Basant Prasad Singh vs State Of Bihar Through The Principal Secretary And Ors

The present petition has been filed for quashing the order dated 16.02.2017, whereby and whereunder the Director-in-Chief (Adminstration), Health

Services, Bihar, Patna has directed for forfeiting 100% pension of the petitioner for life.

The short facts of the case are that the petitioner herein was posted as Head Clerk in the office of Civil Surgeon-cum-Chief Medical Officer,

Aurangabad and he is stated to have allegedly been caught by the flying squad of the District Anticorruption Committee, Aurangabad on 10.06.2007

with a sum of Rs. 5,000/-, said to be the bribe money received by the petitioner from one Pushpa Surin, A.N.M. in order to facilitate her transfer.

Thereafter, a criminal case bearing Aurangabad Town PS case no. 131 of 2007 was instituted against the petitioner herein and the petitioner was

taken into custody. A chargesheet dated 03.07.2007 was served upon the petitioner herein and an Inquiry Officer was appointed as well as the

petitioner was directed to file his reply. The petitioner then filed his reply on 10.02.2014 before the Inquiry Officer denying all the charges leveled

against him. The Inquiry Officer had submitted his inquiry report dated 13.02.2014 finding the charges to have been proved and also holding the

petitioner guilty. In the meantime, the petitioner had retired on 28.02.2014, whereafter a second show cause notice was issued to the petitioner on

07.05.2014, to which the petitioner had replied by his letter dated 24.05.2014 and then the impugned order dated 16.02.2017 has been passed by the

Director-in-Chief (Administration), Health Services, Bihar, Patna, whereby and whereunder the punishment of withholding of 100% pension for life

has been imposed on the petitioner herein.

The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the impugned order is based upon the inquiry report submitted by the Inquiry Officer which

is based on no evidence, inasmuch as neither the pre-trap witnesses nor the post-trap witnesses, who have alleged to have witnessed the petitioner

accepting bribe from the complainant, have been examined during the course of departmental inquiry. In the inquiry report specially in the finding

portion, the contents of the FIR of Aurangabad Town PS case no. 133 of 2007, has been re-stated, however the findings of the inquiry officer does

not stand substantiated by any evidence. It has further been submitted that though the Inquiry Officer has stated that the complainant namely Pushpa

Surin had submitted her written statement before the Inquiry Officer on 10.02.2014, however the petitioner herein has not been granted an opportunity

to cross-examine the complainant.

Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondents has contended that the petitioner was caught red-handed while taking bribe from the

complainant and this is enough for proving the guilt of the petitioner herein. It has been further submitted that there is no procedural irregularity in the

conduct of the departmental proceeding, hence the evidence led during the course of the departmental inquiry cannot be re-appreciated, hence the

punishment order dated 16.02.2017 does not required any interference by this Court.

I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials on record. Admittedly, the present case is a case of no evidence

inasmuch as neither prosecution has examined pre-trap witnesses nor the post-trap witnesses have been examined and the Inquiry Officer has

submitted the inquiry report dated 13.02.2014 which is full of surmises and conjectures and is apparently, on the very face of it, based on no evidence.

At this juncture, it would be relevant to refer to a judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab

National Bank & Ors. reported in (2009) 2 SCC 570, paragraphs no. 14, 15 and 23 whereof are reproduced herein below :

“14. Indisputably, a departmental proceeding is a quashi-judicial proceeding. The enquiry officer performs a quasi-judicial function.

The charges leveled against the delinquent officer must be found to have been proved. The enquiry officer has a duty to arrive at a finding

upon taking into consideration the materials brought on record by the parties. The purported evidence collected during investigation by the

investigating officer against all the accused by itself could not be treated to be evidence in the disciplinary proceeding. No witness was

examined to prove the said documents. The management witnesses merely tendered the documents and did not prove the contents thereof.

reliance, inter alia, was placed by the enquiry officer on the FIR which could not have been treated as evidence.

We have noticed hereinbefore that the only basic evidence whereupon reliance has been placed by the enquiry officer was the

purported confession made by the appellant before police. According to the appellant, he was forced to sign on the said confession, as he

was tortured in the police station. The appellant being an employee of the Bank, the said confession should have been proved. Some

evidenceshould have been brought on record to show that he had indulged in stealing the bank draft book. Admittedly, there was no direct

evidence. Even there was no indirect evidence. The tenor o the report demonstrates that the enquiry officer had made up his mind to find

him guilty as otherwise he would not have proceeded on the basis that the offence was committed in such a matter that no evidence was left.

Furthermore, the order of the disciplinary authority as also the appellate authority are not supported by any reason. As the orders

passed by them have severe civil consequences, appropriate reasons should have been assigned. If the enquiry officer had relied upon the

confession made by the appellant, there was no reason as to why the order of discharge passed by the criminal court on the basis of

selfsame evidence should not have been taken into consideration. The materials brought on record pointing out the guilt are required to be

proved. A decision must be arrived at on some evidence, which is legally admissible. The provisions of the Evidence Act may not be

applications to a departmental proceeding but the principles of natural justice are. As the report of the enquiry officer was based on merely

ipse dixit as also surmises and conjuctures, the same could not have been sustained. The interferences drawn by the enquiry officer

apparently were not supported by any evidence. Suspicion, as is well known, however high may be, can under no circumstances be held to

be as substitute for legal proof.â€​

As mentioned in Roop Singh Negi’s case (supra), in the present case also, no pre-trap/ post-trap witnesses have been examined to prove the

documents apart from the most significant lapse that even the copy of the FIR has not been tendered much less proved during the course of the

enquiry, as is stated in paragraph no. 2 of the inquiry report. Thus, in view of the fact that the factual position is not disputed by the respondents, I find

that apparently the order of punishment dated 16.02.2017 rests on no evidence and the disciplinary authority has in a mechanical manner endorsed the

finding of the Inquiry Officer while passing the impugned order of punishment dated 16.02.2017.

For the reason mentioned hereinabove, the order of punishment dated 16.02.2017 passed by the Director-in-Chief (Administration), Health Services,

Bihar, Patna is hereby quashed.

The writ petition is allowed.