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Judgment
V. Sivaraman Nair, J.—In these writ petitions, petitioners are candidates seeking employment in the cadre of sub-staff (Peon/Sepoy) in the District Offices of the Life Insurance Corporation, West Godavari, Krishna, Guntur and Prakasham. They applied pursuant to a notification issued by the Divisional Manager, Machilipatnam on 25-3-1991. All of them satisfy the educational qualifications specified in the notification, some of them being persons who have passed IX Standard or 9th Class, some others have passed S.S.C. or Matric or X Standard with less than 55% marks and yet others have passed P.U.C. /Inter/H.S.C. /XII Standard with less than 45% marks. All of them belong to the general category and do not belong to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. The Notification provides that Ex-Servicemen need have minimum educational qualification of a pass in VII Standard only. The other eligibility criteria are (1) Knowledge of Telugu, (2) Shall not be below 18 years and more than 25 years as on 1-3-1991. The Notification stipulated that "there will be a written test in Regional Language (viz., Telugu) of IX Standard level of 3 hours'' duration. Those who are successful in the test will be called for interview. Final selection will be based on the results of the above test and interview". The notification also specifically mentioned that "depending upon the response, the Corporation reserves the right to allow only a limited number of candidates to sit for written test under categories I(i), (ii) and (iii)". Petitioners belong to categories I(i), (ii) and (iii) and therefore the reservation of right of the Corporation to limit the number of candidates to the written test applies to all the petitioners before us. After the written test, the selected candidates have to apply by submitting their bio-data in the prescribed proforma. Final selection has to depend upon interview. As indicated above the marks obtained in the written test and the interview have to be aggregated for purposes of selection and screening. Petitioners submit that the basis of limitation of candidates to be admitted for the written test was not intimated to them. They submit that the written test is being conducted on 2-2-1992 and the respondent-Corporation has sent hall tickets of such examination only to a few of the candidates eliminating the petitioners. They submit that such elimination amounts to denial of opportunity for employment in public service and is therefore arbitrary and unreasonable since such refusal violates Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. Petitioners also complain that the free-fold classification of eligible candidates on the basis of 35% marks in 9th class, less than 55% marks in the 10th class, less than 45% marks in Intermediate and corresponding examinations is discriminatory. Petitioners submit that the elimination of some of the eligible candidates on the basis of a restriction of the number of candidates allowed to appear in the written test without intimating them in advance of their elimination or the basis thereof is violative of the principles of natural justice. They submit further that such elimination on the basis of a ratio of candidates to be called for the written test/examination to the number of available vacancies is unsupported by rules and is therefore illegal and discriminatory. Yet another submission is that the equation of candidates who passed IX Standard with 35% marks to those having 45% marks in S.S.C., Matric or X Standard and 55% in Intermediate or P.U.C. or XII Standard examination is unreasonable and in so far as it herds together and treats unequals as equals. It is on these submissions that the petitioners seek a direction in the nature of Writ of Mandamus to the respondents to issue hall tickets to all the petitioners and to allow them to appear for the written test for the post of Sub-Staff (Peon/Sepoy) to be held on 2-2-1992 at Machilipatnam.
