Bhagirath Singh vs The State of Punjab and Others

Dua, J.—Bhagirath Singh, a resident of village Bhiduki, Tehsil Palwal, District Gurgaon has approached this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution claiming to have been elected as a sarpanch of the village Panchayat ever since the inception of the Panchayat Elections in 1943; he claims to have again been elected as Sarpanch in 1960. In the elections held in 1961 under the Punjab Panchayat Samitis and Zila Parishads Act, 1961, he was elected a member of the Panchayat Samiti Hodal Block in his capacity as a Sarpanch and was later elected a Chairman of the said Panchayat Samiti; he claims still to continue to be the Chairman. The elections to the Gram Panchayat of this village were held on 6th January, 1964 and nomination papers for the election as Sarpanch were filed by the petitioner on 5th January, 1964. They were, however, rejected by the Returning Officer on the ground that the petitioner was a tenant respecting certain land owned by the village Panchayat as part of the common land. Giving the history, it is pleaded that in July, 1963, the petitioner as a Chairman of the Block Samiti, Hodal, had filed complaints against Rao Balbir Singh, respondent No. 8, who was then Block Development and Panchayat Officer, Hodal Block; the complaint related to embezzlements made by him in the collections made towards war efforts. As a result thereof, this respondent had to return the amounts and was also transferred from Hodal Block. Since then, he has been harbouring personal grudge against the petitioner of which he made no secret. Although the petitioner did not cultivate any land as a tenant under the village Panchayat and was merely cultivating land as an old occupant without payment of any rent on account of his being a co-sharer in the village shamilat, the petitioner''s nomination papers in the election for Sarpanch were rejected by the Returning Officer under the influence and presure of Balbir Singh, respondent No, 8. An election petition was filed by the petitioner against the rejection of his nomination papers but the petition is still pending and has not yet been disposed of; indeed no proceedings according to the writ petition, have taken place, although the question involved is extremely simple and there are specific instructions to dispose of the election petitions within two or three months. The petition initially pending with the Illaqa Magistrate has since been transferred to the General Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner, Gurgaon. Fresh elections to the Panchayat Samiti, Hodal Block, were notified to be held in June, 1964. The primary members of the Panchayat Samiti are to be elected from three different categories within the block, namely, from amongst the Panches and Sarpanches of the village Panchayats, two members from the Co-operative Societies and one member from the growers of the Market Committee. As the decision in the petitioner''s election petition against the rejection of his nomination papers for the election of Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat village Bhiduki was being unnecessarily and purposely delayed, he filed his nomination papers for election as a primary member of the Panchayat Samiti, Hodal, from two seats meant for the Co-operative Societies. In addition to the petitioner, respondents Nos 4 to 7 filed their nomination papers for two seats for the Co-operative Societies. The scrutiny of the nomination papers was fixed for 18th June 1964. Hari Singh respondent No. 4 objected to the petitioner''s nomination papers on the basis of the rejection of the petitioner''s nomination papers for the election as Sarpanch of the Gram Panchayat of village Bhiduki. This objection was controverted by the petitioner on the strength of section 6(j) of the Punjab Panchayat Samitis and Zila Parishads Act, 1961, but the Returning Officer being an old friend of Rao Balbir Singh, respondent No. 8, and also being under his influence and pressure, on the basis of another objection raised suo motu rejected the petitioner''s nomination papers observing that the petitioner was disqualified u/s 6(k) of the above Act. The petitioner immediately applied for a copy of the order of the Returning Officer but rather than supplying a copy thereof, the Returning Officer returned the application in original with a note forwarding the same to the Deputy Commissioner, Gurgaon, for necessary action because he had no instructions for issuing copies. It is in these circumstances that this petition has been presented and it is pleaded that this not only effects the question of the petitioner''s membership of the Block Samiti but also deprives him of all charges of his election as Chairman. By way of interim relief, stay of the elections which were due to be held on 22nd June, 1964, and declaration of the result thereof was also prayed. On 22nd June, 1964 a learned Single Judge sitting during vacation ordered that the result of the election may not be declared till 13th July, 1964. On 13th July, 1964 notice was given in the petition for 3rd August, 1964 and stay was directed to continue till then. Shri M.R. Sharma on behalf of the respondents Nos. 1 to 3, the State of Punjab, the Deputy Commissioner, Gurgaon, and the Returning Officer, accepted notice. On 3rd August, 1964, the counsel for the State wanted time for putting in the return which was granted by me with some reluctance but on payment of Rs. 50 by way of costs. It is, however, stated at the bar that in the elections held respondents Nos. 4 and 5 have been elected.

