Bar Council vs An Advocate

S. Ramachandra Ayyar, C.J.—The Respondent, was enrolled as ah Advocate of the Madras High Court on 31st July 1950; he was

subsequently appointed as a Sub-Magistrate. When he was employed in that capacity, he is alleged to have committed certain acts amounting to

misconduct on the part of a Government servant. In respect of such conduct disciplinary proceedings were taken in the Andhra State where he

was doing the duties of a Sub-Magistrate. In the departmental enquiry that was held the charges were held to have been proved: he was dismissed

from service. Thereafter, the Respondent wishing to resume practice as an Advocate intimated to the Bar Council of his intention. There was also a

letter to the Registrar of this Court from the Respondent. That letter was duly communicated to the Bar Council which framed a number of charges

against the Respondent which were almost identical with the charges framed against him while holding the office of a Judicial Second Class

Magistrate at Jammalmadugu in the State of Andhra Pradesh, stating that by reason of such conduct, he was unworthy of being a member of the

Bar. The Respondent filed a written statement denying that he was guilty of the offences with which he was charged. After some vicissitudes, the

Tribunal of the Bar Council proceeded to enquire into the matter. Before the Tribunal, the Respondent did not appear. The only material the

Tribunal had was the record relating to the disciplinary proceedings which charged him with misconduct as a Sub-Magistrate. The Tribunal felt that

the records available put beyond all manner of doubt that the Respondent, as a Judicial Second Class Magistrate, behaved in the most

reprehensible manner and was guilty of the offences of bribery with which he was charged. It also took the view that though the misconduct might

have been committed while he was a Judicial Magistrate, those offences, if proved, would come within the mischief of Section 10(1) of the Bar

Councils Act, 1926 in that they were of the category of other misconduct contemplated by that section. The Tribunal has, therefore, reported that

the Respondent was guilty of the misconduct charged. In so doing, the Tribunal based its conclusion on the decision of the Privy Council in

Advocate-General of Bombay v. Phiroz Rustomji Bharucha (1935) 69 M.L.J. 431 , where it was held that on an Advocate being convicted of a

criminal offence, such conviction would itself be evidence of misconduct within the meaning of Section 10(1) of the Bar Councils Act. We are

unable to accept that rule with respect to administrative enquiries. In the present case, there has been no criminal charge against the Respondent in

respect of the offence charged and consequently there has been no adjudication by the ordinary Courts of the land in regard to that matter. What

all we have is punishment inflicted upon the Respondent after enquiry in disciplinary proceedings. There has been no attempt before the Tribunal to

prove the offences themselves even prima facie and as such, we have no option to refuse to accept the report and to remit the case for a further

enquiry by the Tribunal. It has to be noticed that as chapter V of the Advocates Act has come into force, this Court''s jurisdiction will hereafter be

subject to the provisions of that Act. There is also the fact that the Bar Council of Andhra Pradesh might be interested in the matter regarding the

application of the Respondent; notice has yet to be given in regard to that matter. The learned Advocate-General realizing that several matters

require fresh consideration seeks permission to withdraw the present complaint with liberty to initiate proceedings if necessary for the same

purpose. We allow him to do so.