Barinder Kaur vs Directorate Of Enforcement

Girish Kathpalia, J

The accused/applicant seeks anticipatory bail in case ECIR/03/DLZO/ 2016 of the Directorate of Enforcement (DoE) for offence under Sections 3&4 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA).

1.1 For the first time, this anticipatory bail application came up before me on 22.04.2025 and for reasons mentioned in the said order, the accused/applicant  was  granted  interim  protection  from  arrest  till  next  date. However, by way of order dated 09.05.2025, the request of the accused/applicant for continuance of interim protection was declined for the reasons mentioned in that order, though it was directed that since the accused/applicant at the time of passing that order was sitting in the office of DoE for interrogation, on the same day she shall not be arrested.

1.2 Thereafter, on account of change of Roster, this anticipatory bail application got listed before a coordinate bench of this Court where it remained pending for a few dates.

1.3 Finally, this anticipatory bail application was again assigned to this bench on 23.03.2026, on which date final arguments were heard and concluded, reserving the matter for orders.

I  have heard learned senior counsel for accused/applicant and learned counsel for DoE, both of whom took me through records.

Broadly speaking,  the  circumstances  relevant  for  present  purposes  as culled out of records are as follows.

3.1 On 19.02.2014, Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) registered a case RCBD1/2014/E/0004 dated 19.02.2014 for offence under Section 120B and 420 IPC (hereinafter referred to as “the predicate offence”) for causing loss to the Government of India. After completion of investigation, chargesheet under Section 173(2) CrPC was filed on 07.04.2016 against Mr. Nirmal Singh Bhangoo (now deceased), his firms M/s Pearl Agrotech Corporation Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as“PACL”), M/s Pearl Golden Forest Limited (hereinafter referred to as“PGFL”) and their Promoters and Directors  namely Mr.  Sukhdev  Singh,  Mr.  Gurmeet  Singh  and  Mr.  Subrata Bhattacharya.

3.2 In the chargesheet of the predicate offence, the CBI alleged that PACL and PGFL through their illegal and fraudulent activities had collected more than Rs.48000 crores by way of investment schemes under the garb of sale and development of agricultural land across the country. Mr. Nirmal Singh Bhangoo being Managing Director of PGFL since its incorporation in 1983 and also being the officer in control of the day to day business activities of PACL since its incorporation in 1996 was prime accused, besides the remaining Directors.

3.3 The company PACL collected money from public under the pretext of allotting  plots  of land  under  different  schemes across  the country, with an option to the investors to take back their expected tentative value of the land instead of allotment of the plot. Those plots were deliberately allotted at places  far  away  from  places  of  residences  of  the  investors.  Since  land  was allotted to investors far away from their respective residences, they were constrained not to take possession of the allotted land and were compelled to take back money with nominal interest. The PACL, engaged in the business of  real  estate  and  sale  of  agricultural  land  across  the  country,  thus  derived double benefit by creating easy equity for procurement of land and later drawing benefit on appreciation of land prices. The companies PGFL and PACL colluded with each other, by making fake allotments of land without even  having  ownership  over  the  same.  Not  only  did  they  sell  plots  of  land belonging to other individuals/entities, thereby committing fraud, but also created sham documentation of reverse sale of land to the investors.

3.4 The offences committed by the PGFL and PACL being the specified offences under the Schedule appended to the PMLA, the ECIR was registered on 26.07.2016 against the accused persons including the PGFL and PACL as well as the now deceased Mr. Nirmal Singh Bhangoo and other Directors for offence under Sections 3 & 4 of the PMLA.

3.5 The present accused/applicant is daughter of late Mr. Nirmal Singh Bhangoo and is a  Director in two Australian companies, namely M/s Pearls Australasia Pty Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as“PAPL”) and M/s Pearls Australasia Mirage I-Pty Ltd. These two companies are recipients of the proceeds  of  crime,  which  were  collected  by  PACL  and  transferred  to  these Australian companies through M/s. Pearls Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “PIPL”). According to the investigation, an amount of Rs.657.18 crore was siphoned off by PACL through PIPL to the said two Australian companies. Those proceeds of crime were used in purchase of various immovable properties in Australia, which properties now stand attached in accordance with law.

