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Judgment
144 paragraphs · 2,038 wordsIn this case, we are concerned with the interpretation and application of
Section 12(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 read with its
Seventh Schedule. Section 12 (5) is set out below:
"12(5) Notwithstanding any prior agreement to the contrary, any person whose relationship, with the parties or counsel or the subject matter of the dispute, falls under any of the categories specified in the Seventh Schedule shall be ineligible to be appointed as an arbitrator:
Provided that parties may, subsequent to disputes having arisen between them, waive the applicability of this sub-section by an express agreement in writing."
The Seventh Schedule to the Act specifies certain relationships. If a
person who is intended to be appointed as an arbitrator falls in that
relationship with a party he is ineligible to be appointed. The exact scope
and implication of this provision has been recently explained in detail by
the Supreme Court in the case of Voestalpine Schienen Gmbh v. Delhi
Metro Rail Corporation Ltd. decided by it on 10th February, 2017.
Delivering the judgement of the Court Mr. Justice A.K.Sikri noted that by
their letter dated 8th July, 2016 the respondent, Delhi Metro Rail
Corporation Limited forwarded to the petitioner a list of five serving and retired officers belonging to the Delhi Development Authority (DDA) and
Central Public Works Department (CPWD), to choose their nominee
arbitrator from it. Thereafter, the respondent forwarded a list of about
thirty one names which included retired officers of the Indian Railways
with technical qualification and experience. The court noted that before
amendment of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 the Law
Commission considered the requirement of neutrality of arbitrators.
Arbitrators were required to the independent as well as impartial. The
court observed.
"21. Independence and impartiality are two different concepts. An arbitrator may be independent and yet, lack impartiality, or vice versa. Impartiality, as is well accepted, is a more subjective concept as compared to independence. Independence, which is more an objective concept, may, thus, be more straightforwardly ascertained by the parties at the outset of the arbitration proceedings in light of the circumstances disclosed by the arbitrator, while partiality will more likely surface during the arbitration proceedings.
24.********************
In the context of this case, it is relevant to mention that only if an arbitrator is an employee, a consultant, an advisor or has any past or present business relationship with a party, he is rendered ineligible to act as an arbitrator. Likewise, that person is treated as incompetent to perform the role of arbitrator, who is a manager, director or part of the management or has a single controlling influence in an affiliate of one of the parties if the affiliate is directly involved in the matters in dispute in the arbitration. Likewise, persons who regularly advised the appointing party or affiliate of the appointing party are incapacitated. A comprehensive list is enumerated in Schedule 5 and Schedule 7 and admittedly the persons empanelled by the Respondent are not covered by any of the items in the said list.
it cannot be said that simply because the person is retired officer who retired from the government of other statutory corporation or public sector undertaking and had no connection with DMRC (party in dispute), he would be treated as ineligible to act as an arbitrator. Had this been the intention of the legislature, the Seventh Schedule would have concerned such persons as well. Bias or even real likelihood of bias cannot be attributed to such highly qualified and experienced persons, simply on the ground that they served the Central Government or PSUs, even when they had no connection with DMRC. The very reason for empanelling these persons is to ensure that technical aspects of the dispute are suitable resolved by utilising their expertise when they act as arbitrators. It may also be mentioned herein that the Law Commission had proposed the incorporation of the Schedule which was drawn from the red and orange list of IBA guidelines on conflict of interest in international arbitration with the observation that the same would be treated as the guide ''to determine whether circumstances exist which give rise to such justifiable doubts''. Such persons do not get covered by red or orange list of IBA guidelines either."
Very often past officers of the government or government organisations
with a great deal of technical expertise or professional knowledge are
included in the panel so as to effectively arbitrate upon specified
disputes.
Hence, being a past officer of the government or a government
organisation does not per se make a person ineligible to be appointed as
an arbitrator under the Seventh Schedule. In my opinion, if after
appointment of an eligible person it is found that the arbitrator is biased
in favour of his previous employer or is not impartial or that a doubt
occurs in the minds of reasonable persons that the arbitrator is not
independent or is biased or is partial, or circumstances as mentioned in
the fifth schedule exist then the procedure under Section 12 & 13 is open
to a party to challenge him, asking him to withdraw from office or for ask
for his removal by the court under Section 14 of the said Act.
Now, very briefly I come to the facts of this case.
On 3rd June, 2011 the parties executed a formal agreement under which
the petitioner was to supply, install and commission internet protocol
based surveillance system, personal baggage screening system and
explosive detection and disposal system at twenty three metro railway
stations at Kolkata. A letter of acceptance of the petitioners had already
been issued by the metro railway on 25th February, 2011. It was modified on 11th April, 2011 with the concurrence of the petitioner. The petitioner
had furnished with the metro railways a bank guarantee for Rs.
85,36,764 representing 5% of the contract value. The respondent, from
time to time during execution of the contract, paid to the petitioner Rs.
