Bhairo Prasad vs Additional District and Sessions Judge Xth and Others and Jagdish Narain and Another

V.K. Shukla, J.—In Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 40870 of 2001, petitioner has questioned the validity of orders dated 07.08.2001 and 06.09.2001 passed by Additional District & Sessions Judge Xth, Kanpur Nagar, and for issuing a writ in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents not to give effect to the exparte order dated 23.12.1988 passed by Prescribed Authority and the judgment and order dated 20.11.1992 as affirmed in appeal. By way of amendment application, validity of order dated 07.01.2008 has also been questioned. Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 23914 of 2006 has been filed questioning the validity of orders dated 23.12.1988 and 31.03.2006.

Brief background of the case, as disclosed in the writ petition, is that Bhairo Prasad is the real brother of Jagdish Narain and both are staying at 11/45, Gwal Toli, Kanpur Nagar. Jagdish Narain purchased the said property in the name of his wife, and after the death of the wife, the same has vested in him on 08.04.1971. Jagdish Narain, claiming himself to be landlord of the premises in question, moved release application u/s 21 (1) (a) of U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 on 07.04.1986. In the said release application, as per Jagdish Narain, petitioner entered appearance through his counsel. Release application was allowed on 23.12.1988 and therein order of demolition was also passed with the right to reconstruct. Right of re-entry as provided u/s 24 (2) of the said Act, was assured to tenants. Against the said order dated 23.12.1988 appeal was filed, being Appeal No. 26 of 1989. Said appeal was dismissed with cost and three months'' time was allowed for vacating the premises in question. After the said appeal was dismissed, an application was moved on behalf of petitioner, contending therein that judgment and order which had been obtained on 20.01.1992 was nothing but an outcome of fraud and manipulation and in this background, request was made for recall of the aforesaid order in exercise of authority vested u/s 34 of U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 read with Rule 22 of 1972 Rules. After said application was moved objections were filed to the said application. Thereafter, petitioner requested on 21.05.1993 for rejecting the said objection and allowing restoration application. Thereafter, as far as other tenants are concerned, they questioned the validity of the order passed by appellate court by means of writ petition No. 8945 of 1992 before this Court and this Court on 12.08.1992 quashed the appellate order and directed the appellate authority to restore the appeal and decide the same on merits. Petitioner moved an application before the Prescribed Authority also mentioning therein that the proceedings initiated before the Prescribed Authority were also outcome of fraud and manipulation. To said application also objections were filed by Jagdish Narain on 10.04.1992. In between SCC Suit No. 336 of 1995 was filed by Jagdish Narain for arrears of rent. Said application was considered by the appellate authority on 07.08.2001 and it was found that no fraud had been practised and there was no occasion to cancel the order dated 20.01.1992. After the said order had been passed again Review application was moved and said application has also been rejected on 06.09.2001. At this juncture Civil Misc. Writ petition No. 40870 of 2001 was filed.

In the present case, from the records, it appears that attempt was made by this Court to get inter se dispute between the brothers settled amicably, but it appears that no interest was shown in this direction by petitioner, as such interim protection accorded was withdrawn.

As far as application which was filed, before the Prescribed Authority, same was taken up and it was rejected by order dated 28.01.2006, mentioning that suit can be filed. Appeal filed against the said order has also been dismissed vide order dated 31.03.2006. At this juncture writ petition No. 23914 of 2006 has been filed.

Pleadings inter se parties have been exchanged in both the writ petitions, and thereafter, matter has been taken up for final hearing and disposal with the consent of the parties.

Specific contention of petitioner has been that fraud has been practised upon him and he has not even signed Vakalatna, nor had instructed any counsel, and in this background, this Court on 19.02.2007 passed following order, which is being quoted:

Heard the counsel for the parties at some length. The case of the petitioner is that he was never a tenant of the disputed accommodation. It is not in dispute that the petitioner and the contesting respondent are brothers. The contesting respondent filed an application u/s 21 (1) (a) (b) of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 against the petitioner. One of the pleas raised therein was that the petitioner tenant has agreed to vacate the premises. The said release application was allowed by the Prescribed Authority and the said order has been confirmed in appeal. The contention of the petitioner is that as a matter of fact he is not the tenant of the disputed accommodation. Earlier his father was the tenant who died and the property in disputed was purchased by the respondent No. 3 in the name of his wife. The petitioner is residing in the disputed accommodation being a co-owner. His further case is that the property in dispute was purchased out of the Joint Hindu Family Fund and a suit for partition between the parties is pending.

