Basavaraj vs Basavaraj

N. Ananda, J.—The learned Magistrate has held that there was delay of 62 days in filing the complaint.

The application for condonation of delay was contested by the accused and an enquiry was held. The complainant and accused have adduced evidence.

The learned Magistrate on appreciation of evidence has held that complainant has failed to establish sufficient cause to condone delay of 62 days.

The learned counsel for complainant would submit that delay of 62 days has to be condoned bearing in mind the object and purpose of the Act.

On reconsideration of evidence, I find that the complainant has made an unsuccessful attempt to establish that accused had gone to the house of complainant and assured him to repay the cheque amount. The complainant has not stated the date on which accused had gone to his house and assured him to repay the cheque amount.

The learned Magistrate noticing this basic discrepancy has held that complainant has failed to establish sufficient cause to condone delay of 62 days in filing the complaint.

The learned counsel for petitioner (complainant) would submit that the trial court should have liberally considered the cause shown in the application for condonation of delay.

In a judgment reported in Lanka Venkateswarlu (D) by L.Rs. Vs. State of A.P. and Others, the Supreme Court has held:

"28. We are at a loss to fathom any logic or rationale, which could have impelled the High Court to condone the delay after holding the same to be unjustifiable. The concepts such as "liberal approach", "justice oriented approach", "substantial justice" cannot be employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation. Especially, in cases where the court concludes that there is no justification for the delay. In our opinion, the approach adopted by the High Court tends to show the absence of judicial balance and restraint, which a Judge is required to maintain whilst adjudicating any lis between the parties. We are rather pained to notice that in this case, not being satisfied with the use of mere intemperate language, the High Court resorted to blatant sarcasms.

The use of unduly strong intemperate or extravagant language in a judgment has been repeatedly disapproved by this Court in a number of cases. Whilst considering applications for condonation of delay u/s 5 of the Limitation Act, the courts do not enjoy unlimited and unbridled discretionary powers. All discretionary powers, especially judicial powers, have to be exercised within reasonable bounds, known to the law. The discretion has to be exercised in a systematic manner informed by reason. Whims or fancies; prejudices or predilections cannot and should not form the basis of exercising discretionary powers."

In view of what has been held by the Supreme Court, the delay has to be condoned by exercising judicial discretion in a systematic manner with proper reasoning. The discretion to be exercised should be judicial discretion.

In the case on hand, the reasons assigned by complainant do not constitute sufficient cause to condone the delay of 62 days in filing the complaint. In the circumstances, the learned Magistrate was justified in rejecting the application.

There are no reasons to interfere with the impugned order. The petition is dismissed.