Bhagga S/o Sri Kishore vs State of Rajasthan

In this criminal appeal filed by the appellants under Section

374 Cr.P.C. the judgment dated 05th of December, 1992 passed

by learned Special Judge, SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act

Cases, Udaipur (trial court) in Session Case No.52/1991 is under

challenge, whereby the learned trial court convicted the appellants

for commission of offence under Section 302 / 34 of IPC and passed

sentence for life imprisonment with a fine of Rs.100/- against each

with the default stipulation to further undergo one month''s simple

imprisonment.

As per facts of the case, the S.H.O., Police Station-

Vallabhnagar, District Udaipur, after rerecording information of the

incident in ''Rojnamcha'' reached at the place of occurrence on

18.05.1991, and recorded statement (Ex.P./2) of complainant,

Smt. Chunni Bai at 02.25 PM and registered FIR No.34 on

18.05.1991 against the appellants for the offence u/s 307 of IPC

and after death of deceased Hukma @ Hukami Chand, converted

the offence to 302 of IPC and dispatched the FIR (Ex.P/7) to the

concerned magistrate at 07.00 PM on 19.05.1991 but it was

received in the court at 11.30 AM on 20.05.1991.

In the statement of Smt. Chunni Bai (Ex.P/2), upon which

FIR No.34/1991 was registered, following allegations were levelled

by her against the appellants, which is reproduced herein below:

"VERNACULAR MATTER OMITTED" 4. After registration of the FIR, the police inspected the site and

also got postmortem conducted by Dr. B.L. Siriya (PW.1) on

18.05.1991, who prepared the postmortem report (Ex.P/1), in

which none of the injuries were found upon the vital part of the

body, however, it was opined that deceased died due to shock as

a result of bleeding. The appellants were arrested on 24.05.1991

and after completing investigation, charge sheet was filed against

the appellants in the court of learned Judicial Magistrate,

Vallabhnagar, where from the case was committed for trial to the

court of Sessions Judge, Udaipur but later on the case was

transferred to the court of learned Special Judge, SC/ST

(Prevention of Atrocities) Act Cases, Udaipur, for trial.

In the trial, after recording the statements of 19 prosecution

witnesses, statements of the accused appellants were recorded

under Section 313 Cr.P.C., in which they denied the allegations

levelled by the prosecution witnesses and said that they were not

present at the time of occurrence, and they went to purchase

some articles for solemnizing marriage at Bhinder and further

stated that they have been falsely implicated in this case. No

evidence in defence was produced by the appellants.

The learned trial court after recording the evidence finally

heard the arguments of both the parties and decided the case vide

judgment dated 05.12.1992, and held the accused appellants

guilty for offence under Section 302 / 34 of IPC and passed

sentence of life imprisonment along with fine of Rs.100/-, which is

under challenge in this appeal.

At the threshold, learned counsel appearing on behalf of

appellants submit that even though the entire evidence of

prosecution is accepted coupled with the medical evidence, the

finding of guilt recorded by the learned trial court against the

appellants for committing offence under Section 302 / 34 of IPC is

not sustainable in law because there is no dispute that all the

injuries mentioned in the postmortem report, were found upon

non-vital part of the body, whereas as per allegation of the

eyewitnesses, accused appellants, Heera, and Teja were having

''Lathi''/s, and accused, Bhagga and Girdharu were having axes and

Jeta was having ''Lathi'' in their hand but no injury was caused by

them to the deceased, Hukam on vital part of the body. It is

obvious from the postmortem report and statement of the doctor

PW.1- Dr. B.L. Siriya, no offence u/s 302/34 IPC is made out. The

complainant, Smt. Chunni Bai, specifically stated in her statement

that all appellants were having ''Lathi(s)'' and axes in their hands

and inflicted injuries upon the body of her husband, deceased

Hukma @ Hukmichand. The crux of the argument of learned

counsel for the appellants is that finding of conviction for offence

u/s 302/34 of IPC recorded by the learned trial court upon

prosecution evidence including medical evidence is not sustainable

in law because as per postmortem report, no injury was found

upon the vital part of the body and none of the injury was

dangerous to life and this fact is sufficient to accept that there was

no intention of the appellants to cause death of deceased.

Therefore, the finding of conviction recorded by the trial court for

offence under Section 302 / 34 of IPC may kindly be altered to

offence u/s 325. 326 or under Section 304 Part-II of IPC.