An application to recall the order dismissing the appeal was filed before the court below on the ground that the entire proceedings was nothing but fraud on the court with the allegation that the petitioner never engaged any counsel nor he filed any written statement or preferred appeal or signed any Vakalatnama. During the pendency of the said restoration/recall application, the petitioner filed an application, a copy thereof has been filed as Annexure-4 to the writ petition stating that his admitted signatures from the bank accounts (details of which have been given in the application) may be got compared with the disputed signatures on the Vakalatnama, memo of appeal and the written statement etc.. The said application remained pending though filed in the year 1999 and the court below while writing the judgment observed that the said application was never pressed by the petitioner. The petitioner has denied the said observation made by the court below. For the proper appreciation of the dispute between the parties it seems desirable that the finding may be called for from the court below with regard to the fact as to whether the alleged signatures of the petitioner on the memo of the appeal, Vakalatnama do tally with the admitted signatures of the petitioner. In this regard, both the parties may produce report of handwriting expert and other documents in support of their respective cases. The petitioner shall appear before the court below on 1st of March, 2007 along with the certified copy of this order and shall furnish his admitted signatures for comparison and verification by the handwriting experts before the Additional District Judge, Kanpur (Court below). The Additional District Judge, Kanpur shall record a finding as to whether the disputed signatures of the petitioner do tally with the admitted signatures of the petitioner in the light of the evidence which may be produced by the parties and send the finding preferably within a period of three months from the date of production of the certified copy of this order.

List after three months.

After the said order had been passed, Additional District Judge considered the matter as directed by this Court. Finding has been returned that there is no fraud or misrepresentation and the signature appended is the signature of the petitioner himself. Said order has been questioned by way of amendment application, which has been allowed.

With the consent of the parties, both the writ petitions have been taken up together and are being decided by a common judgment.

Sri M.P. Srivastava, learned Counsel for the petitioner, contended with vehemence that this is a glaring case of fraud practised by elder brother on the younger brother taking undue advantage of his being elder, and this is not a case of fraud on party rather this is case of fraud on court and in the present case appellate authority has totally misdirected itself by not probing the fraud in its correct perspective and by illegally concluding that signature in appellate papers are of petitioner, whereas signatures have been compared with disputed signatures, and Prescribed Authority has totally misdirected itself by asking petitioner to file suit, as such orders impugned in both the writ petitions are liable to be quashed.

Sri Gopal Ji Saxena, learned Counsel appearing for another brother Jagdish Narain contended that on each and every stage of the proceedings petitioner had entered appearance through his counsel, participated in proceedings, and unnecessarily factum of fraud is being alleged and the falsity of the averments made by petitioner is fully supported from the finding which has been returned by the appellate court, as such no interference be made, in the facts of case and writ petition, as it has been framed and drawn is liable to be dismissed.