In the written statement by these respondents preliminary objections have been raised on the ground that there is an alternative remedy by way of election petition u/s 121 of Punjab Act No. 3 of 1961 which is equally efficacious and speedy and also that the petition raises disputed questions of fact, with the result that this Court should decline in its discretion to adjudicate on it. On facts otherwise, there is hardly any controversy and the question is only confined to the legal validity of the order of the Returning Officer rejecting the petitioner''s nomination papers. This written statement is dated 3rd August, 1964. In the written statement on behalf of respondent No. 2, Deputy Commissioner, Gurgaon, it is admitted that complaints had been made by the petitioner against Shri Balbir Singh, the then Block Development and Panchayat Officer, regarding embezzlement of war effort collections but as a result of enquiry it was found that the said officer had not misappropriated the collections. It is, however, admitted he was transferred from Hodal in March, 1964. The written statement then proceeds to refer to the objection raised in the third general elections to Panchayats on 5th January, 1964 and to a plea taken by the petitioner in his election petition filed against that order and then it is pleaded that the matter is sub judice. It is clear from this reply that the prior election petition is still at the preliminary stages and the last date fixed was 5th August, 1964. It is further pleaded that the copy of the Returning Officer''s order could only be obtained from copying branch of the office of the Sub Divisional Officer, Palwal or of the Deputy Commissioner, Gurgaon. This written statement, however does not throw any helpful light on the position. Written statement by respondent No. 8, produced in this Court is dated 5th August 1964 in which Shri Balbir Singh has admitted that the petitioner had complained against him charging him with embezzlement of war effort collections. On enquiry, however, to use this respondent''s own words "except some procedural mistakes, no embezzlement was found as all the money received by the office of this respondent had already been properly deposited even before the filing of the said complaint". Existence of personal grudge against the petitioner has been denied by him and he has also denied having anything to do with the rejection of the petitioner''s nomination papers.

On behalf of the petitioner, I have been taken through the impugned order of the Returning Officer dated 18th June, 1964 the operative part of which may here be reproduced:

Shri Hari Singh raised an objection that the nomination paper of Shri Bhagirath Singh son of Hira Lal of village Bhiduki should be rejected as his nomination paper for the election of member of Gram Sabhas has already been rejected and he is also in arrears of rent. Shri Hari Singh and Sh. Bhagirath Singh filed their affidavits. It is evident from the affidavit that Shri Bhagirath Singh has been dis-qualified for being elected as member of Gram Sabha as his nomination paper was rejected. I, therefore, u/s 6 of the Punjab Panchayat Samitis and Zila Parishads Act, 1961, rejected the nomination paper of Shri Bhagirath Singh son of Hira Lal Bhiduki from the election of representative of Co-operative Society for primary member of Block Samiti Hodal as objected in the objection petition.

It has been contended that there is no material on the record justifying rejection of the petitioner''s nomination papers On the ground that he was disqualified for being elected to be a primary member of the other Samiti as a representative of the Co-operative Societies. Reference has been made to section 6 of the Punjab Panchayat Samits and Zila Parishads Act and it has been submitted that clause (k) seems to be the only clause under which the Returning Officer appears to have purported to act, though he has not mentioned any specific clause in his order. According to this clause, no person can be eligible for election as a primary member if he is disqualified for being elected or co opted as a member. In the order the only basis for the disqualification is stated to be rejection of the petitioner''s nomination papers in an earlier election in respect of which an election petition is pending with the General Assistant of the Deputy Commissioner. It is contended that there bring no material for such disqualification produced before the Returning Officer the impugned order suffers from a manifest illegality and should be set aside.

