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Bharat Prasad Sharma vs Union of India and Others

Chhattisgarh High Court · Decided on 7 February 2013 · Citation: (2013) 1 CGBCLJ 460 : (2013) 2 MPJR 78

HON’BLE JUDGES
Yatindra Singh, C.J · Nawal Kishore Agarwal, J
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
Writ Petition (C) No. 6956 of 2011

AI Structured Summary

Not yet generated for this judgment

Judgment

64 paragraphs · 1,913 words
1.

The main question involved in these cases is whether an officer of Steel Authority of India Limited (SAIL) can be appointed as Estate Officer under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (the Act).

THE FACTS

The Bhilai Steel Plant, Bhilai (the Plant) is a unit of SAIL. The Central Government issued a notice dated 26.02.1997 appointing the Estate Officer of the Plant as the Estate Officer under the Act.

2.

The SAIL issued an order on 07.08.1998 re-designating the post of Shri Chandra, Senior Estate Manager (HBA & HUDCO) Town Administration as the Estate Officer on his existing pay and scale of pay with immediate effect.

WP 6956 of 2011 & WA 76 of 2013

3.

Hindustan Steel Works Construction Limited (HSCL) is a construction company. It constructed the Plant. The SAIL also permitted the HSCL to construct its quarters for the residents of its employees, as they were constructing the plant.

4.

Shri B.P. Sharma (Shri Sharma) was an employee of HSCL. He retired on 01.12.2003. Shri Chandra issued notices for eviction of Shri Sharma under the Act. In this proceeding, some ex parte order was passed against Shri Sharma. He filed an application to recall ex parte order as well as challenged the authority of Shri Chandra to hold the office as the Estate Officer.

5.

Shri Chandra permitted Shri Sharma to participate in the proceedings, However, rejected his objections regarding his jurisdiction as a Estate Officer on 27.07.2007.

6.

Shri Sharma filed an appeal against the aforesaid order before the District Judge under the Act. It was dismissed on 03.08.2011.

7.

Shri Sharma filed Writ Petition-5814 of 2011 against the aforesaid two orders. It was dismissed on 11.10.2011. Hence, the Writ Appeal number 76 of 2013.

8.

Shri Sharma filed Writ Petition-6956 of 2011 for setting aside the appointment of Shri Chandra as Estate Officer under the Act.

WP 1520 of 2012

9.

Shri K.N. Premnath (Shri Nath) was a shop-keeper in Bhilai township at Sector 10. A notice under Sections 4(1) and (7)(I) under the Act was issued against him. He has filed Writ Petition (C) No. 1520 of 2012 challenging the appointment of Shri Chandra as the Estate Officer.

10.

The three cases raise same controversy and are being decided together. We have heard counsel for the parties.

THE DECISION: WA 76 of 2013

11.

It is not disputed that the Estate Officer under the Act acts as a quasi-judicial authority. He rejected the objections of the Appellant on 27.07.2007 regarding his authority to hold the office of the Estate Officer. The appeal against this order was dismissed by the District Judge on 03.08.2011.

12.

Is WP 5659 of 2011 was filed against the aforesaid orders. It was under Article 227 of the Constitution for setting aside the order passed by the quasi-judicial authorities.

13.

In SKS Ispat Limited Vs Union of India and others (Writ Appeal-1006 of 2012, decided on 12.12.2012), It has been held that it is not the heading of the writ petition, but the substance of the order passed by the single judge is material. It is the order passed that determines whether the order was passed under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution.

14.

In the present case, the single judge has refused to set aside the impugned order. The substance of the order is under Article 227 and no power under Article 226 of the Constitution has been exercised.

15.

In view of the proviso of sub-section (1) of section 2 of the Chhattisgarh High Court (Appeal to Division Bench) Act, 2006, the writ appeal is not maintainable.

THE DECISION: WP 6956 of 2011 & WP 1520 of 2012

16.

The counsel for the SAIL submits that:

� The WP 5814 of 2011 was filed against the orders holding that Shri Chandra had jurisdiction to proceed with the case;

� The WP 6956 of 2011 is subsequent writ petition. In substance, it claims the same relief;

� The WP 6956 of 2011 is not maintainable.

17.

There is some force in the aforesaid submission but, in any case, we have to decide this question in WP 1520 of 2012. So, we proceed to decide this case on merit with WP 1520 of 2012.

Petitioner''s Submissions

18.

The counsel for Shri Nath and Shri Sharma (jointly referred to as the Petitioners) placed reliance on Steel Authority of India Ltd. Vs. Shri Ambica Mills Ltd. and Others, and Dr SL Agarwal V General Manager, Hindustan Steel Limited, Bhilai and others (1971) MPLJ 825 (the SL Agarwal case) and submit that:

(i) Only an Officer of the Government of India or of a Statutory Authority can be appointed as Estate Officer. The SAIL is neither Government of India nor a Statutory Authority;

(ii) The appointment of Estate Officer is to be done by the Central Government, and Shri Chandra was not appointed by the Central Government;

(iii) Shri Chandra decided all cases in favour of SAIL and he is a biased person;

(iv) Shri Chandra has laid down the policy and is executing the same. He cannot be a judge of his own cause.