After respective arguments have been advanced, factual position which emerges in the present case and qua which there is no dispute, is that sale deed of the property in question dated 08.04.1971 is in favour of the wife of Jagdish Narain. After her death, Jagdish Narain claims that said property devolved upon him. Against Bhairo Prasad and other tenants proceeding u/s 21 (1) (a) read with Section 21 (1) (b) of U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 was initiated by Jagdish Narain, and in the said proceedings Bhairo Prasad and Radha Mohan, another brother, were also shown as tenants along with Bulaki, Jagannath, Chameli Devi, Shyam Lal and Moti Lal. In the said release application total number of family members, total accommodation, which was available on ground floor, first floor and second floor was clearly mentioned and the need set up was for himself and his son Kamal and his family and another son Mahesh. In the release application, clear cut mention was made that the petitioner and other brother Radha Mohan had agreed to vacate the premises for purposes of demolition and reconstruction, when the other opposite parties would vacate their respective portions. This, suit in question was decreed on 23.04.1988, and in the order passed on 23.12.1988 by the Prescribed Authority, it was categorically mentioned that opposite parties No. 2 and 3, Bhairo Prasad and other tenants had agreed to vacate the premises for purposes of demolition and reconstruction and the other parties have vacated their respective portions. Against the said order, appeal had been filed. Xth Additional District Judge while passing judgment has mentioned that learned Counsel for the appellant Bahairo Prasad did not argue any thing on merit except that the appellant required few more time to vacate the tenanted accommodation in their possession. The order by means of which appeal has been decided clearly reflects that nothing was argued on merits and three months'' time was allowed. The petitioner Bhairo Prasad moved an application before the Prescribed Authority as well as the Appellate Authority contending therein that at no point of time he had engaged any counsel on his behalf and the entire proceedings undertaken at his behest are nothing but an outcome of manipulation and manoeuvring at the behest of his elder brother, and the fact of the matter is that he is co-sharer in the property in question, as the same had been purchased by Jagdish Narain from the funds of Joint Hindu Family, as being elder brother he was Karta of the family, and their father, late Bal Krishna, was original tenant of the house in question. The appellate authority rejected the application preferred by Bhairo Prasad. In writ petition No. 40870 of 2001 precise direction was given to find out as to whether there is any semblance of truthfulness in the facts narrated by Bhairo Prasad, and on this categorical direction so given, petitioner appeared before the court below on 01.03.2007 along with certified copy of the order and furnished his admitted signatures for comparison and verification by hand-writing expert before the Additional District Judge, Kanpur Nagar. The Additional District Judge was directed to record finding as to whether disputed signatures of the petitioner did tally with the admitted signatures of the petitioner in the light of the evidence which might be produced by the parties, and the finding so recorded was to be produced before this Court within three months from the date of production of certified copy of that order. Pursuant to the order passed by this Court, petitioner appeared and supplied his sample signatures, and the hand-writing experts gave their respective opinion. Coupled with this, application was also moved for calling of the signatures, which were available at the office of the Municipal Corporation. Said records were summoned and orders were passed on 19.05.2007 in this regard. Petitioner tried to move transfer application. This Court intervened in the matter and held that the said transfer application was not competent and maintainable and directed the Additional District Judge to decide the matter. The Additional District Judge in the present case has taken note of the conduct of petitioner, sample signatures supplied by him, signatures admitted by him in English and signatures denied by him in Hindi, and the signatures, which were available in the record of the appellate court. Thereafter exhaustive consideration of the same was made, and the appellate court has recorded categorical finding that the signatures which were available on the record of the appeal tallied with the signatures supplied by the petitioner. The conduct of the petitioner has been taken note of. The fact that while supplying sample signatures, deliberately and intentionally signatures had been appended in such manner so that there might be variance. Qua sample signatures supplied, exhaustive examination has been done based on the experts'' opinion and view point of the experts on the same, then opinion has been formed. One more important feature, which has emerged, is that petitioner himself had moved application for calling for admitted sample signatures from Bank, and the said application itself was got dismissed as not pressed. Ground of challenge of the order under appeal is that fraud has been practised and petitioner had never filed any appeal and it was fraud and manipulation on him. Once prima facie material has come on record that signatures of petitioner are there on the memo of appeal, Vakalatnama and other documents, then qua the same no interference is possible. The order which has been passed by Additional District Judge on the basis of prima facie consideration of material warrants no interference.

Hon''ble Apex Court in the case of Ranjeet Singh Vs. Ravi Prakash, has clearly taken the view, that High Court cannot act like appellate Court and re-appreciate or re-evaluate the evidence while exercising certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction. Only patent error, which does not require establishment by lengthy and complicated arguments, or by long drawn process of reasoning, held is amenable to certiorari jurisdiction. Qua patent error, it has been mentioned, if two opinions on the same material are reasonably possible, the finding arrived at one way or the other cannot be called patent error. Relevant paragraph 4 is being quoted below:

Feeling aggrieved by the judgment of the appellate Court, the respondent preferred a writ petition in the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad under Article 226 and alternatively under Article 227 of the Constitution. It was heard by a learned single Judge of the High Court. The High Court has set aside the judgment of the appellate Court and restored that of the trial Court. A perusal of the judgment of the High Court shows that the High Court has clearly exceeded its jurisdiction in setting aside the judgment of the appellate Court. Though not specifically stated, the phraseology employed by the High Court in its judgment, goes to show that the High Court has exercised its certiorari jurisdiction for correcting the judgment of the appellate Court. In Surya Dev Rai Vs. Ram Chander Rai and Others, this Court has ruled that to be amenable to correction in certiorari jurisdiction, the error committed by the Court or authority on whose judgment the High Court was exercising jurisdiction, should be an error which is self-evident. An error which needs to be established by lengthy and complicated arguments or by indulging into a long drawn process of reasoning, cannot possibly be an error available for correction by writ of certiorari. If it is reasonably possible to form two opinions on the same material, the finding arrived at one way or the other, cannot be called a patent error. As to the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution also, it has been held in Surya Dev Rai (supra) that the jurisdiction was not available to be exercised for indulging into re-appreciation or evaluation of evidence or correcting the errors in drawing inferences like a Court of appeal. The High Court has itself recorded in its judgment that - "considering the evidence on the record carefully" it was inclined not to sustain the judgment of the appellate Court. On its own showing, the High Court has acted like an appellate Court which was not permissible for it to do under Article 226 or Article 227 of the Constitution. Surya Dev Rai Vs. Ram Chander Rai and Others,

Hear as already noticed, view taken by Appellate Court, cannot be faulted on the parameters set out.

As far as order which has been subject matter of challenge in writ petition No. 40870 of 2001 is concerned, it would be relevant to mention here that once precise case of the petitioner has been that fraud has been practised, then instead of relegating the petitioner to file suit, some enquiry ought to have been made on this aspect of the matter. This is well settled that fraud vitiates even solemn proceedings and any judgment obtained by fraud is to be considered as nullity. There is no doubt to the proposition, that if judgments are obtained by fraud, then even if there is no statutory power of review provided for, such judgment can always be recalled by the Court/Administrative authorities, as such an authority is inherent. Such proposition of law has been reiterated by Hon''ble Apex Court, in the case of Indian Bank v. Satyam Fibers, 1996 (2) JCLR 836. Relevant paragraphs 20 to 31 of the said judgment are being quoted below:

By filing letter No. 2775 of 26-8-91 along with the Review Petition and contending that the other letter, namely, letter No. 2776 of the even date, was never written or issued by the respondent, the appellant, in fact, raised the plea before the Commission that its judgment dated 16-11-1993, which was based on letter No. 2776, was obtained by the respondent by practising fraud not only on the appellant but on the Commission too as letter No. 2776 dated 26-8-91 was forged by the respondent for the purpose of this case. This plea could not have been legally ignored by the Commission which needs to be reminded that the Authorities, be they Constitutional, Statutory or Administrative, (and particularly those who have to decide a lis) possess the power to recall their judgments or orders if they are obtained by fraud as Fraud and Justice never dwell together (Fraus et jus nunquam cohabitant). It has been repeatedly said that Fraud and deceit defend of excuse no man (Fraus et dolus nemini patrocinari debent).

In Smith v. East Elloe Rural District Council 1956 AC 736, the House of Lords held that the effect of fraud would normally be to vitiate any act or order. In another case, Lazarus Estate Ltd. v. Beasley (1956) 1 QB 702 at 712, Denning LJ said:

No judgment of a Court, no order of a Minister, can be allowed to stand if it has been obtained by fraud. Fraud unravels everything.

The judiciary in India also possesses inherent power, specially u/s 151 CPC to recall its judgment or order if it is obtained by Fraud on Court. In the case of fraud on a party to the suit or proceedings the Court may direct the affected party to file a separate suit for setting aside the Decree obtained by fraud. Inherent power are powers which are resident in all Courts, especially of superior jurisdiction. These powers spring not from legislation but from the nature and the construction of the Tribunals or Courts themselves so as to enable them to maintain their dignity, secure obedience to its process and rules, protect its officers from indignity and wrong and to punish unseemly behaviour. This power is necessary for the orderly administration of the Court''s business.

