Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. vs Revanappa Sangappa by Lrs.

The revision petition by the tenant is directed against the order dt. 28th July, 1975 passed by the II Addl. District Judge, Dharwar, in H.R.C. Appeal No. 60 of 1974 setting aside'' the order of the Munsiff in H.R.C. No. 205 of 1971 dismissing the eviction petition.

The parties have been referred to in the course of this order with reference to their position in the trial court.

The original landlord Revanappa Sangappa Batli filed the petition under S. 21 (1) (e) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961, alleging that he was the owner of the petition site and that it had been let out to the opponent on a monthly rental of Rs. 50 and that it was renewed for some time thereafter. According to him, he reasonably and bona fide required the petition premises for the purpose of erecting a building to run a boarding and lodging house in order to earn more money.

The opponent tenant repudiated all the petition allegations.

The Munsiff, on a scrutiny of the evidence dismissed the petition. The petitioner landlord approached the District Judge, Dharwar, in H.R.C. No. 60 of 1974 and the learned District Judge took a different view in the matter and ordered eviction of the opponent. The tenant being aggrieved has come up with the revision petition.

It is undisputed that the original landlord Revanappa Sangappa Batli died during the pendency of this revision petition i.e., on 9.2.1977 leaving behind him his widow and five daughters as his LRs. The widow and his five daughters have been brought on record in this case.

The learned counsel Shri S.G. Sundaraswamy submitted that on account of the death of the original landlord, the cause of action for a petition under clause (e) does not survive and the subsequent event of the death of the original landlord should be taken note of by this Court. For that proposition, he quoted M.M. Quasim v. Manohar Lal, AIR 1981 SC 1113. It was a case where the landlord had filed the petition against the tenant alleging that he required the premises bona fide and reasonably for his own use.

The subsequent event of extinguishment of interest of the landlord was pressed before the Supreme Court as an event which should be taken into consideration by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that on account 61 the subsequent event of partition between the co-owners, the landlord had lost interest in entirety in the petition premises and therefore such an event will have to be taken into consideration by the Supreme Court. It was also a matter arising under the Bihar Buildings Rent Control Act. He next relied on a decision in Rajagopal v. P.Reanna, (1974) 1 Kar.L.J. 425. It was a case where the landlord filed an eviction petition under S. 21 (1) (h) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act alleging that he required the petition premises bona fide and reasonably for his own use and occupation. It was held that since the requirement of the deceased landlord was personal to him, it was not open to the legal representatives to raise the plea that the shop was required by them for their business and for their occupation when no such plea was raised by the landlord in his application. The learned counsel Shri Gunjal pressed into service a decision in Rameshwar v. Jokram, AIR 1976 SC 49. Under the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, a provision had been made for purchase of proprietary right by a tenant from a big land owner. A perusal of the said ruling shows that once the first instalment was paid by the tenant, title vested in him. Later on the big land owner died and his legal representatives as usual under the circumstances became small holders. This subsequent event was sought to be pressed into service, before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the rights of the parties are to be regulated by the circumstances that prevailed on the date of the petition but not by the subsequent events. When the law itself provides that the rights of the parties are to be regulated by the events obtaining on the date of the petition, the Court of law cannot take info consideration the subsequent event of the legal representatives of the big landholders becoming small holders. Therefore the principle laid down in Rameshwar''s case will not apply to the facts of the present case at all.

A perusal of the eviction petition filed in the trial court clearly shows that the original landlord filed the petition under cl. (e) of S. 21 (1). of the Kar. Rent Control Act, alleging that he was the owner of the petition premises and that he required it bona fide and reasonably for putting up a boarding and lodging house in order to earn more money, There is no whisper in the petition that he filed the petition as a karta of the joint family or that the petition site belonged to the joint family. There is no whisper about the legal representatives of the landlord having any interest in the petition property. The bona fide and reasonable requirement envisaged by clause (e) will be bona fide and reasonable requirement of the original landlord and cannot be equated with the bona fids and reasonable requirement of the legal representatives of the deceased landlord. The learned counsel Shri Gunjal placed before me a short notes case in Usman Khan v. Abdul Karim, (1974) 1 Kar.L.J. Sh. N. 177. The facts in the said case were that the landlord applied for eviction under Sec. 21(1) (e) of the Act to erect a new house. ft, was held that on his death, his wife and children must independently establish their need to obtain possession of the premises. It was held that there was no such necessity in a case where the applicant required the vacant site in question for the purpose of erecting a new building, not only for his use, but also for the use of his family members; (underlining (italics) is mine). Therefore, it was a case where the petitioner landlord had clearly averred that he bona fide and reasonably required the petition premises for the purpose of erecting a new building not only for himself but also for his family members. Here no such case has been made out. If any such case had been made out by the landlord in this case. then there would have been some force in the contention of the learned counsel Shri Gunjal. When the petitioner in this case has made a specific averment that he is the owner of the petition site and that he wanted to build a boarding and lodging house to make more money, it cannot be said that he wanted to put up a boarding and lodging house for the use of his family members or to earn more money for his family members. Therefore, the said ruling will not be applicable to the tacts of the present case.