3.6 Further, the present accused/applicant is also a Director of M/s Maurya  Healthcare  (P)  Ltd.,  which  is  an  associate  company  of  PACL  and was involved in transfer of Rs.7.74 crores to PIPL and from there, the money was diverted to the above mentioned two Australian companies.

3.7 On the basis of intelligence reports regarding diversion of funds by PACL to foreign entities through Mr. Nirmal Singh Bhangoo, searches were conducted  on  04.10.2024  at  44  premises  belonging  to  the  accused  persons and the business entities associated with PACL.

3.8 Later, by way of email dated 21.03.2025, a copy of FIR No.0079/2020 was received  from Punjab Vigilance Bureau, which revealed that representatives of PACL were engaged in illegal disposal of the properties belonging to PACL, despite a  restraint order dated 02.02.2016 of the  Supreme  Court.  On  21.03.2025,  Sh.  Harsatinder  Pal  Singh,  husband  of the  accused/applicant  was  intercepted  at  the  Delhi  airport  and  he  disclosed information regarding Manoj, a close associate of late Sh. Nirmal Singh Bhangoo. Accordingly, on 23.03.2025 searches were carried out at the premises of the accused/applicant and Manoj. The accused/applicant was not present at the time of those searches. However, incriminating digital evidence,  including  conversation  between  the  accused/applicant  and  Manoj regarding disposal of properties was recovered during the said search. In the course of search proceedings, the accused/applicant called Manoj over Apple  Facetime  call,  directing  him  to  ensure  that  no  incriminating  material from  mobile  phones  should  be  divulged  to  the  DoE  in  the  course  of  search proceedings. In this manner, the accused/applicant tried to influence the witnesses and tamper with the evidence according to DoE, so she is not entitled to anticipatory bail, according to DoE.

3.9 On analysis of the digital devices recovered during the searches, it was  found  that  the  accused/applicant  had  been  receiving  rent  at  the  rate  of Rs.2.17 lakhs per month from a Japanese company, which amount was being paid in her HDFC bank account and the said rent was pertaining to a property originally purchased by PACL.

3.10 On 25.03.2025, DoE received a  report  dated 18.03.2025  from Justice (Retired) R.M. Lodha Committee (hereinafter referred to as “the Lodha Committee”) appointed by the Supreme Court, according to which investors’ funds were being diverted through 76 entities, which called for further investigation by DoE. It was also revealed that the accused/applicant held post of Director in several such entities.

3.11 During investigations, DoE recovered evidence of disposal of multiple properties by the accused/applicant, which properties had been purchased with PACL funds.

3.12 Despite repeated notices, the accused/applicant opted not to join investigation and sought anticipatory bail from the Court of Sessions, which anticipatory bail application was dismissed and even thereafter, the accused/applicant continued to evade the notices.

3.13 Thereafter, it is under the directions of this court that the accused/applicant joined investigation on 25.04.2025, but she remained evasive in her replies. According to DoE, in response to the question regarding details of the companies in which she was Director, the accused/applicant stated that she had no information; similarly, the accused/applicant refused to disclose the dates when she joined and/or ceased to be Director; the accused/applicant also refused to provide any document and to disclose the source of funds pertaining to properties purchased  by  her;  and  further,  on  being  asked  to  divulge  regarding  sale  of two more immovable properties registered in her name, she feigned ignorance.