Since fraud affects the solemnity, regularly and orderliness of the proceedings of the Court and also amounts to an abuse of the process of Court, the Courts have been held to have inherent power to set aside an order obtained by fraud practised upon that Court. Similarly, where the Court is misled by a party or the Court itself commits a mistake which prejudices a party, the Court has the inherent power to recall its order. (See Benoy Krishna Mukerjee Vs. Mohanlal Goenka and Others, Gajanand Sha and Others Vs. Dayanand Thakur, AIR 1947 236 (Nagpur) Devendra Nath Sarkar v. Ram Rachpal Singh ILR (1926) 1 Luck 341 : AIR 1926 Oudh 315; Saiyed Muhammad Raza v. Ram Saroop ILR (1929) 4 Luck562 : AIR 1929 Oudh 385 (FB) : Bankey Behari Lal v. Abdul Rahman ILR (1932) 7 Lucknow 350 : AIR 1932 Oudh 63; Lekshmi Amma Chacki Amma v. Mammen Mammen 1955 KLT459). The Court has also the inherent power to set aside a sale brought about by fraud practised upon the Court (Ishwar Mahton v. Sitaram Kumar AIR 1954 Pat 450 ) or to set aside the order recording compromise obtained by fraud. Bindeshwari Pd. Chaudhary Vs. Debendra Pd. Singh and Others, Smt. Tara Bai v. V.S. Krishnaswamy Rao AIR 1985 Kar 270).

We may now turn to the next and allied questions; what is forgery, whether forgery is a fraud and whether in the instant case, forgery and fraud are proved?

Forgery has its origin in the French word "Forger", which signifies : "to frame or fashion a thing as the smith doth his work upon the anvil. And it is used in our law for the fraudulent making and publishing of false writings to the prejudice of another man''s right (Terms de la Ley) (Stroud''s Judicial Dictionary, Fifth Edition Vol.2).

In Webster Comprehensive Dictionary, International Education, "Forgery" is defined as:

The act of falsely making or materially altering, was intent to defraud; any writing which, if genuine, might be of legal efficacy or the foundation of a legal liability.

This Definition was adopted in Rembert v. State, 25 Am. Rep. 639. In another case, namely, State v. Phelps 34 Am. Dec. 672, it was laid down that forgery is the false making of any written instrument, for the purpose of fraud or deceit. This decision appears to be based on the meaning of forgery as set out in Tomlin''s Law Dictionary.

From the above, it would be seen that fraud is an essential ingredient of forgery.

Forgery under the Indian Penal Code is an offence which has been defined in Section 463, while Section 464 deals with the making of a false document. Section 465 describes punishment for forgery. "Forged document" is defined in Section 470 while Section 471 deals with the crime of using as genuine, the forged document.

Forgery and Fraud are essentially matters of evidence which could be proved as a fact by direct evidence or by inference drawn from proved facts.

The Privy Council in Satish Chandra Chatterjee v. Kumar Satish Kantha Roy AIR 1923 PC 73, laid down as under:

Charges of fraud and collusion like those contained in the plaint in this case must, no doubt, be proved by those who make them - proved by established facts or inferences legitimately drawn from those facts taken together as a whole. Suspicions and surmises and conjecture are not permissible substitutes for those facts or those inferences, but that by no means requires that every puzzling artifice or contrivance resorted to by one accused of fraud must necessarily be completely unravelled and cleared up and made plain before a verdict can be properly found against him. If this were not so, many a clever and dexterous knave would escape.

To slightly differently formulate the proposition, could the initial unauthorised entry, if there be any, permit a House Allotment Officer, 22 years after the entry, to evict the appellant on the short ground that he entered the premises in contravention of Clause 22 (2). Undoubtedly, power is conferred on the Collector to see that the provisions of the Rent Control Order which disclosed a public policy are effectively implemented and if the Collector therefore, comes across information that there is a contravention, he is clothed with adequate power to set right the contravention by ejecting anyone who comes into the premises in contravention of the provisions. But when the power is conferred to effectuate a purpose, it has to be exercised in a reasonable manner. Exercise of power in a reasonable manner inheres the concept of its exercise within a reasonable time. Undoubtedly, no limitation is prescribed in this behalf but one would stand aghast that a landlord to some extent in pari delicto could turn the tables against the person who was in possession for 22 years as a tenant. In such a situation, even though the House Allotment Officer was to reach an affirmative conclusion that the initial entry 22 years back was an unauthorised entry and that failure to vacate premises till 9 years after retirement was not proper, yet it was not obligatory upon him to pass a peremptory order of eviction in the manner in which he has done. In such a situation, it would be open to him not to evict the appellant. In this connection, we may refer to Murlidhar Aggarwal and Another Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, , wherein one Ram Agyan Singh who came into possession of premises without an order of allotment in his favour as required by Section 7 (2) of the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, was permitted to. retain the premises by treating his occupation lawful and this Court declined to interfere with that order. No doubt it must be confessed that Section 7A conferred power on the District Magistrate to take action against unauthorised occupation in contravention of the provisions of the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, but there was a proviso to the section which enabled the District Magistrate not to evict a person found to be in unauthorised occupation, if the District Magistrate was satisfied that there has been undue delay or otherwise it is inexpedient to do so. There is no such proviso to Clause 28 which confers power on the Collector to take necessary action for the purpose of securing compliance with the Rent Control Order. But as stated earlier, where power is conferred to effectuate a purpose, it has to be exercised in a reasonable manner and the reasonable exercise of power inheres its exercise within a reasonable time. This is too well established to need buttressing by a precedent.

