Bhagwan Singh and Others vs Financial Commissioner and Others

Sanjiv Khanna, J.—The appellants herein are legal heirs of Mr. Roop Chand and claim bhumidari rights in land located in Khasra No. 120, admeasuring Bigha and 5 biswas situated within the revenue estate of Village Moradabad Pahari, Delhi. The said claim was made by the legal representatives of Mr. Roop Chand by filing an application u/s 11(2) of the Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as the Act, for short) before the Revenue Assistant in August, 1982. The basis of the claim was the decree dated 2nd January, 1961 in a suit which was filed by Mr. Roop Chand against Gaon Sabha of the Vill. Katwaria Sarai. The Revenue Asistant rejected the application by Order dated 3rd June, 1983, inter alia, holding that the land in question as per jamabandi, (Exhb. P-4) for the year 1948-49 had been both shown as Khud Kasht and in possession of Mr. Roop Chand but also as ghair mumkin masjid. The Revenue Asistant further held that there is no documentary evidence to establish cultivation by Mr. Roop Chand and after his death in 1967, by his legal heirs from 1948-49 till 1983 but on the contrary the land has remained ghair mumukin. The decree of the Civil Court relied upon by the appellants herein was held to be not binding and without jurisdiction in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Hatti Vs. Sunder Singh, . It was also noticed by the Revenue Assistant that the claim of bhumidari rights was made only after Notification u/s 4 of the Land Acquisition Act had been issued on 24th October, 1981. On appeal, the Additional Collector upheld the said Order observing, inter alia, that the landed in question had not been under cultivation since 1948-49 and therefore the claim that Mr. Roop Chand was a khud kasht cannot be accepted. On further appeal. The Financial Commissioner has upheld the findings of the Revenue Assistant and the Additional Collector. It was held that the decree of the Civil Court was without jurisdiction and cannot be relied upon. The Act is a complete Code in itself.

Learned counsel for the petitioners has referred to the provisions of the Section 40 of the Delhi Land Revenue Act, 1954 as well as Sections 44 and 45 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act and submitted that the decree of the Civil Court dated 1st February, 1961 was binding on the Revenue Authorities and suit was not barred under the provisions of Section 185 of the Act readed with Schedule 1, Clause 4. Relying upon Section 11(2) of the Act it was submitted that the petitioner is entitled to be recorded as bhumidar on the basis of the decree of the Civil Court. It was further submitted that there was no question of limitation as Schedule 1, Clause 4 of the Act specifically states that an application claiming bhumidari rights can be moved at any time and no limitation period is prescribed.

In order to determine and decide the controversy I have examined the copy of the plaint filed by Mr. Roop Chand enclosed to the writ petition as Annex. P-1. Paragraph 1 of the plaint refers to jamawandi of the land as recorded in the year 1948-9. In paragraphs 2 and 3 of the plaint it is further stated as under:

That the land was wrongly recorded in the Khasra Girdwari of 1953-54 as Garhi Mumkin (Waste Land) with the result that it was ordered to vest in the Gaon Sabha by the Revenue Assistant, Delhi and this order is ultra-vires, illegal and beyond jurisdiction for the following other reasons:-

(a) The land was not Ghari Mumkin (Waste land) in the year 1953-54 and the Kh. Girdwari entry of the said year is incorrect.

(b) It could vest in the defendant u/s 7 & 154 D.L.R. Act 1954 because it was in the cultivation and possession of the plaintiff was part of this holding in which it was included. On all the four sides it was surrounded by the cultivated land of the plaintiff.

(c) This cultivable area which has been under cultivation of the plaintiff from a long time past being his khud kasht land as the owner has sadar of this land.

(d) In respect of proof of (a)(b)(c) mentioned above, it was not the type of land as could vest u/s 154 DLR Act. Further alternatively there was abandonment of the user of the type recorded in girdwari long before 1953-54.

That the defendant was asked to ignore the Khasra Girdwari entries of 1953-54 and the vesting order passed by the Revenue Asistant Delhi about a year ago of which the plaintiffs came to know only a month back but he has refused to do so giving rise to cause of action for the suit.

The following prayer was made in the suit:

''The Khasra Girdwari entry for the year 1953-54 with regard to the land detailed in para no. 1 of the plaint is incorrect in so far as it records the land as Ghari Mumkin because the land was a cultivated area in the Khud Kasht cultivation of the plaintiff, as a part of his holding during the year 1953-54 and hence, the order of the Revenue Assistant, Delhi, passed about a year and a half ago, about which the plaintiff came to know only a month back is ultra-vires, illegal and beyond jurisdiction as it was not the area in the year 1953-54 which could vest in the Gaon Sabha defendant u/s 7/154 of the Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954.

