Behari Lal vs Gram Panchayat, Salemshah

Jawahar Lal Gupta, J.—These three petition, viz. C. W. P. Nos. 7486, 74?5 and 7215 of i987, involve common questions of fact and law. Consequently, they . will be disposed of by one order. The facts stated in C.W.P. No. 7486 of 1987 may be noticed.

The petitioner herein was granted a lease of land measuring 37 Kanats 8 Marias comprised in Rectangle No. 38 Killa No. 21 (3-12), 22(3-18), 23(3-13), 24(3-9), 25(5-17), Rectangle No. 63 Killa No. 1 min (4 0), 2 min (4-0), 26(0-11), 3 min (4-0) 4 min (4-0) and 5 min (4-0), situated in village Salemshah, Tehsil Fazilka, District Feiozepur, for a period of 1C years from Kharif 1954 to Rabi 1963. It is averred that originally the land was shown to be in possession of the proprietary body of the village and was recorded as Makbuza Malkan in the revenue record, The possession of the land was taken by the Collector under the provisions of the East Punjab Utilization of Lands Act, 1949 (hereinafter referred to as ''the 1949 Act''). It is further averred that the possession of the land had been given to the petitioner u/s 5 of the 1949 Act. The petitioner submits that a petition under Sections 5 and 7 of the Punjab Public Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1973 (hereinafter referred to 1973 Act'') was moved by the Gram Panchayat. This application was dismissed as not maintainable by the District Development and Panchayat Officer, Ferozepur, vide his order dated 25th August, 1983. A copy of this order has been produced as Annexure P-I with the petition. According to the petitioner, it was held that the land having been allotted under the provisions of the 1949 Act, the ejectment could be ordered only by the Collector. Aggrieved by this order, the Gram Panchayat filed an appeal before the Commissioner of Ferozepur Division, Ferozepur. It is averred that on 19th December, 1984, the counsel for the Gram Panchayat made a statement at the bar that the Gram Panchayat did not want to pursue the appeal. Accordingly, the said appeal was dismissed as withdrawn. On January 7, 1985 the Gram Panchayat filed an application for restoration of the appeal through another counsel on the ground that the counsel was not competent to withdraw the appeal, Inspite of the application having been opposed by the petitioners, the Commissioner allowed the application. Finally, vide orders dated 20th July, 1987, the Commissioner allowed the appeal and ordered the eviction of the petitioners from the land in question. Aggrieved by this order, the petitioners have approached this Court through the present writ petitions. The order has been challenged on various grounds.

A written statement has been filed on behalf of the Gram Panchayat through its Sarpanch. It has been inter alia averred by way of preliminary objections that "there is nothing on record to show as to how the land which was Shamlat-Deh passed to the Collector under the Land Utilization Act......" and as to how he leased out the same. It has been averred that u/s 5 of the 1949 Act the land could not be leased for a period of more than 20 years. The land having been leased out to the petitioners only for a period of 10 years, and they having cultivated the same, had no right to continue in possession after the expiry of the period of lease. It has been further averred that the withdrawal of the appeal in the absence of a resolution from the Gram Panchayat, was wholly incorrect, and, thus, the Commissioner''s action in permitting its restoration was wholly legal and fair. The order has been supported on various grounds stated in the written statement.

The petitions had come up for hearing before me initially on July 24, 1991. In view of the plea in the written statement that the petitioners had not paid the rent in respect of the land their possession, Mr. Chopra, learned counsel for the petitioner, had stated that the arrears of rent shall be deposited. Accordingly, the hearing of the cases was adjourned to enable the petitioners to make the necessary deposits. On the date of hearing, i,e., 25th November, 1991, learned counsel for the petitioners stated that the amount of rent[ which was at a very nominal rate, had been actually deposited! Accordingly, the petition were heard on merits.

Mr. A. K. Chopra, teamed counsel for the petitioners, has raised a two-fold contention. It is firstly contended that after the expiry of the lease period, the land in question had come to vest in the petitioners by virtue of the provisions of sub-sections (3) and (4) of Section 7 of the 1949 Act. It has been farther contended that the Gram Panchayat was estopped by the rule of estopped from claiming the eviction of the petitioners. In any case, the learned counsel contended that the Commissioner had relied on the entries in the Jamabandi, which were illegal, as the change in the column of ''owner- ship'' had not been made in accordance with law.