Petitioner was trying to contend that it was fraud on court, as he had not filed any Vakalatnama nor had engaged any counsel and entire proceeding had been manipulated. In this background Prescribed Authority ought to have made enquiries as to whether fraud had been practised or not instead of relegating the petitioner to file suit. Said order in the facts of the case could not have been subscribed, as u/s 34 of U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 read with Rule 22 (f) of 1972 Rules, inherent power vests for remedying the situation in the ends of justice. See Sita Ram Sikhaula v. P.A. 1978 ARC 91. In the interest of justice order could have been passed. The Prescribed Authority ought to have enquired into the matter, but in the present case on account of subsequent investigation being done pursuant to order passed by this Court, and appellate authority having returned finding against petitioner in appeal that Vakalatnama and other documents which were existing on record, same bore the signature of petitioner, as such observations made for relegating the petitioner to file suit, qua the same no interference is being made.

Peculiar facts of the case are that petitioner and Jagdish Narain are real brothers and proceedings u/s 21 (1) (a) and (b) had been filed by Jagdish Narain and it was precisely mentioned by him that Bhairo Prasad had agreed to vacate the premises in question and Prescribed Authority had proceeded to pass order to that effect that petitioner had accepted the request made by landlord and decree was passed on that basis. It does not stand to any logic that once petitioner consented to the passing of said decree, then why he preferred appeal u/s 22 of the Act, and the most surprising feature of the petitioner-appellant is that counsel who had appeared on his behalf did not press the appeal on merits and was simply seeking time for vacating the premises. Finding has been returned that Vakalatnama and other documents bear signatures of the petitioner. All these circumstances, which are coming forward are beyond human conduct, once consent had been given to pass decree, then why appeal was preferred, and in appeal no arguments were advanced except for seeking time. Petitioner has been shouting from the top of his voice that fraud has been practised and that at no point of time he engaged any counsel to appear on his behalf or filed any case or consented for passing of the decree. In the facts of the case as in appeal, finding has been returned on being asked for by this Court that the said documents bear signatures of the petitioner, in these circumstances, as far as said findings are concerned, no interference is being made with the same. Looking to the peculiar character of the case, as appeal preferred on behalf of petitioner has not at all been decided on merits, as counsel failed to advance arguments on merits, and even did not mention exact period of time, petitioner wanted to retain disputed accommodation are circumstances clearly warranting enquiry, accepting the position that counsel had been validly engaged, the further question was as to whether he colluded with the landlord and compromised with the interest of tenant. Circumstances are speaking for itself, and as here both the brothers are fighting tooth and nail, and appeal admittedly has not been decided on merits, as such it would be much more appropriate and in the ends of justice, that the order passed in Appeal on 20.01.1992, be quashed and matter be directed to be decided afresh on merits.

Consequently, in the facts of case order dated 20.01.1992, passed by Appellate Authority is hereby quashed and set aside. The Appellate Authority is directed to decide appeal on merits, within two months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this judgment. No unnecessary adjournment shall be accorded. Party seeking adjournment shall pay Rs. 500/- as cost to the other side. Hearing be done on day to day basis.

Consequently, writ petition No. 23914 of 2006 is dismissed. Writ Petition No. 40870 of 2001 is partly allowed.

No order as to costs.