Basantlal and Others vs M.P. State Road Transport Corporation

C.M. Lodha, J.—This revision application arises out of proceedings initiated u/s 110A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939.

The Petitioners who are members of the same family were going in their Ambassador car No. MPF 1442 from Shivpuri to Jhansi on 21 April, 1972. At about 5 kilometre from Shivpuri, the stage carriage No. MPG 9846 owned by the M.P.S.R.T.C. was coming from the opposite direction. It was being driven by non-Petitioner No. 2, Motilal. The Petitioners'' case is that the stage carriage was being driven at a very high speed and on account of negligence of the non-Petitioner No. 2, the bus first hit a bullock-cart and then dashed into the Petitioner''s car as a result of which not only the car of the Petitioners was damaged but all the occupants of the car were injured. Hence the Petitioners filed a joint petition before the Claims Tribunal on 19-10-72 for awarding compensation to each one of them.

Both the non-Petitioners filed a joint reply and pleaded inter alia that a joint application for composite reliefs for compensation by more than one Petitioner did not lie.

After framing issues on the contentions raised by the parties, the Tribunal first took up the following preliminary issue

Whether all the Petitioners can present a joint application ?

The preliminary issue was decided by the Tribunal against the Petitioners and it was held that all the Petitioners could not join in one petition. Aggrieved by that order, the Petitioners have filed this revision.

The learned Counsel for the non-Petitioners has raised a preliminary objection here also regarding the maintainability of the revision application on the ground that the order is appealable and since no appeal has been filed it cannot be revised u/s 115 CPC In support of his contention he has relied upon the following authorities:

(i) Laxmi Devi Vs. Chandramani Devi,

(ii) S. Thangavelu Pillai Vs. E.M. Mani (decd) and Others,

(iii) B. Govindarajulu Chetty Vs. M.L.A. Govindaraja Mudaliar and Others,

In Laxmi Devi Vs. Chandramani Devi, , it was held that an order dismissing application u/s 110-A as time-barred and refusing condonation for want of sufficient cause, effectively terminates the proceedings and disposes of the application and consequently, is an award and as such appealable u/s 110D of the Motor Vehicles Act. The same proposition was laid down in 1969 A.C.J. 10 and B. Govindarajulu Chetty Vs. M.L.A. Govindaraja Mudaliar and Others, .

In 1956 A.C.J. 153 , it was observed that "the expression ''award'' in Section 110-D must be understood as the decision of the Claims Tribunal whether involving a total dismissal of the claim or the determination of a particular amount of compensation."

In this view of the matter, it was held that there was no substance in the argument that an award can only mean a decision of the Claims Tribunal determining the amount of compensation and not a decision dismissing the application.

In my opinion the principle laid down in the above-mentioned cases has no application to the present case. No decision or determination as to the merits of the case has been given by the Claims Tribunal. It cannot be said by any stretch of imagination that in the present case the Tribunal has disallowed the Petitioners claims or dismissed their application for compensation. The only interpretation that can be put on the order of the Tribunal is that the Tribunal has refused to entertain a joint application, on behalf of all the Petitioners on the principle which may be described in the language of CPC as misjoinder of parties. In fact, there is no determination at all. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the impugned order is not appealable u/s 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act. In this view of the matter, the preliminary objection is overruled.

Coming to the merits of the revision, learned Counsel for the Petitioners has urged that the language of Section 110-A does not necessarily envisage that even in respect of the same cause of action more than one claim cannot be joined. It is argued that even though the word ''person'' has been used in Section 110-A (l)/(a), it can be interpreted as more than one person in an appropriate case. It is submitted that according to Section 5 of the Madhya Pradesh General Clauses Act the word in singular shall include plural and the word in plural shall include singular. It is further argued that the Claims Tribunal is a civil Court and an application u/s 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act is in the nature of a civil suit, and, therefore, the provisions of the CPC will apply to the proceedings before the Tribunal. The sum and substance of the learned Counsel''s argument is that the provisions contained in Order 1, Rule 1 CPC would apply to a case like the present one, and, therefore, all the Petitioners can join in one application inasmuch as if separate applications were brought, common questions of fact and law would arise. In support of his contention Mr. R.D. Jain has relied upon the following authorities

(i) Kashi Prasad Singh Vs. Gupteshwar Singh and Another,

(ii) Krishan Gopal Devi Prasad and Others Vs. Dattatraya Madho Lad,

(iii) Hayatkhan and Others Vs. Mangilal and Others,

(iv) AIR 1964 P & H 335

(v) Vinod Kumar Shrivastava Vs. Ved Mitra Vohra and Others,

(vi) Mrs. M.J. Stone and Others Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others

On the other hand, Mr. Dubey, learned Counsel for the non-Petitioners has contended that the language of Section 110-A clearly envisages that only in case of legal representatives of a deceased, where death has resulted from accident, that more than one person can be joined in the application for compensation. It is further argued that only specific provisions of the CPC have been made applicable to the trial before the Claims Tribunal by Rules 14 of the M.P. Motor Accidents Tribunal Rules, 1959, made by the State Government in exercise of the powers conferred on it by Section 111A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. It is further submitted that Order 1 Rule 1 CPC has not been made applicable to such proceedings. To lend support to his argument, learned Counsel has further relied on Rule 13 of the said Rules and has submitted that if two or more cases before the Claims Tribunal arise out of the same accident and any issue involved is common to such cases, such cases may so far as evidence bearing on such an issue is concerned, can be heard simultaneously.

After having given my anxious consideration to the various aspects of the case, I have come to the conclusion that even though the claims by the Petitioners arise out of the same accident and some of the issues involved are common in respect of all different claims, there would be still some issues which all the Petitioners would not be jointly interested and the reliefs to be granted to them are also bound to be different in the very nature of things. I may illustrate my point by referring to the fact that five Petitioners though involved in the same accident have claimed different amounts of compensation, regard being had to the nature of injuries received by them and the time taken in their recovery. Thus recording of eviedence on those issues which are not common to all the Petitioners is likely to complicate the trial of the claims. The learned Counsel for the Petitioners has laid considerable emphasis on the fact that all the Petitioners are members of the joint Hindu family but, that, in my view would not make any difference.

The evidence on the issue common to all the Petitioners, namely, responsibility of the driver of the bus for the accident can be recorded simultaneously vide Rule 13 of the said Rules. The proper order, therefore, which should have been passed by the Claims Tribunal, in the circumstances of the case, was to direct all the Petitioners to file separate applications and then to proceed with recording of evidence on common issue under Rule 13, but instead of doing that, the Tribunal has stopped short by holding that "all the Petitioners cannot prefer claims in one petition." I, therefore, consider it fit to modify the order of the Tribunal by giving a further direction that all the Petitioners may file separate petitions. Since, there was no such direction it appears that the Petitioners instead of making separate claims, filed this revision and since this revision has remained pending for a long time, the question of limitation before the Claims Tribunal would arise. In these circumstances, I further hold that the Petitioners are entitled to get the benefit of this period under the proviso to Section 110A(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act. They are allowed one month''s time from today to file separate applications before the Claims Tribunal, and if they do so the Tribunal will proceed to decide their claims in accordance with law.

The revision petition is partly allowed in the terms stated above. The parties are left to bear their own costs.