The respondents have filed detailed counter affidavit traversing the averments contained in the writ petition. It is their submission that it is within the competence of an employer to prescribe the ratio of candidates to be considered or to short-list them or reduce the zone of consideration for purposes of selection. Respondent submits that such process of short-listing or reducing the zone of consideration may apply at the stage of interview as well as at the stage of written examination. It is also submitted that the enormity of number of applicants who have responded to the advertisement notifying only a few posts did compel adoption of reasonable methods of short-listing candidates or reducing the zone of consideration. Respondent submits that unless this Court is persuaded to hold that the principles adopted in such short listing or reduction of zone of consideration is illegal, arbitrary and unreasonable, this Court may not interfere or grant the reliefs which the petitioners seek. Respondent has stated in the counter affidavit that the reduction of zone of consideration even for purposes of admitting the candidates for written examination has been sanctioned by instructions issued by the Chairman of the Corporation and which was communicated by letter dated 6-11-1991. Respondent submits that the above instructions were issued to clarify the recruitment procedure adopted in 1979 whereby those with S.S.C./H.S.C./XII Standard/Inter/P.U.C. etc., were also made eligible to apply for appointment as sub-staff replacing the 1971 instructions restricting eligibility only to those who had studied upto and not beyond IX Standard. Classification of the candidates with IX Standard qualification and those with higher qualification is sought to be justified for the reason that the former are eligible for appointment only as sub-staff, whereas the latter are eligible for appointment in some higher posts also. The graded preference for short listing on the basis of marks and the decision to allow 10 times the number of vacancies in respect of 75% of the vacancies for IX Standard and 25% for candidates with higher qualifications also is sought to be justified on the same reason. He also submitted that in prescribing eligibility criteria, in classifying candidates and in effecting reservations, the Corporation took into consideration the nature of the job and its requirements and such considerations were fully justified. The respondent has stated that candidates with S.S.C./ H.S.C. Standard/P.U.C./Intermediate/XII Standard with not less than 53 marks in the qualifying examination have been allowed to write the examination scheduled to be held on 2-2-1992.
We are of the opinion that it is open for an employer not only to prescribe qualifications with reference to the requirements of the job, but also to reasonably restrict the zone of consideration or to short-list candidates to be considered in circumstances which warrant such a procedure. This has been recognised as an inherent part of service jurisprudence in decisions of the Supreme Court in V.J. Thomas and Others Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, ; Ashok Kumar Yadav and Others Vs. State of Haryana and Others, and S.B. Mathur and Others Vs. Chief Justice of Delhi High Court and Others, . We are not persuaded to accept the argument that such short-listing or reduction of zone of consideration shall be only by framing rules. If it is part of the service jurisprudence as Supreme Court has found, even without framing rules, it may be open to the employer to. introduce the process of short-listing or reduction of zone of consideration, but with due intimation in advance to the candidates of the likelihood of adopting such process if need arises. The advertisement to which the petitioners responded did contain such advance intimation in this regard. They cannot insist that it shall be supported by statutory rules. We are, therefore not persuaded to accept the submission that in the absence of a rule which provides for the process of short-listing or reduction of zone of consideration, the employer is not entitled to adopt that procedure.
Nor are we impressed by the submission that despite the specific caution contained in the notification that the corporation reserved its right depending on the response to allow only a limited number of candidates to sit for the written test under the categories l(i), (ii) and (iii) the corporation is not justified in exercising that right at a later stage after the applications were received. As a matter of fact, the very caution specifically indicated that it would be exercised depending on the response. That exercise necessarily had to be subsequent to the date of notification and even subsequent to the date of receipt of applications. Had there been only limited response to the notification, there would have been no occasion for the corporation to exercise the right which it had reserved. We are, therefore, not persuaded to accept the submission that the exercise of the right to limit the number of candidates depending on the response at a stage later than the issue of the notification is either illegal or arbitrary or discriminatory.
We have been referred to the communication issued by the Secretary of the L.I.C. on 6-11-1991 where by the Corporation specified the number of candidates to be allowed to appear for the written examination to be 10 times the number of vacancies. That circular also contains the criteria on the basis of which the number of candidates shall be limited to be 55% marks or less in the S.S.C. examination in the descending order for those with higher than IX Standard qualification and 100% and less in IX Standard in the descending order. It is the case of the respondent that the reduction of zone of consideration to 10 times of number of vacancies was adopted on the basis of the above circular and the guidelines contained therein. We note that the basis for such short-listing being marks obtained by eligible candidates belonging to the different categories, there is a specific, ascertainable and invariable standard for reducing the zone of consideration.
Counsel for the petitioners submitted that the above instruction being administrative or ministerial in character cannot have retrospective effect. If we may say so, this argument is urged on the basis of a mis-conception. The power to limit the number of candidates depending on the response has already been reserved in the notification itself. It is the manifestation of the exercise of that power that is evident from the circular which was issued generally by the Corporation. As we have already mentioned the power having been reserved, its exercise at a later stage cannot be termed as giving retrospective effect to an administrative or ministerial communication of the Corporation. We also find that the above instruction was issued in furtherance of Recruitment Procedure of 1979 and 1980 having their genesis in Section 49 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act.