A bare perusal of the above paragraphs of the plaint discloses that the petitioner herein was aggrieved by order of vesting of land in Gaon Sabha that had been passed by the Revenue Assistant in terms of Sections 7 and 154 of the Act. It was claimed that the order of the Revenue Assistant vesting the land with Gaon Sabha was illegal and ultra vires and beyond jurisdiction. The object and purpose of the suit was therefore to get a declaration that the order passed by the Revenue Assistant declaring the land as vested in Gaon Sabha was wrong. It was claimed that the revenue entries in the khasra girdawari for the year 1953-54 should be ignored and as the entries were wrongly recorded. The order of vesting in favour of the Gaon Sabha passed by the Revenue Assistant Under the Act was bad as the Petitioner was in possession of land in 1953-54. Copy of the evidence recorded and copy of the judgment passed in the said suit is not available. Parties were asked to furnish copy of the judgment, but both the petitioner and the respondents have expressed their inability to do so on the ground of non-availability. What is available is only the decree dated 1st February, 1961 in terms of the prayer clause. The decree also states that order of Revenue Assistant, Delhi is ultra vires, illegal and without jurisdiction.

In Gaon Sabha of Lado Saral Vs. Jage Ram, it has been held by this Court that jurisdiction of a Court depends upon allegations made in the plaint but a plaintiff by clever drafting of his prayers cannot exclude or include relief as to confer jurisdiction on a Court to try a suit. It is necessary to consider the cause of action in the plaint and the substantive relief that the plaintiff will be entitled to, if he is to succeed in a suit. While reading the plaint it is the substance and not the form which matters. The nature of the claim made in the suit and the underlying object has to be kept in mind. The purpose of examining the plaint is to understand the real relief which the plaintiff wants. Reference in this regard can also be made to the judgments of the Supreme Court in I.T.C. Limited Vs. Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal and Others, and Begum Sabiha Sultan Vs. Nawab Mohd. Mansur Ali Khan and Others,

In Sopan Sukhdeo Sable and Others Vs. Assistant Charity Commissioner and Others, at page 147, it has been held as under:

There cannot be any compartmentalisation, dissection, segregation and inversions of the language of various paragraphs in the plaint. If such a course is adopted it would run counter to the cardinal canon of interpretation according to which a pleading has to be read as a whole to ascertain its true import. It is not permissible to cull out a sentence or a passage and to read it out of the context in isolation. Although it is the substance and not merely the form that has to be looked into, the pleading has to be construed as it stands without addition or subtraction or words or change of its apparent grammatical sense. The intention of the party concerned is to be gathered primarily from the tenor and terms of his pleadings taken as a whole. At the same time it should be borne in mind that no pedantic approach should be adopted to defeat justice or hair-splitting technicalities.

Submission of the learned counsel for Respondent 2 Trust was that requirement of law being reading the plaint in its totality, the appellants cannot take the plea that they would give up or relinquish some of the reliefs sought for. That would not be permissible. The plea clearly overlooks the basic distinction between statements of the facts disclosing cause of action and the reliefs sought for. The reliefs claimed do not constitute the cause of action. On the contrary, they constitute the entitlement, if any, on the basis of pleaded facts. As indicated above, Order 6 Rule 2 requires that pleadings shall contain and contain only, a statement in a concise form of the material facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim. If the plea of Mr. Savant, learned counsel for the respondent Trust is accepted, the distinction between the statement of material facts and the reliance on them for the claim shall be obliterated. What is required in law is not the piecemeal reading of the plaint but in its entirety.

Whether the reliefs would be granted on the pleaded facts and the evidence adduced is totally different from the relief claimed. All the reliefs claimed may not be allowed to a party on the pleadings and the evidence adduced. Whether part of the relief cannot be granted by the civil court is a different matter from saying that because of combined claim of reliefs, the jurisdiction is ousted or no cause of action is disclosed. Considering the reliefs claimed vis-a-vis the pleadings would not mean compartmentalisation or segregation, in that sense. The plea raised by the respondent Trust is therefore clearly unacceptable.

After enforcement of the Act in 1954, ownership or proprietary rights in land were extinguished. The Act, grants bhumidari rights or asami rights to the tenants or the actual tillers. Proprietors who were Khudkasht or Sirs were also protected. All other lands were to vest in Gaon Sabha. Relevant portion of Section 11(1) of the Act reads as under:-

11(1). Subject to the provisions of Section 10, the Deputy Commissioner shall declare as Bhumidars persons holding the following lands, namely:

(a) Khud Kasht land or a proprietor''s grove in the tracts to which the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887, was applicant or Sir Land or Khud Kasht land or a proprietor''s grove in the tracts to which the Agra Tenancy Act, 1901, was applicable;

(b) X X X X

(c) X X X X

(2) For the purposes of sub-section (1), the Deputy Commissioner shall take into consideration the entries in the revenue records which shall be presumed to be correct unless the contrary is proved.

Provided that, where land held as Khud Khast by a proprietor......

Section 11(2) of the Act stipulates that for the purpose of Subsection (1), the Deputy Commissioner shall take into consideration the entries in the revenue record which shall be presumed to be correct, unless contrary is proved. The entries in the revenue record are therefore not binding to decide the question of bhumidari rights and every applicant can prove and establish that the entries in the record are not correct and stake his claim as a bhumidar.