In support of his arguments, learned counsel for the

appellants invited our attention towards following judgments:

Jai Narayan Mishra Vs. State of Bihar, reported in 1972 SCC (Cri.) 40

Molu & Ors. Vs. State of Haryana, reported in 1976 SCC (Cri.) 636

M/s Formina Sebastio Azardeo & Ors. Vs. State of Goa, Daman and Diu, reported in 1992 SCC (Cri.) 671

Nadodijayaraman & Ors. Vs. State of Tamil Nadu, reported 1993 SCC (Cri.) 184

Ram Jattan & Ors. Vs. State of U.P., reported in 1995 SCC (Cri.) 169

Per contra, learned Public Prosecutor vehemently opposed

the prayer of the learned counsel for the appellants and argued

that intention can gathered from the fact that number of injuries

were caused to the deceased by the appellants with deadly

weapons and as a result of those injuries, which is said to be

caused by the appellants in the incident, the deceased, Hukma

died. It is also submitted that as per evidence on record, there

was intention of the appellants to cause death of deceased,

Hukma @ Hukmichand, because Hukma was adopted by his uncle,

Chaturbhuj Ba, and all the appellants were interested to get share

from the property of their uncle, Chaturbhuj Ba, therefore, to grab

the land of Chaturbhuj Ba, various litigations were pending

because the land was transferred by Sh. Chaturbhuj Ba, in the

name of Hukma @ Hukmichand in the revenue record.

The learned Public Prosecutor argued that there is no dispute

that death of Hukma was caused due to the injuries inflicted by

the appellants with intention, therefore, how it can be said that

finding of learned trial court for conviction u/s 302/34 of IPC is

perverse or suffers from any illegality in view of the fact that

number of injuries were found upon the body of deceased, may

not be on non-vital part of the body, therefore, this appeal filed by

the appellants may kindly be dismissed.

After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, we have

considered the arguments of learned counsel for the parties and

perused the entire evidence and finding of conviction. It emerges

from the arguments of the counsel for appellants that the

appellants are not disputing the incident but submitted that there

was no intention of the appellants to cause death of deceased,

which is apparent from the fact that none of the injury was found

upon the vital part of the body of the deceased, and all the

injuries were on hand and leg or back. To consider the said

argument, we have perused the ''Panchnama'' (Ex.P/4) of the dead

body prepared by the S.H.O., Police Station-Vallabhnagar Nagar

on 18.05.1991 at 03.20 PM. In the ''Panchnama'', prepared soon

after the occurrence, it is obvious that no injury was found upon

forehead, ear, eyes, nose, mouth, chest and stomach. All the

injuries were found upon hands, back and both legs of the

deceased, therefore, we find that there is strength in the

argument of learned counsel for the appellants that if four persons

with common intention went on spot to cause death, then,

obviously they ought to have inflicted injuries upon the vital part

of the body, so as to cause death. But, here in this case, as per

prosecution allegations, out of four accused persons, two were

having axes in their hand and two were having ''Lathi(s)'' in their

hand but they caused injuries upon hand and leg of the deceased.

In the statement of PW.1- Dr. B.K. Siriya, out of 19 injuries, none

of them were found upon the vital part of the body of the

deceased and all the injuries were found on non-vital part of the

body and cause of death was shock as a result of bleeding.

We have perused the cross-examination of the witness Dr.

B.L. Siriya, the said witness stated that none of the individual

injury was sufficient to cause death and most of the injuries were

found upon non-vital part of the body. In the cross-examination,

following statement is given by witness PW.1 which reads as

under:

"VERNACULAR MATTER OMITTED"

We have also perused the statements of all the eyewitnesses

so as to ascertain whether there was any intention or motive to

cause death of the deceased. The witness Smt. Chunni Bai (PW.2)

(wife of deceased) deposed in her statement that the appellants

were having intention to grab the land of Sh. Chaturbhuj Ba, but

as per facts the deceased, Hukma was adopted ten years back

and the land was already mutated in the name of Hukam @ Hukmi

Chand. In view of above, once the land is mutated in the name of

deceased, Hukma @ Hukmi Chand, husband of Smt. Chunni Bai,

then obvious, no right could accrue in favour of appellants,

therefore, we are unable to accept the plea that there was motive

so as to uphold the finding of conviction of the trial court under

Section 302 / 34 of IPC because none of the injuries were found

upon the vital part of the body of deceased.