This Court in P. Hajee Abdull Subhan Sahib v. Madras General Hardware, (1971) 2 Mys.L.J. 18, has laid down the test that will have to be satisfied before a petition filed under S. 21(1)(j) is to be allowed. Bona fides has to be proved in the ordinary way and the Court while considering the bona fides will take into consideration the other circumstances affecting the interests of the landlord and the tenant. When it is not shown that the requirement is for collateral purpose or that the purpose is absurd under the circumstances, it is to be held that the requirement of the landlord is both reasonable and bona fide. Bona fide and reasonable need is proved by having plans prepared, necessary estimates made for the building and obtaining sanction of the authorities and also showing that he has got the capacity for the purpose of construction. Shri Gunjal submitted that the plan Ex. P 7 has already been got prepared by the original landlord.

The plans prepared by the original landlord may be to his liking and to suit his convenience. On account of the death of the original petitioner, now there is no material available to show that these plans are to the taste and liking of the legal representatives of the subsequent event of partition betestimates made for the building do not appear to have been produced in this case. It is no doubt true that sanction of the competent authorities has been obtained. The sanction has been obtained in the name of the original landlord petitioner himself. The legal representatives have not got them renewed in their names. As already stated above, the plans on the basis of which the sanction of the competent authority is given are not shown to be to the liking and requirement of the legal representatives of the deceased. Further, it is. no doubt true that the petitioner has produced Exs. P 9 to P 14 the assessment orders in respect of the income tax and wealth tax to show that he is an income tax assessee and that he is even assessed to wealth tax. It might be that the original landlord is a rich man. Shri. Gunjal brought to my notice that the tenant himself has stated in the objection statement that the petitioner was a rich man and has got more than sufficient means. It may be that the original petitioner was a rich man and he must have more than sufficient means. The richness of the father is not the same thing as the richness of the legal representatives of the father It may be that the father had got sufficient means. But at the same time it cannot be forgotten that some times the legacy of indebtedness is also left by the father. It is possible that after paying off the debts the riches left by the father may evaporate altogether. Therefore, merely because the petitioner landlord had got the capacity to construct, it does not mean that the legal representatives have also got the capacity to construct. There is no material to show at present that the legal representatives of the deceased landlord have got necessary means or capacity to put up the construction

A similar situation arose in Kalappanahalli Gowdra v. Gowramma, CRP 2495/73 dt. 17.1.75. It was a case coming under clause (j). It is stated therein thus:

"In regard to the ground which has been made the basis for the decree, it has to be remembered that for a landlord to succeed on that basis he or she has to establish the availability of funds and the reasonableness of the claim, among other matters. In this case whether or not the present respondents (legal representatives) have the necessary financial resources, and whether or not their claim in this behalf is reasonable has to be adjudged independently of the original landlord''s qualifications or eligibility in this regard. It would therefore follow that the present respondents could not avail themselves of the cause of action that was available to their predecessor in interest. In other words, the cause of action does not survive to the present respondents."

Therefore, under the circumstances obtaining at this stage, the subsequent event ie. death of the petitioner landlord has to be taken note of by this Court at the time of final hearing of this revision petition. As already shown above and in view of the ruling reported in Kalappanahall Gowdra Siddappa''s case,6 the cause of action that was available to the original petitioner does not survive for the legal representatives. Therefore, in view of the fact that the cause of action does not survive, the eviction petition filed by the original landlord will have to be dismissed and it is accordingly dismissed. The Civil Revision Petition is allowed.

All the parties are directed to bear their own costs throughout.