Against  the  above  backdrop,  learned  senior  counsel  on  behalf  of  the accused/applicant submitted that the accused/applicant was initially not named as an accused in the predicate offence and even in chargesheet which was filed in the year 2016; that in the ECIR of July 2016 also, the accused/applicant was not named; and that even in the first prosecution complaint of September 2018, the accused/applicant was not named. Learned senior counsel further contended that not naming the accused/applicant during initial stages reflects her innocence. Taking me through the prosecution complaint, learned senior counsel contended that even according to DoE, the accused/applicant was Director of M/s. MIIRESORTS Group during the period from 16.12.2010 to 14.01.2016 only while the alleged tainted transactions took place from 12.03.2010 to 22.03.2010, therefore, she could not be held liable for those transactions, as the same took place prior to her joining as Director. As regards the investments done by PIPL with the Australian company, since more than half those investments were done prior to the accused/applicant becoming Director, she cannot be held liable. Further, it was submitted by learned senior counsel that the accused/applicant was taken in custody as an accused in  the  predicate  offence  on  29.04.2022  and  was  granted  bail  on  20.01.2023 by a  coordinate  bench  of  this  court.  Learned  senior  counsel  also  contended that the accused/applicant being a  lady, the twin conditions laid down under Section  45  PMLA  do  not  apply to  the  present  case.  It  was  also  argued  that since  husband  of  the  accused/applicant  arrested  on  21.03.2025  was  granted bail  on  24.12.2025,  the  accused/applicant  also  deserves  anticipatory bail.  It was  also  argued  that  the  accused/applicant  joined  investigation  as  many  as 07 times during the period of interim protection. Learned senior counsel also argued that the lady who allegedly spoke over phone with Manoj during the searches could be anyone else and not just the accused/applicant. It was also argued that in the FIR registered in Punjab, the accused/applicant was arrested on 06.07.2021 and was granted bail on 11.07.2022, so having suffered that long incarceration, the accused/applicant be not again arrested, also because she has two children aged 09 years and 13 years. Lastly, learned senior counsel submitted that since the accused/applicant  travelled abroad and came back, it shows that she is not a flight risk. In support of his arguments,  learned  senior  counsel  for  accused/applicant  placed  reliance  on the Order dated 15.01.2025 of the Supreme Court in the case of Shashi Bala @ Shashi Bala Singh vs Directorate of Enforcement, Criminal Appeal No.212/2025; and the Order of a  co-ordinate bench of this Court in the case of Harsatinder Pal Singh Hayer vs Directorate of Enforcement, 2025:DHC:11913. The latter decision pertained to husband of the present accused/applicant.

On the other hand, learned counsel for DoE strongly opposed grant of anticipatory bail to the accused/applicant on the ground that there has to be a distinction between regular bail and anticipatory bail; that since husband of the accused/applicant was never evasive during investigation, which is not a case with the accused/applicant, he was granted bail but the accused/applicant does not deserve anticipatory bail. Learned counsel for DoE  also  took me through communication dated  18.03.2025  of  the  Lodha Committee in which on the basis of detailed investigation report of SEBI, it was stated that PACL has been siphoning off funds invested by the investors, for which DoE was expected to take action and inform the Supreme  Court  about  the  same.  The  said  report  of  SEBI  was  handed  over across the board by learned counsel and the same was accepted, to be scanned  and  made part  of  records. The  said  investigation  report  submitted by SEBI with the Lodha Committee elaborately describes the manner in which  funds invested  by the  investors  were  being  siphoned off by different entities and individuals including the present accused/applicant. Learned counsel for DoE also took me through the latest intelligence inputs, as described in the counter-affidavit and contended that present is not at all a fit case to grant anticipatory bail. Learned counsel for DoE strongly emphasized that even if the twin conditions under Section 45 PMLA are ignored because the accused/applicant is a lady, she does not deserve anticipatory bail because whenever she joined interrogation under protection from  arrest,  she  gave  false  replies,  intending  to  derail  investigation.  It  was argued that custodial interrogation is required in this case in order to unearth the assets of the accused/applicant and other companies, which assets would be disclosed by DoE to the Lodha Committee so that the investors get their money back. Learned counsel for DoE submitted that according to the settled legal position, anticipatory bail is a matter of exception and cannot be granted at mere asking. Learned counsel for DoE relied upon the judgment of  this court  in the  case of  Bhaskar Yadav  vs  Directorate of  Enforcement, 2026:DHC:813;  and Shri  Amrit  Pal  Singh  vs  Directorate of Enforcement, 2025:DHC:5118.