Upon assessment of entire evidence and record of the case,

the finding of guilt recorded by the trial court against the

appellants under Section 302 / 34 of IPC is not sustainable in law,

therefore, the finding of conviction for offence u/s 302/34 of IPC

deserves to be altered to offence u/s 304 Part-II of IPC . 17. In the case of Molu & Ors. (supra), the Hon''ble Supreme

Court while considering the fact that two persons lost their life due

to injuries caused to them, held that looking to the nature of

injuries, it cannot be said that offence under Section 302 of IPC is

made out. The relevant paragraphs 3, 11 and 12 of the said

judgment are quoted herein below:

"3. The defence pleaded innocence and contended that they had been falsely implicated due to enmity and had absolutely no motive to commit the murder of the deceased persons. It was a very unfortunate case in which two persons have lost their lives on account of enmity which is said to have existed about eighteen years ago. It may be necessary at this stage to examine the nature of the injuries received by the two deceased persons. Dr. Tyagi who examined the deceased and conducted the post-mortem examination found the following injuries on the person of Ram Nath:

Bruise 10" x 6" on tip and front of right shoulder joint and upper part of left upper arm.

Bruise 12" x 8" on front of whole of upper part.

Abrasion 1/3" x 1/6" and back of elbow joint.

Lacerated wound 2 1/2" x 1/4" on the back of middle of right fore-arm. Whole of right fore-arm and upper half of fore-arm was swollen. On further dissection, there was laceration, and echymosis of underlying muscles, no fracture was seen.

Stitched wound 1 1/4" x 1/6" on dorsum of right hand 1/6" deep.

Abrasion 1/4" x 1/4"/6" and 1/4" on back of base of right little finger.

Punctured wound 1/2" x 1/6" and 1/4" deep on front of upper l/3rd of right leg.

Punctured wound 1/6" x 1/8" and 1" deep on front of upper end of left leg.

Punctured wound 1/4" x 1/6" and 1/2" deep on outer lower end of right leg.

Stitched wound 1/6" x 1/8" and 3/4" deep on outer middle of left forearm.

Stitched wound 3/4" x 1/6" and 1/6" deep on outer lower l/3rd of left fore-arm about 3" below from injury No. 10.

Stitched wound 1/2" x 1/6" x 1/4" on outer lower l/3rd of left upper arm.

Bruise 1" x 1/2" on upper outer side of left tip.

Stitched wound 1 1/2" x 1/3" and 1/6" deep on tip of scalp more on left side, Anteroposterior in direction, scalp, skull, and vertebrae. Membrances brain healthy According to the evidence of the Doctor death of the deceased-Ram N at h was due to shock and haemorrhage as a result of multiple injuries received by him.

xxx

Finally it was argued by the appellants, following the reasons given by the Sessions Judge, that there was no adequate motive for the accused to commit murder of two persons and to cause injuries to others. It is well settled that where the direct evidence regarding the assault is worthy of credence and can be believed, the question of motive becomes more or less academic. Sometimes the motive is clear and can be proved and sometimes, however, the motive is shrouded in mystery and it is very difficult to locate the same. If, however, the evidence of the eye witnesses is credit-worthy and is believed by the Court which has placed implicit reliance on them, the question whether there is any motive or not becomes wholly irrelevant. For these reasons, therefore, we agree with the High Court that the prosecution has been able to prove the case against the appellants beyond reasonable doubt.

The next point that falls for consideration is what is the nature of the offences that the accused have committed on the evidence led before the Trial Court. To

begin with, as pointed out above, multiple injuries were received by the deceased persons which were caused by blunt weapons like lathis and are of minor character. Furthermore the injuries are not on any vital parts of the body and even those which are on the scalp portion appear to be very superficial. There is nothing to show that the accused intended to cause the deliberate murder of the two deceased persons. There is no evidence to show that any of the accused ordered the killing of the deceased persons or incited or in any way expressed a desire to kill the deceased persons at the spot. In these circumstances we are satisfied that there is no legal evidence in this case that the accused intended to cause the murder of the deceased. The fact, however, remains that the accused have caused multiple injuries on both the deceased persons on various parts of their bodies and, therefore, they undoubtedly had the knowledge that the cumulative effect of the injuries would result in the death of the deceased. As all the accused appear to have acted together and under a pre-conceived plan which developed at the spot and which is clear from the fact that they suddenly pounced on the deceased and went away together they must be deemed to have possessed a common intention to assault the deceased with the knowledge that the injuries caused by them were likely to cause the death of the deceased. In these circumstances, the accused have committed an offence under Section 304, Part II of the Indian Penal Code and not one under Section 302, I.P.C . We would, therefore, allow this appeal only to this extent that the conviction of the appellants is altered from that under Section 302 to that under Section 304, Part II, I.P.C . and their sentences reduced from life imprisonment to seven years rigorous imprisonment while maintaining the fine. The conviction and concurrent sentence passed by the High Court under Sections 325 / 34, I.P.C . is maintained."