8,34,59,446/-. According to the respondent the petitioner was guilty of
delay and unsatisfactory work and supply of materials. According to the
petitioner the respondent was in breach of the contract by not
performing their obligations under it like providing a proper
infrastructure, approval of the drawings and diagrams submitted by the
petitioner, failing to issue certification etc.
The contract was governed by the general condition of contract of the
railways including the Arbitration Clause-63. The contractor, after one
twenty days but within 180 days of his presenting the final bill on
disputed matters could demand in writing that the disputes be referred
to arbitration. The demand for arbitration should specify the exact
disputes between the parties. In case the claim exceeded Rs. 10 lakhs
the arbitral panel under Clause-64 (3) (a) (ii) was to comprise of a panel
of three gazetted railway officers. The railways were required to send a
panel more than three names of gazetted railway officers of one or more
departments including the names of retired railway officers empanelled
to work as railway arbitrators to the contractor within sixty days from
the day a written and valid demand for the arbitration is received by the
General Manager. The contractor would be asked to suggest at least two
names out of the panel for appointment as contractor''s nominee
arbitrator, out of which the General Manager would have to appoint one.
The General Manager would simultaneously appoint the balance number
of arbitrators either from the panel or from outside the panel.
I need not recount the details of the proceedings taken before this court
by the petitioner for appointment of an arbitrator.
I shall only refer to the last application made by them under Section 11
of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, (AP 52 of 2017). By an
order dated 15th February, 2017 this court directed the railways to
furnish the names of three persons for nomination of an arbitrator to be
made by the contractor "keeping in mind the fifth schedule to the Act".
On 24th February, 2017 the metro railway authorities forwarded to the
petitioner three names. According to the arbitration clause the contractor
had to choose two out of which the railways would appoint one as the
arbitrator.
Now, this panel is challenged by the petitioner on the ground that it is
against the permitted relationship of the arbitrator with the parties,
mentioned in the fifth and seventh schedules.
The above decision of the Supreme Court has made it absolutely clear
that an ex-employee of the government or a government organisation is
not ineligible to be appointed as an arbitrator. In fact officers with
defined technical knowledge or expertise or with a large experience in
certain matters are retained after retirement to act as arbitrators, by the
above entities for proper adjudication of the disputes that arise between
themselves and another party.
However, the facts of the Supreme Court case were slightly different from
this case to the extent that, in that case initially a list of five names was
forwarded by the Delhi Metro Rail to the petitioner and thereafter
another list was furnished to the petitioner where the number of
empanelled candidates was increased to about 31. In those
circumstances the Supreme Court felt that when the petitioner was given
a wider choice to choose their nominee from those 31 odd persons, the
standards of independence and impartiality expected of arbitrators was
not sacrificed.
The arbitration clause in the general conditions of contract is not in
compatible with the above decision of the Supreme Court in as much as
under those conditions, a contractor is required to be given a list of more
than three names out of which he is required to choose two and the
railways are to select one out of those two as the contractor''s nominee.
Thereafter the railways are required to nominate their arbitrator.
The general conditions of contract provide that the railways are to
provide a list of more than three persons. But this condition is not
followed as the highest court desires it to be followed. The railways have
forwarded only three names. They ought to prepare and furnish to a
contractor a much longer and wider list. They should be given a wide
choice amongst persons with different backgrounds and professional
attainments.
Therefore, the railways are required to furnish a longer list to the
petitioner containing at least 30 names. Secondly, the arbitration clause
provides that the railways can appoint any person from within or outside
that panel. This stipulation is bad. The railways do not disclose the
personnel from whom they would appoint their arbitrator. The
Contractor does not know whether the appointed arbitrator of the
railways would be disqualified under Schedules V and VII. Therefore, it is
also imperative that the railways appoint an arbitrator from the panel
sent to the petitioner or from a disclosed panel.
The only grievance of the petitioner in this application is that the
nomination is against Schedules V and VII of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996. I do not agree, in view of the above Supreme
Court decision. But I do say that the panel forwarded to the petitioner is
very short.
In those circumstances, this application is disposed of by setting aside
the letter dated 24th February, 2017 (Annexure-m page 68 of the petition) by directing the respondent railways to forward a panel of at least 30
names, of persons of different backgrounds and professional avocations
and attainments to the petitioner. It may include serving or retired
officers of other organisations. From this panel the petitioner will be
required to choose two. Thereafter, the railways can select one to be the
contractor''s nominee arbitrator.
I recommend that the arbitration clause in the general condition of
contract of the railways be amended in accordance with the above
Supreme Court decision read with the observations made by this court
following that decision. A copy of this order be sent by the Registrar
Original Side to the Railway Board for doing the needful.
Certified photocopy of this Judgment and order, if applied for, be
supplied to the parties upon compliance with all requisite formalities.
