Bhagwandas vs Liladhar

Mohammad Rafiq, J.—This appeal has been filed by Bhagwandas dissatisfied with the judgment & decree dt. 22.11.1984 passed by learned Additional District Judge, Dholpur whereby, it decreed the suit filed by him for declaration and recovery of possession and in the alternative, if the main relief is not granted due to any defect in the title of defendants No. 1 to 4, for recovery of sale amount of Rs. 7735/-, was decreed in part alongwith interest @ 12% p.a. pendent lite against defendants No. 1 to 9, whereas the suit was dismissed against defendant No. 10. The suit property comprised of House No. E.P. C/354 and land appurtenant thereto situated in ''Badi'' town, which was originally owned by one Majid Khan, who on partition of the country, went to Pakistan and his property was declared as evacuee property by the Custodian Department. The Custodian Department conducted auction of the said house. Plaintiff gave highest bid for Rs. 7,000/-, which was accepted and defendant No. 4 Managing Officer, Custodian Department, Alwar issued a sale certificate in his favour dt. 08-12-1969 (Exh. 14). Boundaries of the property were narrated in para 1 of the plaint, according to which, towards the northern side of the said house, there is house of Ramprasad Vaishya, towards the southern side, there is ''nohra'' of the ownership of the plaintiff and his brother and on the eastern side thereof, there is a public way and on the western side, there is another house of Ram Prasad Vaishya, father of the plaintiff, Receipts in regard to the payment were exhibited as Exh. 16 & Exh. 17. Acceptance of the bid of the plaintiff dt. 10.10.1968 is Exh. 3. On the date when the sale was affected in favour of the plaintiff, defendants No. 5 to 10 were residing in the property, which comprised of a house and land appurtenant to it in Mohalla Kiri, Town Badi, District Dholpur. Defendant No. 5 claimed to be the owner of the said property. He on 07-02-1970 sold part of the suit property, situated in South-East comer, which was in a triangular shape, to defendant No. 10 for consideration of Rs. 1500/- vide registered sale-deed. Defendants No. 1 to 4 did not get possession of the property in dispute nor took any action against defendants No. 5 to 10. Plaintiff thereafter filed a suit with aforementioned prayers. Defendants No. 1 to 4 did not appear before the trial Court and therefore proceedings against them were drawn ex-parte, Defendants No. 5 to 9 filed a composite written statement, They asserted that they were residing in the suit property as its owner and are in possession of the same. They also admitted that plaintiff was never put in possession of the said property. Plaintiff had no cause of action to file suit against defendants. Value of the property is no less than Rs. 15,000/- and therefore, lesser Court fee has been paid. They pleaded ignorance about auction of the property of Rs. 7000/-. It was denied that the disputed property is an evacuee property. Defendants were in possession of the same much prior to 1947 and therefore there was no question of the disputed property, being an evacuee property. Neither any notice of auction was affixed on the property nor any such notice was ever served upon the defendants nor their possession in the property was disturbed. They throughout continued to be in possession of the disputed property. Suit was barred because defendants'' predecessors are in possession of the suit property. Kale Khan, father of defendants No. 6 to 8 and husband of defendant No. 9, was in possession and thereafter Meer Khan along with defendants No. 6 to 9 where in its possession. It was their ancestral property. Suit be therefore dismissed.

Defendant No. 10 also filed separate written statement and admitted that he purchased the suit property from defendant No. 5.

Learned trial Court on the basis of the pleadings of the parties, framed following seven issues:--

Whether the suit Property including the property bearing E.P. No. C/354, transferred by the defendant No. 5 to the defendant No. 10, was an evacuee property and has been sold to the plaintiff under the Displaced Persons (Compensation & Rehabilitation) Rules, 1955?

Whether the suit is not within limitation?

Whether the suit has been undervalued and the Court fee paid is insufficient?

Whether the plaintiff is entitled to get back Rs. 7000/- alongwith interest, if the decision of the issue No. 1 goes against him?

What relief, if any, the plaintiff is entitled to?

Whether the jurisdiction of this Court is barred by Sections 28 & 46 of Administration of Evacuee Property Act and Section 29 of Displaced Persons (Compensation & Rehabilitation) Act to adjudicate about the property in question?

Whether the suit is barred by Sections 28 & 46 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act?

