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Judgment
652 paragraphs · 14,410 wordsAdarsh Kumar Goel, J
The issue involved in this batch of matters is whether foreign law firms/lawyers are permitted to practice in India. Reference needs to be made to
two leading matters. Civil Appeal Nos.7875-79 of 2015 have been filed by the Bar Council of India against the Judgment of Madras High Court dated
21st February, 2012 in A.K. Balaji v. The Government of India, AIR 2012 Mad 124. Civil Appeal No.8028 of 2015 has been filed by Global Indian
Lawyers against the judgment of Bombay High Court dated 16th December, 2009 in Lawyers Collective v. Bar Council of India, 2010 (2) Mah LJ
726.
The Madras High Court held as follows:
After giving our anxious consideration to the matter, both on facts and on law, we come to the following conclusion :-
(i) Foreign law firms or foreign lawyers cannot practice the profession of law in India either on the litigation or non-litigation side, unless they fulfil the
requirement of the Advocates Act, 1961 and the Bar Council of India Rules.
(ii) However, there is no bar either in the Act or the Rules for the foreign law firms or foreign lawyers to visit India for a temporary period on a ""fly in
and fly out"" basis, for the purpose of giving legal advise to their clients in India regarding foreign law or their own system of law and on diverse
international legal issues.
(iii) Moreover, having regard to the aim and object of the International Commercial Arbitration introduced in the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996,
foreign lawyers cannot be debarred to come to India and conduct arbitration proceedings in respect of disputes arising out of a contract relating to
international commercial arbitration.
(iv) The B.P.O. Companies providing wide range of customised and integrated services and functions to its customers like word-processing,
secretarial support, transcription services, proof-reading services, travel desk support services, etc. do not come within the purview of the Advocates
Act, 1961 or the Bar Council of India Rules. However, in the event of any complaint made against these B.P.O. Companies violating the provisions of
the Act, the Bar Council of India may take appropriate action against such erring companies.
The Bombay High Court, on the other hand, concluded as follows:
For all the aforesaid reasons, we hold that in the facts of the present case, the RBI was not justified in granting permission to the foreign law
firms to open liaison offices in India under Section 29 of the 1973 Act. We further hold that the expressions ' to practise the profession of law' in
Section 29 of the 1961 Act is wide enough to cover the persons practising in litigious matters as well as persons practising in non litigious matters and,
therefore, to practise in non litigious matters in India, the respondent Nos. 12 to 14 were bound to follow the provisions contained in the 1961 Act. The
petition is disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs.
When the matter against the judgment of the Madras High Court came up for hearing before this Court on 4th July, 2012, following interim order
was passed :
In the meanwhile, it is clarified that Reserve Bank of India shall not grant any permission to the foreign law firms to open liaison offices in India under
Section 29 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973. It is also clarified that the expression ""to practice the profession of law"" under Section 29 of
the Advocates Act, 1961 covers the persons practicing litigious matters as well as non-litigious matters other than contemplated in para 63(ii) of the
impugned order and, therefore, to practice in non-litigious matters in India the foreign law firms, by whatever name called or described, shall be bound
to follow the provisions contained in the Advocates Act, 1961.
In Civil Appeal Nos.7875-7879 of 2015, writ petition was filed before the Madras High Court by one A.K. Balaji, Advocate. Apart from official
respondents, 32 law firms of U.K., U.S.A., France and Australia have been impleaded as respondents 9 to 40. Prayer in the writ petition is to take
action against the original respondents 9 to 40 or any other foreign law firms or foreign lawyers illegally practicing the profession of law in India and
direct them to refrain from having any illegal practice on the litigation side and in the field of commercial transactions in any manner whatsoever.
Averments in the petition are that the writ petitioner was an advocate enrolled with the Bar Council of Tamil Nadu. To practice law in India, a
person has to be Indian citizen and should possess degree in law from a recognized University in India. Nationals of other countries could be admitted
as advocates in India only if citizens of India are permitted to practice in such other countries. Foreign degree of law from a University outside India
requires recognition by the Bar Council of India. The Indian advocates are not allowed to practice in U.K., U.S.A.,
Under the Advocates Act (the Act), a foreigner is not entitled to practice in India in view of bar contained in Section 29. However, under the guise
of LPOs (Legal Process Outsourcing), conducting seminars and arbitrations, foreign lawyers are visiting India on Visitor Visa and practicing illegally.
They also violate tax and immigration laws. They have also opened their offices in India for practice in the fields of mergers, take-overs, acquisitions,
amalgamations, etc. Disciplinary jurisdiction of the Bar Council extends only to advocates enrolled under the Act. In India, the legal profession is
considered as a noble profession to serve the society and not treated as a business but the foreign law firms treat the profession as trade and business
venture to earn money. Indian lawyers are prohibited from advertising, canvassing and solicit work but foreign law firms are advertising through
websites and canvass and solicit work by assuring results. Many accountancy and management firms are also employing grauates and thus rendering
legal services.
The stand of the Union of India initially was that if foreign law firms are not allowed to take part in negotiations, settling of documents and
arbitrations in India, it will obstruct the aim of making India a hub of international arbitration. Many arbitrations with Indian Judges as arbitrators and
Indian lawyers are held outside India where foreign and Indian law firms advise their clients. Barring the entry of foreign law firms for arbitrations in
India will result in many arbitrations shifting to Singapore, Paris and London, contrary to the declared policy of the Government and against national
interest. However, its final stand in affidavits dated 19th April, 2011 and 17th November, 2011 was different as recorded in Para 3 of the High Court
Judgment as follows :
The first respondent Union of India filed four counter affidavits on 19.08.2010, 24.11.2010, 19.04.2011 and 17.11.2011. In one of the counter
affidavits, it is stated that the Bar Council of India, which has been established under the Advocates Act, 1961, regulates the advocates who are on
the ""Rolls"", but law firms as such are not required to register themselves before any statutory authority, nor do they require any permission to engage
in nonlitigation practice. Exploiting this loophole, many accountancy and management firms are employing law graduates who are rendering legal
services, which is contrary to the provisions of the Advocates Act. It is stated that the Government of India along with the Bar Council of India is
considering this issue and is trying to formulate a regulatory framework in this regard. The 1st respondent in his counter warns that if the foreign law
firms are not allowed to take part in negotiations, settling up documents and arbitrations in India, it will have a counter productive effect on the aim of
the government to make India a hub of International Arbitration. In this connection, it is stated that many arbitrations with Indian Judges and Lawyers
as Arbitrators are held outside India, where both foreign and Indian Law Firms advise their clients. If foreign law firms are denied entry to deal with
arbitrations in India, then India will lose many of the arbitrations to Singapore, Paris and London. It will be contrary to the declared policy of the
government and against the national interest. In the counter affidavit filed on 19.04.2011, it is stated that a proposal to consider an amendment to
Section 29 of the Advocates Act, 1961 permitting foreign law firms to practice law in India in non litigious matters on a reciprocity basis with foreign
countries is under consultation with the Bar Council of India. Finally, in the counter filed on 17.11.2011, it is stated that the Government of India has
decided to support the stand of the Bar Council of India that the provisions of the Advocates Act, 1961 would apply with equal force to both litigious
and non-litigious practice of law, and it is only persons enrolled under Section 24 of the Act, who can practice before the Indian Courts.
In this Court, stand of the Union of India is that presently it is waiting for the Bar Council of India to frame rules on the subject. However, it can
frame rules under Section 49A at any stage.
Stand of the Bar Council of India before the High Court is that even non litigious practice is included in the practice of law which can be done only
by advocates enrolled under the Act. Reliance was placed on the judgment of the Bombay High Court in Lawyers Collective (supra). Further
reference was made to Sections 24 and 29 of the Act. Section 47(2) read with Section 49(1)(e) provides for recognition of qualifications of foreigners
being recognized for practice. It was submitted that practice of foreign lawyers in India should be subject to regulatory powers of the Bar Council.
