a discretion which in respect of jurisdiction is to be exercised in the way in which judicial power and discretion ought to be exercised upon principles which are well understood: the words ''sufficient cause'' receiving a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence nor inaction nor want of bona fides is imputable to the appellant.

This decision received the approval, of this Court in Dinabandhu Sahu Vs. Jadumoni Mangaraj and Others, and Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal Vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., . The words "sufficient cause" in the second proviso to Section 20(2) should receive a similar liberal construction.

5.

The apex Court in the case of Ram Nath Sao @ Ram Nath Sahu and Ors. v. Gobardhan Sao and Ors. 2002 Supreme Court & Full Bench Rent Case, Page 440 has held as under:

The expression ''sufficient cause'' within the meaning of Section 5 of the limitation Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as the ''Act'') Order XXII, Rule 9 of the CPC (hereinafter referred to as ''the Code'') as well as similar other provisions and the ambit of exercise of powers there under have been subject matter of consideration before this Court on numerous occasions. In the case of The State of West Bengal Vs. The Administrator, Howrah Municipality and Others, , while considering scope of the expression ''sufficient'' cause within the meaning of Section 5 of the Act,, this Court laid down that the said expression should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fide is imputable to a party.

6.

The need of society is that there should be justice oriented approach and the application should not be rejected only on the ground of technicalities. The Apex Court has held in M.S. Grewal and Another Vs. Deep Chand Sood and Others, as under:

Law Courts will lose their efficacy if they cannot possibly respond to the need of the society. Technicalities there might be many but the Justice-oriented approach ought not to be thwarted on the basis of such technicality since technicality cannot and ought not to outweigh the course of justice.

7.

In N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy 1998 S.C.F.B. 427, It has been held that law of limitation is founded in public policy on ''the maxim of interest reipublicae up sit finis litium'' i.e. fal the general welfare, it has been held as under:

The primary function of a Court is to adjudicate the dispute between the Parties and to advance substantial justice. Time limit fixed for approaching the Court in different situations is not because on the expiry of such time a bad cause would transform into a good cause.

Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The'' object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. Law of limitation fixes a lifespan for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and the wasted time would never revisit. During efflux of time newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the Courts. So a life span must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. Law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim interest reipublicae up sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time.

It must be rememberd that in every case of delay there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down his plea and to shut the door against him. If the explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not put-forth as part of a dilatory strategy the Court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. But when there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time then the Court should lean against acceptance of the explanation.

8.

In view of the above principle of law, lenient view should be taken while considering the application u/s 5 of the Limitation Act.

9.

The revision is, therefore, allowed on payment of Rs. 1,000/- as costs to the respondents. The suit is restored to its original number.