The Cases cited

19.

The cases cited by the counsel for the petitioners have held as follows:

� In the Ambica case, the question was whether information to Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, a Central government employee, is information to SAIL. The Gujarat High Court had held that the SAIL was a department of Government of India and information to the Chief Controller was information to SAIL

� The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Gujrat High Court in the Ambica case and held that the SAIL was not a department of Union of India and as such, the application to the Chief Controller cannot be treated as an application to the SAIL;

� In the SL Agarwal case, the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court held that the Hindustan Steel Limited is neither a department of the Government nor its servants are holding the posts under the State.

20.

The Supreme Court rightly decided these cases. However, they are not applicable to the facts of the present case.

1st Submission: SAIL is a Statutory Authority

21.

It is admitted case that SAIL is a company registered under the Companies Act. A company registered under the Companies Act has an independent status. It can neither be a part of the State nor its employees could be the Government employees and Article 311 of the Constitution is not applicable. This is what has been held in the two cases cited by the counsel for the Petitioners.

22.

Nevertheless, the proposition laid down by the Supreme Court does not mean that an officer of SAIL cannot be appointed as the Estate Officer under the Act. The question whether the Estate Officer can or cannot be appointed is to be decided on the provisions of the Act itself.

23.

Under the Act, the proceedings for eviction can be taken by an Estate Officer. Section 3 of the Act is titled ''Appointment of Estate Officers''. It provides that the Central Government may appoint any officer of the government or the Officer of equivalent rank of the statutory authority to be Estate Officer for the purposes of the Act.

24.

Section 2 of the Act is the definition clause. Section 2(e) of the Act defines the word ''public premises''. Section 2(e)(2)(i) of the Act provides that the public premises also includes any premises belonging to, or taken on lease by, or on behalf of any company as defined in section 3 of the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), in which not less than 51% share of the paid up share capital is held by the Central Government.

25.

In the counter affidavit of the SAIL, it is mentioned that SAIL is a company registered under the Companies Act; more than 51% of paid up its shares belong to Government of India. No rejoinder affidavit has been filed.

26.

In view of above, it is held that the SAIL has more than 51% of paid up shares and the premises belonging to them are ''public premises'' within the meaning of Section 2(e)2(i) of the Act.

27.

Section 2(f)(fa)(ii) of the Act provides that the statutory authority, in relation to the public premises in respect of 2(e)2(i), is that company. This means that, the SAIL is a statutory authority within the meaning of the Act.

28.

In view of the above, the first submission raised by the counsel for the Petitioners has no merit.

2nd Submission: Appointment is by the Central Government

29.

The Central Government has issued the notification dated 26.02.1997. It has appointed the Estate Officer of the Plant as the Estate Officer under the Act in respect of premises belonging to and under the administrative control of SAIL at Bhilai Township of Durg district.

30.

Shri Chandra was a Senior Estate Manager in the town administration of SAIL. He was re-designated as Estate Officer. Shri Chandra has not been appointed as Estate Officer under the Act by SAIL. His office was merely re-designated as the Estate Officer under SAIL; only this part has been done by SAIL.

31.

All Estate Officers in SAIL were already appointed as Estate Officer under the Act by the Central Government. It is by virtue of this appointment by the Central Government that Shri Chandra became Estate Officer under the Act.

32.

In view of above, it cannot be said that the Estate Officer under the Act was appointed by SAIL: the Estate Officer under the Act was appointed by the Central Government. The second submission also has no merit.

3rd & 4th Submission: No merit

33.

The fact that Shri Chandra decided all cases in favour of the SAIL does not mean that he is biased. In case there is merit in the case of the SAIL, the Estate Officer is bound to decide the case in its favour. Nothing has been shown that any of his judgments were absurd or illegal. In view of this, the third submission has no merit.

34.

It is a settled principle that no person can be judge of his own cause. However, Shri Chandra is not a judge of his own cause. He is not deciding any case regarding his personal property. He is performing the statutory duty under the Act. There is no merit in the fourth submission also.

CONCLUSIONS

35.

The conclusions are as follows:

(a) In view of the proviso of section 2(1) of the Chhattisgarh High Court (Appeal to Division Bench) Act, 2006, the Writ Appeal 76 of 2013 is not maintainable;

(b) SAIL is a statutory authority within the meaning of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971;

(c) SAIL has not appointed Shri Harischandra as the Estate Officer under the Act. It has merely re-designated his post to be Estate Officer under SAIL;

(d) The Estate Officer of SAIL has been appointed as Estate Officer under the Act by the Central Government by GO dated 26.02.1997;

(e) There is nothing on record to show that Shri Chandra is biased in favour of SAIL;

(f) Shri Chandra is not a judge of his own cause. He is competent to perform to function as Estate Officer under the Act.

In view of our conclusions, Writ Appeal 76 of 2013 is dismissed as not maintainable and Writ Petitions(C) 6956 of 2011 and 1520 of 2012 are dismissed on merit.