Stand of the foreign law firms, inter alia, is that there is no bar to a company carrying on consultancy/support services in the field of protection and
management of intellectual, business and industrial proprietary rights, carrying out market service and market research, publication of reports, journals
etc. A person not appearing before Courts or Tribunals and not giving legal advice cannot be said to be practice of law. The ninth respondent stated
that it was a part of group of companies and not a law firm and was duly registered under the Indian Companies Act, 1956. The tenth respondent,
another foreign law firm, submitted that there is no violation of law in giving advice on foreign law. Even Indian lawyers are permitted to practice
outside India and issue of reciprocity is a policy matter to be decided by the Government of India. It does not have a law office in India and does not
give advice on Indian laws. In England, foreign lawyers are free to advice on their own system of law without nationality requirement or qualification
of England. The eleventh respondent is an American law firm and submitted that it advises clients on international legal issues from different
countries. Indian clients are given advice through Indian lawyers and law firms which are enrolled with the Bar Council. There is no discrimination in
U.S. against Indian citizens practicing law. Indian lawyers travel to US on temporary basis for consultation on Indian law issues.
The Act and the Bar Council Rules govern practice of Indian law and not foreign law. Participation in seminars and conferences does not
constitute practice in law. The fourteenth respondent denied the existence of its office in India and that it was practicing Indian law. It also took the
same stand as Respondent No.11 that regulatory framework for advocates did not govern practice of foreign law. It denied that it is operating a Legal
Process Outsourcing office (LPOs) in India. Its lawyers fly in and fly out of India on need basis to advice clients on international transactions. To the
extent Indian law is involved, such matters are addressed by Indian lawyers. If the foreign law firms are prevented from advice on foreign law, the
transaction cost of Indian clients for consultation on foreign law will increase. Other foreign law firms have also taken more or less similar stand.
Fifteenth respondent stated that it is a Business Process Outsourcing (BPO) company providing wide range of customized and integrated services and
functions. The sixteenth respondent also stated that it has no office in India and is only rendering services other than practice of Indian law. The
eighteenth respondent stated that it does not have any office in India and does not practice law in India. It only advises on non Indian law. Respondent
Nos.19, 26, 39 and 40 stated that they are limited law partnerships under Laws of England. They do not have any law office in India. Respondents
Nos.20, 21, 24, 25, 27, 28, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34 and 38 also stated that they do not have any office in India and do not practice Indian law. Indian lawyers
cannot advice on foreign laws and the requirement of Indian litigants in regard is met by foreign lawyers. Its lawyers fly in and fly out of India on need
basis to advise the clients on international transactions. To the extent Indian law is involved such matters are addressed by Indian lawyers.
The respondent No.22 stated that it is an international law firm but does not have any office in India. It advises clients on laws other than Indian
laws. Its India Practice Group advises clients on commercial matters involving an ""Indian Element"" relating to mergers, acquisitions, capital markets,
projects, energy and infrastructure, etc. from an international legal perspective and it does not amount to practice in Indian law. Respondent No.23
stated that it is only advising on matters of English, European Union and Hong Kong laws. It has working relationships with leading law firms in major
jurisdictions and instructs appropriate local law firms to provide local law advice. Respondent No.29 stated that it is a limited law partnership
registered in England and Wales and does not have office in India. It does not represent parties in Indian courts nor advises on Indian law. Respondent
No.35 stated that it does not maintain any office in India and its expertise in international law. 36th Respondent stated that it does not practice Indian
law and has no office in India nor it operates any LPO. Its lawyers fly in and fly out on need basis to advise clients on international transactions or
matters involving Australian laws or international Benches to which there is an Indian component. Working of Indian laws is entrusted to Indian
lawyers. The 37th Respondent denied that it has any office in India or is running LPO in India. It only advises with respect to regulatory laws other
than Indian law.
The High Court upheld the plea of the foreign law firms to the effect that there was no bar to such firms taking part in negotiations, settling of
documents and conducting arbitrations in India. There was no bar to carrying on consultancy/support services in the field of protection and
management of intellectual, business and industrial proprietary rights, carrying out market survey and research, publication of reports, journals etc.
without rendering any legal advice. This could not be treated as practice of law in India. Referring to Section 2(1)(f) of the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, 1996 (the Arbitration Act), it was observed that if in international commercial arbitration, India is chosen as the seat of arbitration, the foreign
contracting party is bound to seek assistance from lawyers of their own country on the contract. There could be no prohibition for such foreign
lawyers to advise their clients on the foreign law.
Judgment of the Bombay High Court in Lawyers Collective (supra) was distinguished on the ground that setting up of law offices for litigious and
non litigious matters was different but if a foreign law firm without establishing any liaison office in India offers advice to their clients on foreign law,
there was no legal bar to do so.
The Bombay High Court in its judgment observed:
It appears that before approaching RBI, these foreign law firms had approached the Foreign Investment Promotion Board (FIPB for short) a
High Powered body established under the New Industrial Policy seeking their approval in the matter. The FIPB had rejected the proposal submitted
by the foreign law firms. Thereafter, these law firms sought approval from RBI and RBI granted the approval in spite of the rejection of FIPB.
Though specific grievance to that effect is made in the petition, the RBI has chosen not to deal with those grievances in its affidavit in reply. Thus, in
the present case, apparently, the stand taken by RBI and FIPB are mutually contradictory.
In any event, the fundamental question to be considered herein is, whether the foreign law firms namely respondent Nos. 12 to 14 by opening
liaison offices in India could carry on the practise in non litigious matters without being enrolled as Advocates under the 1961 Act ?
Before dealing with the rival contentions on the above question, we may quote Sections 29, 30, 33 and 35 of the 1961 Act, which read thus:
Advocates to be the only recognised class of persons entitled to practice law. - Subject to the provisions of this Act and any rules made there
under, there shall, as from the appointed day, be only one class of persons entitled to practise the profession of law, namely, advocates. (not brought
into force so far)
Right of advocates to practise. -Subject to provisions of this Act, every advocate whose name is entered in the State roll shall be entitled as of
right to practise throughout the territories to which this Act extends,
(i) in all Courts including the Supreme Court;
(ii) before any tribunal or person legally authorized to take evidence;
(iii) before any other authority or person before whom such advocate by or under any law for the time being in force entitled to practise.
Advocates alone entitled to practise. -Except as otherwise provided in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force, no person shall, on
or after the appointed day, be entitled to practice in any Court or before any authority or person unless he is enrolled as an advocate under this Act.
Punishment of advocates for misconduct - (1) Where on receipt of a complaint or otherwise a State Bar Council has reason to believe that any
advocate on its roll has been guilty of professional or other misconduct, it shall refer the case for disposal to its disciplinary committee.
(1-A) The State Bar Council may, either of its own motion or on application made to it by any person interested, withdraw a proceeding pending
before its disciplinary committee and direct the inquiry to be made by any other disciplinary committee of that State Bar Council.
(2) The disciplinary committee of a State Bar Council [***] shall fix a date for the hearing of the case and shall cause a notice thereof to be given to
the advocate concerned and to the Advocate-General of the State.
(3) The disciplinary committee of a State Bar Council after giving the advocate concerned and the Advocate-General an opportunity of being heard,
may make any of the following orders, namely:
(a) dismiss the complaint or, where the proceedings were initiated at the instance of the State Bar Council, direct that the proceedings be filed;
(b) reprimand the advocate;
(c) suspend the advocate from practice or such period as it may deem fit;
(d) remove the name of the advocate from the State roll of advocates.
(4) Where an advocate is suspended from practice under Clause (c) of Sub-section (3), he shall, during the period of suspension, be debarred from
practising in any Court or before any authority or person in India.
(5) Where any notice is issued to the Advocate-General under Subsection (2), the Advocate-General may appear before the disciplinary committee of
the State Bar Council either in person or through any advocate appearing on his behalf. Explanation-In this section, (Section 37 and Section 38), the
expressions ""Advocate- General"" and ""Advocate-General of the State"" shall, in relation to the Union territory of Delhi, mean the Additional Solicitor
General of India.
The argument of the foreign law firms is that Section 29 of the 1961 Act is declaratory in nature and the said section merely specifies the persons
who are entitled to practise the profession of law. According to the respondent Nos. 12 to 14, the expression 'entitled to practise the profession of law'
in Section 29 of the 1961 Act does not specify the field in which the profession of law could be practised. It is Section 33 of the 1961 Act which
provides that advocates alone are entitled to practise in any Court or before any authority or person. Therefore, according to respondent Nos. 12 to 14
the 1961 Act applies to persons practising as advocates before any Court / authority and not to persons practising in non litigious matters. The
question, therefore, to be considered is, whether the 1961 Act applies only to persons practising in litigious matters, that is, practising before Court and
other authorities ?