Yet another submission which was evolved during the course of the argument was that in short-listing candidates for the written test a reservation of 75% of 10 times the vacancies to those who have passed only IX Standard whereas 10 times the remaining 25% vacancies alone are made available for candidates who possess higher qualifications. Counsel submits that the prescription of a lesser quota for candidates with higher qualifications is per se discriminatory and arbitrary. Counsel for the respondent submits that even though this point was not taken in the petitions, the reservations are imposed in the light of a circular issued by the Corporation as early as in 1980 and with specific reference to the nature of the job, namely, sub-staff (Peon/Sepoy) and the fact that candidates with IX Standard are eligible for appointment only as sub-staff, whereas the others are eligible for appointment also as record clerks and Assistants. We do not find anything wrong in the corporation providing that on the basis of the job requirements, persons with lesser educational qualifications who are not eligible for any other post will get higher priority. We find in that reservation, an anxiety to assist the under-privileged in a larger measure to obtain the jobs which do not require higher educational qualifications. We, therefore, repel the contention that provision of 75% of 10 times the posts of sub-staff (Peon/Sepoy) to persons with lesser educational qualifications is arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India.
Another submission which counsel for the petitioners raised before us is that the prescription that only ten candidates will be permitted to sit for the examination against each vacancy is irrational, because there is no reasonable nexus with this prescription and the requirements of the post. It is also submitted that relevant considerations have not been taken into account in fixing the ratio of 1:10. Here again, we are not in a position to accept the submission. Petitioners are entitled to challenge the reservation or the ratio only if they are able to make out that either is or both are irrational, arbitrary or unreasonable. We note that it has been held repeatedly by the Supreme Court that in a situation where there is an unmanageable multiplicity of candidates as against a few posts, it is always desirable to restrict the zone of consideration, be it for purposes of preliminary screening or for final consideration, in V.J. Thomas v. Union of India (1 supra), Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana (2 supra) and S.B. Mathurvs. Hon''ble C.J. Delhi High Court (3 supra). On the basis of the principle laid down in the above decisions, it is not possible to hold that the Corporation has no right to introduce a reservation that the zone of consideration shall be lesser than the number of eligible candidates. It is relevant to note that in Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana (2 supra) as also in S.B. Mathur v. Hon''ble Chief Justice, Delhi High Court (3 supra), the Supreme Court has stated that for short-listing for interview leading to appointment, the number of candidates need not be more than two or at the most three times the number of vacancies. The prescription of ten candidates against one for purposes of preliminary screening by written examination does not appear to us to be so arbitrary as to invite interference on the ground that it is discriminatory, arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India.
Yet another submission which counsel f6r the petitioners made before us is that in Cuddapah Division 8,400 candidates were allowed to appear for the written examination against 60 vacancies in March, 1991 and in Warangal Division 3,000 candidates were similarly allowed. He also submitted that in the Divisional Offices in Gujarat State the process of short-listing is not adopted at all for purposes of appointment in Class III and Class IV Services. Counsel submits that adoption of the process of short listing in the Machilipatnam Division of the Life Insurance Corporation alone is discriminatory. Respondent has explained in its counter affidavit that it was with reference to the instances in Cuddapah that the Chairman of the Corporation issued instructions communicated in letter dated 6-11-1991 to short-list candidates for written test also. We are inclined to accept this explanation. We do not find it necessary to deal with the details of this submission any further, because of the observations contained in the decisions of the Supreme Court making it obligatory on the part of any employer to reduce the zone of consideration reasonably. In Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana (2 supra) and S.B. Mathur v. Hon''ble Chief Justice,Delhi High Court (3 supra) the Supreme Court held that the Haryana Public Service Commission should have restricted the number of candidates to be considered as significantly less than the number of eligibles. Restriction of the Zone of consideration and the principles in doing so were upheld in V.J. Thomas v. Union of India (1 supra) also. The only fact that before instructions of the corporation were crystallised into definite guidelines, the Divisional Offices of the Corporation had allowed all eligible candidates to appear for the written test is no justification for the petitioners to contend that the same shall be adopted in this instance also. We, therefore, repel this contention.