Plaintiff Bhagwandas in support of his case, got examined himself as P.W.1, Karan Singh as P.W.2, whereas from the side of defendants No. 5 to 9, Yusuf Khan was examined as D.W. 1, Panna as D.W. 2, Mohd. Hussain Khan as D.W. 3, Radheyshyam as D.W. 4, Dwarika Prasad as D.W. 5 and Hamid Ali Khan as D.W. 6. Respondent No. 2 Padam Sukh appeared on behalf of defendant No. 10 as D.W. 10/1.

Learned trial Court on evidence of the parries though decided Issues No. 1 to 7 in favour of the plaintiff but decreed the suit with costs only against defendants No. 1 to 9, whereas dismissed the suit against defendant No. 10. The suit was decreed in the terms that House bearing E.P. No. C/354 is duly purchased by the plaintiff from the Custodian Department and he holds the title of the same and plaintiff would be entitled to recover possession of the house from defendants No. 2 to 9 to that extent and that if due to reason of any defect in title of defendants No. 1 to 4 in the disputed property, possession of which cannot be handed over to the plaintiff, he be granted a sum of Rs. 7000/- with interest @ 12% p.a. pendent lite from the date of filing of the suit till its realization from defendants No. 1 to 4.

Shri Yash Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff-appellant has argued that the trial Court having given positive finding on Issue No. 1 in favour of the plaintiff-appellant and against defendants No. 5 to 9, regarding ownership and title in the evacuee property E.P. No. C/354, wrongly dismissed the suit against defendant No. 10. It, has failed to consider the oral as well as documentary evidence available on record. The possession of the plaintiff in the evacuee property i.e. the house and the land appurtenant to it, was established by evidence. Despite this, learned trial Court erred in law in holding that there is no oral or documentary evidence to show that the land, which was in possession of defendant No. 10 was appurtenant to the house of Mazid Khan i.e. E.P. No. C/354, auctioned to the plaintiff. Windows as well as water spouts attached of this house opens/falls on the land in question, which was also purchased by the plaintiff along with the house in the auction proceedings. Sale certificate dt. 02-12-1969 (Exh. 14) clearly indicates boundaries of the land sold to him, comprise parcels of land and house of Mujid Khan bearing No. C/354. On Northern Side thereof, there is a house of Jangi, on Southern-Eastern side, there is a road and on Western side, there is house of Ram Prasad Vaishya. The triangular shaped land falls within the aforesaid boundaries. Learned trial Court did not appreciate the fact that there is a presumption of validity in regard to sale by the Custodian Authorities under the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 attracting Section 114(e) of the Indian Evidence Act. 1872. Since both the parties joined Issue No. 1, the question of burden of proof remains academic as held by the Hon''ble Apex Court in Narayan Bhagwantrao Gosavi Balajiwale Vs. Gopal Vinayak Gosavi and Others, . Defendants failed to produce on record any proof to show how they were having title in the disputed triangular shaped land. Defendant No. 5 Meer Khan, who sold this land to defendant No. 10 Liladhar, was an evacuee property appurtenant to the house with respect to which, the suit has been decreed but the learned trial Court declined to accept this part of suit, which ought to have decreed.

Shri Yash Sharma, counsel learned for plaintiff-appellant further argued that defendants cannot raise plea now before this Court that the suit before the civil Court was not maintainable in view of the bar contained in Sections 28 & 46 of the Act of 1950. Trial Court framed Issues No. 6 and 7 in regard to decision of the suit and decided the same in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants. Defendants neither have filed any cross appeal nor any cross objection challenging the aforesaid findings on Issues No. 6 & 7. Defendants cannot be therefore permitted to raise such objection. Relying on the judgment of this Court in Wazira and Another Vs. Shamulal and Others, , learned counsel for the appellant argued that Section 46 does not create an absolute bar against a civil Court dealing with a matter, which may have been decided by custodian under the Act of 1950. The suit can be entertained only when the custodian acts without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction. Since in the present case, the custodian failed to exercise its jurisdiction and did not take possession from the defendants, therefore, suit was maintainable. Section 28 of the Act of 1950 merely provides that order made by the custodian as well as other officers as mentioned in the said provision shall be final and shall not be called in question in any Court by way of appeal or revision or in any original suit, application or execution proceedings. Since the plaintiff-appellant did not challenge any order of the aforesaid authorities, therefore, the said provision would not render the suit filed by him without jurisdiction.