On the issue of anticipatory bail sought in cases under PMLA, I had occasion to examine the legal position in the case of Bhaskar Yadav (supra) decided  on  02.02.2026.  The  judgment  in  the  said  case  on  being  challenged by way of SLP No.2894/2026 was upheld by the Supreme Court. For convenience of reference, the legal position as discussed in Bhaskar Yadav (supra) is extracted below:

“4.In cases arising out of PMLA, grant or denial of bail and anticipatory  bail  is  dealt  with  under  Section  45 of  the  Act,  which mandates the court dealing with the bail application to grant opportunity to the prosecutor to oppose the bail  application; and the provision further lays down the twin test, on the anvil whereof, the case has to be tested before granting bail. The said twin test to allow bail to a person accused of an offence of money laundering is that there should be reasonable grounds to believe that the accused is not guilty of the offence of money laundering, and that the accused is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. The proviso  to  Section  45  of the  Act  confers discretion  on  the special court constituted under PMLA to admit on bail an accused, who is under the age of sixteen years or is a woman or sick or infirm or where the allegation is of money laundering of a sum less than one crore rupees. The provision under Section 45 of PMLA is couched in negative expression and begins with non-obstante clause that notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, no person accused of an offence under the Act shall be released on bail or on his own bond. Such unusual negative expression, coupled with non-obstante qua Criminal Procedure Code while dealing with the issue of bail under PMLA clearly shows the legislative intent that in such cases, bail is not to be dealt with in routine manner solely on the basis of parameters applicable in conventional offences. The provision further stipulates: “unless” the  Public  Prosecutor  has  been  given  opportunity  to  oppose  such release  and  where  the  Public  Prosecutor  opposes  the  application, the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the person accused of an offence under the Act is not guilty of such offence and he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. The blanket of those twin conditions is partially lifted by way of the proviso in order to deal with an accused, who is under 16 years of age or is a lady or sick or infirm or has been accused of money laundering for a sum less than one crore rupees. But that proviso is not relevant for present purposes.

4.1 The  broad  principles  to be  kept  in  mind  while  dealing  with  an application for grant of anticipatory bail in cases arising out of PMLA, as culled out of plethora of judicial pronouncements are as follows. While considering such applications, the court is not expected to delve deep into merits of the allegation by microscopic analysis of the material collected by the investigator; the court has to satisfy itself only as regards existence of prima facie case, based on broad probabilities discernible from the material collected by the  investigator; and  the  question  has  to  be  as  to  whether  on  the basis of such material, there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of the offence alleged. The court is also to satisfy itself as regards any likelihood of the accused committing  any  offence  while  on  bail;  and  this  assessment  can  be based  on  the  antecedents  and  propensities  of  the  accused,  as  well as nature and the manner in which he is alleged to have committed the offence under PMLA. To add a piece of caution, the court is not required to return a positive finding that the accused did not commit the alleged offence. A delicate balance has to be maintained between the final judgment of acquittal or conviction and an order granting or denying bail. The twin conditions stipulated under Section 45 of the Act would apply to anticipatory bail application also, in addition to the regular parameters like nature of accusation, severity of punishment, nature of material collected by investigator, reasonable apprehension of tampering with the witnesses, reasonable possibility of securing presence of the accused at the time of trial, character of the accused and larger interest of public or State, etc.

4.2 Coming to the argument of learned senior counsel for accused/ applicants that in the recent past there has been dilution of the twin conditions stipulated under Section 45 of PMLA, the said dilution, according  to  him  is  by  way  of  settled  view  of  the  Supreme  Court, followed  by  different  High  Courts  across  the  country  to  the  effect that prolonged incarceration overrides the twin conditions, because the prolonged incarceration abrogates fundamental right of  an  individual  under  Article  21  of  the  Constitution  of  India.  But this view flowing from the Supreme Court cannot be overstretched in the name of dilution of the twin conditions to the extent of making the twin conditions nugatory. The said view deals with prolonged incarceration; it does not advocate complete bar on custodial interrogation. Any such interpretation of the interplay between  Article 21  of  the  Constitution  of  India and  Section  45 of PMLA would completely destroy the nature and purpose of investigation. Article 21 of the Constitution of India cannot be read in a manner that completely blocks custodial interrogation. For, it cannot be disputed that custodial interrogation in certain kind of cases is much more effective than interrogation of a person who goes  to  the  investigator  with  protection  from  arrest  in  his  pocket. The line of judicial pronouncements qua dilution of the twin conditions pertain to the issues of regular bail and not anticipatory bail,  especially  where  the  investigating  agency  expresses  need  for custodial interrogation.