It is apt to notice the provisions of Sections 5 and 7 of the 1949 Act. These provide as under :-

"5. Lease by Collector.-Where the Collector has taken possession of any land u/s 3, he may lease it to any person on such terms and conditions as he may deem fit for the purpose of growing food and fooder crops :-

Provided that the period of lease shall not be less than 7 years or more than 20 years."

"7. Delivery of possession on termination of lease.''-(I) Where any land taken possession of by the Collector u/s 3 is on the expiry of the lease to be returned to the owner, the Collector may after making such enquiry, if any, as he considers necessary, specify by order in writing the person to whom possession of the land shall be given.

(2) The delivery of possession of the land to the person specified in any order made under sub-section (1) shall be a full discharge of the Collector from all liability in respect of such delivery but shall not prejudice any rights in respect of the land which any other person may be entitled by due process of law to enforce against the person to whom possession of the land is so delivered.

(3) Where the person to whom possession of any land is given cannot be found and has no agent or other person empowered to accept delivery on his behalf the Collector shall cause a notice declaring that the land is released to be affixed on some conspicuous part of the land.

(4) On issue of the notice referred to in sub-section (3) the land specified in the notice shall be deemed to have been delivered to the person entitled to the possession thereof, and the Government or the Collector shall not be liable for any compensation or other claim in respect of the land for any period after the said date."

A perusal of the above provisions shows that u/s 5 of the 1949 Act the period of lease cannot be less than 7 years or more than 20 years. During the period of lease the Collector is competent to determine the lease and take possession of the land, if the terms and conditions of the lease are violated by the lessee. After the expiry of the lease, the Collector is bound to return the land to the owner. Sub-sections (3) and (4) of Section 7 prescribe the procedure which has to be followed while delivering possession to the owner. However, there is nothing in the provisions to indicate that if the lessee continues to be in possession of the land even after the expiry of the period of ''ease, he becomes the owner thereof. On the contrary, an examination of the provisions shows that the period of lease cannot exceed 20 years, and, therefore, the possession of the land has to be restored to its original owner. In view of the clear language of the provisions, I am unable to find any merit in the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner that the land has come to vest in them after the expiry of the lease.

Equally lacking in merit is the second contention. It has been contended that the Gram Panchayat was estopped from evicting the petitioners. The contention is based on the fact that an application under the Punjab Village Common Land (Regulation) Act, ]961, had been dismissed on October 21, 1963. The appeal against that order was dismissed vide order dated 28th July, 1965 It is submitted on behalf of the petitioner''s that after the dismissal of this application, the petitioners had put manure etc in the land and made it fertile.'' On this premises, the rule of estoppel has been invoked and it has been contended that the Gram Panchayat cannot be permitted to evict the petitioners.

After hearing the learned counsel for the petitioners, I am of the view that the contention is wholly lacking in merit. The petitioners remained possession of the land and reaped the harvest. They paid nominal amount of rent (a few rupees per acre per year) and have utilised the land for more than 36 years. The amount of money spent by them cannot be more than a fraction of the actual amount of money earned by them. By putting manure etc. in the land, they did not act to their disadvantage. On the contrary, they reaped the harvest. The fact that they want to cling to the land, shows that they are making profit out of it. When the petitioners have not in any manner acted to their own disadvantage, I am unable to find any basis for the contention raised on their behalf. In any event, the dismissal of an application moved by the Gram Panchayat amounts to no representation on its behalf. Consequently, even this contention is rejected. As for the reliance on the entries in the Jamabandis, the matter has been dealt within the order of the Commissioner. Learned counsel for the petitioner could not point out any error in the appreciation of the evidence produced by the Gram Panchayat. The plea is, accordingly, rejected.

There is another aspect of the matter. The petitioners ware mere lessees The land was leased out of them for a period of 10 years only. This period had expired in the year 1963. Thereafter they continued in possession for more than two decades even without paying the lease money. This money was paid sometime after July 1991. The petitioners have utilised the land for all these years at a very nominal rate of rent. There is no right in them to continue in possession of the land. There is no equity in their favour. I am, consequently, not inclined to invoke my extra-ordinary jurisdiction in their favour. Even if there were certain technical flaws, though none has been pointed out, it is not a fit case where discretionary relief should be granted to the petitioners.

Consequently, I find no merit in these three writ petitions, which are dismissed. However, keeping in view the fact that nobody has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest these petitions, I make no order as to costs.