Shri Yash Sharma, learned counsel further argued that defendant-respondents for the first time cannot be allowed to raise the argument before this Court that the present suit could not have been decreed against defendants No. 2 to 9 because they did not file suit for setting aside or cancellation of registered sale-deed executed by defendant No. 5 in favour of defendant No. 10. It is argued that once the disputed property is held to have been auctioned by custodian authorities under the Act of 1950 in favour of the plaintiff, subsequent sale by defendant No. 5 to defendant No. 10. Who did not possess any title in triangular shaped land, was void. Relying on the judgment of Madras High Court in In Re: Thirupathiammal , learned counsel argued that plaintiff, not being a party to the sale-deed, the sale-deed is a sham transaction qua him and thus the plaintiff need not pray for cancellation of such document because third party is not bound by a document of the description in question and not obliged to sue for cancellation. It was submitted that the plaintiff made the primary prayer seeking declaration and dispossession of the defendants from the suit property and direction to the defendants to handover possession of the evacuee property auctioned with and alternative prayer for refund of the money along with interest @ 12% p.a. pendent lite if due to any defect in the title in the subject property of defendants No. 1 to 4 plaintiff cannot get the suit property. Once the trial Court came to the conclusion that disputed property was an evacuee property and the custodian authorities had right to auction the same and accordingly decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff against defendants No. 5 to 9, there was no occasion for the trial Court to have also passed the alternative decree of refund of sale consideration. It is therefore prayed that the appeal be allowed and the judgment and decree of the trial Court be set-aside only to the extent it has dismissed the suit against defendant No. 10 and the suit be decreed against defendant No. 10 regarding part of the land.

Shri B.K. Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the defendant-respondent No. 10 opposed the appeal and argued that plaintiff-Bhagwandas (P.W.1) in his cross examination categorically admitted that measurement of the land has not been mentioned in the sale certificate (Exh. 14) and only the boundaries were mentioned. When he (Plaintiff) inquired from the custodian department, they informed him that full house has been sold to him. The boundaries of the house were mentioned in the sale certificate (Exh. 14). This Clearly shows that only the house was sold and not the land outside the house. Learned counsel argued that alternative prayer was made by the plaintiff for refund of amount of Rs. 7735/- together with interest @ 12% p.a. pendent lite and damages if possession is not restored to him for reason of defect in title of the custodian department. That part of the prayer has also been granted by the trial Court under Issue No. 4, which was decided in favour of the plaintiff. Once the alternative prayer of refund of the prayed amount with interest @ 12% p.a. pendent lite has been accepted, main part of the decree is enforceable only against respondents No. 1 to 4. It was argued that in para 4 of the plaint, the fact about sale of this land vide sale-deed dt. 07-02-1970 by defendant No. 5 to defendant No. 10 has been mentioned. The plaintiff thus had full knowledge of the sale of the disputed triangular shaped land by defendant No. 5 to defendant No. 10. Even then, he has not prayed for cancellation or setting aside the sale-deed. In absence of prayer for setting aside the sale deed, no such relief could have been granted by the trial Court.

Shri B.K. Sharma, learned counsel for defendant No. 10 further argued that the suit was filed describing the boundaries of the disputed house i.e. E.P. C/354 in para 1 of the plaint and it is to that extent the disputed property has been described by the learned trial Court in the impugned decree. The plaintiff-appellant is now seeking to expand the scope of the suit by trying to cover even such land, which fell outside the aforesaid boundaries. The triangular shaped land, which was sold by defendant No. 5 to defendant No. 10, was never part of the evacuee property i.e. House No. E.P. C/354 auctioned to the plaintiff. The sale certificate (Exh. 14) also did not specifically cover the land of defendant No. 10.

Shri B.K. Sharma, learned counsel further argued that Issues No. 6 and 7 have wrongly been decided by the learned trial Court in favour of the plaintiff. Issue No. 6 was whether the suit was barred by Sections 28 & 46 of Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 and Section 29 of Displaced Persons (Compensation & Rehabilitation) Act. Learned Counsel submitted that even if the defendant No. 10 has not filed any cross appeal or cross objection, this Court nevertheless can examine correctness of those findings, which go to the root of the case, Learned counsel for the defendant-respondent No. 10 in support of argument has placed reliance upon the judgments of the Supreme Court in Ram Gopal Reddy Vs. Additional Custodian Evacuee Property, Hyderabad, & Custodian of Evacuee Property Punjab and Others Vs. Jafran Begum, . It is, therefore, prayed the appeal be dismissed.