In the statements of Objects and Reasons for enacting the 1961 Act, it is stated that the main object of the Act is to establish All India Bar Council
and a common roll of advocates and Advocate on the common roll having a right to practise in any part of the country and in any Court, including the
Supreme Court. Thus, from the Statement of Objects and Reasons, it is seen that the 1961 Act is intended to apply to (one) persons practising the
profession of law in any part of the country and (two) persons practising the profession of law in any Court including the Supreme Court. Thus, from
the statement of objects and reasons it is evident that the 1961 Act is intended to apply not only to the persons practising before the Courts but it is
also intended to apply to persons who are practising in non litigious matters outside the Court.
Apart from the above, Section 29 of the 1961 Act specifically provides is that from the appointed day, there shall be only one class of persons
entitled to practice the profession of law, namely Advocates. It is apparent that prior to the 1961 Act there were different classes of persons entitled
to practise the profession of law and from the appointed day all these class of persons practising the profession of law, would form one class, namely,
advocates. Thus, Section 29 of the 1961 Act clearly provides that from the appointed day only advocates are entitled to practise the profession of law
whether before any Court / authority or outside the Court by way of practise in non litigious matters.
Section 33 of the 1961 Act is a prohibitory section in the sense that it debars any person from appearing before any Court or authority unless he is
enrolled as an advocate under the 1961 Act. The bar contained in Section 33 of the 1961 Act has nothing to do with the persons entitled to be enrolled
as advocates under Section 29 of the 1961 Act. A person enrolled as an advocate under Section 29 of the 1961 Act, may or may not be desirous of
appearing before the Courts. He may be interested in practising only in non litigious matters. Therefore, the bar under Section 33 from appearing in
any Court (except when permitted by Court under Section 32 of the 1961 Act or any other Act) unless enrolled as an advocate does not bar a person
from being enrolled as an advocate under Section 29 of the 1961 Act for practising the profession of law in non litigious matters. The Apex Court in
the case of Ex-Capt. Harish Uppal (supra) has held that the right to practise is the genus of which the right to appear and conduct cases in the Court
may be a specie. Therefore, the fact that Section 33 of the 1961 Act provides that advocates alone are entitled to practice before any Court / authority
it cannot be inferred that the 1961 Act applies only to persons practising in litigious matters and would not apply to person practising in non litigious
matters.
It was contended that the 1961 Act does not contain any penal provisions for breaches committed by a person practicing in non-litigious matter
and, therefore, the 1961 Act cannot apply to persons practising in non-litigious matters. There is no merit in this contention, because, Section 35 of the
1961 Act provides punishment to an advocate who is found to be guilty of professional or other misconduct. The fact that Section 45 of the 1961 Act
provides imprisonment for persons illegally practicing in Courts and before other authorities, it cannot be said that the 1961 Act does not contain
provisions to deal with the persons found guilty of misconduct while practising in non litigious matters. Once it is held that the persons entitled to
practice the profession of law under the 1961 Act covers the persons practising the profession of law in litigious matters as well as non-litigious
matters, then, the penal provisions contained in Section 35 of the 1961 Act would apply not only to persons practising in litigious matter, but would also
apply to persons practising the profession of law in non-litigious matters. The very object of the 1961 Act and the Rules framed by the Bar Council of
India are to ensure that the persons practising the profession of law whether in litigious matters or in non litigious matters, maintain high standards in
professional conduct and etiquette and, therefore, it cannot be said that the persons practising in non litigious matters are not governed by the 1961
Act.
Strong reliance was placed by the counsel for the respondent No. 12 on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of O.N. Mohindroo (supra) in
support of his contention that the 1961 Act applies only to persons practising the profession of law before Courts / Tribunals / other authorities. It is
true that the Apex Court in the above case has held that the 1961 Act is enacted by the Parliament in exercise of its powers under entry 77 and 78 in
List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. However, the fact that entry 77 and 78 in List I refers to the persons practising before the Supreme
Court and the High Courts, it cannot be said that the 1961 Act is restricted to the persons practising only before the Supreme Court and High Courts.
Practising the profession of law involves a larger concept whereas, practising before the Courts is only a part of that concept. If the literal
construction put forth by the respondents is accepted then, the Parliament under entry 77 and 78 in List I of the Seventh Schedule to make legislation
only in respect of the advocates practicing before the Supreme Court / High Courts and the Parliament cannot legislate under that entry in respect of
advocates practising before the District Courts/ Magistrate's Courts / other Courts / Tribunals / authorities and consequently, the 1961 Act to the
extent it applies to advocates practising in Courts other than the High Courts and Supreme Court would be ultra vires the Constitution. Such a narrow
construction is unwarranted because, once the Parliament invokes its power to legislate on advocates practising the profession of law, then the entire
field relating to advocates would be open to the Parliament to legislate and accordingly the 1961 Act has been enacted to cover the entire field. In any
event, the question as to whether the persons practicing the profession of law exclusively in nonlitigious matters are covered under the 1961 Act, or
not was not an issue directly or indirectly considered by the Apex Court in the case of O.N. Mohindroo (supra). Therefore, the decision of the Apex
Court in the above case does not support the case of the contesting respondents.
It was contended by the counsel for Union of India that if it is held that the 1961 Act applies to persons practising in non-litigious matters, then no
bureaucrat would be able to draft or give any opinion in non-litigious matters without being enrolled as an advocate. There is no merit in the above
argument, because, there is a distinction between a bureaucrat drafting or giving opinion, during the course of his employment and a law firm or an
advocate drafting or giving opinion to the clients on professional basis. Moreover, a bureaucrat drafting documents or giving opinion is answerable to
his superiors, whereas, a law firm or an individual engaged in non litigious matters, that is, drafting documents / giving opinion or rendering any other
legal assistance are answerable to none. To avoid such anomaly, the 1961 Act has been enacted so as to cover all persons practising the profession of
law be it in litigious matters or in non-litigious matters within the purview of the 1961 Act.
The argument that the 1961 Act and the Bar Councils constituted there under have limited role to play has been time and again negatived by the
Apex Court. Recently, the Apex Court in the case of Bar Council of India v. Board of Management, Dayanand College of Law reported in (2007) 2
SCC 202 held thus: It may not be correct to say that the Bar Council of India is totally unconcerned with the legal education, though primarily legal
education may also be within the province of the universities. But, as the apex professional body, the Bar Council of India is concerned with the
standards of the legal profession and the equipment of those who seek entry into that profession. The Bar Council of India is also thus concerned with
the legal education in the country. Therefore, instead of taking a pendantic view of the situation, the State Government and the recommending
authority are expected to ensure that the requirement set down by the Bar Council of India is also complied with. Thus, when efforts are being made
to see that the legal profession stand tall in this fast changing world, it would be improper to hold that the 1961 Act and the Bar Council constituted
there under have limited role to play in the field relating to practising the profession of law.
It is not in dispute that once a person is enrolled as an advocate, he is entitled to practise the profession of law in litigious matters as well as non-
litigious matters. If the argument of the respondents that the 1961 Act is restricted to the persons practising the profession of law in litigious matters is
accepted, then an advocate found guilty of misconduct in performing his duties while practising in non-litigious matters cannot be punished under the
1961 Act. Similarly, where an advocate who is debarred for professional misconduct can merrily carry on the practise in nonlitigious matters on the
ground that the 1961 Act is not applicable to the persons practising the profession of law in non litigious matters. Such an argument which defeats the
object of the 1961 Act cannot be accepted.
It may be noted that Rule 6(1) in Chapter III Part VI of the Bar Council of India Rules framed under Section 49(1) (ah) of the 1961 Act provides
that an advocate whose name has been removed by an order of the Supreme Court or a High Court or the Bar Council as the case may be, shall not
be entitled to practise the profession of law either before the Court and authorities mentioned under Section 30 of the 1961 Act, or in chambers, or
otherwise. The above rule clearly shows that the chamber practise, namely, practise in non litigious matters is also within the purview of the 1961 Act.
Counsel for the Union of India had argued that the Central Government is actively considering the issue relating to the foreign law firms practising
the profession of law in India. Since the said issue is pending before the Central Government for more than 15 years, we direct the Central
Government to take appropriate decision in the matter as expeditiously as possible. Till then, the 1961 Act as enacted would prevail, that is, the
persons practising the profession of law whether in litigious matters or non litigious matters would be governed by the 1961 Act and the Bar Councils
framed there under, apart from the powers of the Court to take appropriate action against advocates who are found guilty of professional misconduct.