Counsel on both sides referred us to the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in L.I.C. of India v. E. Praveen Kumar 1990(2) ALT 316. They referred to this decision for different purposes. Counsel for the petitioners submitted that in the notification which came up for consideration in Praveen Kumar''s case 1990 (2) ALT 316 the reservation was made with reference to the rules in force. That necessarily had reference to Rule 6(vi) of the L.I.C. Recruitment (of Class III and IV Staff) Instructions, 1979. One thing to be noticed is that Rule 6(vi) was part of the instructions which were issued in exercise of the power of the Corporation u/s 49 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act. It was similar instruction which was issued on 6-11-1991 on which reliance is placed by the respondents in the present cases. Counsel for the petitioners submitted that absence of any such rules is annihilatory of the right of the petitioners to be treated equally in matters of public employment and throws mem at the mercy of the employer who may issue instructions without reference to any rule and only according to its whims and fancies even after issuing the notification. We have referred to the finding of the Supreme Court that it is an essential and inalienable part of service jurisprudence, the employer is entitled to restrict the number of candidates to be considered for appointment on any reasonable basis and that may in most cases be far less than the number of eligible candidates.
Counsel for the petitioners submitted that Praveen Kumar 1990 (2) ALT 316 dealt with appointment to Class III and cannot therefore apply to recruitment to posts of Staff in the Lower Category. We do not find any difference in principle, particularly since the advertisement itself had stated that the Corporation reserves its right to limit the number of candidates to be allowed to the written test, depending on the response. It may also be noted that if Rule 6(vi) of the Life Insurance Corporation Recruitment (Class III and IV Staff) Instructions is right, extension of its application to sub-staff cannot be faulted. o
Counsel appearing in W.P.No. 1305/1992 submitted that the respondent fixed 35% for IX Standard candidates, 45% for Intermediate candidates and 53% to 55% for S.S.C. /H.S.C. Candidates and such prescription is unreasonable and illegal. It is evident from the counter affidavit in W.P.No. 996/1992 that the Corporation adopted a two fold classification of the candidates as those with only IX Standard qualification and others with prescribed higher qualification. We have found that this classification is based on job requirements, qualifications and the fact that persons with higher qualifications are eligible for appointment as Record Clerks and Assistants, whereas, persons with lesser qualifications are eligible for appointment only as Sub-Staff and is therefore reasonable. The respondent submits further that in these two categories, separate common denominations were adopted for choosing candidates and selected 144 candidates from those with higher qualifications, all of whom had acquired 53% marks and above upto 55% marks. In the light of the above, we do not find any unlawful discrimination or arbitrary elimination in the choice of candidates.
Counsel for the respondent corporation relied on the decision in Praveen Kumar (4 supra) to submit that almost all the points which are urged now before this Court are covered by the above decision. He also informed us that an application for Special Leave against that decision has been rejected by the Supreme Court in its order dated 4-2-1991.
Even apart from precedents, we are of the opinion that it is open to an employer to provide for any reasonable limitation of the number of candidates to be considered for appointment. In other words, he is free to reduce the zone of consideration or to short-list the candidates on the basis of relevant and germane considerations, subject perhaps to the rule of caution that there shall be at least a mention to that effect in the notification inviting applications. We find that the respondent was competent, in the facts and circumstances of this case to limit the number of candidates to be allowed to write the examination as 10 times the number of vacancies as a preliminary to the process of screening the applicants. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the writ petitions have no merit and deserve to be dismissed. We do so.
There will be no order as to costs.
The following sentence:
"We however note the admission of the respondent that the 11th petitioner in W.P. No. 996/1992 having had 55.4% marks will be admitted in the written test."
was ordered to be deleted in Revision W.P.M.P. No. 3680/1992 on 5-3-1992.