I have given my anxious consideration to the rival submissions and carefully studied the material available on record and cited case law.

A bare perusal of the sale certificate (Exh. 14), reveals that the triangular shaped land, which was sold by defendant No. 5 to defendant No. 10, was not part of the evacuee property i.e. House No. E.P. C/354 as it did not specifically cover the land of defendant No. 10. Plaintiff-Bhagwandas in his statement as P.W.1 specifically stated that at the relevant time, Meer khan and his family members were residing in the disputed house for last 8-10 years. The house belonged to Majid khan, who upon partition of the country in 1947-48, left for Pakistan and thereafter it was the evacuee property. The triangular shaped land was sold by Meer Khan to Liladhar for consideration of Rs. 1500/-. When the house was auctioned, the land was lying open. Specific description of that triangular shaped land is not mentioned in the sale certificate (Exh. 14). When he inquired from the custodian, they informed him (plaintiff) that full house has been sold to him, boundaries of which were indicated in the sale certificate. On the basis of this, plaintiff now seeks to assert that full house would include the land, which is appurtenant to the auctioned house.

Regarding plea of the plaintiff that defendants cannot raise plea now before this Court that the suit before the civil Court was not maintainable in view of the bar contained in Sections 28 and 46 of the Act of 1950 since they have neither filed cross-appeal nor cross-objection challenging the findings of the trial Court on Issue No. 6 and 7 decided in favour of the plaintiff, it is to be noted that order 41 Rule 33 CPC of the code of Civil procedure, 1908 provides for the powers of the appellate Court in such like situation. It provides that the appellate Court shall have power to pass any decree and make any orders which ought to have been passed or made and to pass or make such further or other decree or order as the case may require. The object of Order 41 Rule 33 C.P.C. is to enable the appellate Court to do complete justice between the parties and if the justice of the case may require, to pass any decree or order, which ought in law to have been passed by the trial Court but not passed by it. If the circumstances of the case and the interest of justice demand the variation of the decree, then the appellate Court can deal with the case in a way, which seems to be equitable to all the parties concerned and to vary or modify the decree as the nature of the case may require, The rule further empowers the appellate Court to make whatever order/decree it deems fit, not only as between the appellant and the respondents but, also, as between the respondent and the respondents. Filing or non-filing of appeal or cross-objection does not create a bar for the appellate Court in passing a decree in favour of the respondents if the question raised properly arise out of the judgment of the lower Court and the parties are before the appellate Court, though may be in a different capacity, The rule has thus been couched in such a way that it gives wide discretion to the appellate Court to consider any objection against any part of the judgment or decree of the lower Court and empowers the Court to vary or reverse the same in order to avoid inconsistent, contradictory and unworkable decision.

The Supreme Court in S. Nazeer Ahmed Vs. State Bank of Mysore and Others, expressed the similar view that Order XLI Rule 33 enables the appellate Court to pass any decree that ought to have been passed by the trial Court or grant any further decree, as the case may require and the power could be exercised notwithstanding that the appeal was only against a part of the decree and could even be exercised in favour of the respondents, though the respondents might not have filed any appeal or objection against what has been decreed. In the considered opinion of this Court, therefore, notwithstanding that respondents have not filed any appeal or objection against the findings of the trial Court on Issues No. 6 and 7, since the objections that are sought to be raised go to the root of the matter and the appeal being continuation of the suit, is in fact rehearing of the suit, where in the appellate Court has the power to re-appreciate the entire evidence afresh--oral as well as documentary so as to test correctness of findings recorded by the trial Court and give its own conclusion, there is no impediment in examining any pure legal objection.