In regard to the respondents'' objection on the basis of the existence of alternative remedy, my attention has been drawn to Rulya Ram v. The State of Punjab etc. (1962) 64 P.L.R. 1005 in which I had interfered on a writ petition with an order of rejection of nomination papers and had observed that in spite of the existence of adequate alternative remedy a discretion vests in the High Court to entertain a petition for writ etc., and to grant requisite relief. It has been emphasised that at the time when this petition was presented to this Court, elections had not yet taken place and prayer had been made to stay the election and the declaration of the result and indeed the admitting Bench actually stayed the declaration of the result till 3-8-1964, the date fixed for hearing of the writ petition, the State having delayed disposal of this writ petition by abstaining from filing the return cannot take advantage of the subsequent events on account of this delay and that this Court should not in the exercise of its discretion decline relief to the petitioner. It has been stressed that the point involved is a point of law on which no evidence need be led and the right being an important statutory right, this Court should not direct the petitioner to a lengthy and inefficacious remedy by way of election petition. It has in this connection been pointed out that the earlier election petition has not yet been disposed of and its disposed is being delayed by interested parties through their political influence.

Reliance has also been placed on Nitya Gopal De Vs. The State of West Bengal and Others, in support of the proposition that Article 226 of the Constitution imposes a constitutional obligation on the High Court and that this Court should not hesitate to interfere if the invalidity of the order is manifest on its face.

On behalf of the respondents Nos. 4 and 5. it has been pointed out that in Rulya Ram''s case no rules had actually been framed at the time of the grievance and that indeed for this reason an election petition was not considered to constitute an effective remedy. It has further been argued that as the petitioner''s nomination paper for election as Sarpanch had on an earlier occasion been rejected u/s 6(5) of the Punjab Gram Panchayat Act he was disqualified for seeking election in the present election as well. It has also been asserted that these respondents had objected to the petitioner''s nomination paper u/s 6(f) and (k) of Punjab Act 3 of 1961 and not section 6(j).

In so far as the preliminary objection is concerned it is noteworthy that on 22nd June, 1964 the vacation Judge had ordered that the result of the election should not be declared till 13th July, 1964, the date fixed for preliminary hearing. This order was to be communicated telegraphically on 13th July 1964. the Motion Bench admitted the writ petition and issued notices for 3rd August 1964, the earlier stay being ordered to continue till that date. Shri M.R. Sharma Advocate who was present on behalf of respondents 1 to 3 accepted notice. It is significant that extension of stay does not appear to have been opposed and indeed it does not seem to have been stated on behalf of respondents 1 to 3 that the result of the election had been declared; of course the circumstances of the declaration of the result could in this situation not be stated. On 3rd August, 1964 the counsel for the State wanted time for filing the return and two weeks were granted on payment of Rs. 50/- by way of costs. Respondents 4 and 5 put in their written statement on that date pleading that the election had taken place on 22nd June, 1964, and the answering respondents had been elected but this written statement was also silent about the effect of stay order dated 22nd June, 1964. The return on behalf of respondent 2 is dated 8th August, 1964, and the written statement of respondent 8 is dated 5th August, 1964. In the former it is stated that the election was held on 22nd June, 1964, and the result announced the same day but without even mentioning anything about the stay order issued by this Court on 22nd June, 1964, which was extended on 13th July, 1964, in the presence of Shri M.R. Sharma counsel for respondents 1 to 3. This background is not unimportant for considering the preliminary objection.

