Bejoy Kumar Boral vs Sm. Abala Bala Dutt

P.N. Mookerjee, J.—This is the Defendant''s appeal, arising out of a suit for ejectment. The suit was brought after service of the requisite notice to quit and the landlady''s plea under the Rent Control Law was that she required the suit premises for her own occupation and/or. for building and rebuilding. The suit has been decreed by the learned trial Judge, who has accepted the landlady''s case, save and except the minor allegations that two nephews were members of her own family and that she required the suit premises for inter alias giving effect to a deed of partition. The Defendant has now come up on appeal to this Court.

The learned trial Judge has found that the landlady''s family consists of herself, her two adult sons, the elder son''s wife and two children and one wholetime maid servant. He has also found that the landlady has a family deity which has to be located in one of the rooms to be kept as Thakur Ghar. The learned trial Judge has further accepted the Plaintiff''s evidence that, the business of her two sons needs expansion and, therefore, requires additional accommodation. He has also found, on the evidence of P.W. 2, that the Plaintiff requires the disputed premises for substantial repairs which amount to rebuilding. Upon these findings and upon the notice to quit, which was held by him to be valid and sufficient, the learned trial Judge has decreed the Plaintiff''s suit without considering the question of partial eviction, presumably, upon the view that the offer in that respect was refused by the Defendant in his evidence.

On the question of the Plaintiff''s requirement of the suit premises for her own occupation, the specific findings of the learned trial Judge are as follows:

(1) That, for want of accommodation the Plaintiff''s second son cannot be married and additional accommodation is necessary for that purpose, and

(2) That, for expansion of the Plaintiff''s Sons'' business also, further accommodation is necessary.

The first of the above two findings was not and could not be challenged before us, but the second was severely criticised both on the merits and as to its relevancy on the question of the Plaintiff''s requirement. Upon the judgment of the learned trial! Judge, there is room for such criticism, as, in no view of the case, he can be said to have, considered the matter from all relevant points of view...... The finding of the learned trial Judge that the business of the Plaintiff''s sons needs expansion, appears to have been made somewhat summarily and not upon very cogent, complete or sufficient consideration, and the other questions under this head, namely, whether the requirement of expansion of the sons'' business would be the mother''s requirement! under the relevant statute in this case requires to be more closely examined. Presumably also, even the above requirement, would not have been sufficient for evicting the Defendant from the entire suit premises and the question of partial eviction would have required due consideration under the law. The Defendant Appellant no doubt refused to have partial eviction in his evidence before the court, but that appears to have been dona under some misgivings and misconceptions and, when actually before us, his learned Advocate prayed for an opportunity for his client to have partial eviction, if possible and available in law, we are disinclined, to refuse him such opportunity. Plainly, also, the Plaintiff''s case of requirement for building and rebuilding requires further consideration. We do not think that the evidence of P.W. 2, which alone was relied on by the -learned trial Judge on this part of the case, is sufficient for the purpose. On the present materials, he does not appear to be a very competent witness to speak on this particular point and it will be unsafe to accept the Plaintiff''s plea on this part of the case merely upon that evidence. We are, however, prepared to give the parties opportunity to adduce further evidence on this particular question, so that the rights of the parties in regard thereto may be duly determined in accordance with law.

It is inevitable, in the circumstances, that the case should go back for further consideration by the trial court, but the pure point of law. namely, whether and tinder what circumstances and to what extent the requirement of a business, not the Plaintiff''s may constitute her requirement for her own occupation may well be answered for shortening the scope of this litigation.

The above answer depends upon the proper construction of the words ''''requires for his own occupation", used in Section 13(1)(f) of the West (Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. In the earlier Rent Control Acts also, the same expression was used in the corresponding section or sections and it has been interpreted by this Court in Puspalata Debi v. Dinesh Chandra Das (1950) 85 CLJ 74, as covering requirement for the use and occupation of the landlord his family, dependants and such persons who may be essential and necessary for such occupation, viewed in the context of the social order, the habits and ideas of living and the religious and socio-religious customs of the community to which the individual concerned belongs (Vide also Bibhuti Bhutan De v. Kshetra Gopal Dutta ILR (1951) 1 Cal 375). In the other High Courts too, vide Shankar lal Shionarayan Rathi v. Additional Deputy Commissioner, Nagpur, and Anr. AIR 1951 Nag 22; V.M. Deshmukh v. K.M. Kothari and Ors. AIR 1951 Nag 51; AIR 1952 312 (Nagpur) ; Balabhadra Behari lal v. Premchand Lalchand AIR 1953 Nag 144; Ram Pershad Singh Vs. Mukand Lal, : Nanak Chand v. Tara. Debt AIR 1953 P&H 1156, Bidhubhusan Sen Vs. Commissioner, Patna Division and Another, , the phrase or phrases in the corresponding statute or statutes have received similar interpretation and, although some of the above decisions may be distinguished or may well distinguishable, this much, at least, is clear that the words in question or the particular expression,-and the word "family", in particular, in the context thereof,-should receive a wide and liberal construction. It is also the accepted view that requirement for business or expansion of business would come within the scope of the words "requirement for occupation".

From the above point of view, with which we are in entire agreement, requirement for the landlord''s own occupation would include requirement for the occupation of the members of the landlord''s family and for their business and, in the relevant context, the mother''s family, in regard to Hindus or, the Hindu Society, would obviously include the sons, living jointly with the mother and in a joint family, even though the sons may not be the mother''s dependants. Any other view would disturb the integrity of the said family and compel its disruption and obvious separation between the mother and the sons. That certainly, is not the law and cannot be within its reasonable contemplation.

We would, therefore, hold that the requirement for the sons'' business would aid the Plaintiff in the present case provided such requirement is proved. The trial. court would decide the case at the re-hearing, keeping in view, inter alia, this line of approach.

In the above view, we would affirm the lower court''s finding that the Plaintiff requires additional accommodation for the marriage of her second son but set aside the other finding or findings on the question of her requirement for her Own occupation and for building and rebuilding and remand the case to the court below for further evidence, as indicated hereinbefore, and final hearing and disposal of the suit according to law. At the rehearing the court below will also consider the question of partial eviction, if it is mooted by the parties or if found necessary in law, according to the terms of the relevant statute or statutory provision and in accordance with relevant legal principles.

We would, accordingly, allow this appeal, set aside the decree of the court below and send back the case for further consideration and final disposal according to law in the light of the present judgment.

In the circumstances. of this case, the above further hearing should take place as expeditiously as possible.

Costs of this appeal will abide the final result of the suit, hearing fee being assessed at three gold mohurs.

Bhattachahaya, J.

I agree.