Similarly in the case of M/s Formina Sebastio Azardeo & Ors. (supra), the Hon''ble Apex Court while considering almost similar

facts of number of injuries, altered the conviction recorded u/s

302/34 IPC to Section 326 of IPC even though 55 injuries were

found upon the body of the deceased. The relevant paragraphs, 8,

10 and 11 of the said judgment reads as under:

"8. We have also gone through the evidence and the entire circumstances and the judgments of both the Courts very carefully and we feel that the evidence adduced against the third appellant is insufficient to sustain the conviction and as such the third appellant is entitled for an acquittal. Now coming to the case of the first and the second appellants we have to examine the nature of the offence under which they will be liable to be punished. PW 11, the medical officer, who conducted the autopsy of the dead body of the deceased found as many as 55 injuries on the body of the deceased many of which were abrasions and bruises. The Medical Officer had opined that out of the injuries on the deceased, injuries Nos. 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16 were responsible for causing the death of the deceased.

The above entries in Exhs. P 2 and 15 indicate that at the time when the deceased was tied to the electric pole he was in a drunken mood. Only from the totality of the evidence to the effect that PWs 9, 15 and 16 have seen the deceased having been kept tied to the pole, the High Court has inferred that the appellants were responsible for the death of the deceased. When the entire evidence is carefully scanned, we are of the view that in the absence of any definite evidence attributing specific overt act to any of the appellants in the backdrop of the circumstances appearing in the case, it would not be safe to draw such an allegation that the appellants had

intended to cause the death of the deceased and did commit the offence of murder. But on the other hand, the circumstances would indicate that the appellants evidently wanted to teach a lesson to the deceased for having spread the scandalous information by tying him to the pole and assaulting him. Hence, the offence would be one punishable under Section 326, I.P.C . in that the appellants 1 and 2 intended to cause grievous injury to the deceased. The nature of the injuries found on the deceased, in our opinion, attract the definition falling under Clause (viii) of Section 320, I.P.C . establishing that the injuries were such to endanger the human life.

In the result, we set aside the conviction of the appellants 1 an d 2 under Section 302, I.P.C . read with Section 34, I.P.C . and th e sentence of life imprisonment imposed therefor instead convict them under Section 326 read with 34, I.P.C . and sentence each of them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of five years. The conviction under Section 342 read with 34 is retained to which conviction, the Court below has not awarded any separate sentence."

In the case of Nadodijayaraman & Ors. (supra) the Hon''ble

Supreme Court while considering the fact that 32 injuries were

suffered by the deceased and died but most of the injuries were

found upon non-vital part of the body, therefore, held that

conviction of the appellants should be altered from offence u/s

302/34 to offence u/s 304 Part-II of IPC . The relevant paragraphs

18 and 19 of the said judgment reads as under:

"18. From the evidence as noticed above, it emerges that according to the prosecution case itself the injuries were caused to the deceased Prathab Chandran not only by A-2 and A-3 but by the other accused also, who stand

acquitted. In the face of this evidence it cannot be postulated that the two appellants alone caused all the injuries to the deceased and that too with the common intention to cause his death. A critical analysis of the injuries received by the deceased, which have been extracted elsewhere in the judgment, goes to show that the deceased had suffered 15 lacerations, 12 bruises and five contusions. Injuries 1 to 11 had been caused on his legs, knees, ankle etc., while injuries 26 to 29 were on the thigh and lower part of the abdomen. Injuries 12 to 17 and 32 had been cause on the forearm, elbow and the possibility of those injuries having been received by the deceased while trying to ward off the blows on the vital parts of his body cannot be ruled out. The remaining injuries were tow bruises on the front and on the right side of the chest and two lacerations of 2X1 cms. near the right side of the nose and the inner end of the right eyebrow. There were two lacerations on the right temporal region and one on the right occipital region. It was only injury No.22 viz. "laceration on the back of the left side of the frontal region, 5X2 cms. bons deep, fissured fracture 10 cms. vertical of frontral bone, extending to base with communated fracture of the left orbital place", which was found to be sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. According to the medical witness all the injuries, except injury no.22, were simple in nature and could not have by themselves caused death but those injuries could have precipitated the death. Since, the evidence of the prosecution unmistakably asserts that injuries had been caused to the deceased by all the six accused and some injuries had been caused exclusively by A-2 and A-3 alternatively, during the third part of the occurrence, it cannot be said with certainty that the intention of the accused was to cause death of Prathab Chandran deceased. This is more so because according to the medical evidence the deceased had died "due to shock