A reading of the plaint shows that the petitioner''s predecessor in interest, Mr. Roop Chand was aware that he had not been declared bhumidar of the land and in terms of Section 7/154 of the Act the land was declared as vested with the Gaon Sabha. This is the reason why in the plaint filed by Mr. Roop Chand reference has been made to entries made by the Revenue Assistant in 1953-54 and in the prayer clause challenge was made to the Revenue entries. The object and purpose of filing the suit in 1961 was to get over this order passed by the Revenue Assistant under the Act declaring the land as vested with Gaon Sabha. This claim in fact was required to be made in terms of Section 11 of the Act by Mr. Roop Chand before the Revenue Authorities and not before the Civil Court. Section 11(2) of the Act entitled Mr. Roop Chand to prove and establish that the revenue entries for the year 1953-54 were incorrect and accordingly claim bhumidari rights. Once we reach the above conclusion, it necessarily flows that the Civil Court could not have gone into and decided the question of vesting of the land in Gaon Sabha and pass a decree for declaration in terms of the averments and the prayer made in the plaint. In substance the cause of action for filing of the plaint was the order of the Revenue Assistant under the Act by which he had refused to accept bhumidari rights of the petitioner on the land and had declared that the land vests in Gaon Sabha. Mr. Roop Chand was aggrieved by this action and the order passed by the Revenue Assistant vesting the land with Gaon Sabha had prompted him to file the civil suit. The effect of the claim made in the Suit was to ensure grant of Bhumidari right u/s 11(1) of the Act on the ground that he was Khudkashtkar in the revenue records in the year 1953-54. Entries in the revenue records do not confer title and has only "fiscal purpose'''' i.e. payment of revenue (Refer, Suraj Bhan and Others Vs. Financial Commissioner and Others, and Balwant Singh and another etc. Vs. Daulat Singh (dead) by L.Rs. and others, . The motive and objective behind the suit was to claim Bhumidari right and not a mere correction in the revenue record.

In Hathi v. Sunder Singh (Supra) the Supreme Court has held that the Act is a complete Code in itself and in the light of Section 185 read with Schedule 1 of the Act, claim for Bumidari rights has to be adjudicated and decided under the Act itself and Civil Courts do not have jurisdiction to decide any issue mentioned in Schedule 1, unless reference is made to a Civil Court in terms of Section 186 of the Act.

Section 40 of the Delhi Land Revenue Act refers to the annual register which is to be maintained and the entries to be recorded therein. The purpose and object behind Section 40 of the Delhi Land Revenue Act is not to make the entries final and binding. The Section itself protects the rights of the parties in case of disputes to settle their inter se claims on any interest on the land in a Civil Court. However, this Section has to be read along with Section 11, 185 and Schedule I of the Act, in so far as matters covered by Schedule I are concerned. Civil Court does not have any jurisdiction as the Act is a complete Code for deciding all questions and claims mentioned in Schedule I. Section 40 of the Delhi Land Revenue Act stipulates that entries made in the revenue record do not have finality and a binding effect, so as to prevent parties from making a claim to the contrary. Section 40 of the Delhi Land Revenue Act of the Delhi Land Revenue Act does not specifically confer jurisdiction on a Civil Court but recognises that Civil Courts may continue to have jurisdiction on questions or disputes relating to any interest on the land. Jurisdiction of the Civil Courts is not conferred, expanded or curtailed by Section 40 the Delhi Land Revenue Act. The said Act is neutral in this regard. Section 185 read with Schedule 1 of the Act. however, curtails and takes away jurisdiction of the Civil Courts to deal with all questions mentioned in the said Schedule including the question of bhumidari rights mentioned in Section 11 of the Act. Therefore, while deciding the question whether a Civil Court has jurisdiction, we have to examine Section 185 of the Act read with Schedule I and not Section 40 of the Delhi Land Revenue Act. Whether the plaint passes the test of Section 185 read with Schedule I is the question which has to be answered. If Section 185 read with Schedule I is attracted, a decree hit by the said provisions will be a nullity.

As already noticed above, judgment of the Civil Court has not been produced by the petitioner and is not available. The exact findings recorded by the Civil Courts are not known. What operates as res judicata is the decision given by the Court.

There is another way of looking at the entire controversy. Admittedly, the land has not been cultivated by Mr. Roop Chand or his legal heirs after 1953. The application claiming bhumidari rights came to be filed only in 1981, nearly 26 years after the Act was enforced. The original revenue records produced before me show that on 15th December, 1961 some entries on the basis of the judgment and decree of the Civil Court were made but these were annulled subsequently on 14th June, 1964 on the ground the Civil Court did not have jurisdiction and the decree passed was a nullity. The petitioner did not take any steps to execute the decree before the Civil Court and get the entries corrected in the revenue records. In 1981, when the petitioner filed the application before the Revenue Assistant for including their names as bhumidars in the revenue records of 1953-54 the land had been shown as ghair mumkin masjid and not as khud khast of Mr. Roop Chand. The petitioner on the basis of Section 11(2) could have led evidence to establish that the entries made in the year 1953-54 were incorrect. No evidence was led. No evidence in support of Bhumidari rights has been relied upon even before this Court. Only reliance was placed upon the decree of the Civil Court which as already stated above is a nullity. In view of the above, I do not find any merit in the present Writ Petition and the same is accordingly dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.