For all the aforesaid reasons, we hold that in the facts of the present case, the RBI was not justified in granting permission to the foreign law firms
to open liaison offices in India under Section 29 of the 1973 Act. We further hold that the expressions ' to practise the profession of law' in Section 29
of the 1961 Act is wide enough to cover the persons practising in litigious matters as well as persons practising in non litigious matters and, therefore,
to practise in non litigious matters in India, the respondent Nos. 12 to 14 were bound to follow the provisions contained in the 1961 Act. The petition is
disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs.
The Madras High Court agreed with the above view as follows :
As noticed above, the facts of the case before the Bombay High Court were that the respondents which were foreign law firms practising the
profession of law in US/UK sought permission to open their liaison office in India and render legal assistance to another person in all litigious and
nonlitigious matters. The Bombay High Court, therefore, rightly held that establishing liaison office in India by the foreign law firm and rendering
liaisoning activities in all forms cannot be permitted since such activities are opposed to the provisions of the Advocates Act and the Bar Council of
India Rules. We do not differ from the view taken by the Bombay High Court on this aspect.
The Madras High Court after above observation proceeded to consider the matter as follows:
However, the issue which falls for consideration before this Court is as to whether a foreign law firm, without establishing any liaison office in
India visiting India for the purpose of offering legal advice to their clients in India on foreign law, is prohibited under the provisions of the Advocates
Act. In other words, the question here is, whether a foreign lawyer visiting India for a temporary period to advise his client on foreign law can be
barred under the provisions of the Advocates Act. This issue was neither raised nor answered by the Bombay High Court in the aforesaid judgment.
It was held :
We find force in the submission made by the learned counsel appearing for the foreign law firms that if foreign law firms are not allowed to take
part in negotiations, for settling up documents and conduct arbitrations in India, it will have a counter productive effect on the aim of the Government
to make India a hub of International Arbitration. According to the learned counsel, many arbitrations with Indian Judges and Lawyers as Arbitrators
are held outside India, where both foreign and Indian law firms advise their clients. If foreign law firms are denied entry to deal with arbitrations in
India, then India will lose many of the arbitrations to foreign countries. It will be contrary to the declared policy of the Government and against the
national interest. Some of the companies have been carrying on consultancy/support services in the field of protection and management of intellectual,
business and industrial proprietary rights, carrying out market surveys and market research and publication of reports, journals, etc. without rendering
any legal service, including advice in the form of opinion, but they do not appear before any courts or tribunals anywhere in India. Such activities
cannot at all be considered as practising law in India. It has not been controverted that in England, foreign lawyers are free to advice on their own
system of law or on English Law or any other system of law without any nationality requirement or need to be qualified in England.
Before enacting the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 the Law Commission of India, several representative bodies of trade and industry and
experts in the field of arbitration have proposed amendments to the Act to make it more responsive to contemporary requirements. It was also
recognised that the economic reforms in India may not fully become effective if the law dealing with settlement of both domestic and international
commercial disputes remains out of tune with such reforms. The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) adopted in
1985 the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration. The Arbitration and Conciliation Act is, therefore, consolidated and amended to the law
relating to domestic and international commercial arbitration as well as for the enforcement of foreign arbitral award. The Act was enacted as a
measure of fulfilling India's obligations under the International Treaties and Conventions. On account of the growth in the international trade and
commerce and also on account of long delays occurring in the disposal of suits and appeals in courts, there has been tremendous movement towards
the resolution of disputes through alternative forum of arbitrators.
Section 2(1)(f) of the Act defines the term ""International Commercial Arbitration"" as under:-
(f) International Commercial Arbitration means an arbitration relating to disputes arising out of legal relationships, whether contractual or not,
considered as commercial under the law in force in India and where at least one of the parties is
(i) an individual who is a national of, or habitually resident in, any country other than India; or
(ii) a body corporate which is incorporated in any country other than India; or
(iii) a company or an association or a body of individuals whose central management and control is exercised in any country other than India; or
(iv) the Government of a foreign country.
From the above definition, it is manifestly clear that any arbitration matter between the parties to the arbitration agreement shall be called an
international commercial arbitration"" if the matter relates to the disputes, which may or may not be contractual, but where at least one of the parties
habitually resides abroad whether a national of that country or not. The New York Convention will apply to an arbitration agreement if it has a foreign
element or flavour involving international trade and commerce, even though such an agreement does not lead to a foreign award.
International arbitration is growing big time in India and in almost all the countries across the globe. India is a signatory to the World Trade
Agreement, which has opened up the gates for many international business establishments based in different parts of the world to come and set up
their respective businesses in India.
Large number of Indian Companies have been reaching out to foreign destinations by mergers, acquisition or direct investments. As per the data
released by the Reserve Bank of India during 2009, the total out ward investment from India excluding that which was made by Banks, had increased
29.6% to U.S. Dollar 17.4 billion in 2007-08 and India is ranked third in global foreign direct investment. Overseas investments in joint ventures and
wholly owned subsidiaries have been recognized as important avenues by Indian Entrepreneurs in terms of foreign exchange earning like dividend,
loyalty, etc. India is the 7th largest, the second most populated country and the fourth largest economy in the world. Various economic reforms
brought about have made India grow rapidly in the Asia-Pacific Region, and the Indian Private Sector has offered considerable scope for foreign
direct investment, joint-venture and collaborations. Undoubtedly, these cross-border transactions and investments would give bigger opportunities for
members of the legal fraternity, in order to better equip themselves to face the challenges. It is common knowledge that in the recent past, parties
conducting International Commercial Arbitrations have chosen India as their destination. The arbitration law in India is modelled on the lines of the
UNCITRAL Model Law of Arbitration and makes a few departures from the principles enshrined therein. The Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996,
provides for international commercial arbitration where at least one of the parties is not an Indian National or Body corporate incorporated in India or
a foreign Government.
Institutional Arbitration has been defined to be an arbitration conducted by an arbitral institution in accordance with the rules of the institution. The
Indian Council of Arbitration is one such body. It is reported that in several cases of International Commercial Arbitration, foreign contracting party
prefers to arbitrate in India and several reasons have been stated to choose India as the seat of arbitration. Therefore, when there is liberalization of
economic policies, throwing the doors open to foreign investments, it cannot be denied that disputes and differences are bound to arise in such
International contracts. When one of the contracting party is a foreign entity and there is a binding arbitration agreement between the parties and India
is chosen as the seat of arbitration, it is but natural that the foreign contracting party would seek the assistance of their own solicitors or lawyers to
advice them on the impact of the laws of their country on the said contract, and they may accompany their clients to visit India for the purpose of the
Arbitration. Therefore, if a party to an International Commercial Arbitration engages a foreign lawyer and if such lawyers come to India to advice
their clients on the foreign law, we see there could be no prohibition for such foreign lawyers to advise their clients on foreign law in India in the
course of a International Commercial transaction or an International Commercial Arbitration or matters akin thereto. Therefore, to advocate a
proposition that foreign lawyers or foreign law firms cannot come into India to advice their clients on foreign law would be a far fetched and
dangerous proposition and in our opinion, would be to take a step backward, when India is becoming a preferred seat for arbitration in International
Commercial Arbitrations. It cannot be denied that we have a comprehensive and progressive legal frame work to support International Arbitration and
the 1996 Act, provides for maximum judicial support of arbitration and minimal intervention. That apart, it is not in all cases, a foreign company
conducting an International Commercial Arbitration in India would solicit the assistance of their foreign lawyers. The legal expertise available in India
is of International standard and such foreign companies would not hesitate to avail the services of Indian lawyers. Therefore, the need to make India
as a preferred seat for International Commercial Arbitration would benefit the economy of the country.
The Supreme Court in a recent decision in Vodafone International Holdings B.V. v. Union of India and another, SLP(C) No.26529 of 2010, dated
20.01.2012, observed that every strategic foreign direct investment coming to India, as an investment destination should be seen in a holistic manner.
The Supreme Court observed that the question involved in the said case was of considerable public importance, especially on Foreign Direct
Investment, which is indispensable for a growing economy like India. Therefore, we should not lose site of the fact that in the overall economic growth
of the country, International Commercial Arbitration would play a vital part. The learned counsel appearing for the foreign law firms have taken a
definite stand that the clients whom they represent do not have offices in India, they do not advise their foreign clients on matters concerning Indian
Law, but they fly in and fly out of India, only to advise and hand-hold their clients on foreign laws. The foreign law firms, who are the private
respondents in this writ petition, have accepted the legal position that the term ""practice"" would include both litigation as well as non-litigation work,
which is better known as chamber practice. Therefore, rendering advice to a client would also be encompassed in the term ""practice"".