and haemorrhage on account of multiple injuries", and according to the prosecution version all the seven accused had caused the injuries and not only A-2 and A-3. The accused party was armed according to the prosecution evidence, with iron rods and pipes and not with any other lethal weapon. If the accused had the intention to cause death of the deceased, they would have probably come armed with more formidable weapons. Again, looking to the nature of injuries, which except for injury No.22, were only simple and no other grievous injury was even caused, it appears to us that the accused possibly wanted to chastise the deceased for his trade union activities. The seat of the injuries as also their nature fortifies our view. According to the prosecution case itself, after Prathab Chandran had fallen down in the third part of the incident, none of the accused took advantage and caused any other injury to him. Most of the injuries, as already noticed, were on non-vital parts of the body. From the evidence and circumstances of the case, the appellants do not appear to have had the intention causing the death of the deceased or even causing such bodily injury as was likely to cause death. They can at the best be attributed with the knowledge that their act was likely to cause death or to cause such bodily injury as was likely to cause death, since a number of injuries had been caused and injury No.22 was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. It is not as if A-2 and A-3 alone were armed with iron rods and pipes, with which the injuries were caused and their acquitted co-accused were unarmed. The acquitted co-accused, according to the prosecution evidence, were also armed with iron rods and pipes and as such it would be hazardous to guess as to which blow was caused by which accused. If common intention to cause death had been established in the case, prosecution would not have been required to prove which of the injuries was caused by which accused to sustain the conviction of the

accused with the aid of Section 34 IPC, but in a case like this, where five of the co-accused stand acquitted and the common intention to cause death is not established beyond a reasonable doubt, the prosecution must establish the exact nature of the injuries caused to the deceased by the accused with a view to sustain the conviction of that accused for inflicting that particular injury. The evidence on the record does not lead to the conclusion that A-2 and A-3 alone caused all the injuries to the deceased with the intention to cause his death. The broad circumstances of the case impel us to hold that the common intention of A-2 and A-3 was not to cause the death of the victim and therefore neither of them can be held guilty of the offence under Section 302 / 34 IPC. Since, the deceased did succumb to the injuries, caused collectively, the appellants can only be held guilty of committing culpable homicide not amounting to murder. The act can be said to have been committed by the accused with the knowledge that it was likely to cause death or to cause such bodily injury as was likely to cause death of Prathab Chandran. Learned counsel for the appellants have not been able to persuade us to subscribe to the view that A-2 and A- 3 can only be clothed with the intention of causing grievous hurt, punishable under Section 325 / 34 IPC. The offence of the appellants would, in our opinion, squarely fall under Section 304 Part II IPC. Thus, setting aside the conviction of the appellants for an offence under Section 302 / 34 IPC, we alter their conviction and hold them both guilty of the offence under Section 304Part II IPC.

Coming now to the question of sentence. The occurrence took place almost two decades ago, on 15th June 1972. The appellants faced the trial and were convicted by the learned Sessions Judge Vide Judgment dated 29th March 1975 and thereafter their appeal against conviction and sentence remained pending and was dismissed by the High Court on 15th September 1976. Special leave was granted on Ist February 1978, and on 28th November 1978, the appellants were directed to be released on bail vide this Court''s order made in Criminal Misc. Petition No.2495 of 1978. On behalf of the appellants, we were informed that as under-trial prisoners and during the trial and on conviction, each of the appellants had suffered imprisonment for more than five years. In our opinion, therefore, it is not now desirable to sent the appellants back to jail after they have been on bail also for more than a decade and during this period, nothing has been brought to our notice to show that they had indulged in any criminal activity. Therefore, while convicting them for the offence under Section 304 Part II IPC, we sentence each of the appellants to suffer rigorous imprisonment for the period already undergone by them."