4.3 The Supreme Court in the case of Assistant Director, Enforcement Directorate vs Dr. V.C. Mohan, (2022) 16 SCC 794 held: “Indeed, the offence under PMLA is dependent on the predicate offence which would be under ordinary law, including the  provisions  of  IPC.  That  does  not  mean  that  while  considering the prayer for grant of anticipatory bail in connection with PMLA offence the mandate of Section 45 PMLA would not come into play.....Once the prayer for anticipatory bail is made in connection with  offence  under  PMLA,  the  underlying  principles  and  rigors  of Section 45 PMLA must get triggered although the application is under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.”

4.4 I had an occasion to examine and deal with the provision under Section 45 PMLA in the case of Vedpal Singh Tanwar vs Directorate of Enforcement, 2025 SCC OnLine Del 4330 in which, I briefly traversed through the legal position as follows:

“9.1 In the case of Vijay Madanlal Chaudhary [2022 SCC OnLine SC 929], the Supreme Court traversed through the laudable purpose behind enactment of the PML Act and observed thus:

“Considering the purposes and objects of the legislation in the form of 2002 Act and the background in which it had been enacted owing to the commitment made to the international bodies and on their recommendations, it is plainly clear that it is a special legislation to deal with the subject of  money  laundering  activities  having  transnational impact on the financial systems including sovereignty and integrity of the countries. This is not  an  ordinary  offence. To  deal  with  such  serious offence, stringent measures are provided in the 2002 Act for prevention of money laundering and combating menace of money-laundering, including for attachment and confiscation of proceeds of crime and  to  prosecute  persons  involved  in  the  process  or activity connected with the proceeds of crime. In view of the gravity of the fallout of money laundering  activities  having  transnational  impact,  a special procedural law for prevention and regulation, including to prosecute the person involved, has been enacted, grouping the offenders involved in the process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime as a separate class from ordinary criminals. The offence of money-laundering has been regarded as an aggravated form of crime“world over”. It is, therefore, a separate class of offence requiring effective and stringent measures to combat the menace of money laundering.

xxxxx

Thus, it is well settled by the various decisions of this Court and policy of the State as also the view of international community that the offence of money- laundering is committed by an individual with a deliberate design with the motive to enhance his gains, disregarding the interests of nation and society as a whole and which by no stretch of imagination can be termed as offence of trivial nature. Thus, it is in the interest of the State that law enforcement agencies should be provided with a proportionate effective mechanism so as to deal with these types of offences as the wealth of the nation is to  be  safeguarded  from  these  dreaded  criminals.  As discussed above, the conspiracy of money- laundering, which is a three-staged process, is hatched in secrecy and executed in darkness, thus, it becomes imperative for the State to frame such a stringent law,  which not  only punishes the offender proportionately, but also helps in preventing the offence and creating a deterrent effect. xxxxx

The Court while dealing with the application for grant of bail need not delve deep into the merits of the case and only a view of the Court based on available material on record is required. The Court will  not  weigh  the  evidence  to  find  the  guilt  of  the accused which is, of course, the work of Trial Court. The Court is only  required  to  place  its view based on probability on the basis of reasonable material collected during investigation and the said view will not be taken into consideration by the Trial  Court  in  recording  its  finding  of  the  guilt  or acquittal during trial which is based on the evidence adduced during the trial….. the words used in Section 45 of the 2002 Act are “reasonable grounds for believing” which means the Court has to see only if there is a genuine case against the accused and the prosecution is not required to prove the charge beyond reasonable doubt.”(emphasis supplied)

9.2 There is plethora of judicial pronouncement, not being repeated herein for brevity that existence of the twin conditions  stipulated  under  Section  45  of  the  PML  Act  is mandatory before the court exercises discretion to release on bail a person accused of the offence of money laundering; and that the belief qua the accused being guilty of money laundering has to be tested on“reasonable grounds”, which means something more than“prima facie” grounds. Equally well settled is the scope of Section 24 of the PML Act that unless contrary is proved, the Court shall presume involvement of proceeds of crime in money laundering; and that burden to prove that the proceeds of crime are not involved is on the accused.