As noticed above, Section 2(a) of the Advocates Act defines 'Advocate' to mean an advocate entered in any roll under the provisions of the Act.
In terms of Section 17(1) of the Act, every State Bar Council shall prepare and maintain a roll of Advocates, in which shall be entered the names and
addresses of (a) all persons who were entered as an Advocate on the roll of any High Court under the Indian Bar Council Act, 1926, immediately
before the appointed date and (b) all other persons admitted to be Advocates on the roll of the State Bar Council under the Act on or after the
appointed date. In terms of Section 24(1) of the Act, subject to the provisions of the Act and the Rules made thereunder, a person shall be qualified to
be admitted as an advocate on a state roll if he fulfils the conditions (a) a citizen of India, (b) has completed 21 years of age and (c) obtained a degree
in Law. The proviso to Section 24(1)(a) states that subject to the other provisions of the Act, a National of any other country may be admitted as an
Advocate on a State roll, if a citizen of India, duly qualified is permitted to practice law in that other country. In terms of Section 47(1) of the Act,
where any country specified by the Central Government by notification prevents citizens of India practicing the profession of Law or subjects them to
unfair discrimination in that country, no subject of any such country shall be entitled to practice the profession of Law in India. In terms of Sub-Section
(2) of Section 47, subject to the provision of Sub-Section (1), the Bar Council of India may prescribe conditions, if any, subject to which foreign
qualifications in law obtained by persons other than citizens of India shall be recognized for the purpose of admission as an Advocate under the Act.
Thus, Section 47 deals with reciprocity. As per the statement of objects and reasons of the Advocates Act, it was a law enacted to provide one class
of legal practitioners, specifying the academic and professional qualifications necessary for enrolling as a practitioner of Indian Law, and only Indian
citizens with a Law Degree from a recognized Indian University could enrol as Advocates under the Act. The exceptions are provided under the
proviso to Section 24(1)(a), Section 24(1)(c)(iv) and Section 47(2). In the light of the scheme of the Act, if a lawyer from a foreign law firm visits
India to advice his client on matters relating to the law which is applicable to their country, for which purpose he ""flies in and flies out"" of India, there
could not be a bar for such services rendered by such foreign law firm/foreign lawyer.
We are persuaded to observe so, since there may be several transactions in which an Indian company or a person of Indian origin may enter into
transaction with a foreign company, and the laws applicable to such transaction are the laws of the said foreign country. There may be a necessity to
seek legal advice on the manner in which the foreign law would be applied to the said transaction, for which purpose if a lawyer from a foreign law
firm is permitted to fly into India and fly out advising their client on the foreign law, it cannot be stated to be prohibited. The corollary would be that
such foreign law firm shall not be entitled to do any form of practice of Indian Law either directly or indirectly. The private respondents herein, namely
the foreign law firms, have accepted that there is express prohibition for a foreign lawyer or a foreign law firm to practice Indian Law. It is pointed
out that if an interpretation is given to prohibit practice of foreign law by a foreign law firms within India, it would result in a manifestly absurd situation
wherein only Indian citizens with Indian Law degree who are enrolled as an advocate under the Advocates Act could practice foreign law, when the
fact remains that foreign laws are not taught at graduate level in Indian Law schools, except Comparative Law Degree Courses at the Master's level.
As noticed above, the Government of India, in their counter affidavit dated 19.08.2010, have stated that the contention raised by the petitioner that
foreign law firms should not be allowed to take part in negotiating settlements, settling up documents and arbitrations will be counter productive, as
International Arbitration will be confined to a single country. It is further pointed out that many arbitrations are held outside India with Indian Judges
and Lawyers as Arbitrators where both foreign and Indian Law firms advise their clients. It has been further stated if foreign law firms are denied
permission to deal with arbitration in India, then we would lose many arbitrations to other countries and this is contrary to the declared policy of the
Government and will be against the National interest, especially when the Government wants India to be a hub of International Arbitration.
At this juncture, it is necessary to note yet another submission made by the Government of India in their counter. It has been stated that law firms
as such or not required to register themselves or require permission to engage in non-litigation practice and that Indian law firms elsewhere are
operating in a free environment without any curbs or regulations. It is further submitted that the oversight of the Bar Council on non-litigation activities
of such law firms was virtually nil till now, and exploiting this loop hole, many accountancy and management firms are employing law graduates, who
are rendering legal services, which is contrary to the Advocates Act. Therefore, the concern of the Government of India as expressed in the counter
affidavit requires to be addressed by the Bar Council of India. Further, it is seen that the Government in consultation with the Bar Council of India
proposes to commission a study as to the nature of activities of LPOs, and an appropriate decision would be taken in consultation with the Bar Council
of India.
Shri C.U. Singh, learned senior counsel for the Bar Council of India submitted that Advocates enrolled with the Bar Council of India are the only
recognized class of persons entitled to practice law in India. Unless any other law so permits, no person can practice before any 'Court, authority or
person' other than an Advocate enrolled under the Act. In particular cases, the 'Court, authority or person' may permit a person other than an
advocate enrolled under the Act to appear before him. It was submitted that the expression ""practice profession of law"" covered not only appearance
before the Court but also opinion work which is also known as chamber practice. The Ethics prescribed by the Bar Council of India covered not only
conduct in appearing before Court or authority but also in dealing with the clients including giving legal opinion, drafting or participation in law
conference. If a person practices before any 'Court, authority or person' illegally, is liable to punishment for imprisonment which may extend to six
months. Thus, the view taken by the Madras High Court that visit by a foreign lawyer on fly in and fly out basis to give advice on foreign law or to
conduct arbitration in international commercial arbitrations was erroneous. Reference has also been made to definition of the term 'advocate' under
Section 2(a) of the Act. Section 6 lays down functions of the Bar Council including admission of persons as advocates, safeguarding rights, privileges
and interests of advocates. Section 17 lays down that every State Bar Council shall prepare a roll of advocates and no person can be enrolled in more
than one State Bar Council. Section 24 lays down qualifications for admission on the roll of a State Bar council. The qualifications include the
citizenship of India, unless a person is national of a country where citizens of India are permitted to practice. One is required to have the prescribed
qualification from India or out of India if such degree is recognized by the Bar Council of India, being a Barrister called to the Bar before 31st
December, 1976, passing of articled clerks examination or any other examination specified by the Bombay or Calcutta High Court or obtaining foreign
qualification recognized by the Bar Council of India are also the prescribed qualifications. It was submitted that even in other jurisdictions, persons
other than those enrolled with the concerned Bar Council are not allowed to practice. Even short term running of legal service is subject to regulatory
regime.
Learned counsel for the foreign law firms S/Shri Arvind Datar, Sajjan Poovayya, Dushyant Dave, learned senior counsel and Mr. Nakul Dewan,
learned counsel supported the direction of the Madras High Court permitting foreign lawyers to render legal services on fly in and fly out basis and
also with reference to international commercial arbitrations. It was submitted that Bar Council could come into picture only in respect of advocates
enrolled with it. It is only with reference to appearance before the Courts or other authorities or persons that the regulatory regime of the Bar Council
may apply but with regard to non litigation/advisory work even those not enrolled as advocates under the Advocates Act are not debarred. It was also
submitted by Shri Dewan that Advocates Act applies only to individuals and not to law firms. Provision for reciprocity applies only for enrolment under
the Advocates Act and not for casual legal services on fly in and fly out basis or in connection with international commercial arbitration. Foreign
lawyers are regulated by the disciplinary regime applicable to them and only their Bar Councils could take action with regard to their working in India
also. Practice of law in India did not cover advising on foreign law. Thus, if by a pre-determined invitation, a foreign lawyer visited India to advise on a
foreign law, there is no bar against doing so.