Trial Court has while deciding Issues No. 6 and 7 relied on the three-judge bench judgment of the Supreme Court in Custodian of Evacuee Property Punjab and Others Vs. Jafran Begum, , wherein the Supreme Court held that plaintiff has not prayed for any relief, which may have effect of questioning the finality of orders passed by any party under the Act of 1950. He has also not prayed for any relief that the property has been wrongly declared as evacuee property or it has wrongly been sold in auction by the custodian department. The reasoning given by the learned trial Court in support of its finding appears to be well founded. In fact, the plaintiff did not approach the trial Court questioning the order passed by any of the authorities under the Act of 1950, which could attract the bar of Section 28 nor did the plaintiff approach the trial Court seeking declaration that property auctioned by the custodian authority was not evacuee property nor did he question legality of the auction conducted by the custodian department. In fact, plaintiff approached the civil Court when he failed to get possession of the property despite he acquired title therein on the strength of sale certificate issued by the custodian department. The other ancillary question, which the defendant No. 10 has raised before the trial Court, was whether the triangular shaped land was earlier part of the property i.e. House E.P. No. C/354 auctioned by the custodian department to the plaintiff. That essentially was a question of fact and could be decided only by evidence by the civil Court particularly when in the sale certificate (Exh. 14), only description of the boundaries of the property was mentioned and not measurement. Learned trial Court, in the considered view of this Court, did not commit any error in deciding Issues No. 6 and 7 in favour of the plaintiff holding that the suit was maintainable.

The plaintiff-appellant in the present case has failed to prove that his triangular shaped land was part of the property of House No. E.P. C/354 by required standard of proof. As regards the objection raised by the learned counsel for the defendants that the suit was liable to be rejected because plaintiff has not prayed in the suit for setting aside the sale-deed executed by defendant No. 5 in favour of defendant No. 10 this objection is not sustainable for the simple reason that plaintiffs claim was based on the sale certificate issued by the Managing Officer, Custodian Department, Jaipur for purchase of the evacuee property and therefore the scope of the suit was whether or not the disputed land, which was sold by defendant No. 5 to defendant No. 10 by the aforesaid sale deed, was covered in the House No. E.P. C/354 auctioned to the plaintiff.

Having held so, the core question that may now be examined is whether plaintiff on the basis of evidence, could prove so.

In para 1 of the plaint, plaintiff described the boundaries of the property thus: North-house of Ramprased Vaishya, South-''nohra'' of the ownership of the plaintiff and his brother and East-public way and west-another house of Ram Prasad Vaishya, father of the plaintiff. When this description is compared with the sale certificate (Exh. 14) issued by the custodian department, while description of three boundaries on Northern side, Eastern side and Western side is the same but there appears to be disparity in what is stated in the sale certificate with respect to boundaries of Southern side, than what is pleaded in para 1 of the plaint. Though in the sale certificate (Exh. 14), road is shown on the southern side, the plaintiff in the plaint has shown existence of a ''nohra'' on southern side owned by his brother and thereafter a public way. He has not at all explained this disparity in his statement when he examined himself as P.W.1.

Bhagwandas (P.W. 1) in his statement has stated that the land sold by defendant No. 5 to defendant No. 10 on the southern side is abutting the road. There were number of houses in the entire land but all were burnt during partition, Karan Singh (P.W.2) has also stated that house of Majid Khan was later on declared as evacuee property, which was purchased by the plaintiff in auction. In cross-examination, he stated that on the South-Eastern side of the house is a road. He has seen the land always lying open. Liladhar has purchased this land from Meer Khan. He has not seen Majid Khan even in premises of this land. He has also seen his goats tied there. Liladhar D.W. 10/D.W. 1 has stated in his statement that he has triangular shaped land. Which is 39 feet on the Northern Side, 44x7 feet towards the Western side. He purchased this land for consideration of Rs. 1500/- from defendant No. 5-Meer khan, who used to keep his cattle/goats. Meer Khan received this land from Zamindar. Though all this oral evidence of the defendants does not throw any light as to the nature of title of defendant No. 5 or that of defendant No. 10, but it makes one thing clear that triangular shaped land was outside the disputed house, which was auctioned by the custodian department to plaintiff (P.W.1). Plaintiff himself has failed to prove by any cogent and legally acceptable evidence that this open land was also covered by the sale certificate (Exh. 14) issued by the Custodian Department. He has rather in cross examination admitted that when he went to inquire from the custodian department, they informed him that only full house has been sold to him, boundaries of which were described in the certificate of Sale (Ext. 14).