9.3 Further, it is trite that economic offences constitute an altogether distinct class of offences. That being so, in spite of  the  salutary  doctrine  of  “bail  is  the  rule  and  jail  is  an exception”, matters of bail in cases involving socio- economic offences have to be visited with a different approach, as held in State of Bihar & Anr. vs Amit Kumar (2017) 13 SCC 751.

9.4 As held by the Supreme Court in the case of Y.S.Jagan Mohan Reddy vs CBI, (2013) 7 SCC 439:

“15) Economic offences constitute a class apart and need to be visited with a different approach in the matter of bail. The economic offence having deep rooted conspiracies and involving huge loss of public funds needs to be viewed seriously and considered  as  grave  offences  affecting  the  economy of the country as a whole and thereby posing serious threat to the financial health of the country.

16) While granting bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public/State and other similar considerations.”

9.5 On the aspect of bail in cases involving socio- economic offences, differential treatment in consideration unlike conventional crimes has been the law of land, reiterated in a plethora of judicial pronouncement flowing from apex court. Reference, to cite a few may be drawn from Rohit Tandon vs Directorate of Enforcement, (2018) 11  SCC  46;  Serious  Fraud  Investigation  Office  vs  Nitin Johari, (2019)  9 SCC 165; and Nimmagadda Prasad vs CBI, (2013) 7 SCC 466.”

4.5 The  judgment  in  the  case  of  Vedpal  Singh  Tanwar  (supra) on being challenged before the Supreme Court in SLP (Crl.) No.10839/2025 was not unsettled.”

The legal position discussed in all above noted judicial precedents as cited by both sides is not at variance. What is relevant in the present exercise is application of those judicial principles to the factual matrix of the present case.  In  the  case  of  Harsatinder  Pal  Singh  (supra)  husband  of  the  present accused/applicant was granted regular and not anticipatory bail. Further, according to the case set up by DoE, Harsatinder Pal Singh was booked merely because he was a  Director in the said two Australian companies and had been joining investigation regularly, during which he cooperated and never tried to evade investigation or withhold any relevant information. That is not so in the case of the present accused/applicant, as would be discussed hereafter.  Rather,  it  appears  from paragraph  81  of  the  judgment  in  the  case of Harsatinder Pal Singh (supra) that even husband of the accused/applicant was conscious about the alleged conduct of the present accused/applicant and pleaded that he cannot be held liable for that conduct. Also, in the case of Harsatinder Pal Singh (supra), the supplementary chargesheet regarding him stood filed, so the coordinate bench of this court was of the view that there is no likelihood of his influencing the witnesses or obstructing the investigation or preventing the collection of relevant data. That is not so in the case of the present accused/applicant.

Falling back to the present case, as mentioned above, broad contours of allegations against the accused/applicant are that being Director of the companies named above, she actively siphoned off funds of the investors and  acquired  assets  abroad,  which  continues  even  subsequent  to  institution of the prosecution complaint; and that even during the period when she was granted protection from arrest, she tried to derail the investigation. Of course,  as  repeatedly  held  in  various  judicial  pronouncements,  in  my  view, nobody is under a  duty not to be smart. But that smartness cannot extend to feigning ignorance and even giving false answers to the questions put by the interrogators.

The first hearing of this anticipatory bail application took place on 22.04.2025 at 04:15pm after the mentioning was allowed by the Hon’ble Chief Justice, so keeping in mind the pending board, interim protection from arrest  was granted to  the  accused/applicant,  making  explicitly clear that the interim protection was being granted only to ensure that both sides are effectively heard and the same was not granted on merits.

9.1 On the next date (29.04.2025), the supervising officer of DoE informed that after last date of hearing, the accused/applicant was called four times for her interrogation but on first three occasions, she was evasive and the fourth occasion was the same day  (29.04.2025), when the present matter was listed, but she  took exemption  from  interrogation. On that  day (29.04.2025) the learned prosecutor also expressed concern that the accused/applicant continued to dispose of property in order to defeat orders of the Lodha  Committee  appointed  by the Supreme  Court.  On assurance  of the counsel for the accused/applicant  that till next date she  will not dispose of any property, the interim protection till next was extended so that the interrogation could continue.