Certain decisions have been cited at the Bar to which reference may be made. In Roel v. New York County Lawyers Association, 3 N.Y.2d 224
(1957), the Court of Appeals of the State of New York dealt with a case where a Mexican citizen and lawyer, who was not a citizen of the United
States nor a member of the New York Bar, maintained his office in New York and advised members of the public on Mexican law. He did not give
any advice as to New York law. The majority held that this was not permissible. It was observed:
The minority view, on the other hand, held that:
In this century when the United States has become the creditor nation of the world and when the ramifications of our industrial, commercial, financial
and recreational lives extend to every corner of the global, it is especially improbable that the Legislature intended to preclude the giving of legal
advice in this State to our citizens concerning these far-flung enterprises by trained lawyers from abroad who are equipped to give accurate
information and opinions regarding them. The customary residential requirements for admission to the Bar would in themselves often preclude their
becoming admitted to our Bar. ... ... The omission of the Legislature to enact statutes licensing or regulating the conduct of foreign lawyers in
practicing purely foreign law in this State, does not indicate that such conduct is prohibited by sections 270 and 271 of the Penal Law, but merely that
the Legislature has not seen fit to subject them to regulation. Whatever the merits of such proposed legislation, it is not for us to enact it. If foreign
lawyers came under section 270 and 271 of the Penal Law, it would stifle their activities to the detriment of the large and increasing number of our
nationals who engage in transactions in foreign countries, inasmuch as it would be impossible for most of them to be admitted to practice in this State.
In Appell v. Reiner, 43 N.J. 313 (1964); 204 A.2d 146, the Supreme Court of New Jersey dealt with a case of New York lawyer, who was not
admitted to the New Jersey Bar, giving legal services to New Jersey residents in a matter involving the extension of credit and the compromise of
claims held by New York and New Jersey creditors. The Chancery Division held that the New York lawyer could not advice in respect of New
Jersey creditors. The Supreme Court of New Jersey held:-
The Chancery Division correctly delineated the generally controlling principle that legal services to be furnished to New Jersey residents relating to
New Jersey matters may be furnished only by New Jersey counsel. We nevertheless recognize that there are unusual situations in which a strict
adherence to such a thesis is not in the public interest. In this connection recognition must be given to the numerous multi-state transactions arising in
modern times. This is particularly true of our State, situated as it is in the midst of the financial and manufacturing center of the nation. An inflexible
observance of the generally controlling doctrine may well occasion a result detrimental to the public interest, and it follows that there may be instances
justifying such exceptional treatment warranting the ignoring of state lines. This is such a situation. Under the peculiar facts here present, having in
mind the nature of the services to be rendered, the inseparability of the New York and New Jersey transactions, and the substantial nature of the
New York claim, we conclude that plaintiff's agreement to furnish services in New Jersey was not illegal and contrary to public policy.
It must be remembered that we are not here concerned with any participated by plaintiff in a court proceeding. What is involved is the rendering of
advice and assistance in obtaining extensions of credit and compromises of indebtedness. ... ...
Again, there was a dissenting view as follows:
... ...Regulation of the interests of the public and the bar requires a rule of general application. In cases such as we have here, the only fair and
workable rule is one which recognizes that the client's matter is primarily a New Jersey one and calls for the engagement of a member of our bar for
the legal services to be rendered here. And, in that connection, in the interest of interstate amity, if an out-ofstate attorney renders legal services in
New Jersey which are a minor or incidental part of a total problem which has its principal and primary aspects in his state, he should be allowed to
recover in our courts for the work done in this jurisdiction.
The Chancery Division correctly delineated the generally controlling principle that legal services to be furnished to New Jersey residents relating to
New Jersey matters may be furnished only by New Jersey counsel. We nevertheless recognize that there are unusual situations in which a strict
adherence to such a thesis is not in the public interest. In this connection recognition must be given to the numerous multi-state transactions arising in
modern times. This is particularly true of our State, situated as it is in the midst of the financial and manufacturing center of the nation. An inflexible
observance of the generally controlling doctrine may well occasion a result detrimental to the public interest, and it follows that there may be instances
justifying such exceptional treatment warranting the ignoring of state lines. This is such a situation. Under the peculiar facts here present, having in
mind the nature of the services to be rendered, the inseparability of the New York and New Jersey transactions, and the substantial nature of the
New York claim, we conclude that plaintiff's agreement to furnish services in New Jersey was not illegal and contrary to public policy.
It must be remembered that we are not here concerned with any participated by plaintiff in a court proceeding. What is involved is the rendering of
advice and assistance in obtaining extensions of credit and compromises of indebtedness. ... ...
Again, there was a dissenting view as follows:
... ...Regulation of the interests of the public and the bar requires a rule of general application. In cases such as we have here, the only fair and
workable rule is one which recognizes that the client's matter is primarily a New Jersey one and calls for the engagement of a member of our bar for
the legal services to be rendered here. And, in that connection, in the interest of interstate amity, if an out-ofstate attorney renders legal services in
New Jersey which are a minor or incidental part of a total problem which has its principal and primary aspects in his state, he should be allowed to
recover in our courts for the work done in this jurisdiction.
Mr. Poovayya referred to Rules of the Indian Council of Arbitration which could apply only if there was an agreement between the parties that
the arbitration was to be in accordance with the Rules of the Indian Council of Arbitration. Rule 45 laid down that parties have no right to be
represented by lawyers unless the arbitral tribunal considers it necessary and allows.
Referring to the Arbitration Act, it was submitted that international commercial arbitration is defined under Section 2(f) which covers arbitration
relating to disputes where one of the parties is a national or habitual resident of a country other than India or a body corporate incorporated outside
India or an association of body of individuals whose management and control is exercised in a country other than India or a Government of a foreign
country. In such cases, parties may agree to have an arbitrator of any nationality, to any language to be used in arbitration proceedings, to any place of
arbitration. Section 28(b) permits Arbitral Tribunal to decide disputes in accordance with rules of law applicable to the substance of the dispute as
agreed by the parties. The arbitrator has to give equal opportunity to the parties to present their case (Section 18). Parties can agree on the procedure
to be followed (Section 19). Section 34(2)(a)(iii) provides that an award may be set aside, inter-alia, on the ground that the party was unable to present
its case in the arbitration proceedings. Procedure for presenting case of a party before the arbitrator may be governed by agreement or by the
procedural rules.
Shri Dushyant Dave referred to rules of certain Arbitration Institutions to the effect that the parties are free to be represented by an outside
lawyer. It was submitted that by way of Convention in international commercial arbitrations, there cannot be any compulsion to engage only a local
lawyer. Section 48(1)(b) of the Arbitration Act provides that enforcement of a foreign award can be refused if the parties were unable to present their
case. The New York Convention Awards are governed by the First Schedule to the Act. Article-II provides for recognition of an arbitration
agreement between the parties. Article-V(1)(b) provides that if the party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice or could not
present his case, the award cannot be enforced. Section 53 of the Arbitration Act refers to Geneva Convention Awards which is regulated by the
Second Schedule to the Act containing similar provisions.
Mr. Dave submitted that the Special Leave Petition arising out of the Delhi High Court order is on the question whether London Court of
International Arbitration could use the expression ""COURT"" had become infructuous as the respondent had closed its working in India. He, however,
referred the following: I) Handbook of ICC Arbitration - Commentary, Precedents, Materials - Second Edition (Michael W. Buhler and Thomas H.
Webster) Article 21(4): ""The parties may appear in person or through duly authorized representatives. In addition, they may be assisted by advisers.
The authors' comment is as follows:
In an ICC arbitration, parties have the right to be represented by the persons of their choice. A distinction should however be made between
authorized representatives"" and ""advisors"". Usually, the parties have attorneys represent them in the arbitration. Thus, an attorney may have both
capacities, but this may not always be the case. As an adviser, he or she would not need a power of attorney. On the other hand, as a representative
of a party, he or she might need a power of attorney. In arbitration. The major centres of arbitration do not appear to have restrictions on the right of
lawyers from other countries to argue cases in those countries, with the possible exception of California.
The footnote 31 is as follows:
See Birbower, Montabano, Condon and Frank, P.C. v. The Superior Court of Santa Clara, 949 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1998); see also Holtzmann and Donovan,
United States Country Report"" in ICCA Handbook, Supp. 28 (Paulsson edn, 1999). The California Rules of Court were modified in 2004 in order to
permit any US qualified lawyer to represent a party in an arbitration (r.966). However, it remains unclear whether lawyers admitted to foreign bars
can represent parties in national or international arbitration.
II) Arbitration of Commercial Disputes - International and English Law and Practice (Andrew Tweeddale and Keren Tweeddale).
