Barun Kumar De vs Securities And Exchange Board Of India And Others

Tarun Agarwala, Presiding Officer

The present appeal has been filed against the order dated February 23, 2016 as well as the Recovery Certificate dated October 23, 2019. There is a

delay of 1894 days in the filing of the appeal and accordingly an application for condonation of delay has been filed.

The ground urged is, that the appellant is a senior citizen being 81 years old and has a long medical history, namely, that he is suffering from chronic

ailments including bronchial asthma, hypertension and cardiovascular ailments. It has also been contended that the appellant was hospitalized from

time to time from January 10, 2018 to January 19, 2018 and from March 11, 2019 to March 21, 2019 and again on March 30, 2020 to April 12, 2020. It

was also contended that his wife was also suffering and was hospitalized from time to time. In view of this assertion, it was contended that the delay

may be condoned and the matters may be heard on merit.

Having considered the application for condonation of delay and the grounds mentioned therein, we find that the impugned order was passed on

February 23, 2016. Nothing has come before us to show that the applicant could not take adequate steps to file the appeals during that period. All the

illnesses which has been shown are from 2018 onwards and that too intermittently. Consequently, we are satisfied that sufficient grounds have not

been made out to condone this inordinate delay.

In Basawaraj and Anr. vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, (2013) 14 SCC 81 the Supreme Court held that the discretion to condone the delay has

to be exercised judicially based on facts and circumstances of each case and that sufficient cause cannot be given a liberal interpretation if lack of

bonafide is attributed to a party. The Supreme Court further held that delay cannot be condoned on equitable ground beyond the limits permitted

expressly by statute.

The Supreme Court in Ram Nath Sao and Ors. (supra) held that the expression “sufficient cause†should receive a liberal construction so as to

advance substantial justice when no negligence or inaction or want of bonafide is imputable to a party. The same view was reiterated by the Supreme

Court in Madanlal vs. Shyamlal, (2002) 1 SCC 535.

In Balwant Singh (Dead) vs Jagdish Singh & Ors, (2010) 8 SCC 685 Supreme Court held that the expression “sufficient cause†means the

presence of legal and adequate reasons. The decisions cited by the learned counsel for the appellant are of no avail and, in any case, not applicable in

the present circumstance of the case.

This Tribunal is possessed with the exercise of judicial discretion in condoning the delay if sufficient or adequate reason is given. It is also a settled

proposition of law that the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so

prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds as held by the Supreme Court in Basawaraj and Anr.

(supra). In the instant case we do not find any legal or adequate reasons to condone the delay.

For the reasons stated aforesaid, the application for condonation of delay does not show sufficient cause and is rejected, as a result of which the

appeals are also dismissed with no order as to costs. Since the appeals have been taken up, the urgency applications are disposed of.

The present matters were heard through video conference due to Covid-19 pandemic. At this stage it is not possible to sign a copy of this order nor

a certified copy of this order could be issued by the Registry. In these circumstances, this order will be digitally signed by the Private Secretary on

behalf of the bench and all concerned parties are directed to act on the digitally signed copy of this order. Parties will act on production of a digitally

signed copy sent by fax and/or email.