9.2 On  the  next  date  (09.05.2025),  the  matter  could  be  heard  only  partly and had to be adjourned for paucity of time, however, learned prosecutor objected to grant of any further protection to the accused/applicant from arrest, disclosing her falsehoods on oath aimed at misleading and obstructing the investigation. On that day (09.05.2025), the accused/applicant even filed an affidavit, contents of which were found contrary to her answers to the interrogator and both those statements were on oath. Apart from that, learned prosecutor referred to the counter-affidavit, according to which at the time of search at her premises, the accused/applicant was not present and through video chat she directed her employee Manoj to ensure that no incriminating material was discovered by the raiding team.  In response, the accused/applicant filed an affidavit on that day (09.05.2025) testifying on oath that no such call was made by her to Manoj. To that, learned prosecutor played the video clip in the courtroom which depicted clearly  Manoj in a telephonic conversation with whispering voice of a lady alleged to be the accused/applicant. Considering those circumstances, the interim protection from arrest was withdrawn on 09.05.2025, but it was directed that since the accused/applicant had appeared before DoE and was present in that office at the  time  of  passing  the  order  dated  09.05.2025,  she  be  not  arrested  on  the same day, though later on the DoE shall act in accordance with law.

9.3 Thereafter,  since  the  accused/applicant  did  not  respond  to  notices  to join investigation, non-bailable warrants against her were obtained from the concerned court.

9.4 Further, as mentioned above, when she joined investigation under protection from arrest, the accused/applicant refused to divulge details of the companies in which she was Director and she stated that she had no information. The accused/applicant went to extent of stating during interrogation  that  she  would  not  disclose  the  dates  when  she  joined  and/or ceased to be Director. The accused/applicant also refused to provide any document and/or to disclose the source of funds pertaining to the properties purchased  by  her.  Rather,  on  being  asked  to  divulge  regarding  sale  of  two specific immovable properties, which were registered in her name, the accused/applicant feigned ignorance.

The above narration clearly shows that the accused/applicant has scant regard  for  law. It  is  not  that  she  gave ‘smart answers’  to  the  interrogation questions.  It  is  that  she  gave  ‘false  answers’  to  the  interrogation  questions. The falsity of her answers to the interrogator is elaborately described in order dated 09.05.2025. Not only did the accused/applicant give false answers on oath to the interrogator, she  also had audacity  to file affidavit before this court giving facts contrary to what was told on oath to the investigator.

Not only this, as mentioned above, the accused/applicant even obstructed lawful searches by instructing Manoj over video call to ensure that nothing incriminating was discovered in those raids. On this aspect, learned senior counsel pointed out that order dated 09.05.2025 does not mention with certainty that the lady, whose whispering voice could be heard in the video call to Manoj is the accused/applicant only. But who else would stand benefited by instructing Manoj to thwart the raid.

Even if the twin conditions stipulated under Section 45 PMLA are ignored, the above described conduct of the accused/applicant would not justify allowing her the relief sought by her.

The argument that the accused/applicant is not a  flight risk pales into an insignificance in  view  of her above  described conduct. In  addition, the DoE has justifiably established the requirement of custodial interrogation. The  custodial  interrogation  of  the  accused/applicant  is  required  by  DoE  in order  to  unearth  the  assets acquired by  her with  the  proceeds  of  crime, so that an inventory of those assets is disclosed to the Lodha Committee, appointed by the Supreme Court, so that the investors get their money back. The requirement for  custodial interrogation is genuine in the  present case, because when she joined investigation under protection from arrest, the accused/applicant tried to derail investigation, as described above.

In their counter-affidavit, the DoE has also described at length the latest  intelligence  inputs  related  to  diversion  of  funds  to  foreign  entities  by PACL and the remaining business entities as well as the individual accused persons, which have been narrated hereinabove.

Considering the overall circumstances, especially the requirement for custodial interrogation of the accused/applicant as successfully  established by DoE, I  do not find it a  fit case to grant her anticipatory bail. Therefore, this anticipatory bail application and the pending application are dismissed.