On the merits too it is worth nothing that we have not got the version of the Returning Officer in reply to the writ petition. His order, the certified copy whereof was not immediately made available to the petitioner but was supplied to him later on, shows that the petitioner was considered by him to be disqualified for being elected as a member of the Gram Sabha because his nomination paper for that purpose had been rejected, therefore the present nomination paper was also rejected. It is urged that this order is on the face of it tainted with grievous legal error as mere rejection of nomination paper for election as Sarpanch on an earlier occasion particularly when that is the subject matter of an election petition, which is being prolonged by respondent 4, who wields great influence in official circle, cannot in law mean that the petitioner is now disqualified for seeking election as primary member of the Panchayat Samiti.

Both the points falling for decision of the present case are of great importance and frequently arise. As my order would be open to Letters Patent Appeal as of right and the final decision of the Letters Patent Appeal is likely to be delayed it is in the interest of justice that these points be settled by a larger Bench in the first instance. In election matters it is of utmost importance that the controversy is settled with greatest possible despatch. The papers may accordingly be laid before my Lord the Chief Justice for suitable orders under clause (xxii) Para 1, Chapter 3-B, Volume V, High Court Rules and Orders. This may be done without any delay so that the petition may be disposed of in this month.

ORDER

Dua, J.

19th October 1964

The facts giving rise to this petition and the reasons for reference to a larger Bench are stated in my referring order and need not be repeated The referring order may accordingly be treated as a part of this order.

Before dealing with the petition on the merits. I may first dispose of the preliminary objection on which great reliance has been placed on behalf of the respondents. It is urged with force that the petitioner can challenge the impugned order rejecting his nomination paper by an election petition and that this Court should for this reason decline relief to the petitioner on the writ side. According to the submission, the alternative remedy provided by proceedings for election petition is equally adequate and efficacious and the petitioner should, therefore, not be permitted to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. In support of this preliminary objection reliance has been placed on the following, among other, decided cases :

Tekchand Vs. Banwarilal and Others,

Daulat Ram Vs. State of Rajasthan and Others,

Rattan Singh v. The Deputy Commissioner Rohtak ILR (1965) P&H. 533.

Messrs Avtar Singh Ranjit Singh v. The Assessing Authority (1963) 35 P.L.R. 422.

Thansingh Nathmal v. The Superintendent of Taxes AIR 1961 S.C. 1419.

Rameshwar Kalyan Singh v. The State of Rajasthan AIR 1952 S.C. 64 and

Laksman Lal v. Rameshwar Ram 1963 Bihar L.J.R. 710.

It is unnecessary to refer in detail to these decisions, because in my view the position is now settled beyond controversy by the Supreme Court in more cases than one and the ratio of the Supreme Court decisions and the decisions of this Court cited on behalf of the respondents does not militate against that position. It is true that in Tek Chand''s case 2 in headnote (a) we find the following observation:

* * * *

The petitioner has a remedy to question the validity of the election by an election petition on the ground that his nomination paper was wrongly rejected by the Returning Officer. The High Court should never interfere before the remedy by way of election petition is exhausted.

It is on this observation that the respondent has placed his principal reliance. I regret my inability to read these sentences to mean that the learned Judges intended to lay down any rigid and absolute rule prohibiting the High Court from interfering in a fit case with an order improperly rejecting a nomination paper without exhausting remedy by way of election petition. The question of interference by this Court on its writ side is a matter of judicial discretion which must from the very nature of things call for determination after considering all the facts and circumstances of a given case. In the reported case the Court was influenced by more considerations than one in declining interference on the writ side and one of the important factors which weighed with the Court was that u/s 19 of the Rajasthan Town Municipalities Act an appeal is provided to the High Court from the decision of the District Judge hearing the election petition where the decision is challenged on a point of law. Some of the decided cases cited on behalf of the respondents relate to taxation matters and one of them is concerned with election to a State legislature under the Representation of the People Act. 1951 It need hardlyle pointed out that in cases relating to elections to either house of Parliament or to the House or either House of the State Legislature, Article 329 of the Constitution operates as a constitutional bar in challenge to the elections by any mode other than an election petition. In respect of taxation matters also, I am aware of decided cases in which the approach of the Courts of writ has been somewhat more rigid against interference with orders of assessment, though even in taxation cases where challenge is clear-cut and is based on attack on the vires of the imposition or on jurisdictional or grave legal infirmity manifest on the face of the record which does not require probe into conflicting or disputed facts, the Writ Courts have not hesitated from investigating into the grievance and they have not infrequently granted relief on proper case being made out to further the cause of justice. Even the Supreme Court has on more occasions than one granted relief under Article 32 of the Constitution on the view that a threat by the State to realise without authority of law tax from a citizen by using coercive machinery of an impugned Act is an infringement of guaranteed fundamental right and has also upheld High Court''s interference under Article 226 see Tata Iron and Steel Co., Limited, Bombay Vs. S.R. Sarkar and Others, and cases noticed therein.

