Bhawat Singh vs Sarbjit Singh

S.S. Sodhi, J.—The point in issue, in revision, here is whether the tenant had ceased to occupy the demised premises for a continuous period of more than four months without reasonable cause rendering him liable to ejectment under Clause (v) of Sub-section (2) of S. 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (hereinafter referred to as ''the Act'').

It was the case of the landlord that the tenant had ceased to occupy the demised premises without reasonable cause with effect from February 1, 1981. This was denied by the tenant in his written statement where he also took the plea that he had gone to a foreign country temporarily and in his absence, his brother Parbinder Singh and his nephew Inder Pal Singh had been carrying on business for and on his behalf in the premises let out to him. The Rent Controller, relying upon the judgment of this Court in Jai Chand Jain v. Sohan Lal, 1975 RCJ 157, came to the conclusion that the tenant had ceased to occupy the premises in dispute for a continuous period of more than four months. This being based upon the finding that the tenant had gone abroad in 1981 and had returned only in 1983. An order of ejectment was consequently passed against the tenant on this ground. This order was, however, upset in appeal by the Appellate Authority relying upon another judgment of this Court in Balwant Singh v. Gurdial Singh 1971 PLR 1032. It being held that there being nothing on record to show that the tenant had parted with exclusive control and possession of the demised premises, it could not be said that he had ceased to occupy them.

There is an apparent and obvious conflict between the judgments in Jai Chand Jain and Balwant Singh''s cases (supra). Both these cases came up for consideration in Civil Revision No. 235 of 1984, Buta Ram v. Balwant Singh decided today, where the view taken by Chief Justice Harbans Singh in Balwant Singh''s case (supra) was preferred while that of Chief Justice R.S. Narula in Jai Chand Jain''s case (supra) was found too narrow to be commended and it was held that the position in law stood settled that in order to be in ''occupation'' of the demised premises physical possession of the tenant therein was not an essential requisite for avoiding the penal consequences of ejectment under Clause (v) of Sub-section (2) of Section 13 of the Act. The factual position, as emerges from the evidence on record, in this case has thus to be construed and appreciated in this light.

The significant statement to note at the very outset is that of the tenant RW1 Sarabjit Singh that he had gone abroad in April 1981 and returned to India only in August 1983. It will be recalled that the reply of the tenant Sarabjit Singh to the plea that he had ceased to occupy the demised premises, was that during his absence abroad, his brother and nephew had been carrying on business in the demised premises for and on his behalf. It is, however, pertinent to note that counsel for the tenant could point to no evidence on record to this effect. Further, a reading of the statement of RW1 Sarabjit Singh would show that he had obtained a license for the manufacture of soap as also one under the Sales Tax Act, which, he stated, had been issued in the name of the firm which was a registered one. He also deposed that the accounts of the firm were regularly maintained. He did not, however, care to mention who the members of the firm were, nor did he produce the certificate of registration of the firm for this purpose. The accounts of the firm too were not produced with a view to support his plea that the business being carried on in the demised premises during his absence abroad was for or on his behalf or that he had any interest therein. There is also no evidence to show that either his brother Parbinder Singh or his nephew Inderpal Singh were living with him or were dependent upon him. In other words, there is a total lack of evidence to support his plea that the business being carried on in the demised premises, during his absence abroad was for or on his behalf.

All that counsel for the tenant sought to rely upon in support was the statement of RW1 Sarbjit Singh that he, his brother and nephew were working on the premises in dispute. This statement obviously refers to the present state of affairs, but not to the period during which he was abroad or according to the landlord, he had ceased to occupy the demised premises. This statement is thus clearly of no avail.

Such being the state of evidence in this case, there can be no escape from the conclusion that the tenant Sarabjit Singh had ceased to occupy the demised premises for a continuous period of more than four months without reasonable cause and had thereby rendered himself liable to ejectment on this account.

The order of the appellate authority is accordingly hereby set aside and the tenant is ordered to be ejected from the demised premises. This petition is thus accepted. There will, however, be no order as to costs.