Panna (D.W. 2) has not said anything about the triangular shaped land although he has justified possession of defendants No. 5 to 9 in the disputed house. Fact that Karan Singh (P.W.2) has stated that Majid Khan was not in possession of this triangular shaped land, clearly demolishes the case of the plaintiff because what he purchased in auction from the custodian department is the property, which was declared evacuee upon Majid Khan leaving the country for Pakistan at the time of partition and it was the house No. E.P. C/354, which alone was declared as evacuee property. Even as per the documentary evidence, plaintiff has miserable failed to prove that disputed triangular shaped land was part of the house of Meer khan, boundaries of which have been described in the sale certificate (Exh. 14), as already discussed above. Some of the other documents produced by the plaintiff are objections such as Exh. 18 dt. 20-04-1967 & Exh. 19 dt. 01-04-1967 submitted by Meer khan before the custodian department that the disputed haveli/house may not be auctioned as it belongs to them. Exh. 20 is the copy of the statement of Meer Khan recorded by the Assistant Custodian, Alwar. Exh. I is the copy of the order dt. 27-02-1969 passed by the Assistant Custodian, Alwar rejecting objections of Meer Khan, Exh. 2 is the copy of the order dt. 13-06-1967 similarly rejecting his objections, Exh. 21 is the application of the plaintiff submitted to the Managing officer, Custodian Department, Alwar to issue the letter of allotment with respect to House No. E.P. No. C/354, Exh. 3 is the letter of acceptance of bid dt. 10-10-1969 addressed to the plaintiff by the Managing Officer, Custodian Department, Alwar, Exh. 16 & Exh. 17 are the receipts of deposit of the auctioned money, Exh. 4 is the copy of sale-deed executed by defendant No. 5 Meer Khan in favour of defendant No. 10 Liladhar and Exh. 22 is the notice served by the counsel for plaintiff on defendants No. 1 to 4. None of these documents give description of the auctioned property in such a way as to cover the triangular shaped land, which is outside the house, as part of the house auctioned to the plaintiff.

It is trite that when a plaintiff brings a suit seeking declaration, he has to stand on his foot and not on the weakness of the case of the defendant. The plaintiff has to prove his case by his own evidence. His case cannot be taken as proved just because the defendants failed to produce any evidence. Although, if, in a given case, the plaintiff has, by producing evidence, discharged his burden of proving the case, onus will shift to defendants and in that event, it is for the defendants to prove their case by producing evidence in rebuttal. Section 101 of the Evidence Act, 1872, provides that whoever desires any Court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts, must prove that those facts exist. When a person is bound to prove the existence of any fact, it is said that the burden of proof lies on that person. Section 102 of the Act of 1872 provides that the burden of proof in a suit or proceeding lies on that person, who would fail if no evidence at all were given on either side. As per Sec. 103 of the Act of 1872, the burden of proof as to any particular fact lies on that person, who wishes the Court to believe in its existence, unless it is provided by any law that the proof of that fact shall lie on any particular person.

Coming lastly to the alternative prayer granted by the learned trial Court while decreeing the suit, not only granted the main prayer but also alternative prayer made by the plaintiff in the suit. Main prayer contained in the relief clause of the plaint was with regard to recovery of possession of the house from defendants, boundaries of which have been described in para 1 of the plaint. Suit with respect to property mentioned in para 1 of the plaint was decreed by the learned trial Court as against defendants No. 1 to 9. The alternative prayer was to the effect that if due to any defect in the title of defendants No. 1 to 4 in the disputed property, its possession cannot be handed over to the plaintiff, he be granted a sum of Rs. 7735/- with interest @ 12% p.a. pendent lite. It is in the context of that prayer, learned trial Court has also passed the alternative decree. The suit as against defendant. No. 10 was dismissed. The plaintiff is thus entitled to enforce the decree in respect of either part of the directions contained in para 22(1) of the judgment; viz. either for recovery of possession as against defendants No. 2 to 9, or if for any reason whatsoever, this is not possible, then to enforce the alternative decree contained in para 22(3) of the operative part of the judgment, for recovery of sale consideration with interest pendent lite, as against defendants No. 1 to 4.

In view of above discussion, I do not find any infirmity in the impugned judgment and decree dt. 22-11-1984 passed by learned additional District Judge, Dholpur. The appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs. The record be sent back to the trial Court forthwith.