That the existence of an alternative remedy does not per se operate as an absolute legal bar to the exercise of jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a writ of certiorari etc. under Article 226 of the Constitution or to such relief being granted on its writ side and that this factor has only self-created relevance in the exercise of the Court''s judicial discretion is not disputed and indeed is no longer open to question in face of repeated unequivocal decisions of the Supreme Court to which, it is no longer necessary to refer. In so far, however, as interference on writ side with grievances relating to elections to Municipal Committees or to the Panchayats etc. is concerned this Court has recently considered the legal position in more cases than one. A Division Bench in Devi Ram v. The State of Punjab etc., C.W. No. 1403 of 1964 Civil Writ No. 1408 of 1964 has very recently observed:

...that the existence of an alternative remedy, though an extremely important factor, and more particularly so in those election contests in which the Legislature has provided remedy by way of election petition, does by no means per se affect, curtail or impinge upon the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 which can legitimately be invoked by an aggrieved party in a fit case, when the true dictates of justice so demand. One of the basic and fundamental considerations which largely influence the judical mind of the writ Court inducing it to interfere is when manifest injustice resulting from jurisdictional or grave and material legal infirmity, patent on the face of the record, is plainly discernible without requiring deep probe into conflicting facts, and the alternative remedy, if any, is not equally effective. The matter being pre-eminently one of judicial discretion, no inflexible and rigid rule can or should be formulated to serve as a straight jacket in all cases, Each case would accordingly have to be dealt with in Its own peculiar setting and circumstances and the mere existence of an alternative remedy does not of itself impose an obligation on this Court to relegate the aggrieved party to such remedy.

The fact that the bar on the basis of the existence of alternative remedy has again been pressed by the respondents'' learned counsel in all seriousness, though without controverting that such bar does not go to the jurisdiction of the writ Court, impells me briefly to re emphasise the legal position on the point. The jurisdiction conferred on this Court by Article 226 is not appellate and this Court is accordingly not empowered to act as a Court of appeal. What is conferred by this Article is supervisory jurisdiction which reserves to the writ Court power to remedy failure of justice cause, infer alta, by violation of Rule of law. Justice, it may be remembered, as enshrined in the Preamble of our Constitution, occupies the first place on the list of cherished human values which have been sought to be secured to all citizens of this Republic. Article 226 seems to me to have its roots in this purpose and is apparently designed to assure to the citizen justice denied to him by the subordinate Tribunals. Consistently with this superior status the writ Court does not ordinarily compete or come into conflict with the subordinate Tribunals in their normal functioning, nor is it intended to serve as a substitute for them. It is for this, among other reasons, that if a citizen can have justice elsewhere the extraordinary jurisdiction of the writ Court is ordinarily not allowed to be invoked and the citizen is expected first to seek redress of his grievances from the subordinate Tribunals. But this is not a constitutional bar; it is merely a self-imposed restriction dictated by considerations of practical working, with the result that if the alternative remedy is not equally adequate, efficacious and speedy, this self imposed restriction must give way in favour of interference to facilitate the cause of substantial justice and further its ends. Very recently, a Bench of this Court, of which my learned brother Grover J. was a member. speaking through the learned Chief Justice, in Fateh Singh v. K.C. Grover C.W. No. 927 of 1964, Civil Writ No. 927 of 1964, reaffirmed the legal position in these words:

It may, however, be safely said that the existence of an alternative remedy is not by itself a bar to a petition under Article 226 and that whether Court should interfere or not would depend entirely on the facts and circumstances of the particular case in which the point arises.

