Bhagwandas vs Pyarelal

Shinde, C.J.—This is an appeal u/s (sic) Workmen''s Compensation Act by Bhagwan (sic) Sureshchandra Ginning Factory Sendhwa again the order of the Commissioner for Work Compensation, by which the Appellant was dir to pay to the Respondent a sum of Rs. 735/- facts of the case are briefly as follows:

On 10-2-1949 Radhelal Jaiswal, Ge (sic) Secretary. Majdoor Congress Indore, wrote to commissioner for Workmen''s Compensation one Pyarelal of Anjad lost his right thumb in accident while working in Bhagwandas Ginn (sic) Factory, at Sendhwa; hence compensation awarded to Pyarelal. After several notices: Defendant appeared and the Cominissioner; Workmen''s Compensation awarded Pyarelal pensation of Rs. 735/-. Being aggrieved by, order the Defendant has filed this appeal.

A preliminary objection has been raised the Respondent that as no substantial question law is involved in the appeal, this appeal cannot (sic) be entertained. Section 30, Workmen''s Compensation (sic) Act contains a proviso which reads thus(sic)

Provided that no appeal shall lie against order unless a substantial question of law involved in the appeal and....

It is clear, therefore, that the legislature provided for an appeal against the order of missioner only when there is a substantial connection (sic) of law involved in it. In this appeal although several points have been raised there is no (sic) which can be said to amount to a substance question of law. A Division Bench of this in Cri. Misc. Case No. 17 of 1951(A) held a question of law can be said be a substance question of law when by reason of the question being unsettled or by reason of there being conflict of existing authority as to the pring (sic) of law involved requires an authoritative concession (sic) on from the highest Court in the land.

The same view was taken by Chagla C.J.- Kaikhushroo Pirojsha Ghiara Vs. The C.P. Syndicate Ltd., (B). His Lordship observed follows:

The only guidance that we have had from Privy Council is that substantial question not necessarily a question which is of (sic) importance. It must be a substantial question of law as between the parties in the case volved. But here again it must not be forget that what is contemplated is not a question law alone; it must be a substantial question. One can define it negatively. For instance there is a well established principle of law that principle of law is applied to a give of facts, that would certainly not be stantial question of law. Where the question law is not well settled or where there is doubt as to the principle of law involved certainly would raise a substantial question law which would require a final adjudicate (sic) by the highest Court.

The same view was taken in - Abdur Rahman v. Raghbir Singh AIR 1951 P&H 313 (C and D). Sarnamsingh J. held that questions of law which have been definitely settled by the Privy Counsel or the High Courts in India are not substantial questions of law within Clause 3 of Section 110, CPC or Article 133, Constitution of India. From these authorities it is clear that a question or law can be said to be a substantial question law only when there may be some doubt difference of opinion. No such question of law been raised, in this appeal. This appeal, therefore, cannot be entertained.

This appeal can be rejected only on the round (sic) that it does not involve a substantial question of law. But even on merits this appeal cannot succeed. The counsel for the Appellant has used several points. His first contention is that no notice was given u/s 10, Workmen''s Compensation Act, the claim cannot be entered. This contention has no force. Section 10, previso (sic)(b) clearly states that if the employer (sic) any one of the several employers or any per (sic) responsible to the employer for the managers I any branch of the trade or business in such the injured workman was employed had wages of the accident from any other source or about the time when it occurred want source shall not be a bar to the entertainment of the (sic) a claim. That the Appellant had knowledge of (sic) accident is clear from his own written statement. He states clearly in his written statement that he felt grieved at the loss of Respondent''s thumb and. that he incurred sufficient expender (sic) on that account. This contention therefore, has (sic) no substance.

His second contention is that a claim can be (sic) entertained only if no agreement is reached between the parties. That the Appellant was not selling to pay any compensation to the responds clear from his own conduct. The Commissioner had to issue several notices before the Appellant appeared before him. The accident place on 30.11.1948. On 17-2-1949 a notice (sic) issued from the Department of Industries (sic) the Appellant to let the department know, he proposes to decide the claim of the indicated (sic), for compensation. The Appellant gave no (sic). In these circumstances this contention has force.

The third contention is that Rule 20, Workings Compensation Rules was not followed. contention also has no force. The application was sent by the Secretary, Majdoor Con (sic). Indore which is permitted by Section 24, Workmen''s Compensation Act. Besides if there be (sic) irregularity in the form of the application is not total to the entertainment of the claim. . T.S. Alagappa v. Veerappan AIR 1942 PC 116 (E), Horwill J. held that the Legislature |pt Intend that a claim should not be entered or enquired into, or that no compensation granted, unless the application were in from. It therefore there be any irregularity (sic) form of the application the claim for position (sic) cannot be rejected. Consequently (sic) contention, cannot be upheld.

The next contention of the Appellant is the preliminary inquiry was held. Rule 25, (sic) Compensation Rules gives a describe the Commissioner to hold a preliminary (sic). The rule does not make it obligatory (sic) a preliminary inquiry in every case. Con (sic) thus contention also has no substance.

The next contention of the Appellant is copy (sic) of the application was not sent to the Appellant. This contention appears to be an after-thought. In his written statement the Appellant has raised no objection with regard to this point. Besides the written statement gives replies to all points raised in the application. This shows that the Appellant did receive a copy of the application. In any case such an irregularity cannot defeat the claim of the Respondent as already stated.

The next contention raised by the Appellant is that no issues were framed in the case. It appears from the proceedings that the Appellant, was asked to appear on 20-2-1950. On that date the Appellant flied his written statement. That written statement does not raise any contentious points for determination. Besides the Appellant was asked to deposit the sum of Rs. 750/- on 13-3-1950. On that date the Appellant prayed for two days'' time from the Court stating that an agreement had been reached between him and the Respondent and that within two days he would either submit the compromise or deposit the sum. The Court granted two days time. On the appointed date the applicant neither submitted the compromise nor deposited the amount, but appointed Shree Thakkar as his Vakil and through him submitted an application stating that the factory was not responsible for the accident caused to Pyarelal. Even in the application submitted by Mr. Thakkar no mention has been made that the Appellant wanted to adduce any evidence. Pyarelal''s statement was recorded on 21-1-1950. The Appellant did not cross-examine Pyarelal. In these circumstances ii; cannot be said that the Court acted in a manner contrary to the procedure laid down. Rule 31 states that if the Commissioner finds it impossible to dispose of an application at one hearing he shall record the reasons which necessitate a postponement. This rule clearly indicates that the claim is to be decided as far as possible in one hearing. The Appellant was asked to be present on 20-2-1950 and although he was given two adjournments he still wanted a further adjournment. It is clear from the conduct of the Appellant that he wanted to prolong the case and delay the decision. In these circumstances there is no justification to interfere with the decision of the lower Court although it has not followed the procedure laid down by Rule 28, Workmen''s Compensation Rules.

The last contention raised by the Appellant is that the application is not properly submitted in so far as it has not been signed by the person injured. Section 24, Workmen''s Compensation Act permits a registered trade Union to submit an application on behalf of the injured person. The application in this case was submitted by the Secretary Majdoor Congress Indore. Consequently this contention also has no force.

The result is that this appeal has no force and is therefore, dismissed with costs.