In the case of Ram jattan & Ors. (supra) the Hon''ble

Supreme Court while considering the medical evidence and

injuries caused to the deceased, converted the conviction from

Section 302 / 149 to Section 304 Part-II/149 of IPC . The relevant

paragraphs 5 and 6 of the said judgment reads as under:

"5. The common object has to be gathered or inferred from the various circumstances like nature of the weapons, the force used and the injuries that are caused. After carefully going through the medical evidence we find that it is difficult to conclude that the common object was to cause the death. The injuries on Patroo, P.W. 8 as well as on the deceased were more or less of the same nature except that in the case of deceased, there were few punctured wounds which were not serious but only simple. He died due to shock and haemorrhage the next day. In any event there is no indication anywhere in the evidence

of the doctor or in the post-mortem certificate that any of the injuries was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. No doubt in his deposition the doctor, P.W. 4 has. stated in the general way that these injuries were sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. We have already held that there was no external injury which resulted in the fracture of the ribs. In such an event Clause III of Section 300, I.P.C . is not attracted. Likewise Clause I of Section 300, I.P.C . is also not attracted i.e. intentionally causing death. If their intention was to cause death, they would have used the lethal weapons in a different way and would not have merely inflicted simple injuries on the non-vital parts like legs and hands.

In the result we set aside the convictions of these eight appellants under Section 302 read with Section 149, I.P.C . and the sentence for imprisonment for life. Instead we convict them under Section 304, Part II read with Section 149, I.P.C . and sentence each of them to undergo rigorous imprisonment f or five years. The sentences and convictions imposed on other counts are confirmed. The four other accused who were convicted by the trial court as well as by the High Court are not before us. However, we are of the view that they must also get the same benefit. They are Ram Chander (A-2), Dal Singhar (A-7), Barai (A-8) and Birju (A-11). Accordingly their convictions under Section 302 read with Section 149, I.P.C . for imprisonment for life are set aside and instead they are also convicted under Section 304, Part II read with Section 149, I.P.C . an d are sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for five years. The other convictions and sentences imposed on other counts are, however, confirmed."

After considering the aforesaid judgment cited at bar,

coupled with the statement of PW.1 Dr. B.L. Siriya and injuries mentioned in the postmortem report (Ex.P/1) upon non-vital part

of the body of deceased, we are of the opinion that conviction of

the accused appellants under Section 302 / 34 of IPC deserve to be

altered to under Section 304 Part-II read with Section 34 of IPC.

Consequently, the instant appeal filed by the appellants is

partly allowed, the conviction of the accused appellants recorded

by the learned Special Judge, SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act

Cases, Udaipur vide judgment dated 05.12.1992 for the offence

u/s 302/34 and sentence of imprisonment for life, is set aside but

they are hereby convicted for the offence under Section 304 Part- II read with 34 of IPC .

Coming to the question of sentence, we are of the opinion

that occurrence took place almost 25 years back on 18.05.1991,

the appellants after facing trial convicted by the learned trial court

vide judgment dated 05.12.1991, and thereafter this appeal is

pending for last more than two decades, therefore, it is not

desirable to send the appellants back to jail, as they are on bail

for more than two decades and during this period, nothing has

been brought to our notice to show that they had indulged in any

criminal activity.

In the present case, accused appellants, Heera Lal and Jeta

were arrested on 25.05.1991 and remained in custody till

14.01.1992. Accused appellants Bhagga Gayri and Girdhari, were

arrested on 25.05.1991 and remain in custody till 05.12.1992 and

after conviction, the sentence awarded to accused appellants,

Bhagga and Girdhari was suspended on 24.02.1995, therefore,

obviously Bhagga and Girdhari have had served sentence from

25.05.1991 to 24.01.1995. Accused appellants Heeralal and Jeta

were released on bail on 11.12.1992, therefore, while convicting

all the appellants for offence under Section 304 Part-II read with

Section 34 of IPC, the sentence awarded to the accused appellants

is hereby reduced to the period already undergone by them but

fine of Rs.100/- is hereby enhanced to Rs.25,000/- upon each

accused appellants. The appellants shall deposit the said amount

of fine within two months in the trial court. After depositing the

said amount, the entire amount of fine may be disbursed to the

wife of Hukma @ Hukmichand, Smt. Chuuni Bai.