Shri Sarin for the respondents has submitted that the decisions cited by him were not considered by that Bench, inferentially suggesting thereby that the question requires re-examination. I am not impressed by this submission. The legal position is settled beyond controversy and it was wholly unnecessary for that Bench to notice various authorities in this judgment. I must say that I am in complete and respectful agreement with the view taken in the unreported decision and indeed sitting with the learned Chief Justice, I myself took the same view in Puran Chand Gopal Chand Vs. The State of Punjab and Others, .

The question as to whether or not the alternative remedy in a given case is equally adequate, efficacious a d speedy also depends on its peculiar facts and circumstances and no rigid and inflexible rule can be formulated to cover every case. Any attempt to do so would in my view, be futile. The Court of writ has, strictly speaking to apply its judicial mind to all the facts and circumstances before it and then come to a judicial determination whether or not in the interest of justice it should exercise its jurisdiction or relegate the aggrieved party to the alternative remedy. In the case in hand, the petitioner''s nomination papers were rejected on 18-6-1964 and within four days he presented the writ petition in this Court in which ad interim prayer for staying the election fixed for 22-6-1964 was also made. Bedi, J., who was acting as vacation Judge on 22-6-1964, granted stay of declaration of result of the election upto 13-7-l964, the date fixed for preliminary hearing. The stay order was to be communicated telegraphically. On 13-7-1964, the Motion Bench issued notice for 3-8-1964, and also continued the stay till they said date. It is noteworthy that Shri M.R. Sharma, the learned counsel appearing for respondents Nos. 1 to 3 and accepting notice on their behalf on 3-8-1964, did not oppose the order continuing the stay on the ground that the result had already been announced on 22-6-1964. It has been stated at the bar by the learned counsel that he was not aware of this fact, but I have not the least doubt that his client must have received the intimation pursuant to the order of Bedi, J. dated 22-6-1964, and it was presumably as a result of the receipt of that notice that he appeared on 23-7-1964, and accepted notice. As a matter of fact, ever in the return it has nowhere been explained as to in what circumstances the result of the election was announced on 22-6-1964, in face of the stay order of which telegraphic information was ordered to be given. An election petition can, under Rule 4 of the Punjab Panchayat Samitis and Zila Parishads (Election Petition Rules) 1961, be presented within 20 days from the date of announcement of the result of the election. This would mean that the election petition by the present petitioner could be presented within 20 days from 22nd July, 1964 and such a petition would clearly be now barred by time. It is not suggested that there is any provision of law enabling presentation of election petition after the prescribed period by showing sufficient cause for the delay except Rule 4(2) which does not concern us. In this connection, is may not be out of place to observe that the earlier election petition find by the petitioner questioning the election held on 5th January, 1962 is still in the preliminary stages and up to 5th August, 196(sic) attempts were being mode to secure attendance of the parties. Such delays in the disposal of the election petitioners do seem to me to detract from the efficaciousness of this alternative remedy on the facts and circumstances of the case in hand. In order to determine whether or not a given alternative remedy is equally adequate and quick so as to merit refusal by this Court to go into the controversy, it is necessary to consider the nature of the challenge to the impugned order as also the conduct of the writ petitioner. In the case in hand, the challenge is based on a clear cut legal argument urging grave error of law on the face of the record which does not require enquiry into disputed facts. The petitioner''s conduct is also free from blame and the writ petition was presented with the utmost expedition. I am, therefore, clearly of the view that on the facts and circumstances brought to our notice in this case, the existence of alternative remedy cannot and should not deprive the petitioner of his right to claim adjudication of his grievance from this Court on the writ side.

