Bhajan Singh vs Murli Dhar and Others

Ashok Bhan, J.—Thakur Dass, vendor, sold 9 Bighas 18 Biswas of land on 1.6.1981, in favour of three persons, namely; Bhajin Singh. Prem Chand and Narinder Parshad (hereinafter referred to as vendees No. 1, 2 and 3 respectively).

Murli Dhar son of Thakur Dass filed a suit for declaration that the sale made on 1-6-1981, was not binding upon him because the property in dispute was H.U.F. property and the same could not be sold without consideration and legal necessity. Other allegation was that the land in dispute had been sold by his father without consideration and legal necessity. This suit was dismissed by the trial Court on 21.8.1984. Murli Dhar plaintiff filed an appeal which was dismissed by the first appellate Court on 29.4.1986 on the basis of the compromise. No written compromise was filed. Only the statement of Bhajan Singh vendee No. 1, was recorded in the presence of his counsel. Bhajan Singh vendee No. ! made a statement agreeing to pay Rs. 5,000/- to Murli Dhar Plaintiff till 31.12.1986. o The order passed by the Court was conditional. If the amount was paid upto 31.12.1986 then the appeal filed by the plaintiff would have to be treated to having been dismissed and if the vendee failed to pay the amount of Rs. 5,000/- uptil 31.12.1986, then the appeal was to be treated as having been accepted and the suit filed by the plaintiff Murli Dhar as having been decreed.

Bhajan Singh vendee No. 1 filed R.S.A. No. 2296 of 1986, which was disposed of in limine on 25.9.1986, with the following directions :-

"Counsel seeks to contend that no compromise has been made by the appellant, as has been mentioned in the impugned judgment of the Addl District Judge. This appeal is dismissed with the observation that it shall be open to the appellant to approach the Addl. District Judge in this behalf."

Thereafter, Bhajan Singh vendee No. 1 filed an application under Order 41 Rule 21 C. P. C seeking a direction that the appeal be decided on merits as he had not entered into any compromise. The allegations made in the application were that he engaged Shri Sadhu Singh, Advocate, as his counsel and when the case was called by the Court, he went to bring his counsel Shri Sadhu Singh. When he appeared in the Court the Presiding Officer of the Court told him that the case would be decided in his favour and he was made to thumb mark the statement purported to have been made by him in the Court; that Bhajan Singh vendee No. 1 later on came to know that in fact he had been asked to pay Rs. 5000/- to Murli Dhar plaintiff on or before 31.12.1986 failing which the suit of the plaintiff would be deemed to have been decreed. This application was opposed by the plaintiff-respondent and on the pleadings of the parties, following issues were framed :-

Whether the thumb impression of Bhajan Singh applicant in the compromise was obtained under misrepresentation and without telling the contents of the same ? If so, to what effect ?

Whether the alleged compromise is illegal and fraudulent as alleged ?

Relief.

Both the issues have been decided against Bhajan Singh (sic) by the trial Court. First appellate Court did not believe the statement of vendee that his statement had been recorded by the Presiding Officer of the Court on any misrepresentation made to him specially when his counsel was also present when he made the statement. Bhajan Singh vendee No. 1 made the following statement on 29.4.1986:-

"Statement of Shri Bhajan Singh respondent on SA and counsel for respondents.

I have compromised in this appeal. I will give Rs. 5000/- to the appellant from the side of the respondents. I will give the amount within eight months, and if I would not pay the same upto 31.12.1986 then the appeal of the appellant may be treated as accepted and his suit decreed by setting aside the sale deed in our favour.

R.O. & A.C.

Sd/- Addl. District Judge (III) Sangrur 29.4 86"

Murli Dhar plaintiff made the following statement :-

"Statement of Shri Murli Dhar appellant on SA and counsel for the appellant.

I have heard the statement of Bhajan Singh respondent and counsel for the respondents. The appeal may be decided accordingly and it is acceptable to me.

R.O. & A.C.

Sd/- Addl. District Judge (III) Sangrur. 29/4/86".

A perusal of these statements would show that the same had been made by the parties in the presence of their counsel I fully endorse the view taken by the first appellate Court that there could not possibly be any misrepresentation to Bhajan Singh vendee and that too from Presiding Officer of the Court inducing to pay Rs. 5000/- while dismissing the appeal. The appeal was to be accepted and the suit decreed specially when his counsel was present with him at the time of effecting the compromise.

It was contended by the counsel for the petitioner that in the absence of the written agreement supported by the statements of the parties, as in the present case, compromise cannot be held to be valid or legal in view of the judgment in Gurpreet Singh Vs. Chatur Bhuj Goel, . On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent- plaintiff submitted that the said case of the Supreme Court is clearly distinguishable as even in that case, statements made were not of the parties whereas in the present case, parties have made the statements which were only signed in the presence of their respective counsel; it was argued by him that such a compromise based on the statements of the parties recorded in the presence of their counsel in Court can form a valid basis for effecting a compromise even in the absence of written compromise. For this proposition, he placed reliance on a judgment of this Court reported as Walaiti Ram v. Dharam Singh 1989 P. L. J. 582. where the Court after discussing the judgment of the Supreme Court in Gurpreet Singh''s case (supra), under similar circumstances, held as under::-

"After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and going through the case law cited at the bar I do not find any merit in this appeal. The Supreme Court case Gurpreet Singh''s case (supra) has got no application to the facts of the instant case. In that case, even the statement of the. respondent which was recorded by the Court not signed by him as is evident from para 5 thereof. Not only this, in para 12 thereof it has been observed that "In any event, the present case clearly does not come within the ambit of the second part of the Order XXIII, Rule 3 of the Code Under the terms of the proposed compromise, the appellant was required to pay Rs. 2,25,000/- by a bank draft on March 17, 1987, but the fact remains that the respondent before the due date resiled from the proposed compromise saying that it was detrimental to his interest. That being so, the appellant could only fall back on the first part But in the absence of an agreement in writing, the learned Judges had no other alternative but to direct that the appeal be listed for hearing on merits.

In the present case, as obeserved earlier, the statements made by both the parties are duly signed by them, and also countersigned by their respective counsel. Moreover, there is no other ground taken in this Court for challenging the said compromise except that it was not reduced to writing as such. It was held by this Court in Smt. Raksha Rani alias Raksha Devi''s ease (supra) that if the statements were recorded by the trial Court, containing the terms of the compromise which were duly signed by them, it could not be said that the compromise should not be considered to be in writing and signed by the parties. In view of the said judgment of this Court, this appeal is liable to be dismissed with costs".

I find force in the submission made by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in view of the judgment of this Court in Walaiti Ram''s case (supra) and therefore, this revision petition is liable to be dismissed The statements of the parties recorded by the Court containing the terms of compromise which were duly signed by them in the presence of their counsel can form a valid basis for a binding compromise between the parties.

Consequently this revision petition fails and is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs.

Nothing stated in this order shall in any way be deemed to affect the decision on merits of the applications which are stated to have been filed by Prem Chand and Narinder Parshad vendees 2 and 3 respectively for setting aside the order of the first appellate Court.