10.15. The right to legal representation at trial has existed both in the common law and in international treaties for centuries[See, for example, art 42 of
the Statute of the International Court of Justice which states: Rs.1. The parties shall be represented by agents. 2. They may have the assistance of
counsel or advocates before the Court. 3. The agents, counsel, and advocates of parties before the Court shall enjoy the privileges and immunities
necessary to the independent exercise of their duties.' See also art 37 of the Hague Convention 1899 which states: 'The parties have the right to
appoint delegates or special agents to attend the Tribunal, for the purpose of serving as intermediaries between them and the Tribunal. They are
further authorized to retain, for the defense of their rights and interests before the Tribunal, counsel or advocates appointed by them for this purpose.'].
However, the right to legal representation is not absolute. The parties may agree to dispense with legal representation[Henry Bath and Son Ltd. v.
Birgby Products [1962] Lloyd's Rep 389; and see also the English Arbitration Act 1996, s 36.]. Furthermore, some rules of arbitration prohibit the use
of legal representation[The arbitration rules of the Australian Football league, for example, limit legal representation.]. In international commercial
arbitrations it is generally accepted that the parties may choose their own advocate without necessarily choosing one qualified at the seat of the
arbitration[See, for example, In the matter of an Arbitration between Lawler, Matusky and Skelly, Engineers and the Attorney General of Barbados
(No.320 of 1981) 22 August 1983 where the High Court of Barbados held that there was a 'common law right of everyone who is sui juris to appoint
an agent for any purpose'. The court held that this included the right to appoint a representative to appear as advocate on a party's behalf in a
commercial arbitration.]. However, in a few recent cases that principle has been challenged[In the matter of an Arbitration between Builders Federal
(Hong Kong) Ltd. and Joseph Gartner and Co., and Turner (East Asia) Pte Ltd (No. 90 of 1987) (1988) 2 MLJ 280 the Malaysian Judicial
Commissioner Chan Sek Keong ruled that the respondents, who were a foreign company, could not select a counsel from their own country because
Singapore's Legal Profession Act operated as a bar to foreign lawyers from representing their clients in international arbitrations in Singapore.
However, in June 2004 Singapore finally amended its Legal Profession Act to eliminate this restriction on representation by foreign lawyers in
arbitrations in Singapore. See also Birbrower, Montabano, Condon and Frank v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County, 1998 Cal LEXIS 2, 1998 WL
1346 (Cal 1/5/98) where the court held that a New York lawyer representing a client in a Californian arbitration was not qualified to act for his client
because he was not called to the Californian bar and therefore not entitled to recover his fees. The court, however, stated that this principle would not
apply to an international commercial arbitration.].
III) Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration
In general, the parties may also be represented by engineers, or commercial men, for the purpose of putting forward the oral submissions, and even
for the examination of witnesses. It is not uncommon, where a case involves technical issues, for an engineer or other professional man to be part of
the team of advocates representing a party at a hearing, although it is more usual for such technical experts to be called as witnesses in order that
their opinions and submissions may be tested by cross-examination. However, it may sometimes be convenient and save time if technical experts
address the arbitral tribunal directly as party representatives[ Both the UNCITRAL RULES (Art4) and the LCIA Rules (Art18) make it clear that
parties are entitled to be represented by non-lawyers.].
The Supreme Court of California held in 1998 that representing a party in an arbitration without its seat in California was 'engaging in the practice of
law' in that state. It followed that a New York lawyer, not a member of the Californian Bar, was not qualified to represent his client in a Californian
arbitration; and was thus unable to recover his fee when he sued for it[Birbrower, Montabane, Condon Frank v. The Superior Court of Santa Clara
County, 1998 Cal Lexis2; 1998 WL 1346 (Cal 1/5/98)]. Fortunately the court stated that the rule did not apply in international arbitration. IN England
there is not, and never has been, any danger of a similar situation arising[i.e. that only a member of the local bar should be entitled to represent a party
in a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding.]. A party to an arbitration may, in theory, be represented by his plumber, his dentist, or anyone else of his
choosing, although the choice usually falls on a lawyer or specialist claims consultant in the relevant industry[English Arbitration Act, 1996, s 36. This
reaffirms the previous common law position.IV) LONDON COURT OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (LCIA) RULES (2014)].
Article 18 - Legal Representatives
18.1Any party may be represented in the arbitration by one or more authorized legal representatives appearing by name before the Arbitral Tribunal.
18.2 Until the Arbitral Tribunal's formation, the Registrar may request from any party: (i) written proof of the authority granted by that party to any
legal representative designated in its Request or Response; and (ii) written confirmation of the names and addresses of all such party's legal
representatives in the arbitration. After its formation, at any time, the arbitral Tribunal may order any party to provide similar proof or confirmation in
any form considers appropriate.
Article 22 - Representation
A party may be represented by its authorized Chinese and/or foreign representative(s) in handling matters relating to the arbitration. In such a case, a
Power of Attorney shall be forwarded to the Arbitration Court by the party or its authorized representative(s).
ARTICLE 26 - Hearings
The parties may appear in person or through duly authorized representatives. In addition, they may be assisted by advisers.
R-26. Representation
Any party may participate without representation (pro se), or by counsel or any other representative of the party's choosing, unless such choice is
prohibited by applicable law. A party intending to be so represented shall notify the other party and the AAA of the name, telephone number and
address, and email address if available, of the representative at least seven calendar days prior to the date set for the hearing at which that person is
first to appear. When such a representative initiates an arbitration or responds for a party, notice is deemed to have been given.
Party Representatives
23.1Any party may be represented by legal practitioners or any other authorized representatives. The Registrar and/or the Tribunal may require proof
of authority of any party representatives.
23.2 After the constitution of the Tribunal, any change or addition by a party to its representatives shall be promptly communicated in writing to the
parties, the Tribunal and the Registrar.
Party Representation and assistance
At the hearing, a party shall be entitled to appear through Attorney, Advocate or a duly authorized Advisor or Representative or in person, subject to
such proof of authority to the satisfaction of the Registrar or the Tribunal.
Shri C.U. Singh, learned senior counsel, by way of rejoinder, opposed the submissions of learned counsel appearing for the foreign law firms. He
submitted that the stand of the Central Government finally was to support the stand of the Bar Council of India. The argument that participation of
foreign lawyers will be in the interest of the country was raised by the foreign law firms only as shown from para 51 of the Madras High Court
judgment. He submitted that the arbitrator was also an 'authority' before whom only advocates enrolled in India alone could appear. The arbitrator
could record evidence and summon witnesses through Court(Section 27). Rules of Arbitration Institutions have to be in conformity with the law of the
land. He also submitted that the rules framed by the Bar Council of India under Section 49 define the practice of law so as to cover even giving of
opinion.
Shri Singh further pointed out that Ethics for the profession as applicable in India are different from the Ethics applicable in other countries. In this
regard, it was submitted that Rule 36 in Part VI, Chapter II of the BCI Rules prohibits direct or indirect advertising by advocates, or solicitation by any
means whatsoever. Rule 18 bars an advocate from fomenting litigation. In Bar Council of Maharashtra v. M.V. Dabholkar, (1976) 2 SCC 291, this
Court held that advertising was a serious professional misconduct for an advocate. As against this, in USA Rule 7.3 of the American Bar Association
Rules bars only in-person or live telephonic solicitation of clients, but expressly permits lawyer-to-lawyer solicitation, as well as client solicitation by
written, recorded or electronic communication, unless the target of solicitation has made known to the lawyer his desire not to be solicited, or the
solicitation involved coercion, duress or harassment. The US Supreme Court, inter alia, in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 US 626
(1985) and in Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Association, 486 US 466 struck down disciplinary actions against lawyers for soliciting clients through print
advertisements or hoardings. In UK, Solicitors Regulation Authority(SRA) is a regulatory body established under the Legal Services Act, 2007.
Chapter 8 of the SRA Handbook permits publicity of the law firm but prohibits solicitations.
In India, with regard to Contingency fees, Rule 20 in Part VI, Chapter II of the BCI Rules bars an advocate from stipulating a fee contingent on
the results of the litigation or from agreeing to share the proceeds thereof. Rule 21 prohibits practices akin to champerty or maintenance, and prohibits
an advocate from buying or trafficking in or stipulating or agreeing to receive any share or interest in an actionable claim. In USA Rule 1.5 (c) of the
ABA Rules permits lawyers to charge contingency fees, except in certain specified cases like criminal defence, etc. Fee-splitting arrangements
between lawyers from different firms are also permitted with some restrictions. In U.K., Section 58 of the Courts and Legal Services Act, 1990
permits ""conditional fee agreements"" except in criminal proceedings and family law matters and Section 58AA permits ""damages-based fee
agreements"", all of which entitle legal practitioners to a share of the ""winnings"".