This brings me to the merits of the legal infirmity. The impugned order dated :8th June, 1964 does not specifically mention the clause of section 6 of the Punjab Panchayat Samitis and Zila Parishads Act (Act No. 3 of 1961) (hereinafter called the Act) under which the petitioner''s nomination paper was rejected. All that this order shows is that Hari Singh had raised an objection against the petitioner''s nomination paper on the ground that the latter''s nomination paper for election as member of Gram Sabha had already been rejected and that he was also in arrears of rent. After going through the affidavits of Hari Singh and Bhagirath Singh petitioner, the Returning officer came to the conclusion that Bhagirath Singh had been disqualified for being elected as a member of the Gram Sabha because his nomination paper had been rejected. It was on the basis of this conclusion that the petitioner''s nomination paper for election as a Primary Member of the Block Samiti representing the Co-operative Societies was rejected. Before us, the respondents'' learned counsel have attempted to support the impugned order by reference to clauses (f), (j) and (k) of section 6 of the Act. These clauses are in the following terms :

Disqualifications of candidates for election as Primary Members: 6. No person shall be eligible for election as a Primary Member if such person-

* * *

(f) is so disqualified by or under any law made by the Legislature of the Punjab State; or

* * *

(j) is disqualified from membership of a Municipal Committee, Gram Panchayat, Panchayat Samiti, Zila Parishad or any other local authorities as a result of his election having been set aside under rules made under this Act or any other enactment for the time being in force relating to Municipalities, Panchayats or other local authorities; or

(k) is disqualified for being elected or co-opted as a member; or

* * *

None of these three clauses seems to me to apply to the petitioner. It has not been shown under which law made by the Legislature of the Punjab State the petitioner is disqualified for being elected as a Primary Member of the. Panchayat Samiti. That the expression "so disqualified" in clause (f) refers to disqualification in regard to eligibility for election as a Primary Member appears to me to be char on the language of this clause read with section 5 in the light of the definition of the word "member" contained in section 2(9) of the Act. Similarly, there is nothing on the record to show that the petitioner is disqualified as a result of his election having been set aside within the contemplation of clause (j). For bringing the petitioner''s case under clause (k), it has been argued that as the petitioner was held to be disqualified for being elected as a member of the Gram Sabha on 5th January, 1964 when his nomination paper for that election was rejected, he must be considered to be disqualified for being elected or co-opted as a member within this clause. It may be pointed out that it was on this identical reasoning that the impugned order was apparently passed. The fallacy underlying this argument appear to me to be based on failure to apply the definition of the word "member" contained in section 2(9), according to which "member" means a member of the Panchayat Samiti or Zila Parishad as the case may be. The submission that this definition is not intended to be rigid and if the context otherwise requires, the Court can depart from it is of no avail to the respondents and indeed their counsel are unable to point out any cogent reason which in the context would justify such departure. As a matter of fact, the respondents'' contention seems to me to be almost circular, in that, it is first assumed without urging any cogent reason that the word "member" as used in clause (k) as wide enough to include member of a Gram Sabha, and then it is sought on the basis of this assumption to induce the Court to depart from the statutory definition and to give this word a wider meaning so as to justify the assumption. The bald submission is thus unsupported by any cogent or convincing reason. I have accordingly no hesitation in repelling it. I may point out that when the Legislature has intended a wider meaning of the word "member", it has expressed its intention specifically as is clear from clause (j), The position, therefore, boils down to these that there is absolutely no material on the record establishing disqualification of the petitioner from being eligible for election as a Primary Member of the Panchayat Samiti on the dates when his nomination paper was either filed or rejected. The ground in support of the impugned order which has, as a last resort, been urged is, that, since in January, 19S4, the petitioner''s nomination paper for election to the Gram Sabha was rejected on the ground of his being a lessee of the Panchayat land, he must be held to be disqualified for being elected as member of the Panchayat Samiti in the present election as well It is not denied that an election petition in regard to the earlier election to the Gram Sabha is still pending in which the correctness of the order rejecting the petitioner''s nomination paper is in issue.

Now, in the first instance, merely because on 5th January, 1964 the petitioner was considered to be a lessee of Panchayat land, it does not necessarily follow that he was also one in June, 1964. Secondly, non-eligibility for being elected as a member of the Gram Sabha need not necessarily mean non-eligibility for being elected as a Primary Member of Panchayat Samiti. Our attention has not been drawn to any provision of law which would suggest that a lessee of Panchayat land would be ineligible for election as a Primary Member of a Panchayat Samiti.

C. (j) of S. 6 only speaks of disqualification as a result of the candidates election having been set aside: this would obviously be different from initial ineligibility for election which does not arise out of an order setting aside the candidate''s election; the context of this clause seems to me to be clear on this point. Clause (k) is also inapplicable as no disqualification of the petitioner has been brought to cur notice; the word "member" in this clause, I may repeat, is intended to bear the defined meaning, no cogent 0f convincing reason having been urged for adopting a wider meaning; and even if the meaning is to be somewhat wider, there is nothing to suggest as to how wide it should be: in other words what kind of membership and of which local body should be deemed to have been intended by the Legislature. It is worth-noting that except for the earlier order of rejection of the petitioner''s nomination paper on 5th January, 1964 there is no other material to which our attention has been drawn which would establish the petitioner''s disqualification justifying the impugned order. I have, therefore, little hesitation in holding that the impugned order is wholly unsupportable and contrary to law, and, therefore, liable to be quashed in these proceedings.

There is one aspect to which I am inclined to advert before concluding. If an election petition in a case like the present is to serve the purpose of being an effective alternative remedy, then it is desirable to make a provision for its speedy disposal and such provision must be effectively enforced. The Parliament has in its wisdom made such a provision in section (sic)0(6) in the Representation of the People Act, 1951. It is true that in some cases parties have managed to defeat the purpose of this provision by unduly prolonging the proceedings, but by and large, this provision has promoted the cause of speedy disposal of election petitions. The authorities concerned in this State might also with advantage consider the question of making some effective provision for speedy disposal of election petitions like the present one, for otherwise an unscrupulous party may by adopting delaying tactics easily render an election petition futile for all practical purposes. Another aspect which is no less necessary to emphasise is that the Returning Officers must not only be properly posted with the relevant law on the subject of elections but they must also be properly trained and disciplined so as to be able to discharge their duties with the objective detachment of a judicial mind, completely free and insulated from administrative, political or personal considerations and influences. In the absence of this essential pre-requisite, our representative institutions may not be able to inspire confidence and our democratic set up founded on the principle of people''s representation would seem to rest on week foundations. In our experiment in Panchayati Raj in villages is to succeed and if we expect effectively to train rural India in the democratic way of life as envisaged by our Constitution, then the election processes must be worked strictly in accordance with law wholly uninfluenced by collateral considerations. It may be remembered that detailed and high democratic principles enshrined in written constitutions do not automatically establish democracy : it is the way these principles are acted upon in practice and enforced, and the way the citizens adopt the democratic way of life, both in public and private, which determines whether or not a country is a true democracy. The most inspiring modern democracy, it may be pointed out has no written Constitution and another great democracy has, comparatively speaking, a brief written Constitution.

As a result of the foregoing discussion, this writ petition succeeds and allowing the same I quash the impugned order dated 18th June 1964 by which the petitioner''s nomination paper was rejected. The election held on 22nd June, 1964 must also automatically be set aside and I order accordingly. The election in question would, therefore, have to be held again in which the petitioner would be entitled to contest. The petitioner must get his costs.

Grover, J.

I agree.