In India, there are no rules framed by the Bar Council on the subject 'sale of law practice'. In U.S.A., Rule 1.17 permits law firms or lawyers
having private practice to sell their practice including the goodwill. In U.K., SRA Guidelines permit sale of practice as a going concern or acquisition
of a practice which is closing down.
In India, senior advocates are barred from interacting directly with clients, and are not permitted to draft pleadings or affidavits, correspond on
behalf of clients, or to appear in court unassisted by an advocate (Part VI, Chapter I of the Bar Council of India Rules). In U.S.A., no such distinction
or designations are made. In U.K., there appear to be no restrictions on Queen's Counsel (QCs) similar to the ones imposed by the Bar Council in
India. QCs are permitted to join law firms as partners.
In India, funding of litigation by advocates is not explicitly prohibited, but a conjoint reading of Rule 18 (fomenting litigation), Rule 20 (contingency
fees), Rule 21 (share or interest in an actionable claim) and Rule 22 (participating in bids in execution, etc.) would strongly suggest that advocates in
India cannot fund litigation on behalf of their clients. There appears to be no restriction on third parties (non-lawyers) funding the litigation and getting
repaid after the outcome of the litigation. In U.S.A., lawyers are permitted to fund the entire litigation and take their fee as a percentage of the
proceeds if they win the case. Third Party Litigation Funding/Legal Financing agreements are not prohibited. In U.K., Section 58B of the Courts and
Legal Services Act, 1990 permits litigation funding agreements between legal service providers and litigants or clients, and also permits third party
Litigation Funding or Legal Financing agreements, whereby the third party can get a share of the damages or ""winnings"".
In India, partnerships with non-lawyers for conducting legal practice is not permitted. In U.K., Section 66 of the Courts and Legal Services Act,
1990 expressly permits solicitors and barristers to enter into partnerships with non-solicitors and non-barristers.
We have considered the rival submissions. Questions for consideration mainly arise out of directions in para 63 of the Madras High Court
judgment which have already been quoted in the beginning of this judgment. viz. :
(i) Whether the expression 'practise the profession of law' includes only litigation practice or non-litigation practice also;
(ii) Whether such practice by foreign law firms or foreign lawyers is permissible without fulfilling the requirements of Advocates Act and the Bar
Council of India Rules;
(iii) If not, whether there is a bar for the said law firms or lawyers to visit India on 'fly in and fly out' basis for giving legal advice regarding foreign law
on diverse international legal issues;
(iv) Whether there is no bar to foreign law firms and lawyers from conducting arbitration proceedings and disputes arising out of contracts relating to
international commercial arbitration;
(v) Whether BPO companies providing integrated services are not covered by the Advocates Act or the Bar Council of India rules.
RE : (i)
In Pravin C. Shah v. K.A. Mohd. Ali, (2001) 8 SCC 650, it was observed that right to practice is genus of which right to appear and conduct cases
is specie. It was observed:
.........The right of the advocate to practise envelopes a lot of acts to be performed by him in discharge of his professional duties. Apart form
appearing in the courts he can be consulted by his clients, he can give his legal opinion whenever sought for, he can draft instruments, pleadings,
affidavits or any other documents, he can participate in any conference involving legal discussions etc. ......
In Ex. Capt. Harish Uppal v. Union of India, (2003) 2 SCC 45, same view was reiterated.
Ethics of the legal profession apply not only when an advocate appears before the Court. The same also apply to regulate practice outside the
Court. Adhering to such Ethics is integral to the administration of justice. The professional standards laid down from time to time are required to be
followed. Thus, we uphold the view that practice of law includes litigation as well as non litigation.
RE : (ii)
We have already held that practicing of law includes not only appearance in courts but also giving of opinion, drafting of instruments, participation
in conferences involving legal discussion. These are parts of non-litigation practice which is part of practice of law. Scheme in Chapter-IV of the
Advocates Act makes it clear that advocates enrolled with the Bar Council alone are entitled to practice law, except as otherwise provided in any
other law. All others can appear only with the permission of the court, authority or person before whom the proceedings are pending. Regulatory
mechanism for conduct of advocates applies to non-litigation work also. The prohibition applicable to any person in India, other than advocate enrolled
under the Advocates Act, certainly applies to any foreigner also.
RE : (iii)
Visit of any foreign lawyer on fly in and fly out basis may amount to practice of law if it is on regular basis. A casual visit for giving advice may
not be covered by the expression 'practice'. Whether a particular visit is casual or frequent so as to amount to practice is a question of fact to be
determined from situation to situation. Bar Council of India or Union of India are at liberty to make appropriate rules in this regard. We may, however,
make it clear that the contention that the Advocates Act applies only if a person is practicing Indian law cannot be accepted. Conversely, plea that a
foreign lawyer is entitled to practice foreign law in India without subjecting himself to the regulatory mechanism of the Bar Council of India Rules can
also be not accepted. We do not find any merit in the contention that the Advocates Act does not deal with companies or firms and only individuals. If
prohibition applies to an individual, it equally applies to group of individuals or juridical persons.
RE: (iv)
It is not possible to hold that there is absolutely no bar to a foreign lawyer for conducting arbitrations in India. If the matter is governed by
particular rules of an institution or if the matter otherwise falls under Section 32 or 33, there is no bar to conduct such proceedings in prescribed
manner. If the matter is governed by an international commercial arbitration agreement, conduct of proceedings may fall under Section 32 or 33 read
with the provisions of the Arbitration Act. Even in such cases, Code of Conduct, if any, applicable to the legal profession in India has to be followed. It
is for the Bar Council of India or Central Government to make a specific provision in this regard, if considered appropriate.
RE: (v)
The BPO companies providing range of customized and integrated services and functions to its customers may not violate the provisions of the
Advocates Act, only if the activities in pith and substance do not amount to practice of law. The manner in which they are styled may not be
conclusive. As already explained, if their services do not directly or indirectly amount to practice of law, the Advocates Act may not apply. This is a
matter which may have to be dealt with on case to case basis having regard to a fact situation.
In view of above, we uphold the view of the Bombay High Court and Madras High Court in para 63 (i) of the judgment to the effect that foreign
law firms/companies or foreign lawyers cannot practice profession of law in India either in the litigation or in non-litigation side. We, however, modify
the direction of the Madras High Court in Para 63(ii) that there was no bar for the foreign law firms or foreign lawyers to visit India for a temporary
period on a ""fly in and fly out"" basis for the purpose of giving legal advice to their clients in India regarding foreign law or their own system of law and
on diverse international legal issues. We hold that the expression ""fly in and fly out"" will only cover a casual visit not amounting to ""practice"". In case
of a dispute whether a foreign lawyer was limiting himself to ""fly in and fly out"" on casual basis for the purpose of giving legal advice to their clients in
India regarding foreign law or their own system of law and on diverse international legal issues or whether in substance he was doing practice which
is prohibited can be determined by the Bar Council of India. However, the Bar Council of India or Union of India will be at liberty to make appropriate
Rules in this regard including extending Code of Ethics being applicable even to such cases.
We also modify the direction in Para 63 (iii) that foreign lawyers cannot be debarred from coming to India to conduct arbitration proceedings in
respect of disputes arising out of a contract relating to international commercial arbitration. We hold that there is no absolute right of the foreign
lawyer to conduct arbitration proceedings in respect of disputes arising out of a contract relating to international commercial arbitration. If the Rules of
Institutional Arbitration apply or the matter is covered by the provisions of the Arbitration Act, foreign lawyers may not be debarred from conducting
arbitration proceedings arising out of international commercial arbitration in view of Sections 32 and 33 of the Advocates Act. However, they will be
governed by code of conduct applicable to the legal profession in India. Bar Council of India or the Union of India are at liberty to frame rules in this
regard.
We also modify the direction of the Madras High Court in Para 63(iv) that the B.P.O. Companies providing wide range of customized and
integrated services and functions to its customers like word processing, secretarial support, transcription services, proof reading services, travel desk
support services, etc. do not come within the purview of the Advocates Act, 1961 or the Bar Council of India Rules. We hold that mere label of such
services cannot be treated as conclusive. If in pith and substance the services amount to practice of law, the provisions of the Advocates Act will
apply and foreign law firms or foreign lawyers will not be allowed to do so. The Civil Appeals are disposed of accordingly.
